On April 17, 2025, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service (together, the “Services”) proposed to rescind their longstanding regulatory definition of “harm”, which has for decades served as a foundational element in ESA enforcement and permitting.

The ESA prohibits any action that “harasses, harms, pursues, hunts, shoots, wounds, kills, traps, captures, or collects” endangered or threatened species. Historically, the Services have defined “harm” to include “significant habitat modification or degradation which actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering.” This expansive definition enabled the Services to regulate indirect impacts—such as habitat destruction—that may not immediately result in observable injury or death but nonetheless threaten species survival.

Under the Services’ proposed approach, “harm” would be interpreted more narrowly to encompass only affirmative, intentional actions that directly affect protected wildlife. As a result, incidental or indirect impacts—like habitat modification—may no longer trigger ESA liability or require Section 7 consultation. This change could significantly reduce the regulatory burden for developers, infrastructure planners, and federal permitting agencies, particularly where activities occur in or near designated critical habitats.

How Did We Get Here?

For decades, the Services’ definition of “harm” has been a linchpin of ESA enforcement. Because direct violations—like killing or injuring protected wildlife—are often nearly impossible to detect or prove, regulators have relied on habitat modification as a more practical and observable proxy for prohibited actions.

This approach won approval in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon (1995), where a divided U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Services’ interpretation as reasonable under Chevron deference, though it noted other readings were possible. Indeed, Justice Antonin Scalia’s sharp dissent argued that the ESA’s active, purposeful verbs— “harass,” “pursue,” “shoot,” and “capture”—show Congress intended to prohibit only deliberate, direct acts against wildlife, not indirect effects like habitat degradation, which he saw as stretching the law beyond its text and burdening landowners unfairly.

The Services’ proposed rule now echoes Scalia’s view, presenting the narrowed definition of “harm” as a return to the ESA’s original intent. They argue this shift is necessary after the Supreme Court’s 2024 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo decision, which eliminated Chevron deference, and directed courts to decide for themselves the “single best reading” of a statute.

What This Means Going Forward

Looking Ahead

The public comment period closed on May 19, 2025. The Services are now reviewing feedback and may revise the proposal before issuing a final rule. Given the far-reaching implications for ESA enforcement, federal permitting, and environmental litigation, stakeholders—especially those with projects in or near ecologically sensitive areas—should closely monitor this issue and be prepared for potential implementation hurdles and litigation challenges.

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