Laken Riley Act Could Impact U.S. Visa Stamping for Certain Foreign Nationals
On January 29, 2025, President Trump signed the first bill of his second presidential term into law. The legislation, named the Laken Riley Act, gives substantial power to state attorneys general (and other authorized state officers) to interpret and implement federal immigration policies.
Quick Hits
The Laken Riley Act authorizes states to sue for injunctive relief to stop the issuance of visas to nationals of a country that denies or unreasonably delays the acceptance of nationals ordered removed from the United States.
The act potentially allows state attorneys general to disrupt federal immigration policies and procedures.
Foreign nationals of certain countries may be unable to obtain visa stamping at U.S. consulates if their “home countries” deny or unreasonably delay the acceptance of their nationals ordered removed from the United States.
The Laken Riley Act places unprecedented power in the hands of state attorneys general (and other authorized state officers) to reshape federal immigration law by allowing states to sue for injunctive relief to halt the issuance of visas at U.S. consulates for nationals of certain countries. Thus, a singular state’s attorney general could potentially sue for injunctive relief to stop visa issuance to nationals of entire countries.
Next Steps
It will be important to closely monitor which countries are willing to cooperate with the Trump administration by repatriating and accepting their nationals who are ordered removed from the United States. Countries that deny or unreasonably delay repatriation could cause immense unintended issues for their nationals who are lawfully present in the United States or intend to lawfully enter the United States. Impacted foreign nationals needing new visa stamps for international travel or initial visa stamps to enter the United States could face unexpected delays or impasses in these scenarios.
EU Fines EU?!: Alleged Unlawful Data-Transfer Dust-Up
Following a German case brought against the EU Commission, the EU General Court found that the Commission had made an improper transfer of personal information to the US. The plaintiff, a German citizen, alleged (among other things) that his information was sent through the EU Commission’s website to the US through an automated social media login option when he registered for a Commission event. He further alleged that this violated the government-agency equivalent of GDPR (EUDPR), as it occurred during a period in time when the Privacy Shield had been found inadequate, and the replacement program was not yet in place.
The court noted that the Commission, in making the transfer, relied only on website terms for the US data recipient. It did not enter into a contract that included standard contractual clauses or otherwise have “appropriate safeguard[s].” The court ordered the Commission to pay the individual €400.
Putting It Into Practice: This case -brought against the EU entity that oversees GDPR compliance- is a reminder of EU concerns with data transfers to the US. As we await further developments with the Data Privacy Framework under the new administration, companies may want to re-examine the mechanisms (including standard contractual clauses + additional safeguards) EU-US data transfers.
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Deadline for Filing Annual Pesticide Production Reports — March 1, 2025
The March 1, 2025, deadline for all establishments, foreign and domestic, that produce pesticides, devices, or active ingredients to file their annual production for the 2024 reporting year is fast approaching. Pursuant to Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) Section 7(c)(1) (7 U.S.C. § 136e(c)(1)), “Any producer operating an establishment registered under [Section 7] shall inform the Administrator within 30 days after it is registered of the types and amounts of pesticides and, if applicable, active ingredients used in producing pesticides” and this information “shall be kept current and submitted to the Administrator annually as required.”
Reports must be submitted on or before March 1 annually for the prior reporting year’s production and distribution. The report, filed through the submittal of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Form 3540-16: Pesticide Report for Pesticide-Producing and Device-Producing Establishments, must include the name and address of the producing establishment, as well as pesticide production information, such as product registration number, product name, and amounts produced and distributed. The annual report is always required, even when no products are produced or distributed.
EPA has created the electronic reporting system to submit pesticide-producing establishment reports using the Section Seven Tracking System (SSTS). Users will be able to use SSTS within EPA’s Central Data Exchange (CDX) to submit annual pesticide production reports. Electronic reporting is efficient, saves time by making the process faster, and saves money in mailing costs and related logistics. EPA is encouraging all reporters to submit electronically to ensure proper submission and a timely review of the report.
Links to EPA Form 3540-16, as well as instructions on how to report and how to add and use EPA’s SSTS electronic filing system, are available below:
EPA Form 3540-16: Pesticide Report for Pesticide-Producing and Device-Producing Establishments;
Instructions for Completing EPA Form 3540-16 (available within the ZIP file); and
Electronic Reporting for Pesticide Establishments.
Further information is available on EPA’s website.
REBO Quarterly: 2024 in Retrospect
STATE-LEVEL REAL ESTATE BENEFICIAL RESTRICTIONS ON OWNERSHIP
2024 was a busy year for legislatures throughout the United States on the topic of limitations and restrictions on ownership of real property assets. Last year, state legislators introduced over 75 bills in 29 states throughout the country that affect the beneficial ownership of real property. Legislative proposals affecting beneficial ownership generally fell into three categories: restricting ownership of agricultural land by foreign persons or entities; restricting ownership of any real property near critical infrastructure by foreign persons or entities; and restricting ownership of agricultural land by corporate entities.
The most common ownership bills specifically targeted individuals, entities, and governments from certain countries designated as “foreign countries of concern.” These “foreign countries of concern” most often included the People’s Republic of China, Iran, Russia, North Korea, and Venezuela.
While the majority of bills introduced pertain to foreign ownership, certain states have also explored restricting domestic corporate ownership of real property. Growing interest in enacting corporate farming laws has the potential to trigger unintended consequences that the commercial real estate industry must be aware of when acquiring tracts of land, particularly when acquired for development in rural or semi-rural areas. In addition, corporate ownership provisions may be intertwined within larger foreign ownership legislative proposals, necessitating a careful analysis of all bills affecting beneficial ownership of land.
Successfully Enacted State Beneficial Ownership Bills
Of the successful bills prohibiting certain parties from owning land, the definition of those subject to restriction varies by state. The majority of bills passed in 2024 prohibit “foreign adversary” citizens, governments, and business entities as defined in 15 C.F.R. § 7.4, a list generated by the secretary of the Department of Commerce, which currently lists the People’s Republic of China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela. Others prohibit adversaries designated by the secretary of state as a Country of Particular Concern,1 or countries subject to international traffic in arms regulations under 22 C.F.R. § 126.1.2 Some seek to define adversaries as those parties on sanctions lists maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control,3 while others directly name a list of countries.4
States also diverge in the exemption provisions they include in law. Louisiana and Indiana exempt legal permanent residents from their foreign ownership laws. Louisiana’s HB 238 also contains a provision not found in other bills passed this year that exempts religious, educational, charitable, or scientific corporations. Oklahoma, Tennessee, Nebraska, and Kansas bills exempt from their ownership laws business entities that have a national security agreement with the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). Georgia, Mississippi, and South Dakota bills stipulate that foreign ownership prohibitions do not apply to business entities leasing land for agricultural research and development purposes. Indiana specifies that its prohibition law does not apply to agricultural land that has not been used for farming within the last five years, unless it is recognized by the US Farm Service Agency as farmland.
Proposed foreign ownership bills around the country differ in their treatment of existing real property owned by prohibited foreign parties. The most common treatment of the bills that were successful in 2024 was to direct any prohibited parties to divest of their ownership interest within a certain timeframe of the bill’s effective date, typically one or two years.5 Some bills specify that their provisions only apply after the bill’s effective date or a future date.6 In rare circumstances, a bill will apply retroactively; Idaho’s HB 496 was signed into law in March 2024 but applied retroactively to April 2023.
The following 15 bills impacting beneficial ownership of land were approved by state legislatures in 2024:
Georgia SB 420
Introduced on 29 January and signed into law on 30 April, the bill adds a new section to the code that provides that no nonresident alien shall acquire directly or indirectly any possessory interest in agricultural land or land within 10 miles of any military installation. In this case, “nonresident alien” is defined narrowly to mean a noncitizen of the United States who also is an agent of a foreign government designated as a foreign adversary and has been absent from the United States for six out of the preceding 12 months. The prohibition also applies to business entities domiciled in a foreign adversary or domiciled in the United States but with 25% ownership by a foreign adversary.
Idaho HB 496
HB 496 was introduced on 7 February and signed by the governor on 12 March. It amends existing foreign ownership restrictions to exempt federally recognized Indian tribes from the definition of “foreign government.” It also adds forest lands to the kinds of property that foreign governments and state-controlled enterprises are prohibited from acquiring.
Indiana HB 1183
Introduced on 9 January and signed into law on 15 March, the bill, in addition to prohibiting citizens or business entities controlled by a foreign adversary (which includes the People’s Republic of China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela) from acquiring agricultural land in the state, also specifically prohibits the acquisition of mineral rights, water rights, or riparian rights on agricultural land.
Iowa SF 2204
Introduced on 1 February and signed into law on 9 April, the bill tightens existing Iowa statutes restricting foreign persons and business entities from acquiring agricultural land suitable for use in farming. The act amends Iowa code by eliminating a provision in law that suspends certain registration requirements, thereby restoring its requirements. SF 2204 also expands the information required to be completed in a registration form to include the identity of the foreign person or authorized representative; the identity of any parent corporation, subsidiary, or person acting as an intermediary; the purpose for holding the agricultural land; and a listing of any other interest in agricultural land held by the registrant that exceeds 250 acres.
Iowa SF 574
SF 574 was introduced on 24 April 2023, and carried over into 2024, where it was signed by the governor on 1 May. The bill created the “Major Economic Growth Attraction Program.” As part of multiple provisions relating to economic development, the law authorizes the Iowa Economic Development Authority board to give an exemption to the existing restrictions in law on agricultural land holdings for a foreign business if it meets certain requirements. These requirements include a business locating the project on a site larger than 250 acres and a business making a qualifying investment in the proposed project of over US$1 billion.
Kansas SB 172
SB 172 was introduced on 7 February and passed by the Kansas Legislature on 30 April. However, Kansas Governor Laura Kelly (D) vetoed the bill. The bill would have prohibited foreign principals from acquiring any interest in nonresidential real property within 100 miles of any military installation. Given the wide restriction range and the position of McConnell Air Force Base in Wichita near the center of the state, the bill would have applied to most areas of the state. Democrats largely opposed the legislation, and critics of the bill voiced concern that language in the bill allowing seizure of private property without guaranteed compensation would be unconstitutional. In her veto message, Governor Kelly wrote:
“While I agree that it is important for our state to implement stronger protections against foreign adversaries, this legislation contains multiple provisions that are likely unconstitutional and cause unintended consequences…the retroactive nature of this legislation raises further serious constitutional concerns.”
The bill ultimately was not reconsidered by legislators and did not become law.
Louisiana HB 238
HB 238 was introduced on 27 February and was signed into law on 3 June. The bill restricts foreign adversaries or corporations in which a foreign adversary has a controlling interest from owning, acquiring, leasing, or otherwise obtaining any interest in agricultural land. The law defines “foreign adversary” as the People’s Republic of China (and Hong Kong), Iran, Cuba, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela.
Mississippi SB 2519
Introduced on 16 February and signed by the governor on 15 April, the bill prohibits ownership of majority part or a majority interest in forest or agricultural land by a nonresident alien. “Majority part” or “majority interest” means an interest of 50% or more in the aggregate held by nonresident aliens. “Nonresident alien” is defined as an individual or business entity domiciled in the People’s Republic of China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, or Venezuela, or an entity domiciled in the United States but majority owned by a foreign adversary entity. In addition, the bill specifies that land classified as industrial or residential but is otherwise used as forest or agricultural land shall be subject to the act.
Nebraska LB 1301
Introduced on 16 January at the request of the governor, LB 1301 was signed on 16 April. The bill amends existing law to prohibit nonresident aliens, foreign corporations, and foreign governments from purchasing, acquiring title to, or taking any leasehold interest extending for a period for more than five years (or any other greater interest less than a fee interest) in any real estate in the state by descent, devise, purchase, or otherwise. The law also prohibits restricted entities from purchasing, acquiring, holding title to, or being a lessor or lessee of real estate for the purpose of erecting manufacturing or industrial establishments, with certain exemptions.
Nebraska LB 1120
Separately, LB 1120, which was introduced on 10 January and also signed into law on 16 April, requires that upon a conveyance of real property located in whole or in part within a restricted area (i.e., within a certain radius of critical infrastructure or a military installation), the purchaser must complete and sign an affidavit stating it is not affiliated with any foreign government or nongovernment person determined to be a foreign adversary pursuant to 15 C.F.R. § 7.4. Specifically, the bill targets those individuals and entities from the People’s Republic of China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela.
Oklahoma SB 1705
Introduced on 5 February and approved by the governor on 31 May, the bill amends the exiting foreign ownership law to prohibit foreign government adversaries and foreign government enterprises from acquiring land in the state. The law defines a “foreign government enterprise” to mean a business entity or state-backed investment fund in which a foreign government adversary holds a controlling interest.
South Dakota HB 1231
HB 1231 was introduced on 31 January and signed by the governor on 3 March. Prior to passage, South Dakota prohibited aliens and foreign governments from acquiring agricultural lands exceeding 160 acres. HB 1231 prohibits foreign entities from owning, leasing, or holding an easement on agricultural land in the state unless the lease is exclusively for agricultural research purposes and encumbers no more than 320 acres, or the lease is exclusively for contract feeding of livestock.
Tennessee HB 2553
HB 2553 was introduced on 31 January and was signed into law on 21 May. The bill replaces the prior definitions of individuals and entities restricted in their real property ownership and expands upon land ownership restrictions through the creation of two separate prohibitions: one that restricts a prohibited foreign-party-controlled business from acquiring an interest in public or private land and another that restricts a prohibited foreign party from acquiring an interest in agricultural land (regardless of whether the party intends to use it for nonfarming purposes). Additionally, HB 2553 creates the Office of Agricultural Intelligence within the Tennessee Department of Agriculture to enforce the new law.
Utah HB 516
Introduced on 8 February and signed into law on 21 March, the bill modifies the definition of a “restricted foreign entity” to prevent entities owned or majority controlled by the following governments from obtaining any interest in real property in the state: the People’s Republic of China, Iran, North Korea, or Russia.
Wyoming SF 77
SF 77 was introduced on 6 February and signed by the governor on 14 March. The bill allows the governor and the Wyoming Office of Homeland Security to designate critical infrastructure zones and requires county clerks to report each transaction involving property within a five-mile radius of the designated zones. The law also authorizes the attorney general to take any action necessary to determine the identity of any party reported by the county clerks.
Corporate Ownership Spotlight
While the majority of bills introduced in the states regarding beneficial ownership of land focused on limiting foreign actors, at least five bills proposed changes that would reduce the ability of business entities to acquire real property. Nebraska’s LB 1301 and Iowa’s SF 2204, detailed above, both made changes to existing statutes that restrict corporate entities from engaging in farming in those states. In addition, two bills in California and one in Virginia took aim at investment funds acquiring land or water rights.
California Assembly Bill 1205
As originally introduced, the bill required the State Water Resources Control Board to conduct a study and report to the legislature on the existence of speculation or profiteering by an investment fund in the sale, transfer, or lease of an interest in any surface water right or groundwater right previously put to beneficial use on agricultural lands. The measure was amended in August 2024 to remove all study provisions and instead renames and makes changes to the unrelated California Promise Program.
California SB 1153
SB 1153 would have prohibited a hedge fund from purchasing, acquiring, leasing, or holding a controlling interest in agricultural land within the state. The bill would have required the California Department of Food and Agriculture to compile an annual report containing, among other information, the total amount of agricultural land that is under hedge fund ownership, how that land is being put to use, and any legislative, regulatory, or administrative policy recommendations in light of the information from the annual report. The bill did not receive a hearing before the end of the legislative session.
Virginia SB 693
SB 693 was introduced on 19 January but did not receive a hearing before the legislative session concluded. The bill would have restricted any partnership, corporation, or real estate investment trust that manages funds pooled from investors, is a fiduciary to such investors, and has US$50 million or more in net value or assets under management on any day during a taxable year from acquiring any interest in residential land in the state.
Ongoing Rulemaking and Court Challenges
In addition to the aforementioned bills that were signed into law in 2024, certain other bills that were passed in 2023 continue to be active in 2024 and 2025. Specifically, in Florida, bills related to the foreign ownership of real property in the state continue to make headlines. Florida Statute § 692.202–.205, which were signed into law in 2023, create a three-pronged approach to restricting foreign ownership of real property assets in the state.7 The first prong prohibits the foreign ownership of agricultural land in the state with few exceptions. The second prong prohibits foreign ownership of any real property within a certain radius of critical infrastructure or military installations within the state. Lastly, the third prong prohibits Chinese ownership (at the individual, entity, or government level) of any real property within the state. The statute also creates a registration regime for all real property assets held by foreign principals prior to 1 July 2023. Administrative rules and regulations regarding the first prong of the statute were finalized as of 4 April 2024. Final rules surrounding the third prong of the laws were published in late January by the Florida Department of Commerce and will become effective 6 February 2025. In addition to the rule promulgation, the third prong of the statute is also currently being challenged in the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. We continue to actively monitor these developments.
In Arkansas, SB 383 was enacted in 2023. The proposal prohibited foreign investments through two separate restrictions: a restriction on foreign-party-controlled businesses from acquiring interest in land, and a restriction on prohibited foreign parties from acquiring any interest in agricultural land. In November 2024, Jones Eagle—a digital asset mining company owned by a Chinese-born naturalized US citizen—filed a lawsuit requesting a preliminary injunction against the law. On 9 December, the presiding federal judge granted the injunction, which prevents enforcement of the law against the company until further orders from the court. The plaintiff argues that the federal government retains exclusive authority over foreign affairs, and that the Arkansas law violates this foreign affairs preemption. The court found that Jones Eagle was likely to prevail on the question, noting that the Arkansas law “go[es] so far as to target specific foreign countries for economic restrictions and conflict with the express foreign policy of the federal government as represented by the FIRRMA and ITAR regimes.”8 The case is pending in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. We will continue to actively monitor these developments and their effect on recent and upcoming legislation regarding foreign ownership of real property.
FEDERAL-LEVEL RESTRICTIONS ON BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP OF REAL ESTATE
Like state legislatures, there was a strong focus on foreign investment in agricultural land in Congress in 2024. Unlike state legislatures, Congress has not yet implemented restrictive or prohibitive measures addressing foreign or corporate ownership of real property.
Though largely a Republican effort, a few bills were bipartisan: H.R. 7678, the Protecting Against Foreign Adversary Investments Act sponsored by then-Representative Elissa Slotkin (D-MI-7), would have required CFIUS’s approval of certain real estate sales to foreign entities of concern and required a report to Congress assessing the feasibility of divestiture of real estate owned by foreign entities of concern.
Members of Congress also introduced several bills building on the Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act (AFIDA) and CFIUS authorities by (i) expanding AFIDA reporting mandates or increasing penalties for nondisclosure or both, and (ii) extending CFIUS jurisdiction over broader categories of land. There were also bills that would create new stand-alone prohibitions on purchases of US land by certain foreign persons.
A provision of proposed bill H.R. 7476 to counter Chinese influence would have required the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) to prohibit the purchase of agricultural land by companies owned in full or in part by the People’s Republic of China. S. 3666 would have required data sharing between the USDA and CFIUS, while S. 4443 would have directed the director of national intelligence to complete a study on the threat posed to the United States by foreign investment in agricultural land. Most recently, Senator Mike Braun (R-IN) and Representative Dan Newhouse (R-WA-4) introduced companion bills requiring the USDA to notify CFIUS of each covered transaction it has reason to believe may pose a risk to national security.
In addition to stand-alone legislation, elements of some of the above bills were included in annual budget appropriations omnibus packages. On 4 March 2024, the federal Fiscal Year 2024 Agriculture Appropriations bill was signed into law by President Joe Biden as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024. The package included a section addressing foreign ownership of agricultural land: it required the secretary of agriculture to be included as a member of CFIUS on a case-by-case basis with respect to covered transactions involving agricultural land, biotechnology, or the agricultural industry. The bill also directed the USDA to notify CFIUS of any agricultural land transaction that it has reason to believe may pose a risk to national security, particularly on transactions by the governments of the People’s Republic of China, North Korea, Russia, and Iran.
2025 FORECAST
Federal Level
The Farm Bill is a five-year package of bills that governs a broad range of agricultural programs covering commodities, conservation, nutrition, rural development, forestry, energy, and more. The last time a Farm Bill was passed into law was the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, which was passed on 20 December 2018 and expired on 30 September 2023. Facing a stalemate on negotiations of a new Farm Bill in late 2023 and early 2024, members of Congress agreed to pass a one-year extension of the 2018 Farm Bill to continue authorizations until the end of the fiscal year (September 2024) and the end of the crop year (December 2024).
However, Senate and House negotiations on a new Farm Bill did not sufficiently progress in 2024, so agriculture leaders again passed a one-year extension on 21 December 2024 to continue authorizations until September 2025. While there is strong commitment from Republican Congressional leadership to finalize the bill this year, success will depend on many factors, including on how quickly the House and Senate can address other policy priorities.
Both the Senate Democratic and the House Republican agriculture leaders have released draft Farm Bill proposals for a new five-year authorization. Both parties and chambers seem to agree on the need to address foreign ownership of agricultural land. The Senate Democratic and the House Republican proposals include provisions to the following:
Establish a minimum civil penalty if a person has failed to submit a report or has knowingly submitted a report under AFIDA with incomplete, false, or misleading information.
Direct outreach programs to increase public awareness and provide education regarding AFIDA reporting requirements.
Require the USDA to designate a chief of operations within the department to monitor compliance of AFIDA.
Mandate establishment of an online filing system for AFIDA reports.
In addition, the federal House Agriculture Committee has six incoming Republicans this year—five of them newcomers to Congress—who will want to make their mark on agricultural policy in the new legislative session. Newcomer Mark Messmer (R-IN-8) previously sponsored and passed a bill in 2022 in Indiana to cap the amount of agricultural land any foreign business entity can acquire in the state. In addition, Rep. Newhouse, who has prioritized addressing foreign ownership of agricultural land in the past two years, joins the House Agriculture Committee this year. We expect to see legislation from Rep. Newhouse in this area.
State Level
With respect to the outlook in the states, 46 states meet annually, while four states (Nevada, North Dakota, Texas, and Montana) meet only during odd-numbered years. With the additional four states convening this year, we expect to see a very active year for legislative proposals affecting beneficial ownership of real property.
New Jersey and Virginia are the only states where bills from the 2024 legislative session carry over into the 2025 session, which means that all legislative proposals that were not signed into law in 2024 in the other 48 states are considered to have died and must be re-introduced in 2025.
Already as of 29 January, at least 57 bills affecting beneficial ownership have been pre-filed or introduced in 22 different states. The majority of these bills so far are aimed at preventing foreign entities from acquiring agricultural land.
Footnotes
1 Oklahoma Senate Bill (SB) 1705.
2 Tennessee House Bill (HB) 2553.
3 Nebraska Legislature Bill (LB) 1301.
4 Utah HB 516, South Dakota HB 1231.
5 Tennessee HB 2553; Kansas SB 172; Mississippi SB 2519; Utah HB 516.
6 Louisiana HB 238; Wyoming Senate File (SF) 77.
7 Marisa N. Bocci, Kari L. Larson & Douglas Stanford, Real Estate Beneficial Ownership Regulatory Alert: Florida Restricts Real Estate Ownership by Individuals and Entities From “Countries of Concern”, K&L Gates HUB (Sept. 11, 2023).
8 Jones Eagle LLC v. Ward, 4:24-cv-00990-KGB (E.D. Ark. Dec. 9, 2024).
US Withdrawal From the Paris Climate Accord and its Impact on the Voluntary Carbon Market
Introduction: A Withdrawal with Broad Implications
On January 20, 2025, President Donald Trump issued a series of executive orders on energy and environmental topics that included initiating a US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accords, a move consistent with his previous term’s policy and a central promise of his campaign.
This order was an anticipated “day one” action, as President Trump withdrew from the Paris Agreement during his first term and clearly stated his intention to repeat the action upon taking office again. The executive order references Trump’s distaste for international agreements that do not properly balance domestic economic and energy-sector development with environmental goals.
To formally pull the United States out of the Paris Agreement, the Trump administration will need to formally submit a withdrawal letter to the United Nations, which administers the pact. The withdrawal would become official one year after the submission. The formal withdrawal of the United States and subsequent changes to agreements under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change cannot be transmitted to the United Nations until President Trump’s nominee to be US Ambassador to the UN, Rep. Elise Stefanik (R-NY), is confirmed by the Senate. She appeared before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on January 21, 2025, for a confirmation hearing, and the Senate is expected to vote on her confirmation this week.
This announcement coincided with the declaration of a national energy emergency under another executive order, as well as several other executive orders issued on the same day or since that together emphasize a refocus on hydrocarbon production and energy independence without mention of any correlative offset commitments.
Indirect Impacts on the Voluntary Carbon Market
The withdrawal raises key questions about the future of the voluntary carbon market (VCM), particularly in light of the Paris Climate Accords’ role in driving offset demand.
Under the Biden administration, the US government’s strong support for carbon markets included endorsement of guiding principles to bolster integrity, CFTC guidance to facilitate the scaling of carbon credit trading on derivative markets and fostering private sector confidence in the VCM. In contrast, the Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement and its general dissatisfaction with ESG and climate disclosure initiatives may undermine confidence in the VCM by reducing the impetus for corporate and national net-zero commitments.
Without the federal endorsement of climate goals, corporate strategies might shift away from investing in carbon offsets, diminishing demand for carbon credits. Furthermore, uncertainty surrounding federal support could delay or derail the development of new VCM projects that depend on long-term revenue from carbon credit sales. If federal support for the VCM is lacking, the private sector may follow suit.
Lessons From the First Withdrawal: Resilience of the Market
Under President Trump’s first term, the VCM subsisted under an administration that did not support the Paris Accord from the beginning. In that period, the United States was actually only “out of” the Paris Agreement for about 100 days — despite the withdrawal being initiated at the beginning of that term — with the federal messaging to the market clear from the outset (if not fully in effect). The delay was due to the signatory countries only being able to give a notice to withdraw from the Paris Agreement within the first three years of its start date — which, for the United States, was November 4, 2016 — with a subsequent one-year withdrawal process to follow. The United States therefore formally withdrew on November 4, 2020, the day after Joe Biden won the election, and re-entered the Paris Agreement under President Biden on February 19, 2021.
It should be emphasised that President Trump’s first withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord did not significantly hinder the VCM. In fact, the market grew during that period, with robust private-sector demand for offsets driving progress. Between 2016 and 2021, the VCM experienced notable expansion, both in terms of transaction volume and the range of projects receiving funding. Carbon credit issuances from the four main registries increased in volume significantly from 2017 to 2021 (by more than 300 percent). There was then a dip after 2021 with the chief causal suspects being the scrutiny over market robustness, slow progress under the annual UN COP gatherings (in particular regarding the roll out under Article 6.4 of an international UN-backed trading mechanism for carbon credits) as well as the expected market vagaries of a young, developing trading system. Few attributed the cause to the delayed impact from the first US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accords years before the dip. The resilience of the VCM suggests that federal policy is not the sole determinant of its trajectory.
Furthermore, the market is global in nature and likely to grow with international offset trading, further insulating it from shortfalls in federal support. The increasing integration of international carbon trading mechanisms provides additional stability and opportunity for the VCM, independent of domestic policy shifts. COP 29 made significant advances with respect to the Article 6.4 trading mechanism and, when operational, this is expected to bolster the VCM globally.
Additionally, the voluntary nature of the VCM means it operates largely outside regulatory frameworks, relying instead on private-sector leadership and investment. In this context, a lack of government support could incentivize corporations to independently bolster the market, particularly as international competition for climate leadership intensifies.
A Pro-Market Administration: Contradictions and Possibilities
To be sure, the Trump administration’s broader climate stance creates potential headwinds for the VCM, a point that is underscored by the administration’s other early moves to pull back from federal initiatives that underpin investment in projects that could generate voluntary carbon credits (discussed below). However, in addition to the points outlined above, there are other reasons to believe that the VCM could thrive despite what might be perceived to be a federal withdrawal. As a “pro-markets” administration, Trump’s economic policies prioritize private-sector growth and innovation. The VCM represents a burgeoning industry with significant economic potential, aligning with the administration’s stated commitment to fostering successful markets. In this context, the VCM should not pose a risk to the economic interests or energy security of the United States, which are the main concerns that the executive orders seek to address.
Supporting the VCM could also serve as a strategic response to growing foreign competition in the carbon trading space, ensuring US companies remain competitive globally.
Other Potential Executive Order Headwinds for VCMs
In addition to withdrawing the United States from the Paris Climate Accord, President Trump has so far directed the government not only to emphasize and clear the way for new hydrocarbon production and infrastructure, but also to take aim at Biden-era regulations, grants and loan programs that encourage non-hydrocarbon energy and energy transition projects.
For example, President Trump has issued executive orders and related memoranda:
pausing federal funding streams under existing law and the disbursement of additional funds through the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) (including some that currently flow to energy transition projects);
withdrawing offshore areas from future wind energy leasing;
freezing, at least for now, the issuance of awards and permits for wind projects; and
rescinding the Biden administration’s priorities and coordination efforts for implementing the IIJA and the IRA.
However, within a few days of the announcement of the pause on federal funding streams, this action was temporarily stayed by at least two federal judges pending review and a memorandum detailing the funding to be frozen was subsequently rescinded by the White House.
The pause in authorized and appropriated clean energy spending has been criticized on constitutional grounds. As noted above, preliminary court challenges have resulted in some setbacks for the new administration on this front. However, it is anticipated that the administration will continue to press its agenda calling into question new governmental expenditures for certain disfavoured technologies or projects.
The above actions may reduce developer appetite (and if the actions are fully realized, federal funding) for projects that could play a role in generating credits for the VCM, and that may in turn reduce its liquidity and viability. However, the reasons for potential resilience of the VCM discussed above also apply to these administration actions. Due in part to the differences in how voluntary carbon offsets are generated as compared with federal tax credits, not all transactions and projects involved in the creation or trading of offset in the VCM are impacted by these actions, and the administration’s pursuit of new infrastructure and energy production may ultimately benefit such projects.
Conclusion: Competing Factors and an Uncertain Future
The US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord under President Trump and the new administration’s actions seeking to roll back existing incentives for energy transition and climate-focused new projects introduces potential challenges for the VCM, from reduced federal support to weakened corporate commitments to offsets. However, the market’s unregulated nature, historical resilience and alignment with private-sector growth could offset these challenges. The ultimate trajectory of the VCM will depend on the interplay between federal initiatives, private-sector leadership and international climate efforts. As the global demand for carbon offsets continues to rise, the US VCM may well find pathways to growth despite a shifting domestic policy landscape.
Tariffs on Mexico, Canada Paused for 30 Days
Earlier today, President Trump announced that he agreed to delay imposing the additional 25% tariff on Mexican products for 30 days after Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum promised to send soldiers to the US-Mexican border to help stop the flow of fentanyl and migrants into the United States. The two Presidents also agreed to negotiations to be held between the U.S. Secretary of State, Secretary of Treasury and Secretary of Commerce, and certain Mexican government officials.
Similarly, after finishing a conference call this afternoon with President Trump, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced that President Trump agreed to delay imposing the additional 25% tariff on Canadian imports for 30 days in consideration for Canada implementing a $1.3 billion border plan to reinforce the border to stop the flow of fentanyl, including appointing 10,000 frontline personnel and appointing a “Fentanyl Czar.”
The 10% additional tariff on Chinese imports are still set to become effective on February 4, 2025 (see China EO).
The additional IEEPA national security tariffs to be imposed on Mexican and Canadian goods pursuant to President Trump’s executive orders have not been canceled. The imposition of the tariffs has been just suspended to allow further bi-lateral negotiations to occur.
Due to current uncertainty, importers of Mexican and Canadian goods may seek to stock up on inventories over the next 30 days, which could cause logistical problems and major traffic at U.S. ports. Importers, however, will likely be exempt from the additional tariffs only if they meet the deadlines stated in the executive orders. These dates will most likely be updated to reflect the delayed implementation of the goods.
But any such imported goods will be exempt from the additional tariffs only if they meet the deadlines stated in the executive orders, which dates may or may not be updated to reflect the delayed implementation of the executive orders. Thus, importers need to closely monitor whether and how the timing for assessment of additional tariffs will be changed in any future pronouncements. The current executive orders provide that, in order to be exempt from the additional tariffs, the imported goods must have either (i) cleared U.S. customs, or (ii) been loaded or in transit on the final mode of transit on the way to the United States as of a certain date and time, as follows:
Such rate of duty shall apply with respect to goods entered for consumption, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern time on February 4, 2025, except that goods entered for consumption, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, after such time that were loaded onto a vessel at the port of loading or in transit on the final mode of transport prior to entry into the United States before 12:01 a.m. eastern time on February 1, 2025, shall not be subject to such additional duty, only if the importer certifies to CBP as specified in the Federal Register notice (see Section 2(a) of the Mexico EO and the Canada EO).
In sum, as of the close of business today, the 25% tariffs on Mexican and Canadian imports that were promulgated pursuant to the Mexico EO and the Canada EO have been suspended for 30 days. Thus far, however, the additional 10% tariff to be imposed on Chinese imports still remains intact.
Cybersecurity in the Marine Transportation System: What You Need to Know About the Coast Guard’s Final Rule
The U.S. Coast Guard (“USCG”) published a final rule on January 17, 2025, addressing Cybersecurity in the Marine Transportation System (the “Final Rule”), which seeks to minimize cybersecurity related transportation security incidents (“TSIs”) within the maritime transportation system (“MTS”) by establishing requirements to enhance the detection, response, and recovery from cybersecurity risks. Effective July 16, 2025, the Final Rule will apply to U.S.-flagged vessels, as well as Outer Continental Shelf and onshore facilities subject to the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (“MTSA”). The USCG is also seeking comments on a potential two-to-five-year delay of implementation for U.S.-flagged vessels. Comments are due March 18, 2025.
Background
The need for enhanced cybersecurity protocols within the MTS has long been recognized. MTSA laid the groundwork for addressing various security threats in 2002 and provided the USCG with broad authority to take action and set requirements to prevent TSIs. MTSA was amended in 2018 to make clear that cybersecurity related risks that may cause TSIs fall squarely within MTSA and USCG authority.
Over the years, the USCG, as well as the International Maritime Organization, have dedicated resources and published guidelines related to addressing the growing cybersecurity threats arising as technology is integrated more and more into all aspects of the MTS. The USCG expanded its efforts to address cybersecurity threats throughout the MTS in its latest rulemaking, publishing the original Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NPRM”) on February 22, 2024. The NPRM received significant public feedback, leading to the development of the Final Rule.
Final Rule
In its Final Rule, the USCG addresses the many comments received on the NPRM and sets forth minimum cybersecurity requirements for U.S.-flagged vessels and applicable facilities.
Training. Within six months of the Final Rule’s effective date, training must be conducted on recognition and detection of cybersecurity threats and all types of cyber incidents, techniques used to circumvent cyber security measures, and reporting procedures, among others. Key personnel are required to complete more in-depth training.
Assessment and Plans. The Final Rule requires owners and operators of U.S.-flagged vessels and applicable facilities to conduct a Cybersecurity Assessment, develop a Cybersecurity Plan and Cyber Incident Response Plan, and appoint a Cybersecurity Officer that meets specified requirements within 24 months of the effective date. There are a host of requirements for the Cybersecurity Plan, including, among others: provisions for account security, device protection, data safeguarding, training, drills and exercises, risk management practices, strategies for mitigating supply chain risks, penetration testing, resilience planning, network segmentation, reporting protocols, and physical security measures. Additionally, the Cyber Incident Response Plan must provide instructions for responding to cyber incidents and delineate the key roles, responsibilities, and decision-making authorities among staff.
Plan Approval and Audits. The Final Rule requires Cybersecurity Plans be submitted to the USCG for review and approval within 24 months of the effective date of the Final Rule, unless a waiver or equivalence is granted. The Rule also gives the USCG the power to perform inspections and audits to verify the implementation of the Cybersecurity Plan.
Reporting. The Final Rule requires reporting of “reportable cyber incidents”[1] to the National Response Center without delay. The reporting requirement is effective immediately on July 16, 2025. Further, the Final Rule revises the definition of “hazardous condition” to expressly include cyber incidents.
Potential Waivers. The Final Rule allows for limited waivers or equivalence determinations. A waiver may be granted if the owner or operator demonstrates that the cybersecurity requirements are unnecessary given the specific nature or operating conditions. An equivalence determination may be granted if the owner or operator demonstrates that the U.S.-flagged vessel or facility complies with international conventions or standards that provide an equivalent level of security. Each waiver or equivalence request will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
Potential Delay in Implementation. Due to a number of comments received related to the ability of U.S.-flagged vessels to meet the implementation schedule, the Final rule seeks comments on whether a delay of an additional two to five years is appropriate.
Conclusion
As automation and digitalization continue to advance within the maritime sector, it is imperative to develop cyber security strategies tailored to specific management and operational needs of each company, facility, and vessel. Owners and operators of U.S.-flagged vessels and MTSA facilities are advised to review the new regulations closely and begin preparations for the new cybersecurity requirements at the earliest opportunity. Stakeholders are also encouraged to provide comments before March 18, 2025, addressing the potential two-to-five-year delay in implementation for U.S.-flagged vessels.
[1] A reportable cyber incident is defined as an incident that leads to, or, if still under investigation, can reasonably lead to any of the following: (1) substantial loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of a covered information system, network, or operational technology system; (2) disruption or significant adverse impact on the reporting entity’s ability to engage in business operations or deliver goods or services, including those that have a potential for significant impact on public health or safety or may cause serious injury or death; (3) disclosure or unauthorized access directly or indirectly of non-public personal information of a significant number of individuals; (4) other potential operational disruption to critical infrastructure systems or assets; or (5) incidents that otherwise may lead to a TSI as defined in 33 C.F.R. 101.105.
Federal Grant Funding: A Thaw in the Freeze?
Last week was a roller coaster ride for health care providers and other recipients of federal grant funding. Here’s a quick recap of everything that’s happened since our last e-alert:
OMB Memo Rescinded – On January 29, the OMB issued a rescission of the memorandum (M-25-13) that contained the agency directive to review federal grant programs and the corresponding funding pause (the “OMB Memo”). Providers and other outside observers could be forgiven for making the assumption that this would be the end of the story for the time being.
The Story Continues – Shortly after the OMB rescinded the OMB Memo, communication from the White House, including posts on X from the Press Secretary, indicated that the rescission applied to the OMB Memo only and that the White House still intended to freeze federal funds and enforce the Executive Orders.
Normalcy? Returns– Thursday evening into Friday morning, Medicaid agencies reported irregularities in accessing funding portals and drawing down federal funds. We have heard from providers that access to their 330 PHS grant funds has been restored. At the same time, we have reports that some agencies (such as the National Science Foundation) are still reviewing grant programs for compliance with the Trump Administration’s Executive Orders. For now, however, the status quo for grant funding seems largely to have been preserved.
The Legal Battle Continues – A coalition of Democratic Attorneys General filed a lawsuit in Rhode Island earlier this week to oppose the OMB Memo and associated funding freeze.1 The judge in that case held a hearing to determine whether the legal challenge was moot, given the rescission of the OMB Memo. Citing communication from the press secretary, Judge McConnell indicated a willingness to still enter some kind of protective order related to the actions underlying the OMB Memo, even if the OMB Memo itself had been rescinded. Late afternoon on January 31, Judge McConnell issued a temporary restraining order in this case, which will last through a hearing and decision on the states’ motion for a preliminary injunction.2 On the morning of February 3, the DOJ responded with a notice of compliance outlining the Administration’s response to the TRO.
What Now? – Whatever the final legal outcome from the Rhode Island case, it seems clear that the Executive Branch is intent on reviewing federal grant programs for compliance with its policy directives. We know, based on OMB’s rescinded Memo, the initial list of programs on the Administration’s radar. Subject to any final disposition in the AG suit, we expect additional action in the coming weeks and months with respect to these programs, and providers should be aware of the potential impact on their organizations up to and including the inability to access funds previously appropriated and awarded.
Attached to this e-alert is an Excel tool that identifies the grant programs identified in OMB’s rescinded Memo. Providers and other grant recipients should use this tool to inventory their current grant funding streams, assess organizational risk moving forward and make plans in the event of future disruption.
[1] A copy of the states’ request for a temporary restraining order is available here: https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/court-filings/new-york-et-al-v-trump-et-al-complaint-2025.pdf.
[2] A copy of the preliminary injunction is available here: https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.rid.58912/gov.uscourts.rid.58912.50.0_2.pdf.
Grant Review Tool
DOJ Compliance Notice
Healthcare Preview for the Week of: February 3, 2025 [Podcast]
Senate Committee to Vote on RFK Jr. Nomination, House Tries to Move Forward on Budget Resolution
The Senate Finance Committee is set to vote on the confirmation of Robert F. Kennedy (RFK) Jr., President Trump’s nominee for Secretary of the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), on Tuesday morning. All eyes are on Senator Cassidy (R-LA), who publicly struggled at the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, & Pensions hearing last week with whether to support RFK Jr. for the role of HHS Secretary. If Senator Cassidy and all Democrats on the Finance Committee vote against RFK Jr.’s confirmation, the committee would need to move him to a full floor vote without the committee’s support.
Last week, House Republicans used a retreat to try to coalesce around the reconciliation process. The House Budget Committee should hold a markup of the budget resolution this week to meet the schedule put forth by Speaker Johnson. However, so far no scheduled meeting has been posted. The House Budget Committee includes Rep. Chip Roy (R-TX) and some other very conservative members who appear to be raising concerns about the committee directives that might appear in the budget resolution – and are seeking to have higher numbers inserted than leadership had intended, because their top concern is lowering federal spending.
Turning to the Administration, there was a lot of activity over the weekend that included shutting down agency websites, Department of Government Efficiency representatives gaining access to closely controlled government databases, and layoffs of government employees.
Also over the weekend, President Trump imposed tariffs on Canada, China, and Mexico, reportedly for their roles in illegal immigration into the United States, and in producing and trafficking fentanyl. President Trump called the flow of contraband drugs into the United States a national emergency and public health crisis. On Monday morning, President Trump paused the new tariffs on Mexico for one month after Mexico agreed to reinforce its northern border with 10,000 National Guard members. Canada and Mexico indicated that they may to impose tariffs on the United States as well.
Today’s Podcast
In this week’s Healthcare Preview, Debbie Curtis and Rodney Whitlock join Julia Grabo to discuss the next steps in Robert F. Kennedy Jr.’s Senate confirmation process, budget reconciliation in the House, and the flurry of recent activity from the White House.
UK ICO Sets Out Proposals to Promote Sustainable Economic Growth
On January 24, 2025, the UK Information Commissioner’s Office (“ICO”) published the letter it sent to the UK Prime Minister, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Secretary of State for Business and Trade, in response to their request for proposals to boost business confidence, improve the investment climate, and foster sustainable economic growth in the UK. In the letter, the ICO sets out its proposals for doing so, including:
New rules for AI: The ICO recognizes that regulatory uncertainty can be a barrier to innovation, so it proposes a single set of rules for those developing or deploying AI products, supporting the UK government in legislating for such rules.
New guidance on other emerging technologies: The ICO will support businesses and “innovators” by publishing innovation focused guidance in areas such as neurotech, cloud computing and Internet of Things devices.
Reducing costs for small and medium-sized companies (“SMEs”): Focusing on the administrative burden that SMEs face when complying with a complex regulatory framework, the ICO commits to simplifying existing requirements and easing the burden of compliance, including by launching a Data Essentials training and assurance programme for SMEs during 2025/26.
Sandboxes: The ICO will expand on its previous sandbox services by launching an “experimentation program” where companies will get a “time-limited derogation” from specific legal requirements, under the strict control of the ICO, to test new ideas. The ICO would support legislation from UK government in this area.
Privacy-preserving digital advertising: The ICO recognizes the financial and societal benefits provided by the digital advertising economy but notes there are aspects of the regulatory landscape that businesses find difficult to navigate. The ICO wishes to help reduce the burdens for both businesses and customers related to digital advertising. To do so, the ICO, amongst other things, referred to its approach to regulating digital advertising as detailed in the 2025 Online Tracking Strategy (as discussed here).
International transfers: Recognizing the importance of international transfers to the UK economy, the ICO will, amongst other things, publish new guidance to enable quicker and easier transfers of data, and work through international fora, such as G7, to build international agreement on increasing data transfer mechanisms.
Promote information sharing between regulators: The ICO acknowledges that engaging with multiple regulators can be resource intensive, especially for SMEs. The ICO will work with the Digital Regulation Cooperation Forum to simplify this process, and would encourage legislation to simplify information sharing between regulators.
Read the letter from the ICO.
Trump Department of Labor Signals Likely Retreat from Biden Era Independent Contractor Classification Rule
We’ve written before about the “tennis match” that describes how, with changes in presidential parties, the Department of Labor (DOL) has proposed different tests to determine whether workers are “employes” covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) or “independent contractors” who are exempt from FLSA coverage. Indeed, with the new administration taking office last month, the DOL looks to be setting up a new volley in this ongoing match.
Current Status: Incoming DOL Leadership Is Reassessing the Agency’s Position
The Trump 2.0-era DOL had been slated to defend the Biden-era DOL Independent Contractor Rule (the “2024 Independent Contractor Rule”) in oral arguments before a federal appeals court in early February 2025. See Frisard’s Transp., LLC v. United States DOL, No. 24-30223.
But the DOL secured a postponement to decide how to proceed and is now due to provide the court a status update by March 25, 2025. (Frisard’s is one of five lawsuits challenging the 2024 Independent Contractor Rule.)
Likely Future Status: Farewell to the Short-Lived 2024 Independent Contractor Rule
We can expect that the DOL will drop its defense of the 2024 Independent Contractor Rule, which had rescinded the Trump 1.0-era test for independent contractor classification under the FLSA (the “2021 Independent Contractor Rule”).
Incoming DOL leadership might restore the 2021 Independent Contractor Rule or might just let courts analyze classification questions without agency guidance.
What Does This All Mean for Employers?
The back-and-forth over different administrations’ DOL rules can leave one’s head spinning. Let’s review what this latest volley will mean for employers.
If the 2021 Independent Contractor Rule is restored, it means a five-factor test to determine worker classification, with two being “core” factors: the nature and degree of the worker’s control over the work, and the worker’s opportunity for profit or loss. (By contrast, the 2024 Independent Contractor Rule being challenged uses a six-factor test, with a “totality of circumstances approach.”) The 2021 Independent Contractor Rule was generally viewed as simpler and more employer friendly, but it was no free pass, either. It made clear that actual practice dictates whether a worker is properly classified, not contractual labels or the parties’ preference.
If the DOL declines to issue guidance, courts will continue to do what they’ve long done anyway — reference their own precedents, which frankly consider the same types of factors identified in the both the 2021 and 2024 Independent Contractor Rules to determine if a worker is an employee or independent contractor. These classification analyses are fact-intensive and case-specific.
Amidst Flip-Flopping, Constant Good Advice: Be Careful When Classifying Workers as Independent Contractors
That fact-intensive judicial analysis is good reason to proceed with caution when classifying workers as independent contractors, even with an anticipated pro-employer bend at the DOL. (Indeed, the game-changing Loper Bright decision last summer means any DOL interpretation of the arguably ambiguous term “employee” in the FLSA is not entitled to judicial deference, anyway.) Therefore, it still behooves employers to ask themselves some key questions when classifying workers as independent contractors:
What is the nature and degree of control that the worker has over their own work? For example, does the company set the worker’s schedule, supervise their performance, or control pricing for their services?
What type of opportunity for profit or loss does the worker have? For example, is the worker making entrepreneurial investments in their services?
Is the relationship with the worker non-exclusive?
Is the worker providing services on a project-specific or sporadic basis, rather than indefinitely or continuously?
Are the worker’s services integral to the company’s principal business?
Do company employees perform the same type of services as the worker?
Does the worker bring a special or unique skill?
Where is the worker located? Remember, some states have very stringent so-called ABC-tests that would classify many workers as employees, even if the other factors outlined above are satisfied.
Companies uncertain about their classification decisions should reach out to counsel for advice.
Wearable Technologies and Employment Risks – EEOC Issues New Guidance
From smart watches to exoskeletons, wearable technologies are quickly changing the landscape of the American workplace. Several states and administrative agencies have responded to this shift by enacting new laws and issuing regulatory guidance concerning the use of such technologies. The latest of these responses includes a fact sheet issued by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) titled “Wearables in the Workplace: Using Wearable Technologies Under Federal Employment Discrimination Laws.” The fact sheet provides guidance on how employers can use wearable technologies while maintaining compliance with various federal employment laws. More broadly, the fact sheet signals growing concern over the use of employee-monitoring technologies.
The General State of Wearable Technologies
Wearable technologies are digital devices worn or carried by employees that are used to track and collect certain types of information. Smart watches and GPS devices are common examples of wearable technologies. However, wearable technologies include a broad range of devices, such as environmental or proximity sensors which alert employees of nearby hazards, smart glasses or helmets which measure electrical activity in the brain, and exoskeletons which provide employees with increased strength and mobility.
Wearable technologies are becoming increasingly common in the workplace – and for good reason. By augmenting employees’ physical and perceptual abilities, these technologies can enhance workplace productivity and safety. Wearable technologies can be particularly valuable for companies struggling with an aging workforce or shortages of skilled labor. They can also be particularly valuable in construction, manufacturing, and warehousing industries which experience hundreds of thousands of non-fatal injuries and thousands of fatal injuries per year.
However, these benefits come with risks. One of the biggest risks is employee privacy. Several state and federal laws, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and state biometric information laws, protect certain information given by employees to their employers. Other risks include employee health, data security, and data interpretation. Since the wearable technologies industry is likely to expand in the future, government regulators have started to enact new laws and to adapt existing laws to account for these risks. The EEOC fact sheet on wearable technologies represents one piece related to this growing concern.
EEOC Guidance on Wearable Technologies
The EEOC’s recent guidance on wearable technologies provides several important considerations for employers. The EEOC has explained how employers can implement wearable technologies in the workplace while maintaining compliance with a variety of federal employment laws. It remains to be seen whether the EEOC under the Trump Administration will rescind or amend this guidance that was issued at the end of Biden’s Administration.
Medical Examinations and Disability-Related Inquiries
The EEOC’s guidance provides that wearable technologies may constitute “medical examinations” and/or “disability-related inquiries” in violation of the ADA.
To determine whether a test or procedure is a medical examination under the ADA, the EEOC will consider several factors, including whether the test measures an employee’s performance, whether the test is normally given in a medical setting, and whether medical equipment is used. Wearable technologies may be deemed to be conducting medical examinations when they track and collect information about an employee’s physical or mental condition, such as blood pressure monitors and eye trackers. Wearable technologies may also be deemed to be conducting medical examinations where they are conducting diagnostic testing, such as EEGs.
Disability-related inquiries, on the other hand, are questions that are likely to elicit information about an employee’s disability. Employers may be making disability-related inquiries where employees are required to provide health information, such as information about prescription drug use or a disability, in connection with using wearable technologies.
The ADA generally limits medical examinations and disability-related inquiries to situations where they are “job related and consistent with business necessity.” This may include situations where an employee makes a request for reasonable accommodation or where an employer is concerned that an employee poses a direct threat of serious harm due to their medical condition. Medical examinations and disability-related inquiries are also permitted: (1) when required under federal law or safety regulations; (2) for certain employees in positions affecting public safety, such as police officers or firefighters; and (3) when they are voluntary and part of an employee health program. If an employer uses wearable technologies to conduct medical examinations or disability-related inquiries outside of one of these exceptions, under the EEOC’s guidance, the employer risks violating the ADA.
Non-Discrimination
The EEOC’s guidance also provides that employers must not use information collected by wearable technologies to discriminate against employees based on a protected characteristic. Protected characteristics include, but are not limited to, race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, disability, and genetic information.
For example, according to the EEOC, employers may violate non-discrimination laws by:
Using data from wearable technologies to infer that an employee is pregnant, then taking an adverse action against the employee as a result.
Relying on data from wearable technologies which produces less accurate results for certain protected classes, then taking adverse actions against those employees based on that data.
Tracking an employee to a medical center and then researching the purpose of the employee’s visit in a way that elicits genetic information.
Moreover, employers may not selectively use wearable technologies on a discriminatory basis nor use information from wearable technologies to make employment decisions which have a disproportionate adverse effect on the basis of a protected characteristic.
Reasonable Accommodations
The EEOC’s guidance also suggests that employers may need to make exceptions to the use of wearable technologies as reasonable accommodations under Title VII (religious belief, practice, or observance), the ADA (disability), or the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions).
Confidentiality
If an employer collects medical or disability-related data from wearable technologies, the employer, generally, must maintain that data in separate medical files and treat it as confidential medical information.
Other Laws and Guidance on Wearable Technologies
The guidance expressed in the EEOC fact sheet is similar to that presented by other administrative agencies. For example, the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) former General Counsel Jennifer Abruzzo issued a memorandum in October 2022 addressing various technologies in the workplace, including wearable technologies. The memorandum warned that wearable technologies may impair or negate employees’ ability to engage in protected activity due to “the potential for omnipresent surveillance.”
In addition, several state legislatures have enacted laws regulating employee-monitoring technologies, including wearable technologies. Some of these laws regulate the collection and handling of employee biometric information.[1] Other laws regulate certain forms of employee location tracking,[2] or regulate employee surveillance more broadly.[3]
Key Takeaways
Employers who use wearable technologies in the workplace should:
Assess the type of information collected by the wearable technologies and determine whether that collection would constitute an improper medical examination or disability-related inquiry under the ADA.
Evaluate the accuracy and validity of the information collected by the wearable technologies before making any adverse employment decisions based on that information.
Refrain from using information collected by wearable technologies to discriminate against employees on the basis of a protected characteristic.
Consider whether any state or local laws govern the use of wearable technologies or the information collected by the wearable technologies.
Because the legal framework governing wearable technologies is quickly evolving, employers would be wise to consult with employment counsel to ensure their continued compliance with federal and state laws, regulations, and guidance.
Note: Since this post was written, the EEOC Fact Sheet appears to have been removed from the EEOC website. This may indicate that the new administration is not inclined to follow or issue the same guidance.
FOOTNOTES
[1] See, e.g., 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 14/1 et seq.; Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 503.001; Wash. Rev. Code § 19.375; H.B. 24-1130, 74th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg Sess. (Colo. 2024).
[2] See, e.g., Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378‑102; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:6B-22; Cal. Penal Code § 637.7; N.H. Rev. Stat. § 644-A:4.
[3] See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 52-C; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 31-48d.
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