OFAC Sanctions Russia’s Energy Sector
In an effort to reduce Russian energy revenues being used to fund the war against Ukraine, on January 10, 2025, the United States Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), issued a “determination” that subjects the energy sector of the Russian Federation to significant sanctions.
In parallel, OFAC issued a determination that prohibits exportation of petroleum services to Russia from the United States or by U.S. persons wherever located.
Designation of Russia’s Energy Sector. The determination pursuant to Section 1(a)(i) of Executive Order 14024, which took effect on January 10, 2025, designates the energy sector of the Russian Federation economy as a sanctioned sector. As explained by OFAC in FAQ 1214 (issued in conjunction with the determination), not all persons that operate or that have operated in the energy sector are now sanctioned. Rather, the designation enables the Secretary of the Treasury in consultation with the Secretary of State (or vice versa), to impose sanctions on any person, entity, or vessel determined to be operating, or to have been operating, in the Russian energy sector. Any such person, entity, or vessel is now at sanctions risk, and contractual counterparties are on notice that transactions with or involving anyone in the Russian energy sector may be prohibited or blocked without warning.
Pursuant to the authority thus granted, the Secretary of the Treasury immediately listed as Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) Russia’s two leading energy companies (Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas), as well as numerous vessels, vessel owners, oil traders, oilfield service providers, insurance companies, and Russian energy officials. Any property or interest in property of anyone listed as an SDN in the possession or control of a U.S. person, must be blocked (i.e., frozen). Any property or interest in property of any entity owned 50% or more by one or more SDN-listed persons or entities must likewise be blocked. The designations prohibit any U.S. person (including any person in the United States) from providing funds, goods, or services to, and from receiving funds, goods, or services from, any blocked person or entity.
The term “energy sector” will be formally defined in forthcoming OFAC regulations. FAQ 1213 sets out the anticipated definition, which will include “activities such as the procurement, exploration, extraction, drilling, mining, harvesting, production, refinement, liquefaction, gasification, regasification, conversion, enrichment, fabrication, manufacturing, testing, financing, distribution, purchase or transport to, from, or involving the Russian Federation, of petroleum, including crude oil, lease condensates, unfinished oils, natural gas, liquefied natural gas, natural gas liquids, or petroleum products, or other products capable of producing energy, such as coal, wood, or agricultural products used to manufacture biofuels; the development, production, testing, generation, transmission, financing, or exchange of power, through any means, including nuclear, electrical, thermal, and renewable, to, from, or involving the Russian Federation; and any related activities, including the provision or receipt of goods, services, or technology to, from, or involving the energy sector of the Russian Federation economy.”
Prohibition on Petroleum Services. The determination pursuant to Section 1(a)(ii) of Executive Order 14071, titled “Prohibition on Petroleum Services,” will take effect at 12:01 am EST on February 27, 2025. It generally prohibits “[t]he exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States, or by a United States person, wherever located, of petroleum services to any person located in the Russian Federation.”
The term “petroleum services” will be formally defined in forthcoming OFAC regulations. FAQ 1216 sets out the anticipated definition, which will include “services related to the exploration, drilling, well completion, production, refining, processing, storage, maintenance, transportation, purchase, acquisition, testing, inspection, transfer, sale, trade, distribution, or marketing of petroleum, including crude oil and petroleum products, as well as any activities that contribute to Russia’s ability to develop its domestic petroleum resources, or the maintenance or expansion of Russia’s domestic production and refining. This would include services related to natural gas as a byproduct of oil production in Russia.”
General Licenses. OFAC has also issued several general licenses (GL) that mitigate the immediate impact of the determinations. Existing transactions that fall within the prohibitions may be wound down until either February 27 or March 12, 2025, depending on the Russian entity involved (GL 8L, 117, 118, 119). Activities necessary for the health or safety of crews on sanctioned vessels are authorized until February 27, 2025, as are vessel repairs necessary to protect the environment (GL 120). Petroleum services related to three major energy projects (the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, Tengizchevroil, and Sakhalin-2) are authorized until June 28, 2025 (GL 121).
OFAC’s latest salvo against the Russian Federation mandates heightened caution in dealing with the Russian energy sector. Anyone planning or currently involved in such activity would be well-advised to consult with experienced sanctions counsel. Katten stands ready to assist.
The BR International Trade Report: January 2025
Recent Developments
President Biden blocks Nippon Steel’s acquisition of US Steel. On January 3, President Biden announced that he would block the $15 billion sale of U.S. Steel to Japan’s Nippon Steel, citing national security concerns. President Biden’s decision came after the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”) reportedly deadlocked in its review of the transaction and referred the matter to the President. U.S. Steel and Nippon Steel condemned the President’s action in a joint statement, arguing it marked “a clear violation of due process and the law governing CFIUS,” and on January 6 filed suit challenging the measure.
Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announces his resignation as party leader and prime minister. On January 6, Prime Minister Trudeau, who has served as the Liberal Party leader since 2013 and prime minister since 2015, declared his intention to “resign as party leader, as prime minister, after the party selects its next leader through a robust, nationwide, competitive process.” Governor General Mary Simon suspended, or prorogued, the Canadian Parliament until March 24 to allow the Liberal Party time to select its new leader—who will replace Trudeau as prime minister leading up to the general elections, which must be held by October 20. Separately, details have begun to leak of the potential Canadian retaliation against President-elect Trump’s threatened tariffs on Canadian goods. This retaliation could include tariffs on certain steel, ceramics, plastics, and orange juice.
U.S. Department of Commerce announces new export controls for AI chips. On January 13, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) issued a new interim final rule in an effort to keep advanced artificial intelligence (“AI”) chips from foreign adversaries. The interim final rule seeks to implement a three-tiered system of export restrictions. Under the new rule, (i) certain allied countries would face no new restrictions, (ii) non-allied countries would face certain restrictions, and (iii) U.S. adversaries would face almost absolute restrictions. BIS followed up with another rule on January 15 imposing heightened export controls for foundries and packaging companies exporting advanced chips, with exceptions for exports to an approved list of chip designers and for chips packaged by certain approved outsourced semiconductor assembly and test services (“OSAT”) companies.
Biden Administration imposes sanctions against Russia’s energy sector in parting blow. On January 10, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”) issued determinations authorizing the imposition of sanctions against any person operating in Russia’s energy sector and prohibiting U.S. persons from supplying petroleum services to Russia, and designated two oil majors—Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas—among others.
BIS issues final ICTS rule on connected vehicle imports and begins review of drone supply chain. On January 14, BIS issued a final rule under the Information and Communications Technology and Services (“ICTS”) supply chain regulations prohibiting the import of certain connected vehicles and connected vehicle hardware, capping a rulemaking process that started in March 2024. The rules, which will have a significant impact on the auto industry supply chain, will apply in certain cases to model year 2027 and in certain other cases to model year 2029. (See our alert on BIS’s proposed rule from September 2024.) Meanwhile, BIS launched an ICTS review on January 2 into the potential risk associated with Chinese and Russian involvement in the supply chains of unmanned aircraft systems, issuing an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
China implicated in cyberattack on the U.S. Treasury. In December, a China state-sponsored Advanced Persistent Threat (“APT”) actor hacked Treasury, using a stolen key. Reports suggest that attack targeted Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”), which administers U.S. sanctions programs, among other elements of Treasury. Initial reporting indicated that only unclassified documents were accessed by hackers, although the extent of the attack is still largely unknown. The Chinese government has denied involvement.
United Kingdom joins the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. On December 15, the United Kingdom officially joined the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (“CPTPP”)—a trade agreement between Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam—nearly four years after submitting its 2021 application. The United Kingdon is the first non-founding country to join the CPTPP.
Fallout of failed presidential martial law declaration continues in South Korea. South Korea continues to face unrest after last month’s short-lived declaration of martial law by President Yoon Suk Yeol, which led to his December 14 impeachment and January 15 arrest by anti-corruption investigators. On December 27, the National Assembly also impeached Prime Minister Han Duk-soo, who had been serving as acting president for the two weeks following Yoon’s impeachment. Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok now serves as acting president, and faces calls from South Korean investigators to order the presidential security service to comply with a warrant for President Yoon’s arrest.
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative initiates investigation into legacy chips from China. In late December, U.S. Trade Representative (“USTR”) Katherine Tai announced a new Section 301 investigation “regarding China’s acts, policies, and practices related to the targeting of the semiconductor industry for dominance.” The USTR will focus its initial investigation on “legacy chips,” which are integral to the U.S. manufacturing economy. The USTR began accepting written comments and requests to appear at the hearing on January 6. The public hearing is scheduled for March 11-12.
President-elect Donald Trump eyes the Panama Canal and Greenland. At the December 2024 annual conference for Turning Point USA, President-elect Donald Trumpcriticized Panama’s management of the Panama Canal, indicating that the United States should reclaim control due to “exorbitant prices” to American shipping and naval vessels and Chinese influence in the Canal Zone. Panamanian President José Raúl Mulino rejected Trump’s claims, stating “[t]he canal is Panamanian and belongs to Panamanians. There’s no possibility of opening any kind of conversation around this reality.” President-elect Trump also has sought to revive his 2019 proposal to purchase Greenland from Denmark, emphasizing its strategic position in the Arctic and untapped natural resources. In response, Greenland’s Prime Minister Mute Egede stated that Greenland is not for sale, but would “work with the U.S.—yesterday, today, and tomorrow.”
Nicolás Maduro sworn in for third presidential term, despite disputed election results. On January 10, Nicolás Maduro Moros was inaugurated for another six-year term as president of Venezuela, despite evidence he lost the election to opposition candidate Edmundo González Urrutia. Gonzalez, recognized by the Biden Administration as the president-elect of Venezuela, met with President Biden in the White House on January 6. In response to Maduro’s inauguration, the United States announced new sanctions programs against Maduro associates and extended the 2023 designation of Venezuela for Temporary Protected Status by 18 months.
U.S. Department of Defense designates more entities on Chinese Military Companies list. In its annual update of the Chinese Military Companies list (“CMC list”), the Department of Defense (“DoD”) added dozens of Chinese companies to the list, including well-known technology, AI, and battery companies, bringing the total number of CMC List entities to 134. Beginning in June 2026, DoD is prohibited from dealing with the newly designated companies.
European Union and China consider summit to mend ties. On January 14, European Council President António Costa and Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke via phone call, reportedly agreeing to host a summit on May 6, 2025—the 50th anniversary of EU-China diplomatic relations. The conversation comes just days before the inauguration of President-elect Donald Trump, who has threatened additional tariffs on Chinese goods and pushed the European Union to further decouple from China. Despite Beijing’s and Brussels’s willingness to meet, China-EU trade tensions remain high, highlighted by the European Commission’s October decision to impose duties of up to 35% on Chinese-made electric vehicles.
What Will the New FTC Do With the Green Guides?
The incoming administration will change the Federal Trade Commission leadership. Chair Lina Khan, whose term has expired, is leaving, making way for a new majority of three Republican Commissioners. Andrew Ferguson will become the new Chair and Melissa Holyoak will stay on as a Republican Commissioner. President-Elect Trump has stated that he intends to nominate Mark Meador to occupy the seat of the departing Chair Khan. If confirmed, Meador will become the third Republican Commissioner. Expected to stay on are Democratic Commissioners Slaughter and Bedoya. Thus, following the expected confirmation of Mr. Meador, a Republican majority will control the FTC.
The FTC proposed revisions to its well-known Green Guides two years ago. It subsequently held a workshop on Recycling Claims and an informal hearing regarding the Energy Labeling Rule. Most commentators had expected to see final revisions to the Guides released in 2024. But, this has not happened, begging the questions of “what’s the holdup,” “what changes, if any, to the current draft will Republicans seek,” and “what is the new timetable for release?”
The holdup is most likely a result of the changing administration. Commissioner Ferguson notably dissented from the new, narrowed Junk Fees Rule solely because he did not believe the outgoing Commission should issue new rules. Therefore, we certainly do not believe we will see a revision to the Green Guides before the Inauguration.
One would also not expect to see revised Guides until Commissioner Meador (or whoever takes that seat) assumes office and has an opportunity to review the draft. Assuming he agrees with the proposed Guides, one might expect to see revisions issued in mid-2025. If he or others demand changes, however, that could take longer.
The Guides will probably remain as Guides. Although speculation had circulated that recycling claims might be broken off into a new rule, the change in the composition of the Commission makes new rules less likely in general.
For these reasons, the Guides are likely to be issued in 2025. They provide much-needed clarity to marketers that is welcomed irrespective of political affiliation. However, are there adjustments one might expect from the direction that had been conjectured for the Guides?
Although FTC Staff, who work across administrations, are tight-lipped regarding the Guides’ content, a few areas seem to be more politically fraught than others.
Recycling claims are one of those areas. Although there had been considerable chatter from activists regarding the use of the term “recycling” to refer to thermal reprocessing of plastics, a firm stance in the Guides on the issue now seems less likely. Case law had generally interpreted the term “recyclable” to refer to any material that can be recycled, regardless of whether it is actually recycled, and it seems less likely that the newly constituted Commission would issue guidance attempting to influence the courts’ stance.
Moreover, many states have begun to pass their own recycling laws – often referred to as “Extended Producer Responsibility” (or “EPR”) laws. Therefore, one would expect softer language from the FTC here (or less change to the existing guidance) in favor of allowing states to implement their own rules.
“Carbon claims” is another prominent area in which many had urged the Commission to take action. The GOP has signaled mistrust of collaborations to promote “ESG”, and it seems that mistrust might carry over at the FTC to enhanced scrutiny of non-governmental efforts to promote collective actions regarding carbon emissions reduction. Carbon offsets often fall into this bucket, so we do not believe the new Commission will be particularly friendly to voluntary carbon markets. Thus, one might expect to see a new section of the Guides setting out stringent requirements regarding making carbon neutrality claims. One would also expect the Guides to require rigorous support for aspirational environmental claims relating to carbon reduction and energy savings.
Consistent with the GOP skepticism regarding the efficacy of human efforts to combat climate change, the new Guides will likely spell out the need for competent and reliable scientific evidence to bolster any corporate activity claimed to reduce climate change. That could be a tall order for many companies, so one would expect to see a softer approach to such claims going forward. I have been informed by prominent consultants that the acronym “ESG” is on shaky ground, as it has been frequently invoked to include diversity, equity and inclusion programs. As the pendulum swings back, expect to see the term “environmental” more often used in place of “ESG.”
Claims of “sustainability” are also likely to come in for enhanced scrutiny in any Guide revision. Some activities that had been touted for sustainable features may be questioned by the majority, so the use of the term could be constrained more substantially than originally contemplated. One can expect the new guides to treat “sustainability” claims as general environmental benefit claims, which must be qualified. That has already been the practice among most reputable corporations.
Given the importance of the Green Guides, revisions are long overdue. Canada and the EU have already passed new restrictions on environmental claims, so the United States lags internationally. There is likely to be pressure on the U.S. government to update these “rules for the road,” lest the international standards become the de facto rules by which corporate America must live.
Mexico Increases Textile Sector Tariffs and Amends IMMEX Decree
On Dec. 19, 2024, the “Decree modifying the tariff on the General Import and Export Tax Law and the Decree for the Promotion of the Manufacturing, Maquila and Export Services Industry” (Decree) published in the Official Gazette of the Federation, through which the Mexican government seeks to establish two measures protecting domestic textile production.
Tariff Increases
Through the Decree, the Mexican government made temporary changes in the tariffs on several items included in the General Import and Export Tax Law, which will be effective until April 23, 2026. Such adjustments, which cover 155 items, correspond to the following chapters:
15% Tariff
–
Chapter 52 (cotton)
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Chapter 55 (synthetic or artificial staple fibers)
–
Chapter 58 (special woven fabrics, textile fabrics, lace, tapestries, trimmings, and embroidery)
–
Chapter 60 (knitted fabrics)
35% Tariff
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Chapter 61 (articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted)
–
Chapter 62 (articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted)
–
Chapter 63 (other made-up textile articles, sets, worn clothing, worn textile articles, and rags)
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Tariff item number 9404.40.01 (footmuffs, quilts, comforters, and blankets)
These tariffs apply only to products originating in countries with which Mexico does not have free trade agreements.
Modifications to the IMMEX Program
The Dec. 19 Decree also changes the IMMEX Decree, adding new restrictions to Annex I, which lists “Goods that cannot be temporarily imported under the IMMEX program.” The IMMEX (Manufacturing, Maquiladora, and Export Services Industry Program) program is designed to promote the development of companies engaged in manufacturing and assembly activities for export purposes in Mexico. The changes to the Annex I affect several items under chapters 61, 62, and 63 of the General Import and Export Tax Law, with some exceptions. The government has also added other subheadings from this law to the restricted list.
Conclusion
The increase in tariffs on specific fractions of the textile industry, along with the addition of more restricted tariff items under the IMMEX program, could impact both importers and companies operating under IMMEX. Importers may face higher costs due to increased duties, which could affect their profit margins and competitiveness in the market. Similarly, IMMEX program participants might experience disruptions in their supply chains and increased operational costs, limiting their ability to efficiently import and export goods. These changes highlight the need for careful consideration of the potential consequences on trade and business operations.
FTC Finalizes Long-Awaited Updates to Children’s Privacy Rule
On January 16, 2025, the FTC announced the issuance of updates to the FTC’s Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule (the “Rule”), which implements the federal Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (“COPPA”). The updates to the Rule come more than five years after the FTC initiated a rule review. The Commission vote on the Rule was 5-0, with various Commissioners filing separate statements. The updated Rule, which will be published in the Federal Register, contains several significant changes, but also stops short of the version proposed by the FTC in January 2024. The Rule will go into effect 60 days after its publication in the Federal Register; most entities subject to the Rule will have one year after publication to comply.
Key updates to the Rule include:
Requirement to obtain opt-in consent for targeted advertising to children and other disclosures of children’s personal information to third parties: The Rule will require operators of child-directed websites or online services to obtain separate verifiable parental consent before disclosing children’s personal information to third parties. According to a statement filed by outgoing FTC Chair Lina Khan, this means that operators will be prohibited from selling children’s personal information or disclosing it for targeted advertising purposes unless parents separately agree and opt in to these uses.
Limits on data retention: The Rule will prevent operators from retaining children’s personal information for longer than necessary than the specific documented purposes for which the data was collected. Operators also must maintain a written data retention policy that (1) details the specific business need for retaining children’s personal information and (2) sets forth a timeline for deleting this data. Operators may not retain children’s personal information indefinitely.
Changes to key definitions: The Rule also makes several changes to the definitions that govern its application. For example, the definition of “personal information” now includes biometric identifiers that can be used for the automated or semi-automated recognition of a child (e.g., fingerprints, handprints, retina patterns, iris patterns, genetic data – including a DNA sequence, voiceprints, gait patterns, facial templates, or faceprints). In addition, the factors the Commission will take into account in considering whether a website or service is “directed to children” will be expanded to include marketing or promotional materials or plans, representations to consumers or third parties, reviews by users or third parties and the ages of users on similar websites or services.
Increased Safe Harbor transparency: FTC-approved COPPA Safe Harbor programs are required to identify in their annual reports to the Commission each operator subject to the self-regulatory program (“subject operator”) and all approved websites or online services, as well as any subject operator that left the program during the time period covered by the annual report. The Safe Harbor programs also must outline their business models in greater detail and provide copies of each consumer complaint related to a member’s violation of the program’s guidelines. In addition, Safe Harbor programs must publicly post a list of all current subject operators and, for each such operator, list each certified website or online service.
Importantly, the Rule is notable for what it does not contain.
No EdTech changes: Despite having proposed imposing a wide range of obligations on EdTech companies operating in the education space, the Rule avoids incorporating any education-related requirements. According to the FTC, because the Department of Education has indicated its intention to update its FERPA regulations (34 C.F.R. 99), the Commission sought to avoid changing COPPA in any way that might conflict with the DOE’s eventual amendments. Instead, the Commission states it will continue to enforce COPPA in the EdTech context consistent with its existing guidance.
No coverage of user engagement techniques: The Rule does not incorporate the proposal to require parental notification and consent for the collection of data used to encourage or prompt children’s prolonged use of a website or online service. The Commission indicated that, after reviewing the public comments, it believes the proposed use restriction “was overly broad and would constrain beneficial prompts and notifications.” The FTC cautioned, however, that it nevertheless may pursue enforcement under Section 5 of the FTC Act in appropriate cases to address unfair or deceptive acts or practices encouraging prolonged use of websites and online services that increase risks of harm to children.
Personalization and contextual advertising still exempted: The Rule does not limit the “support for the internal operations” exemption under COPPA to exclude operator-driven personalization or contextual advertising.
No need to tie personal information collected to specific uses: The Rule will not require that operators correlate each data element collected online from children to the particular use(s) of such data element.
In voting in support of the revised Rule, incoming FTC Chair Andrew Ferguson filed a separate statement expressing what he termed “serious problems” with the Rule, which he blamed on “the result of the outgoing administration’s irresponsible rush to issue last-minute rules.” Ferguson would have required the Rule to clarify instances in which an operator’s addition of third parties to whom they provide children’s personal information would trigger a need for updated notice and refreshed consent. He also took issue with the prohibition on indefinite retention of children’s personal information, predicting that it “is likely to generate outcomes hostile to users.” Finally, he indicated his belief that the FTC missed an opportunity to make clear the Rule is not an obstacle to the use of children’s personal information solely for the purpose of age verification.
As the (Customs and Trade) World Turns: January 2025
Welcome to the January 2025 issue of “As the (Customs and Trade) World Turns,” our monthly newsletter where we compile essential updates from the customs and trade world over the past month. We bring you the most recent and significant insights in an accessible format, concluding with our main takeaways — aka “And the Fox Says…” — on what you need to know.
This edition provides essential insights for sectors including International Trade, Aluminum and Steel Industries, Fashion and Retail, E-commerce, Automotive, and Compliance, as well as for in-house counsel, importers, and compliance professionals.
In this January 2025 edition, we cover:
Federal Circuit deliberates on Section 301 tariffs: a landmark case for importers.
Aluminum extrusions import dispute: CIT to review ITC’s negative determination.
CBP’s proposed rule for low-value shipments: CBP’s attempts to enhance efficiency and security.
Forced labor enforcement intensifies: new challenges and strategic shifts.
Mexico’s textile and apparel tariff hikes: navigating new import challenges.
CFIUS controversy: presidential block on Nippon-US Steel deal sparks legal battle.
Temporary sanctions relief: OFAC authorizes limited transactions, maintaining key restrictions.
1. Section 301 Tariffs Appeal: Federal Circuit Hears Oral Argument
On January 8, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) heard the oral argument in HMTX Industries LLC v. United States, a pivotal case challenging the legality of tariffs imposed on Chinese-origin goods under Lists 3 and 4A of the Section 301 tariff regime. These tariffs, which cover approximately $320 billion in goods, have been challenged by over 4,000 importers.
Central to the case is whether the US Trade Representative’s (USTR) actions expanding tariffs to the Lists 3 and 4A qualify as a permissible “modification” of the original Section 301 action (covering Lists 1 and 2) under Section 307 of the Trade Act of 1974. The plaintiffs argued that the term “modify” allows only moderate or minor adjustments to the original tariffs, which targeted $50 billion in goods. The judges explored whether the statutory language supports such limits and considered distinctions between this case and prior rulings interpreting a different section of the Trade Act that limited “modification” to smaller adjustments.
The panel also examined whether China’s retaliatory tariffs, which formed the basis for USTR’s tariff increases under Lists 3 and 4A, were sufficiently linked to the intellectual property violations initially investigated under Section 301. The plaintiffs argued these actions were distinct, while the government claimed they were part of the broader context of unfair practices. A final issue was whether USTR’s authority to modify tariffs when an action is “no longer appropriate” could justify broader increases, with the judges probing the potential limits of this provision.
And the Fox Says…: The CAFC is expected to issue a decision before the end of this year, though further appeals could extend the litigation into 2026. A final ruling for the plaintiffs could lead to refunds of tariffs paid under Lists 3 and 4A for those participating in the litigation, and to the end of any Lists 3 and 4A tariffs. More broadly, the decision could constrain future tariff actions, particularly those being contemplated by President-elect Donald Trump in his second term or validate such escalation of tariffs.
2. Challenging the US International Trade Commission’s Decision: Implications of the Appeal on Aluminum Extrusions Imports
On November 26, 2024, the petitioners, US Aluminum Extruders Coalition (USAEC) and the United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union (USW), filed a summons with the US Court of International Trade (CIT), contesting the US International Trade Commission’s (ITC) final negative determination in the aluminum extrusions’ antidumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) proceedings against multiple countries. As we discussed previously, on October 30, 2024, the ITC had reached a negative determination in its final phase of the antidumping and countervailing duty investigations concerning aluminum extrusions from China, Colombia, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Italy, Malaysia, Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam.
The CIT will either affirm the underlying decision by the ITC, which can then be appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, or it can remand the decision back to the ITC for further consideration of certain matters. Remand could lead to a new vote from the Commissioners sitting on the Commission at that time. If the decision by the Commission becomes affirmative, and the CIT affirms, AD/CVD orders will be issued. The appeal may be taken to the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
And the Fox Says…: Importers should closely monitor the CIT appeal. If the case is remanded and the ITC makes an affirmative determination which is affirmed by the CIT, AD/CVD orders will be imposed and estimated AD/CVD duties will have to be deposited and ultimately collected at liquidation. Please contact the AFS team if you are uncertain whether the product you import containing aluminum extrusions is within the scope of the investigations and therefore potentially subject to AD/CVD duties if the CIT remands the case and the ITC makes an affirmative determination.
3. CBP Proposes Enhanced Entry Process and Other New Rules for De Minimis Shipments
US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has announced a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) aimed at modernizing the entry process for low-value shipments, specifically those valued under $800. The proposed Entry of Low-Value Shipments (ELVS) rule is intended to increase the efficiency and security of processing these shipments in response to the rise of e-commerce. Through this process, CBP aims to expedite clearance and improve its ability to target high-risk shipments, such as those containing illicit drugs.
The ELVS rule would create a new “Enhanced Entry Process,” based on lessons learned from the Section 321 Data Pilot and Entry Type 86 test, requiring the advance electronic submission of various data elements, including the shipment contents, origin, destination, and a 10-digit Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) classification, amongst others. An HTSUS Waiver Privilege is also included in the proposal, allowing certain filers to bypass the requirement to submit an HTSUS classification, subject to certain requirements, including documented internal controls ensuring certain compliance measures. Goods that are regulated by other federal agencies and mail importations must go through the Enhanced Entry Process.
Additionally, the “Release from Manifest Process” will be renamed the “Basic Entry Process” and revised to include additional data elements for verifying eligibility for duty- and tax-free entry. Another key change is the specification that the “one person” eligible for the de minimis exception is only the owner or buyer of the goods and no longer a consignee receiving the goods. Where a person receives multiple shipments that exceed the $800 threshold in the aggregate on a single day, none of the shipments would be eligible for the de minimis program.
And the Fox Says…: The deadline to file comments to the NPRM is March 15. The ELVS rule is the first of two NPRMs announced by the Biden Administration in September 2024. A second NPRM is expected at a later date and will likely continue to build on CBP’s aggressive multi-pronged strategy. Stay tuned for a more in-depth analysis on the NPRM and its impacts.
4. Forced Labor Enforcement Updates: CIT Case to Challenge Forced Labor Finding, Auto Industry Targeted for Detentions, More Entities Added to UFLPA Entity List, Reports Scrutinize Global Supply Chains, USTR Issues Trade Strategy to Combat Forced Labor
Kingtom Challenges Forced Labor Finding
On December 23, 2024, aluminum extrusions exporter Kingtom Aluminio, a Chinese-owned company based in the Dominican Republic, filed a complaint with CIT to challenge CBP’s forced labor finding, which authorizes CBP to seize the company’s imports of aluminum extrusion and profile products at the port. In filing the suit, the company claims in part that CBP’s issuance of the finding was arbitrary or capricious and that CBP bypassed administrative steps in failing to first issue a Withhold Release Order. See Kingtom Aluminio v. US, CIT # 24-00264.
Auto Industry Targeted for UFLPA Detentions in FY 2025
Significantly, the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) dashboard statistics for FY 2025 published thus far show that CBP primarily targeted the automotive and aerospace sector, with 1,239 shipments stopped for suspected violation of the UFLPA in December alone, with a total of 2,042 shipments in the first three months of FY 2025. By way of comparison, in the entirety of FY 2024, only 197 shipments in this sector were stopped. This follows scrutiny from US Congress resulting from Sheffield University and Human Rights Watch non-governmental organization (NGO) reports alleging connections to Xinjiang in every part of the auto supply chain. These statistics may reflect a shift in the industries targeted for enforcement, which have historically focused on electronics, apparel and footwear, and industrial and manufacturing materials.
DHS Adds 37 Companies to UFLPA Entity List
On January 14, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced the addition of 37 companies to the UFLPA Entity List. These entities include companies that grow Xinjiang cotton, manufacture textiles, manufacture inputs for solar modules and the energy industry, and supply critical minerals and metals. The UFLPA Entity List is nearly 150 companies.
Reports Scrutinize Supply Chains for Forced Labor Concerns
Several reports were issued last month discussing supply chains and forced labor risks:
UMASS Amherst Labor Center issued a report covering REI’s published supplier list and alleged connections to forced labor.
Transparentem issued a report covering its investigation into conditions on cotton farms in Madhya Pradesh, India. The report warned that the NGOs could not definitively link the problematic farms to the specific supply chains of brands and retailers.
The Financial Times published a report discussing billions of dollars invested by environmental, social, and governance funds linked to forced labor in Xinjiang.
In its first ever Quadrennial Supply Chain Review, the White House recommended upgrades to trade legislation to strengthen supply chains.
USTR Issues Trade Strategy to Combat Forced Labor
On January 13, USTR issued a trade strategy to combat forced labor that outlines the actions the United States is taking and considering to address forced labor in global supply chains. We will outline the USTR’s strategy in our forthcoming 2025 forced labor guide for global businesses.
And the Fox Says…: Forced labor enforcement has shown no signs of slowing down, and we anticipate that enforcement will remain steady or even increase as the Trump Administration assumes office later this month, particularly due to US Sen. Marco Rubio’s (R-FL) nomination as Secretary of State. Companies in the solar, textile, and apparel industries specifically should review the recent additions to the UFLPA Entity List to confirm whether any entities listed are in their supply chains.
Recent reports have focused on the global supply chains of fashion and apparel brands and critical industries, underscoring the importance for companies in the United States and globally to monitor these reports to ensure their supply chains are not associated with forced labor risks. While companies have been encouraged to release their supplier lists, this comes with some risk, as NGOs have scrutinized the labor practices of publicly disclosed suppliers.
Finally, as we previously discussed, the Kingtom Aluminio CIT litigation joins other cases where importers and affected companies have filed suit against CBP for issues related to forced labor enforcement. As forced labor enforcement efforts intensify, we should continue to expect legal disputes over forced labor allegations in global supply chains. To date, we have not seen a final decision on any of the cases.
5. Mexico Takes Aim at Textile and Apparel Sector With IMMEX Restrictions Focused on E-commerce and Increased Tariffs
Effective December 20, 2024, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum Pardo announced a decree imposing significant changes to the import regime for certain apparel and textile products, including tariff increases and restrictions on temporary imports under Mexico’s Manufacturing, Industry, Maquila and Export Services (IMMEX) program.
Mexico applied temporary tariff increases on goods imported into Mexico through April 23, 2026, as follows:
Increase to 35% for 138 Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) codes covering finished textile and apparel products, including items under Chapters 61, 62, 63, and 94.
Increase to 15% for 17 HTS codes covering textile inputs, including items under Chapters 52, 55, 58, and 60.
The decree also imposes restrictions on the temporary importation of certain textile and apparel products under the IMMEX program, which allows companies to defer duties on imported products, raw materials and components, enabling duty-free importation for manufacturing, assembly, export services such as e-commerce sales, or other programs, before re-exporting. The decree imposes restrictions on finished clothing and textile articles classified under HTS Chapters 61, 62, and 63 are excluded from the IMMEX program.
Shortly after the decree was published, Mexico’s Ministry of Economy revised the decree and exempted the IMMEX restriction for six months for goods classified in HTS chapters 61, 62, 63, and subheadings 9404.40 and 9404.90, as long as certain requirements are met.
And the Fox Says…: These changes are part of Mexico’s broader strategy to bolster its domestic textile and apparel industries, tackle compliance challenges under the IMMEX program, shield its textile and clothing sectors from alleged unfair trade practices, and possibly retaliate against the incoming administration’s proposed tariffs. Mexico’s decree could significantly affect textile and apparel importers utilizing the IMMEX program to bring goods into the United States.
Companies should reassess their import strategies, explore alternative sourcing to mitigate tariff impacts, and collaborate with trade compliance experts to navigate new regulations and optimize supply chain efficiency. The AFS team is well-equipped to assist businesses in adapting to these changes, offering expert guidance on global supply chains and duty mitigation.
6. Nippon No-Go: President Uses CFIUS Authority to Block Nippon-US Steel Acquisition, Parties Sue
On January 4, President Biden issued an executive order prohibiting the acquisition of US Steel by Japanese firm Nippon Steel, pursuant to his Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) authorities. CFIUS is an interagency committee charged with reviewing certain foreign investments in the United States for national security risks. If CFIUS finds that such a risk arises from a given transaction, it can recommend that the president prohibit the transaction. President Biden’s order follows a contentious CFIUS review process of the approximately $14 billion deal, which resulted in a “split recommendation.” Split recommendations to the president result when CFIUS cannot come to agreement whether a transaction creates national security risks. In response to the order, US Steel and Nippon Steel filed multiple lawsuits alleging, among other things, political interference in the process.
And the Fox Says…: CFIUS has entered into uncharted territory. Presidential prohibitions on their own are extremely rare; “split recommendations” by CFIUS are rarer still; and CFIUS litigation is almost unheard of. Regardless of the outcome, this case is likely to significantly shape CFIUS’ evolving role in the national security and investment space for many years to come. The results are unpredictable: buyer (and seller) beware.
7. General License Gives Temporary Sanctions Relief to Post-Assad Syria
The US Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued General License 24 on January 6, authorizing for the next six months:
Transactions with governing institutions in Syria following December 8, 2024.
Transactions in support of the sale, supply, storage, or donation of energy, including petroleum, petroleum products, natural gas, and electricity to or within Syria.
Transactions that are ordinarily incident and necessary to processing the transfer of noncommercial personal remittances to Syria, including through the Central Bank of Syria.
The license — which aims to ensure that US sanctions “do not impede essential governance-related services in Syria following the fall of Bashar al-Assad on December 8, 2024” — covers transactions that are otherwise prohibited under Syria Sanctions Regulations, the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, and the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations.
There are several important exceptions to the authorization, including most — but, crucially, not all — financial transfers to blocked persons (like Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, the organization in control of the post-Assad government) and new investments in Syria. Note that comprehensive export controls against Syria are still very much in place. Check out our full client alert here.
And the Fox Says…: Companies and individuals relying on General License 24 must make sure that their activities are in one of the three approved categories and do not fall into one of the exceptions. In the meantime, OFAC’s wait-and-see approach offers temporary but much-needed sanctions relief to the Syrian people.
William G. Stroupe II, Natalie Tantisirirat, Sylvia G. Costelloe, and Matthew Tuchband contributed to this article.
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New Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Petitions on Temporary Steel Fencing from China
On January 14, 2025, ZND US Inc (Petitioner or ZND), domestic producer of temporary steel fencing, filed petitions with the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) and the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) seeking the imposition of antidumping duties (AD) and countervailing duties (CVD) on temporary steel fencing from China. Such structures include fencing for construction sites, security perimeters, events, and animal kennels. The scope does not include permanent steel fencing.
Under U.S. law, a domestic industry may petition the United States government to initiate an AD investigation into the pricing of an imported product to determine whether it is sold in the United States at less than fair normal value prices. For market economies (which China is not), normal value is home market or third-country price, or actual cost plus reasonable profit of the foreign producer/exporter. For deemed non-market economy China, normal value is a constructed cost plus deemed reasonable profit based on surrogate values in a market economy deemed of comparable level of economic development to China.
A domestic industry also may petition for the initiation of an investigation of alleged countervailable subsidies provided by a foreign government to producers and exporters of the subject merchandise. DOC will impose AD and/or CVD duties on subject merchandise if it determines that imports of that product are dumped and/or subsidized, and if the ITC also determines that the domestic industry is materially injured or threatened with such injury by reason of imports of the subject merchandise.
The immediate activity will occur at the ITC. In the preliminary stage, the threshold to find injury from the accused imports is low such that the ITC generally finds sufficient indicia of injury to a U.S. industry from the accused imports to continue the AD/CVD investigations. If the ITC votes to continue, then the investigation moves to DOC.
If the ITC and DOC make preliminary affirmative determinations, U.S. importers will be required to post cash deposits in the amount of the AD and/or CVD duties for all entries of the subject merchandise entered on or after the date of DOC’s preliminary determinations being published in the Federal Register. Note that if there is a surge of imports from the subject countries following the filing of the petitions, DOC can find critical circumstances for a particular subject country (or producer) and instruct U.S. Customs & Border Protection (CBP) to collect cash deposits retroactively to 90 days before the date of publication of the preliminary determination.
Following further factual investigation, verification, and briefing, DOC can change the preliminary AD/CVD rates in its final determinations. AD/CVD Orders will only issue if both the DOC and ITC make affirmative final determinations. The ITC final injury investigation is more rigorous than its preliminary injury investigation, where historically 30% or so of petitions are rejected at that stage.
Scope
Petitioner requests the following product scope for the investigation:
“The merchandise subject to this investigation is temporary steel fencing. Temporary steel fencing consists of temporary steel fence panels and temporary steel fence stands. Temporary steel fence panels, when assembled with temporary steel fence stands or other types of stands outside of the scope, with each other, or with posts, create a free-standing structure. Such structures may include, but are not limited to, fencing for construction sites, security perimeters, and events, as well as animal kennels. Temporary steel fence panels are covered by the scope regardless of whether they attach to a stand or the type of stand to which they connect.
Temporary steel fence panels have a welded frame of steel tubing and an interior consisting of chain link, steel wire mesh, or other steel materials that are not more than ten millimeters in actual diameter or width. The steel tubing may surround all edges of the temporary steel fence panel or only be attached along two parallel sides of the panel. All temporary steel fence panels with at least two framed sides are covered by the scope, regardless of the number of edges framed with steel tubing.
Temporary steel fence panels are typically between 10 and 12 feet long and six to eight feet high, though all temporary steel fence panels are covered by the scope regardless of dimension. Temporary steel fence panels may be square, rectangular, or have rounded edges, and may or may not have gates, doors, wheels, or barbed wire or other features, though all temporary steel fence panels are covered by the scope regardless of shape and other features. Temporary steel fence panels may have one or more horizontal, vertical, or diagonal reinforcement tubes made of steel welded to the inside frame, though all temporary steel fence panels are covered by the scope regardless of the existence, number, or type of reinforcement tubes attached to the panel. Temporary steel fence panels may have extensions, pins, tubes, or holes at the bottom of the panel, but all temporary steel fence panels are covered regardless of the existence of such features.
Steel fence stands are shapes made of steel that stand flat on the ground and have one or two open tubes or solid pins into which temporary steel fence panels are inserted to stand erect. The steel fence stand may be made of welded steel tubing or may be a flat steel plate with one or two tubes or pins welded onto the plate for connecting the panels.
Temporary steel fencing is covered by the scope regardless of coating, painting, or other finish. Both temporary steel fence panels and temporary steel fence stands are covered by the scope, whether imported assembled or unassembled, and whether imported together or separately.
Subject merchandise includes material matching the above description that has been finished, assembled, or packaged in a third country, including by coating, painting, assembling, attaching to, or packaging with another product, or any other finishing, assembly, or packaging operation that would not otherwise remove the merchandise from the scope of the investigation if performed in the country of manufacture of the temporary steel fencing.
Temporary steel fencing is included in the scope of this investigation whether or not imported attached to, or in conjunction with, other parts and accessories such as hooks, rings, brackets, couplers, clips, connectors, handles, brackets, or latches. If temporary steel fencing is imported attached to, or in conjunction with, such non-subject merchandise, only the temporary steel fencing is included in the scope.
Merchandise covered by this investigation is currently classified in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) under the subheading 7308.90.9590. The HTSUS subheading set forth above is provided for convenience and U.S. Customs purposes only. The written description of the scope is dispositive.”
Foreign Producers and Exporters of Subject Merchandise
A list of foreign producers and exporters of temporary steel fencing, as identified in the petition, is provided in Attachment 1.
U.S. Importers of Subject Merchandise
A list of U.S. importers of temporary steel fencing, as identified in the petition, is provided in Attachment 2.
Alleged Margins of Dumping/Subsidization
Petitioners allege the following dumping import duty margins:
China: 405.19%
These are only estimates based on data most favorable to Petitioner. DOC generally assigns duties at the highest alleged dumping rate to foreign producers and exporters who fail to cooperate during the investigation as to answering DOC questionnaires to obtain an AD/CVD margin based on their actual situation.
Petitioner does not provide specific subsidy rates in the petition.
Potential Trade Impact
According to official U.S. import statistics, imports of the subject merchandise totaled 38,423 short tons in 2024, representing approximately 85% of all imports of temporary steel fencing into the United States.
Estimated Schedule of Investigations
1/14/2025
Petition filed
2/28/2025
ITC preliminary injury determination
4/9/2025
DOC preliminary CVD determination, if not postponed
6/13/2025
DOC preliminary CVD determination, if fully postponed
6/23/2025
DOC preliminary AD determination, if not postponed
7/12/2025
DOC preliminary AD determination, if fully postponed
12/26/2025
DOC final AD and CVD determinations, if both preliminary and final determinations fully postponed
2/9/2026
ITC final injury determination, if DOC’s determinations fully postponed
2/16/2026
AD/CVD orders published
FTC WENT TOO FAR: Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Upholds Findings Against Lead Generators– But Finds FTC Went Too Far in Pursuing Dead Guy’s Estate
So a while back I wrote a blog about the extremely dire consequences of violating the TCPA and TSR.
As I reported, not only were a bunch of companies hit for millions in penalties but the individual company owners were also hit with the judgment. And when one of the owners died the FTC went after his estate and sued his daughter– which is just cold blooded AF:
DEATH IS NO ESCAPE: FTC Pursues Lead Generation Company Beyond The Grave as TSR Enforcement Push Smashes All Boundaries
Yeah…
So defendants all appealed. And for the most part they all lost. But the dead guy’s estate walked away clean so there is a lesson here– violate the TCPA/TSR and the only way out… suicide.
Here was the ruling by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in FTC v. Day Pacer, 2025 WL 25217 (7th Cir. 2025):
We agree the defendants are liable and affirm the court on that front. For the companies, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that their practices are prohibited by the regulations, nor that they should have known their actions were deceptive. As for the individuals, all either knew or should have known of the companies’ illegal acts, and all had authority to prevent them.
Ouch. But the court goes on…
But we reverse and remand the decision to substitute an individual defendant’s estate upon his death and the damages award. The Commission’s suit here was a penal action, which never survives a party’s death.
Interesting, no?
Here is how the Court described the conduct of the “bad guys”:
Day Pacer LLC, and its predecessor EduTrek L.L.C., were companies that generated sales leads. Both purchased consumers’ contact information from websites, usually job-search platforms, where the consumers had entered their information. The companies would then personally call those consumers or contract with other organizations—termed “IBT Partners”—to call them, gauging the consumers’ interest in educational opportunities. If consumers expressed interest, the companies would sell their contact information to for-profit educational institutions.
Sound familiar? This is VERY common behavior for lead generators.
So what’s the issue?
Per the lower court: The court responded that consent given to vendors from whom the companies purchased the information was not sufficient; consumers must consent to each separate caller. Additionally, consumer consent after the call was placed was too late, as callers must have written consent before placing the call.
Hmmm. And what?
Well stay with me.
On appeal the Seventh Circuit found the lead generators were liable for penalties because they could not produce the actual underlying record of consent. They were able to provide urls to the FTC– but those URLs did not actually load webpages as many of them had bee taken down. The failure to provide actual records of consumer consent resulted in the judgment standing.
So it wasn’t that the lead forms were bad– its that the callers could not produce the forms when they needed them!!!
The appellate court also found that all three of the majority owners of the calling defendants had the ability to control their activities and were, therefore, PERSONALLY liable for the amount awarded.
Couple of pieces of good news for the defendants though:
Although the lower court had awarded over $28MM in penalties the appellate court found this amount was arrived at in error because the defendant’s ability to pay was not considered– that might mean a big reduction in the judgment on remand;
The Court found the FTC penalties were penal in nature and did NOT survive death. That means when one of the guys who owned the lead generation company died the FTC could not pursue his estate. So the court erred in letting the FTC pursue the dead guy’s daughter as administrator.
Obviously a massive ruling here.
Notice– these guys were not true scumbags. They thought they were calling with consent and there was no finding of any sort of fraud. Their “crime” was not being able to produce consent records– and now they are all out of business and being chased for millions of dollars.
If you are a lead generator or call center you MUST MUST MUST take possession of consent records. Do NOT just get a data push from somebody and think you’re safe! And the new one-to-one rule has massive implications here– don’t get killed!
We will keep an eye on this case on remand and report ASAP when something else breaks.
Biden Administration Issues Sweeping Salvo of Sanctions Against the Russian Energy Sector
On January 10, 2025, in a final action to, among other things, deter Russian aggression on the international stage, the US Department of the Treasury enacted sweeping new sanctions on the Russian energy sector. Specifically, the sanctions package includes:
Determination authorizing sanctions on any person to operate or have operated in Russia’s energy sector;
Determination banning provision of US petroleum services to Russia and
Imposition of blocking sanctions against major players in the oil and gas markets, vessels in the so-called “shadow fleet,” certain traders of Russian oil, Russian maritime insurers and Russian oilfield service providers.
Below we explain these actions and how they substantially increase the sanctions risks associated with Russian energy both for and beyond the directly impacted entities, as well as the General Licenses (GLs) that accompany the sanctions.
Russian Sanctions Regime Overview
On April 15, 2021, President Biden issued Executive Order (E.O.) 14024, “Blocking Property With Respect To Specified Harmful Foreign Activities of the Government of the Russian Federation,” which established a national emergency by which Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Controls (OFAC) could impose sanctions against individuals and entities furthering specified harmful foreign activities of Russia, with a focus on national security. This national emergency is separate from that related to the crisis in Ukraine, which is addressed in E.O. 13660 and its progeny.
Section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024 authorizes sanctions on certain sectors of the Russian economy as determined by Treasury and the State Department. Over the past four years, OFAC has used this authority to sanction numerous sectors of the Russian economy, such as the technology and defense sectors. However, concerns about disruptions to energy prices worldwide, and particularly in relation to European allies, has caused OFAC to stop short of sanctioning the entire Russian energy sector. Until now.
Energy Sector Sanctions (Energy Sector Determination)
Under the Energy Sector Determination OFAC has authority to sanction any party that it determines to operate or to have operated in the Russian energy sector. This determination, which took effect on January 10, 2025, exposes all persons in the energy sector to sanctions risk but it does not automatically impose sanctions on all such entities. FAQ 1214.
OFAC will, in the coming days, issue regulations defining impacted activities in Russia’s oil, nuclear, electrical, thermal and renewable sectors. FAQ 1213. This definition will be similar to the energy sector definition set forth under the Ukraine/Russia-Related sanctions in 31 CFR 589.311 but includes additional language identifying specific activities and petroleum products, reflecting developments since the Department of the Treasury issued the relevant determination on that issue pursuant to E.O. 13662 in 2014.
Prohibition on Petroleum Services to Russia (Services Determination)
The Services Determination, which comes into effect on February 27, 2025, prohibits US persons from providing, directly or indirectly, most petroleum services to Russia. OFAC plans to issue regulations defining “petroleum services” to include those related to oil exploration, production, refining, storage, transportation, distribution and marketing, among others. Significantly, however, OFAC confirmed this determination does not ban all US services for maritime transportation of Russian oil, provided services comply with applicable price caps and do not involve blocked parties. FAQ 1217.
Blocking Sanctions
In addition to these sectoral sanctions determinations, OFAC imposed blocking sanctions on numerous entities by adding them to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list. Blocking sanctions freeze assets or other property of the SDN, and immediately impose a blanket prohibition against US entities, directly or indirectly, transacting with or for the benefit of the assets. This prohibition extends to entities owned more than 50 percent by SDNs. Further, US law makes it a crime to “violate, attempt to violate, conspire to violate, or cause a violation of any” US sanction, and US regulators interpret this language broadly to encompass any transaction in which a non-US entity causes the sanctioned funds of an SDN to pass through the US banking system by simply transacting in US dollars.
Notable new SDNs include:
183 vessels in the so-called “shadow fleet” that has been helping Russia evade sanctions, including vessels owned by Sovcomflot that had previously been protected by GL 93, which OFAC revoked as part of this sanctions package. In December 2024, the United Kingdom Office of Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) added 20 ships to its sanctions list, bringing the number of shadow fleet vessels sanctioned by the UK to 93.
Two of Russia’s biggest oil producers and exporters, Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas, and numerous subsidiaries. OFSI simultaneously imposed sanctions on these producers, on the same day that OFAC and OFSI signed a Memorandum Of Understanding outlining a framework for collaboration in the sanctions space.
A network of traders of Russian oil that are either linked to the Russian government or have otherwise suspicious ownership.
More than 30 Russian oilfield services providers.
Russian maritime insurers Ingosstrakh Insurance and Alfastrakhovanie.
Secondary Sanctions Risk
The impact of these determinations and updates to the SDN list, themselves sweeping, extend even beyond the impact described above through secondary sanctions, which are measures meant to deter third parties from transacting with directly sanctioned entities. Secondary sanctions impose penalties on entities that engage in the same dealings prohibited under primary sanctions, even when there is nothing in the transaction that triggers a US nexus, such as the involvement of a US person or US dollars. These sanctions are typically triggered upon a determination that a non-US entity has “knowingly” engaged in a “significant transaction” with an SDN. Secondary sanctions can range from denial of an export license or loans from US financial institutions to designating the third party an SDN in their own right, depending on the severity of the conduct.
General Licenses
In recognition of the significant impact of this raft of sanctions, OFAC issued several GLs in connection with these measures, mostly creating wind-down periods.
GL 8L authorizes wind down activities transactions with 12 enumerated financial institutions for a “any transaction related to energy” until March 12, 2025.
GL 115A authorizes wind down activities transactions with 12 enumerated financial institutions for transactions “related to civil nuclear energy” until June 30, 2025.
GL 117 authorizes the wind down of transactions involving Gazprom Neft, Surgutneftegas, and certain additional entities until February 27, 2025.
GL 118 authorizes certain transactions related to debt or equity of, or derivative contracts involving, Gazprom Neft, Surgutneftegas, and certain additional entities until February 27, 2025.
GL 119 authorizes certain transactions involving Gazprom Neft related to diplomatic and consular mission operations outside of Russia until February 27, 2025.
GL 120 authorizes limited safety and environmental transactions and the unloading of cargo involving certain newly sanctioned persons and vessels until February 27, 2025.
GL 121 authorizes provision of petroleum services for three projects until June 28, 2025: the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, Tengizchevroil, and Sakhalin-2.
Ultimate Impact
The effectiveness of these sanctions will ultimately be determined by the Trump administration, which will be responsible for either enforcing them or rolling them back. While the incoming administration has indicated an intent to roll back many Biden-era policies, it is impossible to predict to any degree of utility if and when these particular measures will be reversed. This is a fluid area, and companies potentially impacted by the sanctions should remain on high alert. At a minimum, any company that transacts in any way with the Russian energy sector should immediately evaluate their exposure and prepare for the sanctions to be enforced in full.
GT Legal Food Talk Episode 26: Crossing Borders – Regulation of Food in the United States and Canada with Stikeman’s Sara Zborovski [Podcast]
In this episode of Legal Food Talk, host Justin Prochnow welcomes Sara Zborovski, one of his attorney counterparts from Canada with Stikeman Elliott to discuss the outlook on food regulation in 2025 for the United States and Canada.
Like a baseball or hockey game played between teams from Canada and the United States, they stand at attention while both national anthems play, discussing some of the potential political implications on food regulation in 2025, including a new administration in the United States and Justin Trudeau’s recent actions to prorogue Parliament in Canada.
They then discuss the wave of FDA guidance issues by the FDA at the end of 2024 and the start of 2025, including FDA’s revised definition of “healthy,” the removal of coconut as a food allergen, new action levels for lead in food intended for infants and children, and the proper naming of plant-based food alternatives.
This episode is a shining example of international cooperation and the best collaboration between the United States and Canada since Canadian bacon and pineapple!
Trump Tariffs Survival Guide: 10 Strategies for U.S. Importers
Tariffs remain the focus of the incoming Trump Administration. Over the past several months, the announcements from president-elect Trump and his transition team have been dynamic. We expect the Trump trade policy team to use creative methods to deliver aggressive new tariff policies this year.
There are several strategies U.S. importers may consider to cope with the anticipated tariff increases. Some of the strategies are lessons learned during the first Trump Administration (e.g., to mitigate the impact of the Section 301 tariffs on Chinese-origin imports). The key to success remains to plan ahead, understand the laws, and weigh all options.
Potential New U.S. Import Tariffs
Before turning to strategies, we outline the potential types of tariffs that have been shared by Trump insiders. For each type, we cover the potential tariff action, timing for such imposition, and our assessment of the potential likelihood of imposition. Exporters, please note that we may expect to see other countries impose retaliatory tariffs against imports from the United States following the increase of U.S. import tariffs. China, Canada, Mexico and the EU have all threatened such tariffs.
Chinese-Origin Goods.
Potential Tariff Action: Currently, the Section 301 tariffs on most imports of Chinese-origin goods are largely in the 25-50 percent range. During the Trump presidential campaign, we heard about a 60 percent tariff on all Chinese-origin goods. At the end of November 2024, president-elect Trump announced immediately upon taking office, tariffs on imports from China would increase by 10 percent. When coupled with the existing Section 301 tariffs, that action would result in a 35 to 60 percent tariff on such imports.
Timing: Such a tariff could be imposed using the same Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, but that method would take several months to implement. The wild card option under consideration (leaked on January 8, 2025) would be to use the president’s emergency authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA), which would enable the incoming Administration to impose tariffs almost immediately. IEEPA has not been used previously to implement tariffs, so any such tariff action could be a bit of the Wild West.
Likelihood: Very likely.
Chinese-Owned or Operated Ports.
Potential Tariff Action: During the Trump presidential campaign, we heard brief threats about the imposition of tariffs on any goods, regardless of country of origin, that entered the United States through any Chinese-owned or operated ports.
Timing: Such a tariff could be implemented quickly after inauguration. Congress has delegated broad authority to the Executive Branch to impose tariffs for reasons of national security. Thus, the same IEEPA-type action could authorize such tariffs immediately upon inauguration, or potentially even Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act. Any Section 232 action would require several months.
Likelihood: Not likely.
Mexico and Canada.
Potential Tariff Action: Trump has all but promised a 25 percent tariff on all imports from United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) partners Canada and Mexico. The USMCA was negotiated by the first Trump Administration. The agreement has a national security carveout (a theme here) that enables a party to the agreement to apply measures it considers necessary for protection of its own essential security interests. Thus, the USMCA gives the incoming Administration the pretext it needs to impose such tariffs.
Timing: Such a tariff could again be implemented quickly using IEEPA or much longer should negotiations drag on related to any such tariff. The immediate imposition of such a tariff would be aggressive, though not impossible. There is a decent chance the threat is being used as a negotiating tool (or stick) ahead of the 2026 joint review of the USMCA by the member parties.
Likelihood: Possible, but more likely used as negotiating leverage.
Universal Tariff.
Potential Tariff Action: The incoming Administration has also announced the potential for a 10 or even 20 percent universal tariff. Such a tariff would apply to all imports from all countries. However, in recent weeks, we have seen leaks that such a universal tariff would be targeted to imports relating to national security as follows: defense industrial supply chain (through tariffs on steel, iron, aluminum and copper); critical medical supplies (syringes, needles, vials and pharmaceutical materials); and energy production (batteries, rare earth minerals and even solar panels).
Timing: Such a tariff could again be implemented quickly using again using national security arguments. There are also recent reports that it would be phased in gradually to minimize disruption to supply chains and financial markets.
Likelihood: A broad universal tariff is not likely, but also not impossible. A universal tariff targeting imports relating to national security considerations is fairly likely.
Antidumping and Countervailing Duties.
Potential Tariff Action: President-elect Trump’s team is committed to the fair trade end of the free trade/fair trade spectrum. The main tool in that arsenal is an old one: antidumping duties and countervailing duties (AD/CVD). We expect the use of the AD/CVD laws to increase steadily during the incoming Trump administration. One major focus will be anti-circumvention proceedings that are designed to punish imports from countries where foreign manufacturers under AD/CVD orders may try to shift their production.
Timing: AD/CVD cases are slow by nature. No real changes will be noticeable until 2026 or 2027.
Likelihood: Very likely.
Top 10 Tariff Coping Strategies
The potential for new tariffs is substantial. We provide the following for consideration in preparing for such actions. Any plan requires tailoring to specific supply chains, products, and compliance realities. Sometimes a combination of the below strategies may be necessary.
Contract Negotiation: Review supplier and customer contracts to assess the assignment of liability for tariff increases; and negotiate favorable tariff burden-sharing.
Supply Chain Management: Consider suppliers in countries subject to lower tariffs, but be aware of the potential for AD/CVD and circumvention issues. Also consider sourcing a different product or raw material subject to a lower tariff rate. Don’t forget to examine whether manufacture in a third country using raw materials from a high tariff country creates a “substantial transformation,” such that the end product would be considered to originate in the third country. And of course, to the extent possible, review the possibility of sourcing from domestic suppliers.
Trade Agreements: Consider sourcing from countries subject to free trade agreements with the United States, which would enable duty-free imports. But do not assume that Canadian and Mexican goods will be duty-free; be aware of the potential of a national security-based tariff or renegotiated USMCA.
Trade Preference Programs: Keep an eye on potential programs that provide duty-free imports. For example, past programs included the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and the Miscellaneous Tariff Bill (MTB). But be aware that the GSP and MTB programs have been languishing without reauthorization by Congress for years.
In-Bond Shipments and Foreign Trade Zones (FTZ): If a company’s supply chain involves goods transiting through the United States, for sale elsewhere, consider use of in-bond shipments or an FTZ, where tariffs do not normally apply. But be aware that in-bond and FTZ schemes can involve high storage fees, rigorous accounting procedures, and other costs.
Duty Drawback: If manufacturing products in the United States for export, consider making use of a drawback program. Drawback enables importers to obtain refunds of certain U.S. duties paid on the imported component goods or materials. Section 301 duties are eligible for drawback, but AD/CVD are not.
Exclusions: If new tariffs are issued under Sections 301 or 232, consider seeking a tariff exclusion if such an administrative process is provided.
Comments: If Sections 301 or 232 are used, we expect to see a notice and comment period as part of the rulemaking, which should provide interested parties an opportunity to comment on the economic impact of the proposed tariffs.
Congressional Relations: Consider whether outreach to congressional delegations could help in any tariff mitigation strategy.
Litigation: We expect multiple lawsuits challenging the authority to impose certain tariffs. But U.S. courts have generally been receptive to the national security justifications offered for such tariffs, and the timeline to resolve such actions requires years.
In sum, while the imposition of additional tariffs will be challenging for U.S. importers, there are several possible strategies that may reduce certain negative impacts of these tariffs. All importers must carefully analyze any supply chain changes under the applicable laws, and each decision should be well documented and supported by the company’s written import policies and procedures.
BIS Finalizes Rule Prohibiting Connected Vehicle Imports Linked to China and Russia: Key Compliance Requirements Announced
The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has promulgated a Final Rule prohibiting the import and sale of connected vehicles and related components linked to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia, citing critical national security concerns. These rules represent a pivotal shift in U.S. automotive supply chain regulations, emphasizing the need for vigilance and proactive compliance by stakeholders across the industry.
Expanded Compliance Obligations
Although the final rule does not mandate formal certification, suppliers are now required to scrutinize the origins of Vehicle Connectivity Systems (VCS) hardware and Automated Driving Systems (ADS) software to ensure compliance. Suppliers must exclude components with links to the PRC or Russia, with significant implications for sourcing practices and operational processes.
To address these challenges, many suppliers are exploring partnerships with third-party certification firms to assist in supply chain mapping and regulatory compliance. These firms provide specialized support to ensure alignment with U.S. regulations:
Regulatory Compliance Consultants
Offer tools, training, and industry-specific strategies for supply chain compliance.
Assist in establishing robust processes for meeting evolving regulatory requirements.
Cybersecurity and IT Compliance Firms
Evaluate and certify software and hardware for security vulnerabilities.
May expand their offerings to include BIS-specific compliance as the rule is fully enacted.
Automotive-Specific Compliance Firms
Focus on connected vehicle systems, offering cybersecurity testing and risk assessments tailored to the automotive industry.
Limited OEM Guidance
Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) have provided limited direction on how they will interpret and implement the final rule. However, several have engaged in the rulemaking process through public comments and requests for compliance extensions. OEMs may eventually require declarations or certifications from their supply base, even in the absence of a formal BIS mandate. This highlights the importance of proactive supplier engagement and preparation to meet potential OEM requirements.
Implications for Automotive Suppliers
The final rule is poised to profoundly impact automotive suppliers, particularly those sourcing components from the PRC or Russia. As we previously advised, key considerations include:
Supply Chain Transparency: Suppliers must conduct thorough due diligence to identify components with links to the PRC or Russia. This requires comprehensive mapping of supply chains and ensuring traceability down to sub-suppliers.
Increased Costs: Transitioning to alternative suppliers or technologies may drive up costs and disrupt existing contracts.
Collaboration Challenges: Suppliers must work closely with OEMs and industry organizations to navigate evolving requirements.
Recommendations for Compliance
To mitigate risks and align with the new regulations, automotive stakeholders should take the following steps:
Conduct a Supply Chain Assessment
Map the origins of all hardware and software used in connected vehicles.
Identify and mitigate risks associated with PRC- or Russia-linked components.
Engage Third-Party Certification Firms
Partner with firms specializing in supply chain mapping, cybersecurity evaluations, and compliance certifications to streamline processes and ensure regulatory alignment.
Collaborate with Industry Groups
Engage with organizations like the Alliance for Automotive Innovation and Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA) to share insights and develop collective strategies for compliance.
Prepare for OEM Requirements
Anticipate the possibility of OEM-mandated certifications and declarations, and begin preparing the necessary documentation and processes to meet these demands.
While the regulatory landscape remains dynamic, proactive planning, thorough due diligence, and strategic collaboration will be critical for suppliers and manufacturers to adapt to the BIS’s final rule. By aligning their practices now, companies can minimize disruptions and position themselves for long-term compliance and competitiveness in a rapidly evolving market.
Elizabeth Morales-Saucedo contributed to this article