USTR Issues Modification of Section 301 Action
On Oct. 10, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) announced modifications to its Section 301 Action related to China’s Targeting of Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance. These modifications are the result of comments received by USTR in response to its Federal Register notice dated June 12, 90 Fed. Reg. 24856. The four key changes announced by USTR are as follows:
The basis of the service fee on foreign-built vehicle carriers (including Roll-On/Roll-Off Vessels) was changed from car equivalent units (CEUs) to a fee based on the net tonnage of the vessel. Effective Oct. 14, the service fee will be $46 per net ton. The collection of this fee is limited to five times per calendar year per vessel. Previously, USTR had proposed a fee of $150 per CEU.
USTR exempted the operators of vessels that are enrolled in the Maritime Security Program (MSP) through April 18, 2029, including any U.S. flag vessels built in China that are enrolled in the MSP. USTR “[d]etermined that it is appropriate to provide targeted coverage to operators of Maritime Security Program vessels to maintain incentives for maximal use of the U.S. flag and to ensure availability of such vessels for national security purposes, as well as to operators of U.S. Government vessels.”
In order to avoid short-term disruptions to the liquefied natural gas (LNG) sector and promote investment in U.S. shipbuilding capacity, USTR decided not to exercise its authority to suspend licenses for LNG shipments. “USTR views LNG exports as an important contribution to the U.S. economy and U.S. economic security. USTR observes that significant domestic demand for new LNG vessels coupled with increased investment in U.S. shipbuilding capacity will result in the successful construction of LNG vessels in the United States in the coming years, ensuring that U.S. energy exports can be transported on U.S.-built vessels.”
USTR determined that duties of 100% are to be assessed on ship-to-shore (STS) cranes that are manufactured, assembled, or made using parts of Chinese origin. USTR noted that several comments were generally supportive of tariffs on STS cranes. “Increasing Section 301 duties on STS cranes will reduce exposure to and dependence on Chinese sources, strengthen U.S. supply chain resilience and economic security, and provide additional leverage with China to eliminate the investigated acts, policies, and practices.” This duty will not be applied to STS cranes that fulfill contracts executed prior to April 17, 2025 and enter the United States prior to April 18, 2027.
Finally, USTR will continue to monitor the actions taken as part of its investigation and may make future modifications “[b]ased on a range of considerations, including vessel availability, economic impacts, international impacts, and economic security, among others.”
Episode 81- FTC Noncompete Ban Update [Podcast]
In this episode, New Jersey Shareholder Galit Kierkut joins Jordan to discuss the latest developments and trends following the FTC’s 2024 noncompete ban and resulting litigation
The US Issues a Detailed Ultimatum Against International “Carbon Tax” Ahead of IMO Net-Zero Framework Vote
As the International Maritime Organization (IMO) prepares to vote this week (October 14-17, 2025) on final adoption of a mandatory Net-Zero Framework (NZF) for reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the global shipping sector, the United States has reiterated its profound disagreement with the NZF. In a joint statement by Secretary of State Rubio, Secretary of Energy Wright, and Secretary of Transportation Duffy entitled “Taking Action to Defend America from the UN’s First Global Carbon Tax – the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) “Net-Zero Framework,” the US has leveled specific threats against any countries that vote to adopt the proscriptive mandates of the NZF at this week’s meeting of the IMO Maritime Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) Second Extraordinary Session (MEPC /ES.2).
The high-profile animosity of the US to the NZF dates back to the MEPC’s 83rd Session (MEPC 83) in April 2025, during which the US delegation dramatically walked out of deliberations in protest of the proposed NZF framework. Notwithstanding this unusual diplomatic maneuver, the proposed NZF was adopted by simple majority vote in MEPC 83 (63 countries approving, 16 rejecting and 24 abstaining), setting forth a two-prong framework for meeting the IMO’s goal of net-zero carbon reduction from international shipping by 2050:
A global fuel standard that requires ships to gradually reduce how polluting its ship fuel can be (i.e. how much greenhouse gas is emitted for each unit of energy used, across a fuel’s life cycle); and
A pricing mechanism with set prices on the GHG ships emit, to encourage the industry to lower emissions to comply with the global fuel standard.
Shortly after the April vote, the US expressly formalized what the delegation’s walkout had implicitly symbolized in an August 2025 statement from the same triumvirate (Secretaries Rubio, Wright and Duffy) reemphasizing the US’s fundamental opposition to the NZF: “Whatever its stated goals, the proposed framework is effectively a global carbon tax on Americans levied by an unaccountable UN organization. These fuel standards would conveniently benefit China by requiring the use of expensive fuels unavailable at global scale … Our fellow IMO members should be on notice that we will look for their support against this action and not hesitate to retaliate or explore remedies for our citizens should this endeavor fail.”
And now, ahead of this week’s vote to codify the NZF as a final, mandatory framework, the US has doubled down with a specifically enumerated range of punitive sanctions that may be levied against any countries that vote to approve the NZF:
Pursuing investigations and considering potential regulations [both ostensibly via the Federal Maritime Commission] to combat anti-competitive practices from certain flagged countries and potential blocking vessels registered in those countries from US ports;
Imposing visa restrictions including an increase in fees and processing, mandatory re-interview requirements and/or revisions of quotas for C-1/D maritime crew member visas;
Imposing commercial penalties stemming from US government contracts including new commercial ships, liquified natural gas terminals and infrastructure, and/or other financial penalties on ships flagged under nations in favor of the NZF;
Imposing additional port fees on ships owned, operated, or flagged by countries supporting the framework; and
Evaluating sanctions on officials sponsoring activist-driven climate policies that would burden American consumers, among other measures under consideration.
Notably, the above list of potential retributive measures for NZF support came on the same day that the Office of the US Trade Representative issued amendments to its Section 310 Action (“China’s Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance”). These dual efforts emphasize the Trump Administration’s broad-spectrum focus on leveraging the maritime sector as a means of implementing its policy interests at the international level.
The prior April vote for preliminary approval of the NZF was opposed by 16 countries, consisting of Saudi Arabia, on behalf of the delegations of Bahrain, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, the Russian Federation, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Yemen. Prominent among the 63 approving nations were the European Union, China, Japan, Brazil and India.
Heading into this week’s decisive approval vote, which will require a ⅔ majority (unlike the prior, preliminary April vote which only required a simple authority), prognosticators have anticipated that the approval block will retain the high-profile nations from April, as well as Canada, the UK, South Korea, Singapore, Chile, and others.
However, it remains to be seen whether and how the US’s eleventh-hour ultimatum — forcing those who approve to pay (directly or indirectly) — may affect the voting on what would be an industry-redefining mandate.
President Trump has made it clear that the United States will not accept any international environmental agreement that unduly or unfairly burdens the United States or harms the interests of the American people. Next week, members of the IMO will vote on the adoption of a so-called NZF aimed at reducing global carbon dioxide gas emissions from the international shipping sector. This will be the first time that a UN organization levies a global carbon tax on the world…We will fight hard to protect our economic interests by imposing costs on countries if they support the NZF. Our fellow IMO members should be on notice.
Time to Switch: UK Moves to a Single Sanctions List by January 2026
On October 13, 2025, the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (“FCDO”), the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (“OFSI”) and His Majesty’s Treasury (“HM Treasury”) confirmed that from January 28, 2026, the UK Sanctions List (“UKSL”) will be the single official source of United Kingdom (UK) sanctions designations. The OFSI Consolidated List will close. The change follows a cross-government review and industry feedback to simplify screening.
Who Is Affected?
All Firms conducting sanctions screening (banks, asset managers, insurers, professional services, marketplaces, FinTechs, crypto, trade/commodity firms) and any third-party screening vendors that source UK designations.
Non-UK businesses operating outside the UK but screening for UK exposure should also align their sources and controls.
Why It Matters
A single list should cut duplication, reduce false negatives from mismatched fields, and streamline vendor integrations. Guidance has been published to help firms prepare; the UK Government recommends switching to UKSL as the primary data source now (and in any case before January 28, 2026).
What Firms Should Do Now
Firms should update policies to cite the UK Sanctions List as the authoritative source from go-live and brief teams while ensuring subscriptions to Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office/Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation update alerts remain active.
The Lobby Shop- Tariffs on Trial: Rick Woldenberg’s Fight at the Supreme Court [Podcast]
In this crossover episode of The Lobby Shop and Talking with One Voice podcasts, The Lobby Shop team is joined by Omar Nashashibi to talk with Rick Woldenberg, CEO of Learning Resources and hand2mind, who is the plaintiff in the landmark Supreme Court case challenging tariffs imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), scheduled for argument in November. Rick discusses his company, the impact of the tariffs, and why manufacturing all his products in the United States isn’t feasible. He also shares why he chose to pursue the case when larger companies and trade associations declined—and what it’s like to be in the media spotlight during such high-stakes litigation.
Citizens Disability to Pay $1 Million Penalty to the FTC Over Telemarketing Calls
On September 30, 2025, the Federal Trade Commission announced that Citizens Disability, and its subsidiary CD Media, agreed to pay $1 million to resolve allegations that the companies violated Section 5 of the FTC Act and the Telemarketing Sales Rule in connection with tens of millions of telemarketing calls.
According to the FTC, between January 2019 and July 2022, Citizens Disability and its subsidiary allegedly made over 109 million outbound telemarketing calls, with more than 25 million calls to numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry (“DNC Registry”). The FTC further alleged that the companies contracted with lead generators to obtain call lists that were created via websites that “deceptively induce consumers into providing their information through attractive sweepstakes, coupons, and service offers, but fail to disclose their personal contact information will be used for certain telemarketing calls.” Finally, the FTC alleged that Citizens Disability and its subsidiary then misrepresented that they were calling consumers in response to inquiries about eligibility for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits.
In addition to the $1 million penalty, the proposed consent order:
Prohibits Citizens Disability and its subsidiary from certain telemarketing using pre-recorded robocalls.
Prohibits Citizens Disability and its subsidiary from certain telemarketing to telephone numbers on the DNC Registry.
Prohibits Citizens Disability and its subsidiary from making misrepresentations, including that they are calling in response to a consumer’s inquiry about their eligibility for Social Security disability benefits.
Requires Citizens Disability and its subsidiary to conduct due diligence and monitoring of their lead generators to ensure that their lead generators do not make misrepresentations when soliciting consumers.
The proposed order also includes a $2 million civil penalty that will be partially suspended upon paying $1 million within the year after the order is entered.
Russia Adopts Fast Track Mechanism for Selling Federal Assets
On September 30, 2025, President Vladimir Putin signed Decree No. 693 “On Certain Particularities of the Sale of Property in Federal Ownership” (here). The measure took effect the moment it was published. The decree is expressly framed as a response to “unfriendly” actions by the United States and its allies. It is adopted “to protect the national interests of the Russian Federation,” citing Federal Laws No. 390 FZ (On Security) and No. 127 FZ on counter measures.
Decree No. 693 creates an accelerated pathway for disposing of federal property “in cases determined by a decision of the President of the Russian Federation”, where the goal is to ensure Russia’s defense capability and security. In this fast track channel, the market valuation of federal property and the appraisal report must be completed within 10 business days of signing the appraisal contract. The Government of the Russian Federation will appoint the individuals and entities authorized to conduct these valuations. It puts in place a special procedure which will apply to state registration, accounting, and transfer of rights to federal property, including shortened time limits for those steps.
Having said this, the Russian Federation is not literally contemplating selling off its own government property; rather the decree needs to be read against renewed EU and G7 discussions over deploying Euroclear-held Russian sovereign assets to finance Ukraine, including proposals for a €140 billion “reparations loan.” In such a scenario, Moscow would retaliate by nationalizing assets in Russia owned by EU and US nationals and entities, which it would then proceed to auction-off in order to compensate the damages suffered.
Bank PSB (ex. PromSvyazBank) is charged with organizing the auction of the nationalized property and empowered to act as the seller on behalf of the state. Bank PSB has been subject to U.S. and EU sanctions, further complicating any attempts by foreign nationals attempting to buy back their nationalized assets. Although Decree 693 does not itself assign different rules to foreign versus domestic buyers, its counter measures framing and concentration of roles in a sanctioned financial institution heighten exposure for entities from jurisdictions Russia deems “unfriendly,” as well as corporate groups with foreign ownership structures.
The decree compresses the window for anyone on the outside hoping to negotiate for their assets inside the Russian Federation; it gives the Russian Government access to quick liquidity if it should need it, and finally, gives it a mechanism to brandish should foreign actors make a move against its frozen funds.
The decree specifies that President Putin wields considerable discretion when it comes to applying any other elements of Russian law relevant to these transactions, including any which touch upon privatization rules, joint stock and LLC laws, securities market regulation, banking law, and competition/ antitrust law. In practical terms, current decree empowers Russia to avoid these formalities when it feels sufficiently threatened.
Potentially affected parties should monitor official publications and developments related to this possible escalation between the EU and the Russian Federation.
US–EU Trade Deal Restores Zero Tariffs on Aircraft and Aircraft Parts
On July 28, 2025, the White House announced that the United States and European Union reached a new trade agreement. This new agreement reinstates the zero-for-zero tariff framework originally established under the 1 , under which aircraft and aircraft parts were exempt from tariffs. The announcement came just days before the Aug. 1 deadline for the Trump administration tariffs to take effect.
It was then announced, on Aug. 21, 2025, that the United States and EU agreed upon a framework on an Agreement on Reciprocal, Fair, and Balanced Trade, wherein whole aircraft and aircraft parts (among other trade goods) would be exempted from previously announced and imposed tariffs.
The current U.S. administration had threatened to impose a 30% tariff on all aircraft and aerospace imports from the EU, citing trade imbalances and national security concerns. This proposal sparked concern across the aviation sector, which relies heavily on transatlantic supply chains.
On Sept. 25, 2025, the Trump administration published updated guidance in the Federal Register (2025-18660) (90 FR 46136) officially exempting aircraft and aircraft parts from U.S. tariffs. This exemption is retroactive for aircraft and aircraft parts entered into the United States for consumption, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after Sept. 1, 2025.
This exemption was hailed by industry trade groups as step forward that will allow for further aerospace innovation and continued U.S. job growth. While the agreement eliminates tariffs on aircraft and aircraft parts imported from the EU, it does not remove the need to comply with U.S. importation procedures. Importers must continue to:
File proper documentation with U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
Maintain records verifying the origin and eligibility of goods under the zero-tariff regime.
Comply with all relevant Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Transportation, and other regulatory requirements for aircraft and parts.
Aircraft and aerospace components originating from Switzerland are not included in this agreement. Although Switzerland is a signatory to the original 1979 Civil Aircraft Agreement, it is not a member of the European Union and therefore not a party to this bilateral U.S.–EU trade deal. As a result, Swiss-origin aircraft and parts are currently subject to U.S. tariffs unless covered by separate agreements.
Importers and aircraft operators should consult with qualified aviation counsel and customs import specialists to enhance compliance with U.S. trade and regulatory requirements.
Further contributions to this article from Henry Scherck, Law Clerk/JD at Greenberg Traurig, LLP
European Commission Publishes Revised EU Competition Rules for Technology Transfer Agreements
On Sept. 11, 2025, the European Commission published a draft for consultation of the revised Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation (TTBER)1 and updated Technology Transfer Guidelines (Guidelines). This revision follows an evaluation of the current TTBER, which has been in force since May 1, 2014, and is set to expire on April 30, 2026.2
The aim of this revision is to adapt the rules to recent market developments and case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. It also seeks to provide additional legal certainty for companies wishing to enter into technology transfer agreements.
Through this consultation, the European Commission invites all interested parties to submit their views on the proposed changes to the TTBER and the Guidelines. Interested parties can provide their views on the proposed changes until Oct. 23, 2025.
Background
In the European Union, Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibits companies from entering into agreements that restrict competition.
The TTBER is a block exemption regulation the European Commission issued that exempts certain categories of technology transfer agreements that restrict competition from the general prohibition on anti-competitive agreements under Article 101(1) TFEU, with the aim to facilitate disseminating technology, strengthening the incentives for research and development, and promoting innovation. Technology transfer agreements allow one party to grant another party the right to use specific technology rights. Typically, these agreements take the form of a license for intellectual property, such as copyright (for example, on software codes), design rights, patents, or certain know-how. This enables the licensee to use these intellectual property rights in the production of their goods or services.
The main purpose of the TTBER and the Guidelines is to encourage research and development in technology, to make the dissemination of technological innovation easier, and to generate product market competition. For this goal, the TTBER exempts technology transfer agreements that meet the specific conditions of this exemption from the general prohibition of anti-competitive agreements set out in Article 101 TFEU and thus provides for a safe haven. The revised Guidelines offer additional clarifications on how the new TTBER should be applied.
Important Changes in the Draft of the Revised TTBER and Revised Guidelines
The draft of the revised TTBER and Guidelines suggests that the European Commission does not intend to make significant changes to the regulation. Nevertheless, the drafts of the revised TTBER and Guidelines introduce – among other things – updated rules regarding TTBER market share thresholds, technology pools, and data licenses.
Market Share Thresholds and Calculation: The revised TTBER still exempts technology transfer agreements between competing undertakings where the combined market share of the parties on each market does not exceed 20%, and agreements between non-competitors where the individual market share of the parties does not exceed 30%. It, however, aims to provide greater clarity on the calculation and application of market share thresholds for technology markets. Previously, there was uncertainty about how these thresholds should be applied in practice. The new draft aims to address and clarify these issues.
In cases where the market shares of the parties exceed the TTBER thresholds during the agreement’s term, the block exemption under the current TTBER would continue to apply for two years. The EU proposes to amend the provisions on the expiry of the TTBER exemption and to extend the grace period for the exemption from two to three years. This is intended to enhance legal certainty and predictability for businesses.
Technology Pools: In addition, the EU has amended the Guidelines regarding technology pools. A technology pool is an arrangement in which multiple holders of technology rights jointly license their intellectual property rights, typically through multilateral agreements. In principle, the TTBER does not cover such agreements, as it only applies to bilateral agreements. Nonetheless, the TTBER may apply to technology pools, which is referred to in the Guidelines as the “soft safe harbor.” While the new draft TTBER, like the current TTBER, does not include specific provisions for technology pools, the EU has expanded the guidelines to provide more detailed guidance on such collaborations. This aims to offer greater legal certainty for businesses and to enhance compliance with Article 101 TFEU. In this context, the European Commission proposes to revise the definition of “soft safe harbor” in the guidelines. The emphasis is placed on transparency, ensuring the essentiality of the pooled technologies, and preventing double royalties (so called “double-dipping”).
Licensing Negotiation Groups: In addition, the new TT Guidelines provide guidance on the competitive assessment of Licensing Negotiation Groups (LNGs), which are potential licensees that jointly negotiate licensing terms with the licensor. The European Commission proposes adding a “soft safe harbor” for LNGs to these Guidelines. LNGs that do not involve restrictions by object and that meet certain conditions are generally not considered to restrict competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) TTBER or will fulfil the requirements of the exception in Article 101(3) TTBER.
Data Licensing: The draft revised Guidelines now also include rules to license specific types of data. The European Commission explicitly states that it would apply the TTBER and the Guidelines principles to data licenses for production purposes, provided that the licensed data forms part of a database protected by copyright of by the sui generis right as set out in the Database Directive.3 The reason for this is, among other things, that creating databases protected by copyright or by the sui generis right may require significant investments, and licensing them generally has a pro-competitive effect.
The TTBER would now have definitions of active and passive sales, which are the same as in the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation. This would mean, among other things, that in public procurements, a cross-border bid submitted in response to a tender would be deemed a passive sale.
Conclusion
The proposed revision of the TTBER and Guidelines is intended to provide businesses with clarity regarding the competition law rules for technology transfer agreements. The draft published suggests that the European Commission does not intend to introduce major changes to the current regime, but rather to address and clarify particular open questions under the current TTBER. With the consultation, the European Commission aims to collect feedback until Oct. 23, 2025, from interested parties on the proposed amendments to address the issues identified during the evaluation phase.
It remains to be seen what insights the European Commission will gain from this consultation following the publication. For the time being, it does not seem very likely that the changes to the future TTBER and Guidelines will differ significantly from the amendments currently proposed. This might become clear in early 2026 when the Final TTBER and Guidelines will be published prior to the expiry of the current TTBER.
Footnotes
1 Communication from the Commission – Approval of the content of a draft for a Commission Regulation on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of technology transfer agreements and a draft for Commission Guidelines on the application of Article 101 of the Treaty to technology transfer agreements.
2 Commission Regulation (EU) No 316/2014 of March 21, 2014, on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of technology transfer agreements.
3 Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of March 11, 1996, on the legal protection of databases.
Foreign Terrorist Organizations Designations Provide DOJ With New Civil Forfeiture Authorities and Opportunities
Civil forfeiture is becoming an increasingly important tool in the U.S. Justice Department’s (DOJ) campaign against Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs), Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), and other sanctioned parties. This development is part of the Trump Administration’s ongoing campaign against cartels and other TCOs, which most recently has involved the apparent determination that cartels are nonstate actors in a non-international armed conflict with the United States, military strikes on Venezuelan vessels in the Caribbean Sea, and the designation of the Barrio 18 a/k/a 18th Street gang as an FTO.
Civil Forfeiture Defined
Civil forfeiture actions typically begin with a seizure warrant filed by federal prosecutors that allows law enforcement officers to seize specified property that might not otherwise be reachable through the criminal justice process, such as the property of foreign terrorists or fugitives. In such applications, the government must explain how the property is connected to particular criminal violations. This basis can provide the government with the authority to seize and take control of the property for eventual forfeiture.
Such actions are a particularly useful tool for the DOJ as they do not require a criminal conviction. Instead, the government is able to bring a cause of action in rem (against the property) that was derived from or used to commit an alleged offense. In a civil forfeiture action, there is no defendant to contest the charges, and the government has a lower standard of proof in that it must only prove by a preponderance of the evidence (more likely than not) that the property is linked to criminal activity.
The terrorism forfeiture statute is particularly broad as it extends to all assets, both foreign and domestic, (1) of an individual or entity engaged in planning or perpetrating any federal crime of terrorism; (2) acquired or maintained by any person with the intent and for the purpose of supporting or concealing any federal crime of terrorism; (3) derived from or involved in any federal crime of terrorism; or (4) of an individual or entity engaged in planning or perpetrating any act of international terrorism against any international organization or foreign government.[1] Providing any direct or indirect material support to an FTO — an act for which there is no de minimis acceptable amount — is not only among the enumerated federal crimes related to terrorism but can also separately violate U.S. economic sanctions targeting FTOs. This substantially increases the possibility of civil and criminal liability and creates a separate, independent predicate for a civil forfeiture action.
Civil Forfeiture in Action
The DOJ has previously used civil forfeiture proceedings to target property linked to FTOs such as Hamas and Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC). In July 2020, for example, the DOJ filed a complaint seeking to forfeit cargo seized from four foreign-flagged oil tankers that the IRGC used to ship petroleum products to Venezuela.[2] The property seized included over one million barrels of petroleum that the U.S. Government eventually sold for approximately $45 million.[3] Similarly, in August 2020, the DOJ announced its largest-yet seizure of cryptocurrency in the terrorism context, for funds involved in the financing of FTOs including the al-Qassam Brigades (Hamas’ military wing), al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS).[4]
More proceedings like these are likely as the Administration expands its anti-terrorism focus to include TCOs. With the list of FTOs rapidly expanding to include Latin American drug cartels and other related parties, such as transnational gangs with ties to foreign governments, the DOJ appears poised to leverage its civil forfeiture actions in a variety of sectors with increased exposure risk. Even in instances where there is no direct connection with an FTO, the DOJ will still have strong policy and enforcement incentives to use civil forfeiture proceedings in cases involving other TCOs — particularly those designated under longstanding sanctions programs targeting narcotics syndicates. Some of the industries facing enhanced risk include the following:
Manufacturing and Pharmaceutical Industries
The chemical manufacturing and pharmaceutical industry has already seen increased scrutiny this year given the Administration’s focus on fentanyl trafficking and opioid abuse,[5] but this scrutiny has increased even further due to the Administration’s expanded anti-terrorism approach. For example, on September 3, 2025, the DOJ announced the seizure of 300,000 kilograms of methamphetamine precursor chemicals shipped from China and destined to labs controlled by the FTO-designated Sinaloa cartel in Mexico.[6] The seized chemicals, which originated in China, included six shipping containers of benzyl alcohol, a solvent used in the manufacture of pharmaceuticals, and six shipping containers of N-methyl formamide, another liquid organic solvent. This seizure of precursor chemicals, valued at approximately $569 million, was premised on the Sinaloa cartel’s FTO designation, which provided a basis for charges under the material support of terrorism statute. This aggressive pursuit of seizure and forfeiture actions under the government’s anti-terrorism authority may be a warning of similar enforcement actions to come.
Financial Service Providers
Since FTOs often launder money to obfuscate the true nature, source, and/or destination of their funds, anti-terrorism enforcement actions often target the financing of terrorism by invoking material support of terrorism claims as the “specified unlawful activity” necessary to support a money-laundering charge[7] and regulatory enforcement actions against financial service providers. The money-laundering statute itself is already far-reaching: It can apply extraterritorially, against U.S. citizens or non-U.S. citizens, and to conduct even including correspondent banking transactions,[8] as long as there is conduct that occurs in part in the United States and the transaction or a series of related transactions involves funds in excess of $10,000.[9] DOJ typically uses civil forfeiture actions to seize such funds, and it is now increasingly doing so on the basis of anti-terrorism enforcement. For example, on July 22, 2025, the DOJ announced the unsealing of a civil forfeiture action against approximately $2 million in cryptocurrency connected to a Gaza-based money transfer business that was involved in financially supporting the designated FTO entity Hamas.[10] Recent actions by U.S. Department of Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) suggest that Chinese money laundering networks that provide services to Mexican cartels may be the specific focus of U.S. anti-money laundering strategies.[11] Understanding the nature of money-laundering schemes and of related shadow financial networks can assist companies in anticipating how the U.S. government may continue to seize cartel assets and take other steps to dismantle FTO operations.
Oil and Natural Gas Industries
On May 1, 2025, FinCEN highlighted oil smuggling activities in the oil and natural gas industry designed to generate revenue for cartels.[12] According to FinCEN, cartels are using complicit Mexican brokers in the oil and natural gas industry to smuggle and sell crude oil stolen from Mexico’s state-owned energy company, Pemex, to complicit U.S.-based oil and natural gas companies operating near the U.S. southwest border. U.S. importers then sell the crude oil at a steep discount on the U.S. and global energy market before sending a significant amount of the profits back to Mexico. Throughout this scheme, cartels rely on complicit Mexican brokers and their networks of Mexican and U.S. companies, including front companies and shell companies to serve as middlemen. The nature of these schemes suggests that DOJ civil forfeiture proceedings may include actions involving oil and natural gas industries. Indeed, the DOJ has already used criminal forfeiture authority in the oil industry involving the indictment of a U.S.-based father and son who were charged with using their oil and gas company to launder the illicit proceeds of smuggled crude oil on behalf of a Mexican cartel. In that case, law enforcement authorities seized four tank barges containing crude oil, three commercial tanker trucks, and other vehicles.[13]
Meet Anticipated Enforcement with Increased Due Diligence
Corporations operating in key sectors — such as chemical manufacturing, financial services, energy, and pharmaceuticals — should pay attention to recent DOJ actions as warning signs that their assets may be at risk even if there is no direct criminal exposure. These corporations represent just a sampling of the entities that should pay particular attention to their compliance programs, supply chains, and vendor agreements in conducting risk assessments.
To mitigate such risks, companies should screen for red flags identified in FinCEN advisories and implement best practice recommendations by relevant regulators. Adequate training is essential to assist compliance officers and other key company gatekeepers to identify and report issues. Strong internal anti-money laundering policies as well as those internal policies countering the financing of terrorism are essential, and controls should be implemented to block and sever any direct or indirect links to FTOs or other sanctioned individuals and entities. Companies should also establish mechanisms for responding to any U.S. government agencies or other third parties, such as prime contractors and suppliers, and should always consult with counsel when necessary.
[1] See 18 U.S.C. Section 981(a)(1)(G).
[2] See Largest U.S. Seizure of Iranian Fuel from Four Tankers, U.S. Department of Justice (Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/largest-us-seizure-iranian-fuel-four-tankers.
[3] See United States Unseals Civil Forfeiture Complaint for Seizure of Iranian Oil, U.S. Department of Justice (Feb. 2, 2024), https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/united-states-unseals-civil-forfeiture-complaint-seizure-iranian-oil.
[4] See Global Disruption of Three Terror Finance Cyber-Enabled Campaigns, U.S. Department of Justice (Aug. 13, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/global-disruption-three-terror-finance-cyber-enabled-campaigns.
[5] See Executive Order 14193 (Feb. 1, 2025), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/02/07/2025-02406/imposing-duties-to-address-the-flow-of-illicit-drugs-across-our-northern-border.
[6] See U.S. Seizes 300,000 Kilos of Meth Precursor Chemicals Sent from China Destined for Mexico’s Sinaloa Drug Cartel, U.S. Department of Justice (Sept. 3, 2025), https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/us-seizes-300000-kilos-meth-precursor-chemicals-sent-china-destined-mexicos-sinaloa-drug.
[7] See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7).
[8] Corresponding banking refers to a banking relationship between two banks, where one bank (the “correspondent bank”) provides banking services to another bank (the “respondent bank”). This type of relationship facilitates cross-border transactions such as international wire transfers.
[9] See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(f).
[10] See U.S. Files Forfeiture Action Against $2 Million in Digital Currency Involved in Hamas Fundraising, U.S. Department of Justice (July 22, 2025), https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/us-files-forfeiture-action-against-2-million-digital-currency-involved-hamas-fundraising.
[11] See FinCEN Issues Advisory and Financial Trend Analysis on Chinese Money Laundering Networks, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (Aug. 28, 2025), https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-issues-advisory-and-financial-trend-analysis-chinese-money-laundering.
[12] FinCEN Issues Alert on Oil Smuggling Schemes on the U.S. Southwest Border Associated with Mexico-Based Cartels, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (May 1, 2025), https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-issues-alert-oil-smuggling-schemes-us-southwest-border-associated-mexico.
[13] See Father and son indicted for providing material support to Mexican cartel engaged in terrorism, U.S. Department of Justice (May 30, 2025), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdtx/pr/father-and-son-indicted-providing-material-support-mexican-cartel-engaged-terrorism.
FTC and DOJ Settle with Disability-Advocacy Company for Alleged Illegal Telemarketing Practices
On September 30, the FTC and the DOJ announced a settlement resolving allegations that a Massachusetts-based disability-advocacy company and its subsidiary violated the Telemarketing Sales Rule and FTC Act. The FTC alleged that the companies unlawfully contacted consumers through robocalls and calls to numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry to market Social Security Disability Insurance benefits.
According to the complaint, the companies used third-party lead generators to collect consumer information through deceptive websites and then placed automated and misleading calls to consumers nationwide. The settlement requires the companies to implement strict vendor oversight and compliance measures to prevent future violations.
The complaint alleges that the companies:
Called numbers on the Do Not Call Registry. The companies allegedly made more than 25.7 million outbound telemarketing calls to consumers on the National Do Not Call Registry without prior express consent.
Used illegal prerecorded messages. The defendants allegedly placed millions of robocalls through third-party vendors and call centers without obtaining the written authorization required under the Telemarketing Sales Rule.
Misled consumers about the purpose of calls. The FTC claimed that telemarketers falsely represented that they were following up on consumers’ SSDI inquiries to induce them to purchase services.
Collected consumer information through deceptive websites. The companies allegedly relied on lead generators that used sweepstakes and coupon websites to collect data without clearly disclosing that it would be used for telemarketing.
Failed to oversee third-party vendors. The order requires the companies to monitor and pre-approve all lead-generation materials and to suspend or terminate vendors that mislead consumers.
Putting It Into Practice: Amid a broader federal pullback, the FTC has continued to pursue an active supervision and enforcement agenda (previously discussed here and here). Businesses that engage in outbound calls or rely on third-party leads should ensure that vendors obtain valid consent, scrub call lists against the National Do Not Call Registry, and maintain comprehensive oversight programs.
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Key Developments
Foley & Lardner partners Vanessa Miller and Nicholas Ellis assessed the industry implications of GM’s new purchase order “Program Extension Clause.”
Foley & Lardner partners Vanessa Miller and Alejandro Gómez Strozzi led discussions at the 23rd International Congress of the Automotive Industry in Mexico (CIIAM 2025) regarding legal and regulatory shifts shaping regional trade integration.
Foley & Lardner’s “Made in America: End-to-End Guide to Developing Your U.S. Manufacturing Footprint” series delves into the critical decisions U.S. manufacturers face as they rethink where and how they build. The most recent article in the series is Pricing Stability and Supply Continuity: Strategic Contracting for Reshoring. Subscribe to receive updates when new articles in this series are published.
Foley & Lardner partner Lynn Gandhi discussed state and local tax incentives for U.S. manufacturing operations in an audio interview with GlobalAutoIndustry.com.
Foley & Lardner provided an update for companies doing business in Mexico regarding supply chain compliance programs amid growing risks from the Treasury Department’s heightened enforcement priorities.
Foley & Lardner partner Christopher Swift commented on the U.S. Supreme Court’s consideration of the executive branch’s authority to impose tariffs in the Supply Chain Dive article, “White House asks Supreme Court to uphold Trump’s tariff powers.”
Automotive News provided an overview of the impact of the federal government shutdown on the auto industry.
Auto suppliers are encountering a widening financial divide and heightened market pressures due to tariffs and the shift away from vehicle electrification, according to analysis from Plante Moran.
The Trump administration plans to impose a 25% import tariff on all medium and heavy trucks beginning November 1, 2025 in response to a Section 232 national security investigation. At the time of this newsletter publication, details have not been provided regarding exemptions or whether the tariff includes truck parts. Preliminary estimates suggest the tariffs could affect up to $15 billion of truck imports.
The National Association of Manufacturers estimated the Commerce Department’s Section 232 national security investigation of robotics and industrial machinery imports could affect roughly half a trillion dollars in manufacturing equipment and inputs. Public comments are due by October 17, 2025, according to the Federal Register Notice. The Commerce Department has contingency plans that suggest investigations into certain imports that affect national security may continue during the government shutdown.
The European Commission proposed doubling steel tariffs to 50%, and reducing tariff-free import volumes by 47% to 18.3 million tons a year. The previously announced U.S. – EU framework trade agreement lowered tariffs on auto imports from the European Union to 15%. However, certain trade issues that include steel and aluminum tariffs remain open to further negotiations.
Third-quarter 2025 U.S. new light-vehicle sales were up 15.9% YOY for Toyota, 13% for Hyundai, 8.2% for Ford, 8% for GM, 6% for Stellantis, and 5.3% for Nissan. Sales declined 6% for Volkswagen and 2% for Honda.
U.S. new vehicle sales in September 2025 rose 3.5% YOY and reached a SAAR of 16.4 million units, according to estimates from the National Automobile Dealers Association.
Full-year 2025 U.S. vehicle sales are projected to reach approximately 16 million units, according toS&P Global Mobility.
China announced new restrictions on exports of rare earths and other critical materials due to national security concerns. Foreign entities will need to obtain a license from Beijing to export certain products “containing over 0.1% of domestically-sourced rare earths, or manufactured using China’s extraction, refining, magnet-making or recycling technology.”
OEMS/Suppliers
The Wall Street Journal reports that a plant fire at a significant aluminum supplier to Ford could disrupt business “for months” as the company provides an estimated 40% of aluminum sheet used in the auto industry. Ford is reported to be temporarily halting production of the F-150 Lightning electric pickup in Dearborn, Michigan, due to the fire.
Bankruptcies among German suppliers are on track to be 30% higher in 2025 compared to last year, amid challenges that include reduced demand, higher operational costs and increased competition from Chinese automakers. Germany’s auto industry could lose up to 190,000 jobs by 2035, according to estimates from the German Association of the Automotive Industry (VDA).
The European Association of Automotive Suppliers (CLEPA) urged policymakers to establish minimum content requirements for the components used in vehicles manufactured in the EU.
Automotive News provided an update on automakers’ exposure to bankrupt aftermarket auto parts supplier First Brands Group.
Jaguar Land Rover is reported to be considering a supplier loan of up to £500 million ($674 million) to support its supply chain after a cyberattack halted the automaker’s production.
ArcelorMittal announced plans to establish a new 154,000 sq. ft. auto components plant in Ingersoll, Ontario.
GM has spent more on federal government lobbying this year than any company other than Meta.
Hyundai has maintained its commitment to $26 billion in U.S. investments and increasing American production. Hyundai and Kia’s combined U.S. market share was approximately 11% as of mid-2025.
Volvo plans to increase production at its Ridgeville, South Carolina plant, beginning with its popular XC60 SUV in late 2026 and a new hybrid vehicle by 2030.
Market Trends and Regulatory
Automakers may reduce emphasis on lightweighting in response to tariff costs and the easing of restrictions for fuel economy and emissions standards.
Analysis from Edmunds indicated 19.1% of new vehicle consumers in the third quarter of 2025 committed to monthly payments of $1,000 or more, and 22% of financed new-car purchases had loan durations of seven years or longer. In addition, the average down payment for a new vehicle in Q3 2025 fell to $6,020, representing the lowest level in nearly four years.
Automakers may be impacted by higher platinum prices, which have risen by more than 85% in 2025.
An interim final rule from the Commerce Department will extend certain export controls to subsidiaries that are at least 50% owned by companies named to the Specially Designed Nationals and Blocked Persons List.
New-car registrations in Europe increased 4.5% YOY in August and registrations were down by 0.1% for the first eight months of 2025, according to data from the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA) released on September 25. Hybrid-electric models accounted for 34.7% of the total EU market in the first eight months of 2025, while battery-electric vehicles (BEVs) represented 15.8% and plug-in-hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) were 8.8% of the market.
The European Commission plans to review its zero CO2 emissions targets for new vehicles by the end of 2025, in response to automakers’ concerns over the feasibility of complying with the regulations.
Autonomous Technologies and Vehicle Software
A number of major automakers and higher revenue suppliers are urging the automotive supply base to adopt artificial intelligence technologies to help improve efficiencies.
Automotive industry managers expect advanced technologies to deliver manufacturing efficiency gains of 10% by 2028 and 30% by 2030, according to a Bain & Company survey.
A recent survey from RunSafe Security found less than 19% of surveyed connected car drivers were very confident their vehicle is protected from cyberattacks, and 87% said cybersecurity affects vehicle purchase decisions.
Qualcomm and BMW jointly developed an automated driving system that will debut on the BMW iX3 electric SUV. The Snapdragon Ride Pilot Automated Driving System was designed to be licensed to other automakers and supports Level 2+ highway and urban navigation on autopilot capabilities.
Valeo had roughly $10.6 billion in orders for products used in software-defined vehicles in the last three years.
Mercedes-Benz spun out its Silicon Valley chip development group into a new company, Athos Silicon, that will develop advanced technology in areas that include autonomous vehicles.
Self-driving truck developer Kodiak AI began public trading following its merger with special-purpose acquisition company Ares Acquisition Corp. II.
Amazon’s Zoox is seeking approval from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to deploy up to 2,500 robotaxis on U.S. roads.
China’s Hesai Technology announced it is the first lidar company worldwide to exceed one million units in annual production.
Hybrid and Electric Vehicles
Third-quarter 2025 BEV sales represented a record-high 10% of total new vehicle sales, as consumers rushed to get the $7,500 federal EV tax credit that expired September 30.
Tesla delivered a record-high 497,099 vehicles globally in the third quarter of 2025, representing an increase of 7% YOY. This week Tesla debuted Model Y and Model 3 trims that are priced under $40,000.
Ford CEO Jim Farley predicted U.S. BEV market share could fall to 5% of total new light-vehicle sales in the coming months. Dealerships were estimated to have roughly 134,000 unsold EVs nationwide at the end of September.
Rivian’s third-quarter 2025 U.S. deliveries rose 32% YOY to over 13,000 EVs.The company narrowed its 2025 delivery guidance to 41,500 to 43,500 vehicles.
GM, Ford, and Hyundai are among the automakers that plan to extend discounts on certain EV models following the expiration of the $7,500 federal tax credit.
Reuters reports the Department of Energy is considering revoking nearly $1.1 billion in awarded grants for GM and Stellantis to retool certain plants to produce EVs or EV components. According to the article, the potential cancelation of the awards was attributed to the government shutdown.
NextStar Energy, a joint venture between LG Energy Solution and Stellantis, finished construction of its $5 billion EV battery plant in Windsor, Ontario.
The DOE will invest 5% equity stakes in Lithium Americas, as well as the company’s Thacker Pass joint venture lithium mining project with GM inNevada. This deal revises a Biden-era federal loan that is now valued at $2.3 billion.
Automotive News provided an updated list of canceled or postponed EV models in the U.S. Most recently, Honda canceled all future production of its 2026 all-electric Acura ZDX built at GM’s Spring Hill, Tennessee plant to “better align our product portfolio” with consumer demand.
China will require automakers to obtain export licenses for EVs beginning in 2026, as part of an effort to reduce price wars and curtail the export of low-quality products.
BYD’s global sales fell 5.5% YOY in September, representing the automaker’s first monthly sales decline since February 2024.
The number of EV fast-charging ports in the U.S. surpassed 60,000 in August 2025, representing an increase of more than 80% in two years.
San Francisco-based EV Realty raised $75 million in funding from private equity investor NGP. The funding will support projects that include a 76-stall fast-charging facility for commercial fleets in San Bernardino, CA.