Court Affirmed Order Denying Probate Of A Will Due To The Absence Of A Record
In In re Estate of Earnest E. Clifton, an applicant offered a copy of a lost will, and the trial court denied the application via a zoom hearing without a court reporter. No. 05-24-00079-CV, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 7071 (Tex. App.—Dallas October 1, 2024, no pet.). The applicant appealed on multiple evidentiary complaints. The court of appeals affirmed the order due to the absence of a reporter’s record:
“It is the appellant’s burden to bring forward an appellate record showing reversible error by the trial court.” Without a complete reporter’s record, we cannot review all of the evidence presented to the factfinder or apply the sufficiency standards of review. Thus, when the appellant fails to bring a complete reporter’s record forward on appeal, the reviewing court must presume that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the challenged order or judgment. The absence of a reporter’s record requires us to overrule Pearson’s first, second, and fourth issues, each of which is essentially a sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue.
Id. (internal citations omitted). The court then reviewed a complaint about the trial court conducting its own research and relying on same, but the court held that the applicant waived this complaint by failing to adequately brief it. The court affirmed the order.
Wire Transfer Fraud: Prevention and Response Strategies After a Data Breach [Podcast]
In this podcast, Harris Freier (shareholder, Morristown) and Lauren Watson (associate, Raleigh) discuss the growing issue of misdirected wire transfers tied to data breaches. Lauren and Harris begin by addressing social engineering and phishing, and how these types of business email compromise scams by cybercriminals occur. The speakers also review the importance of having an incident response plan, the legal obligations for breach notifications, and strategies for recovering misdirected funds, emphasizing the need for swift action and thorough verification processes to prevent future incidents.
Apple’s Second Bite Is Successful: Federal Circuit Nixes Optis Verdict Involving Standard Essential Patents Due to Jury Instruction Error
Apple has escaped a $300 million patent infringement verdict after a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated both the infringement and damages judgment because of faulty jury instructions and an improper verdict form underscoring how a seemingly small procedural error can upend a half-billion-dollar outcome. [1]
In 2020, a Texas jury found that Apple had infringed at least some of the Standard Essential Patents Otis alleged. A Standard Essential Patent (SEP) is a type of patent for which the rights would be licensed to anyone wanting to comply with the related standard. In exchange for a patent being included in a standard, the owner of a SEP makes the commitment to license it on the basis of “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory” (FRAND) royalties, or royalty-free. The jury awarded just over $506 million as a reasonable royalty for past sales.
Apple sought a new trial arguing that the jury did not hear evidence of Optis’s obligation to license the patents FRAND terms. The district court granted a new trial only on damages. In the subsequent damages retrial, the jury awarded Optis the now overturned $300 million as a lump sum.
The Federal Circuit overturned the award and remanded the case for a new trial on both infringement and damages. The precedential opinion agreed with Apple’s argument that the verdict form was overly broad, improperly combining all asserted patents into a single infringement question and permitting the jury to find Apple liable for infringement regardless of whether all jurors agreed that Apple was infringing the same patent.
The appellate court found that the question asked deprived Apple of its Seventh Amendment right to a unanimous verdict on each legal claim against it related to infringement. Because all the patents were lumped into a single question, the Federal Circuit also found that the lump sum damages award was improper given that the scope of infringement was unknown.
Along with taking issue with the jury instructions, the panel also found that one of the patents in question was too abstract to be litigated as Optis proposed and that the district court erred in not properly analyzing a second patent to determine whether Optis’s claims were too indefinite to meet a “means-plus-function” claim.
[1] The case is Optis Cellular Tech. LLC v. Apple Inc, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, No. 22-1925.
Termination Button–Also Required for Agreements With Automatic Expiry and One-Time Payment
In a recent ruling (I ZR 161/24, 22 May 2025), the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH) clarified the scope of § 312k German Civil Code (BGB) regarding the obligation to provide a ‘cancellation button’ on websites if traders enable consumers to conclude continuing performance contracts (Dauerschuldverhältnis) via their website.
The case involved a loyalty program offering consumers benefits in exchange for a one-time payment and ending automatically after twelve months. The online-shop operator did not provide such a cancellation button arguing that these agreements cannot be considered a contract of continuing performance.
However, the BGH found that the contractual relationship constitutes a contract of continuing performance due to the ongoing performance obligations of the trader throughout the loyalty program term (awarding bonus points, free shipping). The form of the consumers’ payment–whether lump sum or recuring–was on the other hand considered not relevant for this assessment. Therefore, traders enabling consumers to conclude contracts of continuing performance have to provide a cancellation button, even in case of fixed term contracts and one-time payments.
This ruling clarifies the scope of § 312k BGB and establishes more stringent compliance obligations for online traders offering consumers to conclude contracts of continuing performance, including those of fixed term and payable by a one-time payment.
Apart from the obligation to provide a cancellation button, from 19 June 2026, traders will be obliged to ensure that also a withdrawal button is permanently available during the statutory withdrawal period for distance consumer contracts.
Payroll Brass Tax: Payroll Tax Compliance for Multistate Employees [Podcast]
In the second installment of Ogletree Deakins’ new podcast series, Payroll Brass Tax, Mike Mahoney (shareholder, Morristown/New York) and Stephen Kenney (associate, Dallas) discuss multi-jurisdictional tax issues for hybrid and remote employees. Stephen explains the complexities employers face with varying state and local income tax withholding rules, unemployment insurance contributions, and state-specific benefit programs, emphasizing the importance of a state-by-state analysis. Mike and Stephen explore the nuances of non-resident income tax withholding, reciprocal income tax agreements, and the “convenience of the employer” rule. They also address the impact of multi-jurisdictional employees on state benefit contributions and the registration obligations for employers with remote workers in new jurisdictions.
Supreme Court Empowers District Courts to Challenge FCC TCPA Interpretations
The Supreme Court issued a decision on June 20, 2025, in McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corporation, which may fundamentally alter the landscape for businesses subject to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”). In a 6–3 ruling, the Court held that district courts are not required to follow the Federal Communications Commission’s (“FCC”) interpretations of the TCPA in enforcement proceedings, unless Congress has expressly stated otherwise. This marks a significant departure from the longstanding practice in many jurisdictions, where district courts treated FCC orders as binding in TCPA litigation.
Background: The TCPA, the FCC, and the Hobbs Act
The TCPA is a federal statute that restricts certain telemarketing practices, including calls, texts, and faxes, and provides for statutory damages and class actions. Over the years, the FCC has issued a series of orders interpreting the TCPA’s provisions. Under the Hobbs Act, challenges to these FCC orders had to be brought in federal appellate courts within a short window after the order was issued. For years, this framework led many courts to conclude that district courts were bound by the FCC’s interpretations in subsequent enforcement actions, effectively preventing businesses from challenging the FCC’s reading of the law when sued for alleged TCPA violations.
The Supreme Court’s Reasoning
In its decision, the Supreme Court clarified that, absent an express statutory preclusion of judicial review, district courts in enforcement proceedings are not bound by an agency’s pre-enforcement statutory interpretation. Instead, courts must independently interpret the statute, giving appropriate respect to the agency’s views but not treating them as controlling. The Court emphasized that unless Congress has clearly stated that judicial review is precluded in enforcement proceedings, the default rule is that courts may review agency interpretations. The Hobbs Act, the Court found, does not contain such a preclusion.
The Court’s opinion explained that the Hobbs Act’s grant of “exclusive jurisdiction” to the courts of appeals to “determine the validity” of agency orders refers to pre-enforcement declaratory judgments, not to the process of determining liability in enforcement actions. When a district court disagrees with an agency’s statutory interpretation in an enforcement proceeding, it is not issuing a declaratory judgment on the validity of the agency’s order, but rather determining the correct interpretation of the statute for the case at hand.
Implications and Strategic Considerations Going Forward
For businesses that make calls or send text messages, this decision opens new avenues for defending against TCPA claims. Parties are no longer locked into the FCC’s interpretation of the statute and can now argue in district court that the agency’s reading is incorrect, even if they did not challenge the FCC’s order within the Hobbs Act’s 60-day window. This change means that businesses have expanded defenses in TCPA litigation, as they can advocate for their own interpretation of the law rather than being bound by potentially unfavorable FCC guidance.
However, this new flexibility comes with increased uncertainty. With district courts now free to reach their own conclusions about the meaning of the TCPA, there is a greater likelihood of inconsistent rulings across different jurisdictions. This could lead to forum shopping, as plaintiffs and defendants seek out courts perceived as more favorable to their interpretation of the statute. Over time, divergent district court decisions may result in circuit splits, which could prompt further Supreme Court review and prolong uncertainty until key issues are resolved at the highest level.
The decision also suggests that compliance with FCC guidance is no longer a shield in court, and companies should not assume that following agency interpretations will be dispositive in litigation. Instead, businesses must be prepared for the possibility that courts will interpret the TCPA differently from the FCC, and should adjust their compliance and litigation strategies accordingly.
In light of this decision, businesses should continue to monitor both FCC guidance and judicial developments in the TCPA space. Compliance programs may need to be revisited to account for the possibility that courts will not defer to the FCC’s interpretations. In litigation, companies should be prepared to challenge FCC interpretations and defend their own reading of the statute. The legal landscape is now more fluid, and what was once settled by FCC order may now be open to judicial debate.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s ruling in McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corporation represents a potentially significant shift in TCPA enforcement and litigation. Businesses that make calls or send text messages should review their compliance strategies and be prepared for a more dynamic and potentially unpredictable legal environment. It is advisable to consult with counsel to assess how this decision may affect your risk profile and defense options in current or future TCPA litigation.
Texas Establishes Strategic Bitcoin Reserve
On June 20, 2025, Texas Governor Greg Abbott signed into law SB 21, an act establishing a Texas Strategic Bitcoin Reserve. The act is immediately in effect.
In adopting the new legislation, the Texas legislature found that bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies are assets with strategic potential for enhancing the state’s financial resilience. Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies can serve as a hedge against inflation and economic volatility. Establishment of a strategic bitcoin reserve serves the public purpose of providing enhanced financial security to Texas residents. The Texas Strategic Bitcoin Reserve will exist outside the state treasury under the custody of the Comptroller of Public Accounts.
The Comptroller is authorized to manage the Reserve, which will include bitcoin or any other cryptocurrency with an average market capitalization of at least $500 billion over the most recent 24-month period. The Reserve will be funded through legislative appropriations, open market purchases, forks, or airdrops to the state’s cryptocurrency addresses. The statute also establishes a five-person advisory committee to advise the Comptroller regarding administration and management of the Reserve. The Comptroller must publish a biennial report regarding the value of the fund and actions taken by the Comptroller to administer and manage the Reserve during the preceding state fiscal biennium.
TEMPORARY WIN?: Liberty Mutual Escapes TCPA Class Action On Jurisdictional Grounds (For Now)
Liberty Mutual appeared to be trapped in an absolute nightmare of a TCPA class action in Indiana.
It had allegedly purchased a lead from a website called InsuredNation and made prerecorded calls to a woman named Yevonne Powers.
The problem?
Liberty Mutual allegedly wasn’t on the lead form or any associated partner pages.
Eesh.
In the old days (like, last week) Liberty Mutual would have been in a world of hurt. It allegedly made thousands of robocalls to consumers like Plaintiff who had not provided valid consent to receive calls. And if those facts are true Liberty Mutual would have been facing massive exposure.
I use the past tense here because with the new McKesson case coming down from the Supreme Court on Friday the application of the FCC’s CFR concerning express written consent is now very much in doubt. Whereas that CFR provision likely required LiMu’s name to be on the form, the TCPA’s express consent requirement stripped of the regulatory provision likely does not.
In Powers v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 2025 WL 1744225 (N.D. Ind. June 23, 2025) LiMu was sued in Indiana over calls made to a Virginia resident. LiMu moved to dismiss the claim on jurisdictional grounds contending it had not purposely availed itself of Indiana jurisdiction.
The Court agreed with LiMu noting that Plaintiff was in Virginia at the time of the calls and LiMu had not directed any conduct into Indiana for the court to exercise jurisdiction over it.
Interestingly one of LiMu’s employees involved with the campaign actually did reside in Indiana but the Court held that mere coincidence was not sufficient to convey jurisdiction.
So the case was dismissed. That’s great for LiMu but it is also only temporary. The case can be re-filed in Virginia or wherever LiMu is subject to general jurisdiction. So… yay, but not really.
THE DEATH OF PRESUMPTION: Are Cell Phones Still “Residential” Post McLaughlin?
The TCPA landscape is being reshaped in real time and we’re here to bear witness. With the Supreme Court’s decision in McLaughlin Chiropractic Assocs. v. McKesson Corp., No. 23-1226, 2025 U.S. LEXIS 2385 (June 20, 2025), the Court has dealt a fatal blow to Hobbs Act deference in TCPA litigation. We at TCPAWorld have been covering the impact of this decision from day one, but in case you missed it, here’s the headline: district courts are no longer bound to follow FCC interpretations of the TCPA.
Instead, courts must independently determine the law’s meaning under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation. In essence, all bets are off – questions once thought settled are ripe for reconsideration. And forefront amongst these questions is this one – are cell phone users “residential telephone subscribers” for the purposes of the TCPA? Well … maybe.
As a quick refresher, Section 227(c) of the TCPA seeks to protect residential telephone subscribers from unwanted telephone solicitations. § 227(c)(1) (emphasis added). In Section 227(c)(2), Congress directed the FCC to promulgate regulations “to implement methods and procedures for protecting the privacy rights” of residential telephone subscribers. § 227(c)(3).
The relevant FCC regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c), provides: “No person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation to: … (2) A residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry. . .” (“DNC”). § 64.1200(c) (emphasis added).
But the TCPA does not define “residential.” And, unlike with Section 227(b) – which prohibits making a call using regulated technologies to several categories of phones, including “any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service” – Congress was silent as to whether Section 227(c)’s protections extended to cell phones.
Through 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e), the FCC clarified that the rules set forth in § 64.1200(c) apply to wireless telephone numbers “to the extent described in the [FCC’s] Report and Order, CG Docket No. 02–278, FCC 03–153, ‘Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991’” (the “2003 Report and Order”). § 64.1200(e). In the 2003 Report and Order, the FCC not only determined that a wireless subscriber may register their number on the National DNC “to benefit from the full range of TCPA protections”, but also created a presumption that wireless numbers on the DNC are “residential subscribers.” 2003 Report and Order at ¶ 36.
For two decades then, and despite some creative arguments to the contrary, the law has been settled – cell phone numbers are residential for the purposes of the DNC rules. Under Section 227(c), courts generally allowed a claim to proceed if the plaintiff merely alleged that his or her cell phone number is used for residential purposes and is registered on the DNC Registry. See e.g., Barton v. Temescal Wellness, LLC, 525 F. Supp. 3d 195, 201–02 (D. Mass.), adhered to on denial of reconsideration, 541 F. Supp. 3d 138 (D. Mass. 2021) (holding that the 2003 Report and Order established “a more lenient pleading standard for residential subscriber at the motion to dismiss stage”)
But McLaughlin pulls the rug out from under this theory. While the Supreme Court case itself involved a declaratory ruling – and not a C.F.R. provision – the broad language does not preclude its application across the board. If an FCC regulation interpreting the TCPA is not grounded in the statute’s text, a district court may be free to disregard it. That includes 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e) and the FCC’s 2003 interpretation that wireless subscribers on the DNC registry are presumptively “residential.”
The implications are staggering. Courts are no longer constrained to accept the FCC’s conclusion that wireless numbers on the registry are residential subscribers. Instead, they can ask what Congress actually meant by “residential” and examine whether that term should apply to mobile phones at all. But does this necessarily mean that a court will come to a different conclusion? Probably not.
While the McLaughlin decision is barely a week old, we do have some data points from a post Chevron-deference landscape that could indicate the paths courts may take.
In Cacho v. McCarthy & Kelly, LLP, the Southern District of New York was amongst the first to address whether a cellphone qualified as a “residential telephone subscriber” under Section 227(c). In Cacho, the defendant argued that the “absence of any reference to cellular telephones in Section 227(c),” despite explicitly referencing them in Section 227(b), was evidence of “Congress’ intent to exclude cell phone users from the definition of ‘residential subscribers.’” 739 F. Supp. 3d at 203. However, the court disagreed, noting that section 227(b) “forbids the use of artificial and prerecorded messages to enumerated categories of phone technologies,” which includes “cellular telephone[s].” Id. at 204 (emphasis added). In contrast, Section 227(c), uses the term “residential subscriber” not in reference to particular category of technology, but to the “the type or identity of the subscriber to the technology.” Id. at 205 (emphasis added). According to the court, the omission of “line” in Section 227(c) underscores that the statute protects individuals based on their use of the phone for personal, domestic purposes, irrespective of whether it is a landline or cellphone. Id. Construing “residential subscriber” functionally, the court concluded that the term includes any individual using their phone for household purposes, aligning with the TCPA’s goal of safeguarding privacy. Id. at 206-207.
However, Cacho also indicates that this determination may require more than a mere presumption afforded by a user placing their number on the National DNC Registry. Instead, the court took into consideration a multitude of facts pleaded in the complaint to conclude that the plaintiff therein was a residential telephone subscriber:
“That cellphone is ‘Plaintiff’s personal phone that he uses for personal, family, and household use.’ Indeed, Plaintiff ‘maintains no landline phones at his residence and has not done so for at least 15 years and primarily relies on cellular phones to communicate with friends and family.’ The Complaint enumerates the domestic tasks that he performs with his phone, including ‘sending and receiving emails, timing food when cooking, and sending and receiving text messages,’ and avers that ‘the phone is not primarily used for any business purpose.’ Collectively, these allegations exceed ‘conclusory’ boilerplate, and adequately plead that Plaintiff used his cellphone for residential purposes, such that he was a residential subscriber for purposes of the TCPA and its implementing regulations.”
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Other courts have echoed this view. In Lyman v. QuinStreet Inc., the court rested its decision on “both binding Ninth Circuit precedent and the applicable regulation.” Lyman, 2024 WL 3406992 at *3. The Ninth Circuit precedent the court was referring to was Chennette v. Porch.com, Inc., which held that cellphones used for “personal and business purposes [are] presumptively residential” under Section 227(c), a conclusion reinforced by FCC regulations extending protection to wireless lines. Id. But the Court noted that it would reach the same conclusion based on the statutory text:
“Finally, the Court accords due respect to the FCC’s interpretation under pre-Chevron principles. As the Court has done here, the Court needs only ‘independently identify and respect such delegation of authority, police the outer statutory boundaries of [that delegation], and ensure that [the agency exercises its] discretion consistent with the APA.’ Here, Congress has expressly conferred discretionary authority on the agency to flesh out the TCPA. Using its discretion within the boundaries of its delegation, the agency has created a presumption that a cell phone registered on the Do Not Call Registry is a residential phone, a presumption that has lasted for more than two decades. The FCC’s interpretation ‘rests on factual premises within the agency’s expertise,’ thus giving its interpretation ‘particular power to persuade, if lacking power to control.’ In this context, it is especially informative and particularly persuasive. Id. In any event, however, the Court would reach the same conclusion in the absence of any FCC interpretation of the TCPA’s statutory text.”
Id. at *4 (internal citations omitted).
Similarly, in Lirones v. Leaf Home Water Sols., LLC, No. 5:23-CV-02087, 2024 WL 4198134 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 16, 2024), the court held that “according to the TCPA’s plain language and dictionary definitions of ‘residence’ and ‘subscriber,’ ‘a residential subscriber is one who maintains a phone for residential purposes … i.e., for personal activities associated with his or her private, domestic life.’” Id. at *6. Like in Lyman, while the court found the FCC’s interpretation persuasive, it noted that “based on the text of the statute and tools of statutory interpretation, [it] would reach the same conclusion in the absence of any FCC interpretation of the term ‘residential subscriber.’” Id. at *7.
In Lirones, the court also addressed instances of other district courts dismissing Section 227(c) claims brought by cellular telephone users, noting that in many of these cases the plaintiff did not plead that the cellular telephone number called was used for residential purposes. Id. at *5. See e.g., Cunningham v. Rapid Response Monitoring Servs., Inc., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1187, 1201 (M.D. Tenn. 2017) (dismissing Section 227(c) claim because the plaintiff pled no facts sufficient for the court to conclude that he used his cellular number for residential purposes).
But even before McLaughlin and Loper, district courts have deviated from the FCC’s interpretation. In Gaker v. Q3M Ins. Sols., No. 3:22-CV-00296-RJC-DSC, 2023 WL 2472649 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 8, 2023), the court held that “the FCC’s rulemaking authority under section 227(c) extends only to unwanted telephone solicitations directed at ‘residential telephone subscribers.’” Id. at *3. The court also noted that Congress’s specific reference to ‘cellular telephone service’ in § 227(b) evidenced that it was aware of the distinction between a cellular telephone and a residential telephone and “purposely protected only ‘residential telephone subscribers’ under § 227(c).” Id. Further, in a sharp break from other district courts that have cited heightened privacy invasions as a reason to include cell phone users within “residential telephone subscribers”, the court held “cell phones do not present the same concerns as residential telephones [because] the findings in the TCPA show a concern for privacy within the sanctity of the home [and] cell phones are often taken outside of the home and often have their ringers silenced, presenting less potential for nuisance and home intrusion.” Id.
Similarly, in Cunningham v. Sunshine Consulting Grp., LLC, No. 3:16-cv-2921, 2018 WL 3496538, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. July 20, 2018), the court held that “the language of the TCPA specifically provides that the regulations implemented pursuant to Subsection 227(c) concern only ‘the need to protect residential telephone subscribers’ privacy rights.”
And some courts in the Eleventh Circuit have observed that they would have reached a different conclusion were it not for Hobbs Act deference: in Turizo v. Subway Franchisee Advert. Fund Tr. Ltd., 603 F. Supp. 3d 1334, 1342 (S.D. Fla. 2022), the court characterized the inclusion of cell phone subscribers within Section 227(c) as “an unauthorized expansion of the private right of action for violations of the TCPA’s do-not-call provision”, noting that “when Congress granted the FCC authority to create the DNC Registry via section 227(c)(3), [it] intentionally withheld from the FCC any authority to create a registry that included cellular telephone numbers.”
Welcome to the post-McLaughlin era. The presumptions are gone. The pleading bar is higher. And the definition of “residential telephone subscriber” just got a lot more complicated.
AI CALLS AFTER MCLAUGHLIN: Why Consent Is Still Required
I’ll keep this short and sweet.
The Supreme Court’s decision in McLaughlin Chiropractic v. McKesson has undeniably altered how the Telephone Consumer Protection Act will be enforced. But for companies using artificial intelligence voice technologies to communicate with consumers, the crucial question remains: Does this ruling actually provide a viable escape from the TCPA’s restrictions?
Previously, the FCC in its February 2024 Declaratory Ruling clarified that the TCPA’s prohibition on “artificial or prerecorded voice” calls applies to current AI technologies that mimic human voices or generate call content from a prerecorded voice.
The Court’s 6-3 decision in McLaughlin held that federal district courts are no longer bound by an agency’s interpretation of a statute. Instead, judges must independently analyze the law, giving “appropriate respect” to the agency view.
However, this ruling does not change the reality for companies using artificial intelligence voice technologies. The text of the TCPA is clear: it prohibits calls made using an “artificial OR prerecorded” voice without prior express consent. There is no viable legal argument that a call generated by Artificial Intelligence is not “artificial.”
One might argue that a sophisticated, conversational AI that generates responses in real-time is not “prerecorded” in the traditional sense of a static audio file being played. This is a plausible argument, and a debate that can now happen in court.
But that’s only half the battle. The real challenge is the word: artificial. Arguing that a technology literally named “Artificial Intelligence” is not, in fact, “artificial” is a formidable, if not impossible, task.
So to be clear: The use of AI to make voice calls without consent is illegal under the plain text of the TCPA.
The McLaughlin decision does not create a loophole to make this conduct lawful.
Student Visa Pause Lifted; Social Media Will Be Screened
News sources reporting on a U.S. Department of State internal cable have announced that the temporary pause on scheduling new student visa interviews for F, M, and J visas has been lifted. This pause was initially implemented while the State Department implemented steps to expand social media screening for student visa applicants. Under the new directive, consular officers are now required to screen the social media and online presence of student visa applicants.
Quick Hits
The U.S. State Department has lifted the temporary pause on scheduling new student visa interviews for F, M, and J visas and is now requiring consular officers to screen applicants’ social media and online presences.
Enhanced vetting procedures for student visa applicants, including detailed social media scrutiny, are expected to increase processing delays and refusals, impacting international students’ plans to study or train in the United States.
Analysis and Impact
The screening process involves checking for any signs of hostility “towards the citizens, culture, government, institutions, or founding principles of the United States.” Additionally, officers will vet for support of terrorism, antisemitic harassment, violence, or militant groups. This scrutiny is part of the Trump administration’s broader efforts to address stated security concerns with universities that enroll foreign national students.
Consular officers are instructed to flag applicants with a history of political activism and to consider the likelihood of such activities continuing in the United States. Consulates will take detailed case notes and screenshots of online content. The screening applies to both new and returning student visa applicants and includes a broad definition of “online presence,” encompassing social media and online databases.
While the factors identified do not automatically disqualify applicants, they trigger further review to ensure compliance with U.S. immigration admissibility laws. The cable also directs embassies to prioritize interviewing physicians applying for a J-1 visa for medical residency and educational exchange, and students enrolled at universities where international students constitute 15 percent or fewer of the total student population.
University and Employer Impacts
Although the recent State Department cable lifts the Trump administration’s pause on visa interviews for F, M, and J visa applicants, the heightened vetting procedures, particularly enhanced scrutiny of applicants’ social media histories, are likely to increase visa processing delays and refusals. International students planning to enter the United States for academic study or work-based training can expect:
Longer processing times due to expanded vetting and limited appointment availability, especially as demand grows over the summer ahead of the fall academic term.
Consular backlogs and capacity constraints that may further slow visa issuance.
Additional documentation requirements, including:
usernames for social media platforms;
detailed biographic and travel histories; and
sensitive personal information covering the last five years.
Greater risk of delays or denial, as adjudications may hinge on subjective interpretations of social media content and other discretionary factors.
Deployment of AI in the Workplace in France–The Importance of Consulting With the Work Forces
In a significant ruling on 14 February 2025, the First Instance Court of Nanterre, France ordered a company to suspend the deployment of several artificial intelligence tools until proper consultation with its Works Council has been completed.
The company started implementing new AI applications while the mandatory Works Council consultation process was still ongoing. Despite the claim that these tools were merely in a “pilot phase,” the court found that their deployment to employees constituted actual implementation rather than simple experimentation.
The court’s decision emphasizes the importance of respecting employee representation rights in the digital transformation of workplaces, especially in France. This injunctive relief ruled that the premature implementation of the AI tools constituted a “manifestly unlawful disturbance” of the Works Council prerogatives.
This case sets an important precedent for companies implementing AI technologies in France, highlighting the necessity of proper employee consultation procedures before deploying new technological tools in the workplace, in addition to the recently adopted EU AI Act.
The EU AI Act classifies AI systems into four categories: prohibited AI systems, high-risk AI systems (HRAIS), general purpose AI Models (GPAIM), and low-risk AI systems.
Obligations being based on the AI systems risk-level, the most stringent rules apply to HRAIS providers which must particularly:
Implement comprehensive risk management systems;
Ensure data governance;
Maintain technical documentation;
Guarantee transparency;
Enable human oversight;
Meet standards for accuracy, robustness, and cybersecurity;
Conduct conformity assessments; and
Cooperate with regulators.
General Purpose AI Models (GPAIM), must fulfill obligations such as issue technical documentation, comply with EU copyright rules, and provide summaries of their training data. GPAIMs posing systemic risks must also undergo model evaluations, risk mitigation, and incident reporting.
Josefine Beil also contributed to this article.