Category: Constitutional Law

2024 Title IX Regulations: “Off the Books”

Yesterday, a federal district court in Kentucky issued a ruling in Tennessee v. Cardona, finding that the 2024 Title IX regulations are unconstitutional and violated the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) by being “arbitrary and capricious.” The court ordered vacatur, which “takes the unlawful agency action ‘off the books. . .’” and prevents application of the regulations “to all who would otherwise be subject to its operation.” (1)
The memorandum opinion of the court found that “expanding the meaning of ‘on the basis of sex’ to include ‘gender identity’ turns Title IX on its head.” (2) Further, the court determined that the First Amendment was violated by requiring Title IX recipients, specifically teachers, to use names and pronouns associated with a student’s asserted gender identity. (3) Furthermore, the court found that the regulations are overly broad and/or vague that schools have no way of predicting what conduct might violate the law. (4) For example, the court cited to the new regulation’s prohibition of “[u]nwelcome sex-based conduct that, based on the totality of circumstances, is subjectively and objectively offensive . . (5) As discussed in the training offered by SMGG on this topic, this portion of the regulation made determination of Title IX violations completely on a case-by-case basis, with no true guide as to offensive conduct. Due to the constitutional infirmity of the regulations, the court also found that the provisions violate the Spending Clause of the United States Constitution. (6)
In determining the appropriate remedy, the court found that all aspects of the new regulations were tainted with the provisions that the court deemed invalid, requiring the entirety of the regulations to be “jettison[ed].” (7) The court held that the “normal remedy” is vacatur when the challenged action of an administrative agency violates the law. (8) The court also granted plaintiffs’ declaratory relief, and characterized it as “Plaintiff States, their political subdivisions, and their recipient schools need not comply with the Rule to receive federal funding.” (9)
What this Means for Your School
The nationwide vacatur of the 2024 Title IX final rule means that the 2020 Title IX final rule as well as the prior Title IX regulations are in effect. It is anticipated that the Department of Education may issue guidance in the aftermath of yesterday’s ruling, which SMGG education attorneys will monitor.

(1) See, State of Tennessee v. Cardona, No., 2:24-00072 (Jan. 9, 2025), p. 13 (citations omitted).(2) Opinion, p. 7.(3) Id. at p. 8.(4) Id.(5) 34 C.F.R. §106.2 (emphasis added).(6) Opinion, p. 10.(7) Id. at p. 12.(8) Id.(9) Id. at p. 15.

MBTA Communities Act: Next Steps

Massachusetts SJC Upholds MBTA Communities Act on Constitutional Grounds, but Rules Ineffective on Procedural Grounds
Background
If you already have the background, please jump to the end of this article for a discussion of next steps.
The MBTA Communities Act (“§ 3A” or the “Act”) was established in response to the ongoing housing crisis in Massachusetts.[1] Among other things, the law requires cities and towns with access to MBTA services to implement zoning laws that allow for at least one district of multifamily housing “as of right” near local MBTA stations.[2] Under § 3A, each MBTA community[3] must maintain multifamily housing districts of “reasonable size,” in addition to other requirements set forth in the statute: such districts must meet a minimum gross density measurement of 15 units per acre; be located not more than 0.5 miles from an MBTA facility (commuter rail, subway, ferry, or bus station, as applicable); and must be suitable for families with children and must not contain age restrictions.[4]
MBTA communities that do not comply with § 3A are ineligible for certain State funding sources—such as the Housing Choice Initiative, the Local Capital Projects Fund, the MassWorks infrastructure program, and the HousingWorks infrastructure program—but notably, a municipality cannot simply choose not to comply with § 3A.[5] The plain language of the statute requires compliance: “municipalities shall have a zoning ordinance or by-law that provides for [multifamily housing as of right].”[6]
The town of Milton had initially taken steps to comply with § 3A: its planning board had discussed implementation, it received grant money to hire a design consultant to create a zoning plan, and submitted its “action plan” to the Executive Office of Housing and Livable Communities (HLC) seeking a determination of “interim compliance” with § 3A.[7] In February of 2024, however, Milton held a referendum, and the voters rejected the proposed zoning plan by a margin of 8%. Thereafter, the Attorney General filed its complaint against the town to enforce compliance with § 3A.
The Supreme Judicial Court’s January 8, 2025 Decision
In Attorney General v. Town of Milton, et al., the town’s position was threefold: that § 3A “provides for an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, that the Attorney General lacks the power to enforce the [A]ct, and that HLC’s guidelines were not promulgated in accordance with the [Administrative Procedure Act (APA)].”[8]
First, Milton argued that § 3A is legally ineffective because the HLC failed to implement the Act in accordance with the APA.[9] The Court agreed, citing the central function of the APA—G. L. c. 30A—which is to “establish a set of minimum standards of fair procedure below which no agency should be allowed to fall and to create uniformity in agency proceedings.”[10] In response, the Attorney General contended that HLC is exempt from the APA procedure because 30A “directs the agency to promulgate ‘guidelines’ rather than ‘regulations.’” Even if the APA applied, the Attorney General argued, the HLC nonetheless substantially complied with the statute and any omissions were therefore harmless.[11] The Court rejected both arguments: “Given the breadth, detail, substance, and mandatory requirements of the HLC guidelines . . . we reject the agency’s position that the ‘guidelines’ . . . are meant to be exempt from the APA[.]”[12] Here, the guidelines direct HLC to create compliance parameters for MBTA communities, such as detailing what is needed to achieve a “reasonably sized” zoning district. Moreover, the guidelines set forth the manner by which the HLC determines density requirements and whether all of a community’s multifamily housing must be situated within one-half mile of the designated § 3A MBTA facility. Finally, the guidelines define and establish the application process for “as of right” zoning of multifamily housing near MBTA facilities.[13] Taken together, the Act’s “guidelines” fall within the scope of 30A and must, therefore, be promulgated pursuant to the APA’s requirements. 30A, §5 requires agencies engaged in the rulemaking process to, among other requirements, file notice of proposed regulation—which includes a notice of public hearing—with the Secretary of the Commonwealth, along with a small business impact statement, both of which HLC admitted it did not do.[14] The APA leaves no room for “substantial compliance,” but rather strict compliance is required for agencies promulgating rules under 30A.[15] Notably, it also appeared that HLC failed to file a fiscal impact statement with the Secretary of the Commonwealth, which is also required by 30A. The Court, concluding, stated “because HLC failed to comply with the APA, HLC’s guidelines are legally ineffective and must be repromulgated in accordance with G. L. c. 30A, § 3, before they may be enforced.”[16]
Second, Milton argued the Legislature’s delegation of authority to the HLC violated the separation of powers doctrine because § 3A gives HLC the power to require “transformative zoning changes” in MBTA communities.[17] The Court rejected the town’s position based on three factors: first, the Legislature routinely assigns to others the implementation of a policy adopted by statute; second, the Act provided “intelligible” parameters to allow the HLC to make determinations as to whether an MBTA community was in compliance with the Act; and finally, under § 3A, the HLC was guided by principles of reasonableness as well as content limitations, and the Act required the HLC’s consultation with other State agencies in the promulgation of its guidelines, which “sufficiently demarcate[s] the boundaries of regulatory discretion.[18]
Finally, Milton argued the Attorney General could not enforce § 3A because there was no explicit grant of authority in the act, but the court rejected such reasoning, citing the Attorney General’s broad power to enforce the laws of the Commonwealth in addition to the Attorney General’s duty to “represent the public interest and enforce public rights.”[19] Moreover, the fact that § 3A already included consequences for noncompliance—e.g. lack of certain funding opportunities—does not foreclose the Attorney General’s power to enforce equitable relief particularly where, as here, “converting [the] legislative mandate into a matter of fiscal choice” would frustrate the Legislature’s purpose in adopting the statute.[20]
Next Steps
Multiple sources have reported on Governor Healey’s intention to have the HLC file new emergency regulations by the end of the week. While the emergency regulations would be effective immediately upon filing, it is unclear what alternate compliance deadline(s) might be established on municipalities or whether new emergency guidelines would face a court challenge for violating the APA, particularly if the filing by HLC is a perfunctory compliance with the APA procedural requirements only. The establishment of new compliance deadlines is politically sensitive: very near term deadlines could be deemed punitive, whereas distant deadlines could be viewed as accommodating the communities which have not been prompt to comply. Although 30A, § 2(5) states that emergency regulations shall not remain in effect for longer than three months, an agency may prolong such three-month period if during that time it gives notice and holds a public hearing, and files notice of compliance with the Office of the Secretary of State.

[1] See Multi-Family Zoning Requirement for MBTA Communities, Mass.gov (Nov. 22, 2024), https://www.mass.gov/info-details/multi-family-zoning-requirement-for-mbta-communities.
[2] See Compliance Guidelines for Multi-family Zoning Districts Under Section 3A of the Zoning Act, Commonwealth of Mass. Exec. Off. Hous. & Livable Cmtys. (revised Aug. 17, 2023), https://www.mass.gov/doc/compliance-guidelines-for-multi-family-zoning-districts-under-section-3a-of-the-zoning-act/download [hereinafter Compliance Guidelines].
[3] See id. at 4 (An “MBTA community” is “one of the ‘14 cities and towns’ that initially hosted MBTA service; one of the ‘51 cities and towns’ that also host MBTA service but joined later; other ‘served communities’ that abut a city or town that hosts MBTA service; or a municipality that has been added to the MBTA under G.L. c. 161A, sec. 6 or in accordance with any special law relative to the area constituting the authority.”).
[4] See id. at 1.
[5] See Attorney General v. Town of Milton, et al., SJC No. 13580, slip op. at 6, n.6 (Mass. Jan. 8, 2025).
[6] See Compliance Guidelines, supra note 2, at 1.
[7] See Milton, slip op. at 7.
[8] See id. at 9.
[9] See id. at 18.
[10] See id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
[11] See Attorney General v. Town of Milton, et al., SJC No. 13580, slip op. at 19 (Mass. Jan. 8, 2025).
[12] See id. at 19-20.
[13] See id. at 19-20.
[14] See id. at 21.
[15] See Milton, slip op. at 21-22 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
[16] See id. at 22.
[17] See Attorney General v. Town of Milton, et al., SJC No. 13580, slip op. at 9 (Mass. Jan. 8, 2025).
[18] See id. at 10-13.
[19] See id. at 9, 14-16.
[20] See id. at 14-15.

U.S. Department of Education’s 2024 Title IX Final Rule Addressing Sex-Based Discrimination and Sexual Harassment Vacated

On January 9, 2025, in State of Tennessee v. Cardona, Civil Action No. 2:24-cv-072-DCR, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky vacated the Title IX Final Rule that was issued by the U.S. Department of Education on April 29, 2024, and became effective August 1, 2024. The ruling appears to apply nationwide.

Quick Hits

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky vacated the U.S. Department of Education’s 2024 Title IX Final Rule, which had expanded the definition of sex-based harassment to include sexual orientation, gender identity, sex stereotypes, and pregnancy.
The court found that the 2024 Title IX Final Rule violated the First Amendment and the Spending Clause of the United States Constitution, and it exceeded the U.S. Department of Education’s authority under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which traditionally prohibited only discrimination based on sex as male or female, not gender identity. The court also determined the rule was vague, overbroad, and arbitrary.
The decision concluded that while the plaintiff states and their schools were not required to comply with the 2024 Title IX Final Rule to receive federal funding, they potentially “could violate Title IX in ways unrelated to the Final Rule, which might render them ineligible for federal funding.” The 2020 Title IX Rule remains in place for federal enforcement and investigations by the U.S. Department of Education.

Among other changes, the 2024 Title IX Final Rule expanded the definition of “sex-based harassment” to include harassment based on sex characteristics, sexual orientation, gender identity, sex stereotypes, and pregnancy.
It also changed when a response was required. The Final Rule had already been halted in twenty-six states, as numerous legal actions were filed to enjoin the U.S. Department of Education from enforcing the Final Rule.
The district court’s decision granted summary judgment to six states (the Commonwealth of Kentucky, the Commonwealth of Virginia, the State of Indiana, the State of Ohio, the State of Tennessee, and the State of West Virginia) and two intervenors, who were the plaintiffs, and it denied summary judgment to the defendants, Secretary of Education Miguel Cardona and the U.S. Department of Education.
Each side had moved for summary judgment. The decision rejected the Department of Education’s reliance on Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, 590 U.S. 644 (2020), a Supreme Court of the United States decision in which the Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects employees against discrimination because of sexuality or gender identity. In its decision, the district court noted that Title VII has different language, goals, and defenses than Title IX and described inconsistencies the Final Rule created within Title IX, which allows sex-based separation in various circumstances. Notably, the new rules did not address transgender participation in sports.
The decision holds that the Final Rule and its corresponding regulations:

violated the United States Constitution, specifically the First Amendment and the Spending Clause;
exceeded the U.S. Department of Education’s statutory authority under Title IX, which prohibits discrimination based on sex as male or female, not gender identity;
infringed on the free speech rights of teachers and others by requiring them to use names and pronouns associated with a student’s asserted gender identity or face harassment claims;
were vague and overbroad and did not provide clear notice to the states of the conditions for receiving federal funds under Title IX; and
were arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act.

The decision concluded that the U.S. Department of Education did not provide a reasoned explanation for departing from its long-standing interpretation of Title IX and that it failed to account for the “glaring inconsistencies” and consequences of the Final Rule.
The court vacated the entire Final Rule and its corresponding regulations, and declared that they were unenforceable nationwide. The decision also granted declaratory relief to the plaintiffs, stating that they did not have to comply with the Final Rule to receive federal funding. The decision modified the fourth request for declaratory relief, holding that “it goes too far to affirmatively conclude that the plaintiff-states ‘are entitled to funding irrespective of their compliance with the Rule.’” After noting that “the plaintiff-States potentially could violate Title IX in ways unrelated to the Final Rule, which might render them ineligible for federal funding,” the court stated that “a more accurate way to characterize this declaratory relief is that the Plaintiff States, their political subdivisions, and their recipient schools need not comply with the Rule to receive federal funding.”
The U.S. Department of Education has not yet commented on the decision. For purposes of federal enforcement and investigative actions by the U.S. Department of Education, the 2020 Title IX Rule is still in place.

Federal Government Urges Court of Appeals to Uphold Constitutionality of FCA Qui Tam Provisions

Headlines that Matter for Companies and Executives in Regulated Industries

Federal Government Urges Court of Appeals to Uphold Constitutionality of FCA Qui Tam Provisions
In a brief filed earlier this week, the US federal government has urged the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals to uphold the constitutionality of the False Claims Act’s (FCA) qui tam provisions, challenging a Florida district court’s ruling that found them to be unconstitutional.
The appeal stems from an underlying case with relator Clarissa Zafirov, who filed a qui tam action in 2019 against several health care entities, accusing them of misrepresenting patient conditions to Medicare. While the government initially declined to intervene, it later elected to defend the constitutionality of the FCA’s provisions.
At the district court level, the court found that whistleblowers are officers of the United States and must be appointed according to the appointments clause, leading to the dismissal of Zafirov’s suit. Per the government’s appellate brief, the district court decision is an “outlier ruling” that contradicts US Supreme Court precedent. The government specifically pointed to the decision in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 US 765 (2000), in which the Supreme Court held that the FCA’s qui tam provisions are consistent with Article III and argued that this makes clear that relators do not exercise executive power when they sue under the Act. Instead, relators are “pursuing a private interest in the money they will obtain if their suit prevails.” As such, they do not exercise executive power and do not require appointment under the appointments clause.
The government further emphasized that qui tam actions are subject to government oversight and cannot proceed without the government’s decision on intervention. Accordingly, the federal government now seeks to reverse the district court’s decision and has urged the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals to maintain the established legal framework supporting whistleblower actions under the FCA.
The case is Clarissa Zafirov v. Florida Medical Associates LLC et al., Nos. 24-13581 and 24-13583, in the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The government’s appellate brief is available here.

Community Health Network Reaches Third FCA Settlement in 10 Years, Agreeing to Pay $135 Million to Resolve Outstanding Claims
In a deal reached two years after the Indiana health care system agreed to pay $345 million to settle FCA allegations with the federal government, Community Health Network has now agreed to pay $135 million to resolve federal health care fraud claims brought by its former chief financial officer.
Over 10 years ago, in 2014, Community Health CFO and COO Thomas Fischer filed a lawsuit under the FCA’s qui tam provisions, alleging that Community Health overpaid physicians to secure referrals in violation of state and federal laws, including the federal Stark Law and Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS). Per the complaint, Community Health utilized an “aggressive strategy” to grow its physician network and garner referrals, including the recruitment of doctors by providing payment in excess of the market rate through large base salaries and sizable bonuses, among other means.
The US Department of Justice (DOJ) elected to intervene in the case. The $345 million settlement addressed some of Fischer’s claims, leaving others unresolved. In 2020, the district court allowed Fischer to file an amended complaint that asserted additional FCA claims separate from those pursued by the government. This latest settlement with Community Health resolves those remaining claims. Among other things, the deal resolves claims that (1) Community Health paid above fair-market value rent to a physician-owned real estate partnership to induce those doctors to refer patients to a Community Health-owned ambulatory surgical center in violation of the AKS, and (2) Community Health overpaid physicians employed by the organization and also by an independent oncology group that contracted exclusively with the health nonprofit.
Notably, Community Health additionally reached a $20.3 million settlement with the DOJ in 2015 to resolve civil allegations that the health nonprofit submitted false claims to Medicare and Medicaid programs. All told, Community Health has now paid more than half a billion dollars to resolve three FCA matters over the past 10 years. Nonetheless, Community Health has emphasized that all claims were resolved with no finding of wrongdoing, and the issues were unrelated to the quality or appropriateness of the health care provided by Community Health to its patients.
The case is US and State of Indiana ex rel Fischer v. Community Health Network, Inc., et al., Case No. 1:14-cv-1215, in the US District Court for the Southern District of Indiana.
The DOJ’s press release on the 2015 $20.3 million settlement is available here. The DOJ’s press release on the 2023 $345 million settlement is available here.

Athira Pharma Inc. Agrees to Pay Over $4 Million to Settle FCA Allegations
Athira Pharma Inc., based in Bothwell, Washington, has agreed to pay $4,068,698 to settle allegations that it violated the FCA.
Per the DOJ, this settlement will resolve allegations that, between January 1, 2016, and June 20, 2021, Athira failed to report allegations of research misconduct regarding grant applications and grant award progress reports and assurances to both the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Research Integrity. The alleged misconduct included that Athira’s former CEO, Leen Kawas, falsified and manipulated scientific images in her doctoral dissertation and in published research papers that were referenced in several grant applications submitted to NIH, including in a grant that NIH funded in 2019. 
Notably, Athira immediately notified NIH of the research misconduct after the full board of directors learned of it. Underscoring the significance of cooperation credit, the DOJ noted specifically that “the company’s transparency significantly helped Athira mitigate its damages and demonstrated its resolve towards coming into compliance with the relevant law and regulations.” 
The settlement additionally resolves claims brought under the FCA’s qui tam provisions, with whistleblower Andrew P. Mallon, Ph.D., receiving $203,434.
The DOJ’s press release is available here.

Iron Man 2 Actor Sentenced for COVID-19 Scam
Earlier this week, Keith Lawrence Middlebrook, a bodybuilder and actor known for his role in Iron Man 2, was sentenced to over eight years in prison for attempting to defraud investors by falsely claiming he had discovered a cure for COVID-19 and that National Basketball Association legend Magic Johnson was a major investor.
Middlebrook was arrested in March 2020, becoming the first person in the United States charged with a COVID-19-related scam. The case included recorded calls with an undercover FBI agent where Middlebrook claimed his treatments could generate significant profits. Middlebrook’s scheme involved promoting fake COVID-19 treatments and soliciting investments through social media and other channels, falsely claiming Johnson’s involvement to lend credibility.
The recent sentencing follows a guilty verdict on all 11 counts of wire fraud faced by Middlebrook, rendered by a 12-person jury after a three-day trial. During sentencing, and among other things, Middlebrook denied any wrongdoing and claimed to have a relationship with Johnson, who testified that he did not recall meeting Middlebrook. While video evidence showed Middlebrook and Johnson at the same event, the court was unmoved by the defense counsel’s suggestion at trial that Johnson gave false testimony. Specifically, the court noted that it was “inconceivable” that Johnson would have forgotten some of the lengthy interactions that Middlebrook had alleged occurred between them.
In the end, the court’s sentence of 98 months aligned with the sentence sought by the prosecutors.
The case is USA v. Keith Middlebrook, No. 2:20-cr-00229, in the US District Court for the Central District of California. 

The Second Circuit Revives Sarah Palin’s Defamation Suit Against The New York Times

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has once again revived Sarah Palin’s longstanding defamation suit against The New York Times.
The Second Circuit’s opinion highlights important procedural and substantive issues in defamation actions involving public figures, particularly in the current polarized media environment.
Palin’s lawsuit, which we previously wrote about here, relates to a 2017 Times editorial that incorrectly linked a political ad from the 2008 Republican vice presidential candidate and former governor of Alaska to a 2011 mass shooting in Arizona that killed six people and injured 13 more, including Congresswoman Gabby Giffords. After an initial dismissal that was reversed on appeal, Palin’s case proceeded to trial in February 2022.
During jury deliberations, the District Court Judge announced in open court that he believed Palin had failed to produce sufficient evidence of actual malice, and, for that reason, would grant judgment in favor of the Times. However, the judge allowed the jury to continue deliberations and the jury subsequently returned a verdict for the Times. The court later revealed in a public filing that members of the jury had learned about the judge’s decision to dismiss the case during deliberations after receiving push notifications on their smartphones. This unusual procedural sequence, compounded by errors during the trial, led the Second Circuit to vacate the judgment and order a retrial, which is scheduled to begin on April 14, 2025.
The Second Circuit found that the “district court’s Rule 50 ruling improperly intruded on the province of the jury by making credibility determinations, weighing evidence, and ignoring facts or inferences that a reasonable juror could plausibly have found to support Palin’s case.” The appellate panel also identified “several major issues at trial,” including the erroneous exclusion of critical evidence, inaccurate jury instructions regarding defamatory malice, a legally erroneous response to a mid-deliberation jury question, and jurors receiving push notifications on their smartphones about the district court’s Rule 50 ruling in favor of the Times during deliberations. The Second Circuit held that these errors impugned the reliability of the jury’s verdict and warranted a retrial.
Although Palin ultimately succeeded on appeal, Palin’s broader efforts to have the Supreme Court revisit the “actual malice” requirement set by New York Times v. Sullivan may have hit a dead end. Public-figure defamation plaintiffs need to prove actual malice, which requires showing that an allegedly defamatory statement was made “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280. In St. Amant v. Thompson, the Supreme Court explained that proof that a defamatory article was published “recklessly, though not knowingly” is not sufficient to prove actual malice. Rather, the evidence must show that the defendant had “an awareness…of the probable falsity” of the publication. Later, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court defined “reckless disregard of the truth” to mean “subjective awareness of probable falsity.”
On appeal, Palin argued that “the actual malice standard is either no longer good law or should not apply to her case.” The Second Circuit rejected these arguments as barred by the “law of the case” doctrine because they were ripe for review at the time of Palin’s initial appeal but were not raised. Additionally, Palin challenged the district court’s ruling that, regardless of the First Amendment, she was required to prove actual malice as an element of her claim under New York’s amended Anti-SLAPP law, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 76-a. The November 2020 amendment to New York’s Anti-SLAPP law imposes an actual malice fault standard in any action concerning the “exercise of the constitutional right of free speech in connection with an issue of public interest.” However, “because the First Amendment and New York’s amended Anti-SLAPP Statute share the same substantive requirement (that a public-figure defamation plaintiff must prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence),” the Second Circuit stated, “we need not decide—and do not decide—whether the Anti-SLAPP Statute’s amendment applies retroactively.”
The Second Circuit’s decision to defer ruling on this issue is significant. The retroactive application of New York’s amended Anti-SLAPP statute effectively insulates Palin’s case from a future challenge to the current First Amendment standard because the outcome of the new trial will presumably rest independently on both federal law and New York State statutory law. While Palin’s case has reignited debates about Sullivan’s actual malice standard, it is unlikely that her case will provide the vehicle for the United States Supreme Court to revisit this line of precedent.

The California Racial Justice Act of 2020, Explained

A Contra Costa County Superior Court judge recently dismissed all gang enhancements in a murder case against four young Black men under provisions of California’s recently enacted Racial Justice Act […]