The Swiss Federal Supreme Court Bans References to Animals in Plant-based Foods
On May 2, 2025, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court ruled that designations referring to animal species are not allowed to label plant-based meat substitutes (here is the official press release, in French, 2C_26/2023). The full judgment is not yet available, so we cannot provide a more in-depth analysis of the arguments of Switzerland’s supreme judges, and the information below is based solely on the press release.
In 2021, the Zurich Cantonal Laboratory banned a company from labelling its pea protein meat substitutes with names referring to animal species; the company appealed this ban, and the Administrative Court of the Canton of Zurich decided in its favor in 2022, allowing the use of references to animal meat in its products. However, in its judgment of May 2, 2025, the Federal Supreme Court upheld the appeal filed by the Federal Department of Home Affairs, annulling the first instance decision of the Zurich Administrative Court and thus ruling against the company.
According to the press release, food products destined for consumers made exclusively with vegetable proteins (i.e., those usually defined as ‘plant-based meat’) cannot be designated by names of animal species, even if these are accompanied by an indication specifying the vegetable origin of the product, such as ‘planted chicken,’ ‘chicken-like,’ ‘pork-like,’ ‘vegan pork,’ or ‘vegan chicken.’ In fact, the term ‘chicken’ refers to poultry; therefore, it cannot be used for products that do not contain a meat component, as it would be misleading for consumers. In other words, plant-based products alternative to meat must be labelled in such a way as to enable the consumer to recognize the type of foodstuff and to differentiate it from products that they aim to substitute.
GET YOUR FAX STRAIGHT: Court Grants Class Certification In TCPA Fax Blast Case
Hey TCPAWorld!
Litigation is a pursuit of the truth, and the truth has a way of resurfacing—often from the same hands that tried to bury it.
In Loop Spine & Sports Ctr., Ltd. v. Am. Coll. of Med. Quality, No. 22 CV 4198, 2025 WL 1446504 (N.D. Ill. May 20, 2025), Loop Spine & Sports Center, Ltd. (“Plaintiff”), an Illinois chiropractic and sports injury company, sued American College of Medical Quality, Inc. (“ACMQ”), Affinity Strategies, and a former ACMQ executive, Daniel McLaughlin (collectively, the “Defendants”) for sending an unsolicited fax promoting a medical conference, alleging violations under the TCPA.
Plaintiff sought certification and the motion was granted.
Background
Here’s the rundown. ACMQ engaged McLaughlin, who then enlisted Jim Dodge (McLaughlin’s acquaintance) and Michael Henry (who is in the business of distributing faxes), to promote its 2022 “Care After Covid” conference via a “blast fax” campaign to doctors in the Chicago area. Id., at *2. Together, the group compiled 13,850 contacts to reach. Plaintiff was a recipient of one of the faxes and subsequently sued.
The parties disagree on two substantive factual issues related to class certification: (1) how many faxes were actually sent, with Plaintiff contending at least 6,500, while Defendants assert 28, and (2) whether Plaintiff or other putative class members provided permission for the fax. Defendants assert that Henry called Plaintiff, spoke to an employee, and obtained oral consent before sending the fax, however the employee testified to having no recollection of such a call.
Defendants attempted to reconcile Henry’s previously conflicting statements by claiming his reference to “a little over 6500 faxes delivered” meant the numbers were sent to a data cleaning service, but most of those faxes were not actually transmitted, and that Plaintiff’s “fax was part of [a] modest test run.” Id., at *3 (citations omitted). However, Defendants highlight that there is no evidence of any pre-suit mention of such a service, and Henry himself testified he has no records of any communication or transaction with a data cleaning provider. Plaintiff also emphasizes the inconsistencies in Henry’s testimony, stating he sent test faxes to 22 people, but originally mentioned 28 in his affidavit, and claimed in an email that he sent only a single fax.
Another wrinkle in the dispute is that, after being instructed to halt the blast fax campaign, Henry allegedly deleted all the relevant records—prompting Plaintiff to seek an adverse inference. Defendants counter that Henry is not a party to the case and that Plaintiff failed to timely raise the issue in its class certification motion, rendering any adverse inference unwarranted.
Analysis
To pursue class certification, Plaintiff must satisfy the Rule 23(a) prerequisites—numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy—then show they qualify for a particular type of class action under Rule 23(b). Here, Plaintiff argues that it meets the Rule 23(b)(3) requirements that common questions of law and fact predominate and that class action resolution is superior to other methods.
Numerosity
To satisfy numerosity under Rule 23(a)(1), Plaintiff must show that the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical, with the Seventh Circuit recognizing that around forty members typically suffices. Here, Plaintiff argues that even 1% of the 6,500 faxes which were allegedly delivered would establish numerosity. In particular, Plaintiff used the following correspondences between Henry and McLaughlin for support:
On August 6th, “I have scheduled this to run starting at 12 noon Sunday – if your happy with what the customer will receive it will go out”
On August 7th, “we are sending 14352 faxes today”
On August 8th, “we got a little over 6500 faxes delivered” and that the “second attempt” will pick up another 750
Id., at *4. Defendants counter by citing Henry’s post-suit deposition and affidavit claiming he only sent 28 faxes to parties who had consented, but the Court finds that this later testimony lacks credibility due to inconsistencies in Henry’s previous remarks, absence of corroborating evidence, and Henry’s deletion of relevant records. Ultimately, the Court concluded that Plaintiff has established numerosity.
Commonality
To satisfy commonality under Rule 23(a)(2), Plaintiff must show that there are common questions of law or fact capable of class-wide resolution, meaning the answers would resolve issues central to all class members. The Seventh Circuit holds that in cases under the TCPA, such as whether a fax is an advertisement, this standard is typically met because these are common questions across recipients, and “[n]othing about the instant case persuades the Court to depart from this general principle.” Id., at *5. The Court found commonality satisfied because the identical fax was allegedly sent to all recipients by the same marketing project, raising a shared legal question about whether the fax was an ad and who is liable for sending it. Defendants argue that the “distinction between traditional and online efaxes defeat commonality”, but the Court rejects this, noting that “commonality requires one common question, not the absence of any individual questions.” Id.
Typicality
Typicality under Rule 23(a)(3) requires that the representative plaintiff’s claims arise from the same course of conduct and share the same essential characteristics as the class members’ claims. Plaintiff, like all putative class members, allegedly received the same fax promoting the ACMQ conference, and the Defendants do not contest typicality. Thus, the Court concluded that typicality was satisfied.
Adequacy
Adequacy under Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the named plaintiff and their counsel fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Defendants challenged Plaintiff’s adequacy by pointing to Henry’s testimony that he received permission from Plaintiff to send the fax, suggesting Plaintiff was not harmed and thus unsuitable to represent the class. However, the Court found Henry’s testimony unconvincing, especially in light of the employee’s testimony that Plaintiff had a strict policy against receiving unsolicited faxes. The Court concluded that Henry’s statements did not undermine Plaintiff’s adequacy as a representative. Additionally, the Court found no issues with class counsel’s adequacy, noting their experience and lack of conflict. Accordingly, the Court determined that both Plaintiff and its counsel satisfied the adequacy requirement.
Rule 23(b)(3)
Rule 23(b)(3) requires that common questions of law or fact predominate over individual ones, and that a class action is superior to other methods for fairly and efficiently resolving the controversy. Predominance exists when core issues can be resolved on a class-wide basis, such as whether a fax was an advertisement, whether it violated the TCPA, and who is liable for the violation. Superiority is satisfied when a class action would promote efficiency and consistency in adjudication, especially for claims involving small individual stakes.
Defendants argued that predominance fails because individual issues—particularly whether each recipient consented to the fax—would require separate analysis. The Court rejected this, finding that Henry’s claim of consent only related to Plaintiff and not to other recipients, making consent a class-wide issue rather than an individualized one. Moreover, even if consent is an affirmative defense, it is the Defendants’ burden to prove and must be shown for each class member. The Court concluded that evidence of prior express permission did not predominate over the shared legal and factual questions. It also found superiority satisfied, noting that class-wide resolution would conserve resources and promote uniformity. Thus, Plaintiff met both the predominance and superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).
Ascertainability
Ascertainability demands that a class is defined clearly and based on objective criteria. Defendants argued Plaintiff’s original class definition was improper because it hinged on whether faxes were sent “by or on behalf of” certain Defendants, making it a merits-based, fail-safe class. Id., at *7. In reply, Plaintiff proposed a revised definition:
“All persons with fax numbers, who on August 6–10, 2022, were sent faxes in the form of Exhibit A.”
Id. The Court found this new definition objective and free of merits issues, concluding ascertainability was satisfied.
Conclusion
Plaintiff’s Motion was granted, and the class is certified. The Court appointed Plaintiff as class representative and Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin, LLC as class counsel.
Keep in mind – the truth will find its way. Often delayed but rarely denied.
Until the next one, TCPAWorld!
Oregon Expands Consumer Privacy Law to Include Auto Manufacturers—and Possibly Their Dealerships
“Our cars know how fast you’re driving, where you’re going, how long you stay there. They know where we work, they know whether we stop for a drink on the way home, whether we worship on the weekends, and what we do on our lunch hours.” OR Representative David Gomberg
The Oregon Legislature recently enacted House Bill 3875, amending the Oregon Consumer Privacy Act (OCPA) effective September 28. 2025, to broaden its scope to include motor vehicle manufacturers and their affiliates that control or process personal data from a consumer’s use of a vehicle or its components.
While this expansion is clear in its application to vehicle manufacturers, it raises important questions for automobile dealerships, particularly those “affiliated”—formally or informally—with manufacturers. Dealerships should consider whether they may now be subject to the full scope of Oregon’s privacy law. Of course, they may be subject directly to the OCPA in their own right.
The Amendment: HB 3875
HB 3875 modifies ORS 646A.572 to extend the OCPA’s privacy obligations to:
“A motor vehicle manufacturer or an affiliate of the motor vehicle manufacturer that controls or processes personal data obtained from a consumer’s use of a motor vehicle or a vehicle’s technologies or components.”
Who Counts as an “Affiliate”?
To determine whether a dealership is subject to these new obligations, one must examine the OCPA’s definition of affiliate:
“Affiliate” means a person that, directly or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls, is controlled by or is under common control with another person such that:
(a) The person owns or has the power to vote more than 50 percent of the outstanding shares of any voting class of the other person’s securities;
(b) The person has the power to elect or influence the election of a majority of the directors, members or managers of the other person;
(c) The person has the power to direct the management of another person; or
(d) The person is subject to another person’s exercise of the powers described in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) of this subsection.
This definition introduces some ambiguity for dealerships. Many dealerships operate as independent businesses, even if they sell only one manufacturer’s vehicles and display that brand prominently. While they may be contractually tied to a manufacturer, they may not meet the legal standard of being controlled by or under common control with that manufacturer as described in the definition.
However, certain dealership groups—particularly those owned or operated by manufacturers or holding companies—may clearly fall within the definition of “affiliate.”
Dealerships should evaluate their corporate structure and agreements with manufacturers to determine whether this definition might apply to them.
Why This Matters
Entities subject to the OCPA must comply with a range of privacy requirements, including:
Providing transparent privacy notices
Obtaining consumer consent for data collection and sharing under certain circumstances
Offering consumer rights such as access, correction, deletion, and data portability
Implementing reasonable data security measures
These obligations extend to any personal data collected through vehicle technologies, such as navigation systems, driver behavior analytics, location data, and mobile app integrations.
Federal Context: FTC Enforcement
Dealerships should also remain aware of federal obligations. Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), auto dealers engaged in leasing or financing must follow privacy and safeguard rules enforced by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).
The FTC has published detailed guidance for auto dealers, including:
FAQs on the Privacy Rule for Auto Dealers
Safeguards Rule updates for information security programs
What Dealerships Should Do Now
Even if a dealership is not legally an “affiliate” under the OCPA or subject to a similar state comprehensive privacy law, the trend toward regulating vehicle-generated data suggests it’s time to proactively review data practices. Dealerships should:
Conduct a data inventory to identify what personal data is collected, especially from connected vehicle systems.
Update privacy notices and practices in accordance with state and federal law.
Review contracts with manufacturers and vendors for data-sharing provisions and compliance obligations.
Train staff on new privacy responsibilities and how to respond to consumer data requests.
Minnesota Employment Legislative Update 2025, Part III: Regular Session Ends in Stalemate and Stagnation
On May 19, 2025, the Minnesota Legislature’s regular session adjourned without completing the two-year budget, leaving a long list of outstanding bills in limbo. The Minnesota Legislature will now enter a special session to tackle unfinished business. Despite the regular session’s anti-climactic ending, state lawmakers managed to pass a handful of bills that have been signed by Governor Tim Walz and will create new obligations for employers.
Quick Hits
Minnesota’s regular legislative session adjourned on May 19, 2025, but a special session is expected to convene soon to complete remaining budgetary matters.
Governor Walz signed the Brady Aune and Joseph Anderson Safety Act, imposing new requirements on employers with commercial scuba divers.
The legislature amended Minnesota’s medical cannabis law, among other laws, which creates new obligations for employers.
Other significant proposed bills aimed at amending existing labor and employment laws failed to make it to Governor Walz’s desk for approval.
Brady Aune and Joseph Anderson Safety Act
A new statute, Minn. Stat. § 182.679, titled the “Brady Aune and Joseph Anderson Safety Act,” applies to “persons who are conducting self-contained underwater breathing apparatus (scuba) diving at a place of employment while making improvements to the land, including the removal of aquatic plants” took effect May 2, 2025. Under this new statute, which is included in the Minnesota Occupational Safety and Health Act (Minn. Stat. § 182), employers:
may not allow an individual to scuba dive unless the individual has an acceptable open-water scuba diver certificate;
must require certain equipment when an individual is scuba diving;
must ensure that a standby diver is available while a diver is in the water; and
must ensure all individuals scuba diving or serving as standby divers are trained in CPR and first aid.
An employer may be cited by the commissioner of labor and industry for violations under this statute.
Amendments to Minnesota’s Medical Cannabis Law
Minnesota’s medical cannabis law (Minn. Stat. § 342.57) went into effect on March 1, 2025, and prohibits employers from discriminating against a person in hiring, termination of employment, or any term or condition of employment if the discrimination was based on the person’s enrollment in a cannabis registry program. It also prohibits employers from taking adverse action against an employee for a positive drug test for cannabis components or metabolites, unless the employee used, possessed, sold, transported, or was impaired by medical cannabis flower or a medical cannabinoid product on work premises, during working hours, or while using an employer’s vehicle, equipment, or machinery. These protections apply unless compliance would violate federal or state laws or regulations or cause an employer to lose a monetary or licensing-related benefit under federal law or regulations.
Senate File (SF) 2370 / House File (HF) 1615 amended Minnesota’s medical cannabis law in several ways, including:
expanding the protection of this bill to cover employees who are enrolled in a Tribal medical cannabis program. Thus, an employer may not take any adverse action against an employee based on the employee’s enrollment in this type of program;
requiring an employer to notify employees at least fourteen days before the employer takes an adverse employment action due to the specific federal law or regulation the employer believes would be violated if it does not take the action and the monetary or licensing-related benefit the employer would lose if it does not take the action;
prohibiting employers from retaliating against an employee for asserting the employee’s rights or seeking remedies under the Minn. Stat. §§ 342.57 or 152.32;
increasing the civil penalty for violating Minn. Stat. §§ 342.57, subds. 3, 4, or 5 from $100 to $1,000.
giving employees the option to seek injunctive relief to prevent or end a violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 342.57, subds. 3 to 6a.
Governor Walz signed the bill on May 23, 2025, and it took effect the following day.
Amendments to Wage Theft and Whistleblower Laws
On May 23, 2025, Governor Walz also signed bills that amended Minnesota’s wage theft and whistleblower statutes.
Wage Theft: SF 1417 / HF 2432 amends Minn. Stat. § 388.23 to give the county attorney (or deputy attorney if authorized by the county attorney in writing) the authority to subpoena and require the production of records of an employer or business entity that is the subject of or has information related to a wage theft investigation, including: accounting and financial records (such as books, registers, payrolls, banking records, credit card records, securities records, and records of money transfers); records required to be kept pursuant to section 177.30, paragraph (a); and other records that relate to the wages or other income paid, hours worked, and other conditions of employment or of work performed by independent contractors, and records of any payments to contractors, and records of workers’ compensation insurance.
SF 1417 / HF 2432 will go into effect on August 1, 2025.
Whistleblowers: SF 3045 / HF 2783: Amends Minn. Stat. § 181.931 (Minnesota’s whistleblower law) to add definitions of “fraud,” “misuse,” and “personal gain”:
“Fraud” means an intentional or deceptive act, or failure to act, to gain an unlawful benefit.
“Misuse” means the improper use of authority or position for personal gain or to cause harm to others, including the improper use of public resources or programs contrary to their intended purpose.
“Personal gain” means a benefit to a person; a person’s spouse, parent, child, or other legal dependent; or an in-law of the person or the person’s child.
SF 3045 / HF 2783 will go into effect on July 1, 2025.
Looking Ahead
Several omnibus bills include provisions that, if enacted, would amend Minnesota’s meal and rest break law, add employer unemployment insurance fraud penalties, make “political activity” a new protected characteristic under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, revise Minnesota Paid Family and Medical Leave and Earned Sick and Safe Time laws, and create valid circumstances for noncompete agreements. However, when the regular session ended, these bills were stranded in the legislative pipeline, awaiting potential revival in the special session.
The legislature has until July 1, 2025, to enact the rest of its budget to avoid a government shutdown, and Governor Walz is expected to call the special session soon after Memorial Day. With a track record of embedding labor and employment laws into lengthy budget bills, employers may want to prepare for any developments from the special session.
Find the previous parts of this series here: Part I & Part II
The New York Retail Worker Safety Act: Countdown to Compliance
In February 2025, Governor Hochul signed an amendment to the New York Retail Worker Safety Act extending the effective date of some of its provisions to June 2, 2025. The amendment to the New York Retail Worker Safety Act modified several provisions of the legislation, which has an overall purpose of enhancing the safety and well-being of retail workers in the state, to replace panic buttons with silent response buttons, require such buttons for retailers with 500 or more employees statewide, and change the training requirement for smaller retailers.
The Law and Recent Amendments
The New York Retail Worker Safety Act was first proposed in January 2024, and quickly garnered support in the state legislature. The original version of the act was signed into law by Governor Hochul on September 5, 2024, with an effective date set for March 4, 2025. However, an approval memo from the governor indicated that amendments were forthcoming. These amendments were proposed and signed into law on February 14, 2025, pushing the effective date to June 2, 2025.
Which Employers are Covered Under the Act?
The act applies to all employers with at least ten retail employees. The act defines a “retail employee” as an employee working at a “retail store” for an employer. A “retail store” is any store that sells consumer commodities at retail and which is not primarily engaged in the sale of food for consumption on the premises.
What is “Retail”?
While the basic concept of which employers are covered under the act seems straightforward, a primary concern for employers is determining whether their businesses qualify as “a store that sells consumer commodities at retail” and thereby falls under the law’s definition of a “retail store.” While there is no official guidance to help employers with this question, they can turn to other sources for insight. Employers can refer to their North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code, where retail trade employers are classified with numbers beginning with 44 or 45. Employers can also look to the dictionary definitions of “commodity” and “retail.” A “commodity” is generally defined as a substance or product that can be traded, bought, or sold. “Retail” is generally defined as the activity of selling goods to the public, usually in small amounts, for their own use. Therefore, if an employer sells a tangible product to the general public as an end user, that employer may be covered under the act. Contrast this to another employer that sells a service or something nonphysical, or that sells products in larger amounts to other businesses or entities for resale.
Prevention Program Requirements
The new law requires employers to develop a written workplace violence prevention program that identifies factors and situations that place retail employees at risk. While much of this is left for the individual employer to determine, the law does provide some examples, including working late hours, exchanging money with the public, working alone, and having uncontrolled access to the workplace. According to the law, a workplace violence program must include prevention methods, a reporting system for incidents, information on resources for victims of workplace violence, and anti-retaliation language.
Training Requirements
The new law requires also employers to implement an interactive training program for their retail employees. According to the law, retailers must train their retail employees upon hire and annually thereafter, while retailers with fewer than 50 retail employees must train their employees once every two years. These trainings must cover various topics including protection from customer/coworker workplace violence, de-escalation tactics, active shooter drills, and emergency procedures. The trainings must also communicate a site-specific list of emergency exits and meeting places.
Silent Response Buttons
When first signed into law, the act required employers to implement panic buttons with which employees could directly and immediately contact law enforcement contact. However, the February 2025 amendment to the law changed this requirement, to replace the panic button requirement with a silent response button requirement. These buttons notify internal staff and quickly request assistance from on-site security officers, managers, or supervisors instead of off-site law enforcement. The goal with this change was to prevent overwhelming law enforcement with false alarms and ensure a more controlled response to potential incidents.
Notice Requirements
The new law requires employers to provide retail employees with a notice about the company’s workplace violence prevention program and information about training requirements. The law requires that this be in English and the employee’s primary language, if it is one of the 12 most common non-English languages spoken in New York State. If the primary language is not among these, the notice can be provided in English.
Next Steps
The New York Retail Worker Safety Act is intended to be a significant step towards ensuring the safety of retail employees. The new law and its amendments include several requirements on employers, including implementing a prevention program, a comprehensive training program, and silence response buttons. As the effective date approaches, retailers may want to be proactive and prepare to comply with the act’s provisions in advance of its June 2 effective date.
Fourth Circuit Expands FCRA Liability: Legal Inaccuracies Now Actionable
On March 14, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the dismissal of a lawsuit alleging a failure to reasonably investigate a disputed debt.
The lawsuit concerned a consumer who disputed a debt that she claimed was fabricated by her housing provider in retaliation for asserting her rights under her lease. After she refused to pay an invoice for alleged damages, the housing provider assigned the debt to a collection agency. The debt collector then reported the disputed amount to credit reporting agencies, prompting the consumer to file a dispute. Upon receiving notice of the dispute, the credit reporting agencies requested that the debt collector conduct a reasonable investigation, as required under Section 1681s-2(b)(1) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). Instead of performing the required investigation, the debt collector relied solely on the creditor’s recertification of the debt.
The consumer filed suit. The district court dismissed the case, reasoning that the consumer’s challenge involved a legal dispute and therefore did not require further investigation under FCRA. The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that inaccuracies — whether legal, factual or a mix of both — are actionable under Section 1681s-2(b) if the plaintiff pleads an objectively and readily verifiable inaccuracy.
The court clarified that disputes involving complex fact-gathering or in-depth legal analysis such as those courts would typically perform are not “objectively and readily verifiable,” nor are disputes involving unsettled questions of law or credibility determinations, which therefore fall outside the scope of actionable inaccuracies under the FCRA. However, the court also emphasized that a “reasonable investigation” may require more than just confirming basic details like the debt amount or the debtor’s name.
With this decision, the Fourth Circuit joins the Second and Eleventh Circuits in rejecting a bright-line rule that excludes legal inaccuracies. This approach contrasts with rulings from the First and Tenth Circuits, which maintain that only factual inaccuracies are actionable under FCRA.
Putting It Into Practice: The ruling clarifies what constitutes an “actionable inaccuracy” under the FCRA. Specifically, the ruling expands potential liability for furnishers under the FCRA by expanding the subset of factual inaccuracies that are actionable. The Fourth Circuit’s decision aligns with a broader trend of heightened scrutiny and reforms to the FCRA over the past year (previously discussed here). Furnishers and credit reporting agencies should prepare to evaluate a broader range of consumer disputes and stay tuned for further FCRA-related regulatory developments, which will likely include an appeal to the Supreme Court at some point to resolve the conflict among the Circuit Courts.
Philadelphia Enacts POWERful New Worker Protection Ordinance
On May 27, 2025, Mayor Cherelle Parker signed the Protect Our Workers, Enforce Rights (“POWER”) Act into law, which expands the Philadelphia Department of Labor’s enforcement options for violations of the City’s expanding roster of worker protection laws. Under this new ordinance, which is now in effect, workers in Philadelphia have expanded protection against labor infractions; and employers face a host of new and enhanced compliance requirements.
Key provisions of the new legislation include:
Expanded Definitions and Coverage. The ordinance broadens the definitions of “employee,” “employer,” and “domestic worker,” ensuring coverage for a wider range of workers, including part-time, temporary, and live-in domestic workers.
Paid Sick Leave and Leave Accrual. The legislation specifies that employees, including domestic workers, accrue paid sick time, compensated at their regular rate of pay, with specific calculation methods for tipped employees. Employers are prohibited from counting sick time as an absence leading to discipline and must provide notice of rights in multiple languages. Employers must also maintain contemporaneous records of hours worked, sick time taken, and payments for at least three years.
Wage Theft Protections. The ordinance expands the definition of wage theft to include violations of state and federal wage laws where work is performed in Philadelphia, or the employment contract is made in the City. The Department of Labor will be authorized to investigate complaints, with a three-year statute of limitations for filing. Employers failing to maintain required payroll records face an affirmative presumption that they have violated the Act.
Domestic Worker Protection. Employers must provide written contracts to domestic workers (excluding casual work), detailing job duties, wages, schedules, leave, benefits, and termination terms, in English and in the worker’s preferred language. Domestic workers are entitled to paid rest periods and meal breaks and will accrue paid leave, with a centralized portable benefits system to be developed for aggregation across multiple employers. Employers must also provide minimum notice periods (two weeks for most, four weeks for live-in workers) for termination without cause, with severance pay and, for live-in workers, continued housing or its value if notice is not provided.
Anti-Retaliation Protections. The ordinance prohibits retaliation against workers for exercising rights under any worker protection ordinance, including filing complaints, seeking information, or participating in investigations. It also places a rebuttable presumption of unlawful retaliation on any employer who discharges, suspends, or takes other adverse action against an employee within 90 days of the employee engaging in protected conduct.
Expanded Enforcement and Private Right of Action. The Department of Labor will be empowered to investigate, mediate, and adjudicate complaints, with authority to issue subpoenas and expand investigations to cover pattern or practice violations. Workers may also bring private civil actions without first exhausting administrative remedies, subject to a 15-day notice and cure period. Prevailing workers are entitled to legal and equitable relief, including attorney’s fees and costs.
Notice, Posting, and Outreach Requirements. Employers must provide written notice of rights to employees in relevant languages or post notices conspicuously. Failure to provide notice tolls the statute of limitations for any claims and may subject an employer to a civil penalty of up to $2,000 per violation.
Public Reporting. Employers with repeated or unresolved violations may be listed in a public “Bad Actors Database,” face license revocation, and be deemed ineligible for City contracts.
The POWER Act significantly enhances protections for many workers in Philadelphia. Employers and hiring entities must review and update their policies, contracts, and recordkeeping practices to ensure compliance. The expanded enforcement powers, increased penalties, and public reporting mechanisms underscore the City’s intention to take stronger action to enforce its growing list of worker protection laws and hold noncompliant employers accountable.
Pennsylvania Launches Centralized Consumer Complaint System, Expands State Enforcement Under Dodd-Frank
On May 1, Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro announced a new centralized consumer protection hotline, website, and email address, providing residents with streamlined access to state agencies for reporting scams, financial misconduct, and insurance-related disputes. The rollout is part of a broader push by Pennsylvania to expand state-level enforcement amid a shift in federal priorities.
According to Governor Josh Shapiro, Pennsylvania is also expanding its use of enforcement authority under the Dodd-Frank Act, which permits states to enforce federal consumer financial laws when federal regulators decline to act. This includes coordination across agencies and stepped-up investigations into predatory lending, deceptive practices, and insurance misconduct.
The initiative builds on Pennsylvania’s existing consumer protection framework and is designed to connect residents with the appropriate agency, such as the Department of Banking and Securities or the Pennsylvania Insurance Department, regardless of the nature of the complaint. Governor Shapiro emphasized that the program follows a “no wrong door” model, ensuring that consumers can access support across lending, insurance, student loan servicing, and other financial service issues.
Pennsylvanians can now submit complaints by calling 1-866-PACCOMPLAINT, visiting pa.gov/consumer, or emailing [email protected].
Putting It Into Practice: Governor Shapiro’s launch of a centralized complaint platform highlights Pennsylvania’s intention to fill the enforcement void left recently by federal regulators (previously discussed here and here). As the CFPB continues to scale back enforcement and supervision, states like Pennsylvania are asserting authority to investigate and prosecute violations of both state and federal law, including UDAAP violations. Financial service companies should expect to see other states follow suit as they ramp up their enforcement and supervision priorities to compensate for the federal pullback.
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DOJ and CFPB Terminate $9 Million Redlining Consent Order with Southern Regional Bank
On May 21, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee granted a joint motion by the CFPB and DOJ to terminate a 2021 redlining settlement with a regional bank, vacating the consent order and dismissing the case with prejudice. The original lawsuit, filed in October 2021, alleged violations of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) and Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA).
The complaint accused the bank of engaging in unlawful redlining from 2014 to 2018 by failing to serve the credit needs of majority-Black and Hispanic neighborhoods in the Memphis Metropolitan Statistical Area.
Specifically, the complaint alleged that the bank:
Located nearly all mortgage officers in white neighborhoods. The bank assigned no mortgage loan officers to branches in majority-Black and Hispanic census tracts.
Failed to advertise or conduct outreach in minority neighborhoods. Marketing was concentrated in commercial media outlets and business-focused publications distributed in majority-white areas.
Lacked internal fair lending oversight. The bank allegedly did not conduct a comprehensive internal fair lending assessment until 2018.
Significantly underperformed peer lenders. Only 10% of mortgage applications and 8.3% of originations came from majority-Black and Hispanic neighborhoods—less than half the peer average.
Under the consent order, the bank agreed to pay a $5 million civil penalty, invest $3.85 million in a loan subsidiary fund, open a mortgage loan production office in a minority neighborhood, and spend an additional $600,000 on community development and outreach. The consent order was scheduled to last five years, but was terminated early after the agencies found that the bank had disbursed all required relief and was in “substantial compliance” with the orders terms.
Putting It Into Practice: By ending the redlining settlement early, the CFPB continues to back away from redlining enforcement actions launched under the prior administration (previously discussed here). While institutions should remain focused on fair lending compliance, these moves suggest federal scrutiny of redlining—particularly cases built on statistical evidence or marketing practices—may be easing.
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CFPB Seeks to Vacate Open Banking Rule
On May 23, the CFPB notified a Kentucky federal court that it now considers its own 2023 open banking rule “unlawful” and plans to set the rule aside. The Bureau announced its intent to seek summary judgement against the rule, which was issued under Section 1033 of the Dodd-Frank Act to promote consumer-authorized data sharing with third parties.
The original rule (previously discussed here), issued in October 2023 under former Director Rohit Chopra, was designed to implement Section 1033’s mandate by requiring financial institutions to provide consumers and authorized third parties with access to their transaction data in a secure and standardized format. The rule aimed to promote competition and consumer control over financial information by enabling the use of fintech apps and digital tools to manage personal finances.
The lawsuit, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, challenged the rule on several grounds, including claims that the CFPB exceeded its statutory authority and imposed obligations not contemplated by Congress. Key points raised in the challenge include:
Alleged lack of CFPB authority. Plaintiffs argue the Bureau overstepped by mandating free, comprehensive data access and imposing new compliance burdens without clear congressional authorization.
Interference with industry-led initiatives. The plaintiffs asserted that the rule would disrupt private-sector open banking frameworks already set in place, which they claim serve hundreds of million of Americans.
Concerns about data security and consumer harm. The rule’s opponents caution that mandating third-party data access could increase risks of misuse or breaches.
Putting It Into Practice: While the litigation had previously been paused to give the agency time to evaluate the regulation, the Bureau’s latest filing confirms that Acting Director Russel Vought no longer supports the rule and now views it as unlawful. This move effectively puts the rule’s validity in the hands of the court, even as compliance deadlines—set to begin April 1, 2026—technically remain in place unless the rule is vacated. Given the rule’s prior bipartisan support and its importance to fintech stakeholders, market participants should continue monitoring this litigation closely for further developments.
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SEC Signals Reevaluation of CAT Reporting Amid Broader Transparency and Regulatory Reform Efforts
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman Paul S. Atkins recently directed SEC staff to conduct a review of the Consolidated Audit Trail (CAT), focusing on the escalating costs, reporting requirements, and cybersecurity risks stemming from sensitive data collection.[1] This directive aligns with Chairman Atkins’ expressed priorities to return to principled regulation, support market innovation and evolution, and reduce unnecessary compliance burdens. Among other things, Chairman Atkins cited CAT’s “appetite for data and computing power,” noting annual costs approaching $250 million, ultimately borne by investors, as the rationale for this reevaluation.[2] He supported Commissioner Mark T. Uyeda’s efforts behind the granting of an exemption from the requirement to report certain personally identifiable information (PII) to CAT for natural persons.[3]
This CAT reevaluation is part of a broader market-friendly agenda at the SEC. For example, Chairman Atkins has identified a goal of his tenure is to develop a rational regulatory framework for crypto asset markets, covering the issuance, custody, and trading of crypto assets all the while discouraging bad actors from violating the law. Chairman Atkins continues to emphasize the importance of regulatory frameworks that are “fit-for-purpose” with “clear rules of the road” for market participants to facilitate capital formation and protect investors.
While no immediate changes to CAT reporting obligations are effective beyond the PII exemption, market participants should prepare for shifts in how the SEC approaches data collection and cost allocation.
Footnotes
[1] Paul S. Atkins, Chairman, SEC, “Prepared Remarks Before SEC Speaks” (May 19, 2025), https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/atkins-prepared-remarks-sec-speaks-051925.
[2] Id.
[3] Paul S. Atkins, Chairman, SEC, “Testimony Before the United States House Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government” (May 20, 2025), https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/atkins-testimony-fsgg-052025. See Katten’s Quick Reads post on the exemptive relief for reporting personally identifiable information here.
Chapter 93A and the Limits of Consumer Protection: Lessons from Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Coulsey
In a long-running Massachusetts foreclosure case, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Coulsey, the Massachusetts Appeals Court weighed in on the applicability and limits of Chapter 93A. The decision provides guidance as to how—and when—Chapter 93A claims may be brought, and when repeated litigation crosses the line into claim preclusion.
The dispute began in 2007 when the plaintiff purchased a home with a loan and mortgage she would soon default on. Over the next 17 years, the plaintiff engaged in a prolonged legal battle with multiple mortgage holders, ultimately culminating in an eviction. The plaintiff repeatedly but unsuccessfully invoked Chapter 93A in an attempt to block foreclosure and eviction. The plaintiff’s claims were first dismissed without prejudice in federal court and her later attempts to revive or amend the 93A claims were rejected. They were again dismissed in a state court in a collateral action.
The Appeals Court affirmed the state-court dismissal and issued a clear rebuke to repeatedly raising Chapter 93A claims based on the same factual nucleus. The Appeals Court emphasized the following:
Prior Opportunity. The plaintiff was allowed in 2016 to amend her complaint to better articulate 93A violations. That was the moment to raise all related theories. The court found that “any new basis or theory supporting her c. 93A claim could have been brought at that time.”
Ongoing Harm v. Ongoing Claim. Plaintiff argued that her 93A claim should be revived because defendant’s alleged misconduct was “ongoing.” The court rejected that logic, stating: “[Plaintiff’s] assertion that c. 93A violations are ongoing and therefore could not have been advanced in prior litigation is contrary to the purpose of res judicata…” In short, the passage of time or continued impact did not give the plaintiff the right to relitigate previously dismissed claims.
Chapter 93A Not Exempt from Res Judicata. Importantly, the court reiterated that Chapter 93A claims—like any civil claim—are subject to rules of finality. If a claim is dismissed with prejudice or could have been litigated earlier, it cannot be brought again just by rebranding it or restating the facts.
Implications for Companies
A litigant does not get endless chances to reframe Chapter 93A claims. If the allegations asserted are vague or conclusory, challenging them in a motion to dismiss is appropriate even under the broad reach of Chapter 93A. The decision underscores that consumer rights are balanced against the need for closure. Once courts have ruled on a matter, even the broad protections of Chapter 93A will not open the door to re-litigating the same claims under a new heading.