CFPB to Withdraw BNPL Interpretive Rule Amid Broader Agency Rollback
The CFPB has announced plans to withdraw its May 2024 interpretive rule that subjected buy-now, pay-later (BNPL) products to regulations applicable to credit cards under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). The move was revealed in court filing in the CFPB’s ongoing litigation with a fintech-focused trade organization which challenged the rule as procedurally improper and ill-suited to short-term, interest-free BNPL loans.
The interpretive rule, issued under former Director Rohit Chopra, would have extended traditional credit card protections—such as dispute rights and refund guarantees—to BNPL offerings (previously discussed here). The parties jointly requested to stay the case pending revocation of the rule.
This shift comes as part of a broader reorientation of the CFPB under President Trump. Under the current administration, the Bureau has moved to pause or roll back a slew of enforcement and rulemaking efforts initiated during the Biden administration (previously discussed here, here, and here).
Putting It Into Practice: The CFPB’s withdrawal of the BNPL interpretive rule signals a lighter regulatory touch on emerging consumer credit products. While welcomed by BNPL providers, the move may prompt increased scrutiny from state regulators and consumer advocates concerned about potential protection gaps. Industry participants should prepare for a patchwork of regulatory expectations in the near term.
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FHFA Rescinds UDAP Oversight Bulletin and SPCP-Based Renter Protections
The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) has taken two significant deregulatory steps affecting its oversight of the government-sponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (GSEs). The agency rescinded a 2024 advisory bulletin asserting its authority to regulate unfair or deceptive acts or practices (UDAP) by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Additionally, the FHFA withdrew renter protection requirements—previously scheduled to take effect on May 31—for multifamily loans made through Special Purpose Credit Programs (SPCPs) backed by the GSEs.
UDAP Advisory Bulletin Rescinded
FHFA stated that enforcement of unfair or deceptive acts or practices should remain with the FTC, which is the primary administrator of Section 5 of the FTC Act. The agency emphasized its focus on the safety and soundness of the GSEs, rather than duplicating existing consumer protection authority.
The rescinded bulletin had stated that FHFA would evaluate whether the GSE’s actions or inactions could be considered unfair or deceptive under established standards, and would hold the enterprises accountable if they facilitated or failed to prevent such conduct. It also emphasized UDAP concerns could arise in connection with third-party servicers or counterparties acting on behalf of GSEs. By revoking the bulletin, FHFA clarified that it does not intend to impose separate or parallel UDAP obligations on the enterprises beyond those enforced by the FTC or CFPB.
SPCP-Based Tenant Protections Withdrawn
FHFA has formally reversed course on renter protections that were previously tied to multifamily loans issued through SPCPs backed by GSEs. These conditions, which had been scheduled to take effect on May 31, would have required landlords to implement a five-day grace period before charging late fees and to provide at least thirty days’ notice before modifying lease terms.
The protections were introduced as part of the GSEs’ Equitable Housing Finance Plans and were aimed at improving housing stability for very low-, low-, and moderate-income renters. FHFA’s current leadership characterized the requirements as exceeding the agency’s role and stated that lease-related protections should be governed by state and local law.
Putting It Into Practice: The FHFA’s recission of its UDAP bulletin and SPCP-based renter protections reflects a shift toward a narrower role for the agency, centered on institutional supervision and market stability. Financial institutions should continue look to the FTC, CFPB, and state regulators for UDAP enforcement, tenant protection standards, and other consumer-facing compliance obligations.
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Virginia Enacts Law Protecting Reproductive and Sexual Health Data
On March 24, 2025, Virginia Governor Youngkin signed into law S.B. 754, which amends the Virginia Consumer Protection Data Act (“VCDPA”) to prohibit the collection, disclosure, sale or dissemination of consumers’ reproductive or sexual health data without consent.
The law defines “reproductive or sexual health information” as “information relating to the past, present, or future reproductive or sexual health” of a Virginia consumer, including:
Efforts to research or obtain reproductive or sexual health information services or supplies, including location information that may indicate an attempt to acquire such services or supplies;
Reproductive or sexual health conditions, status, diseases, or diagnoses, including pregnancy, menstruation, ovulation, ability to conceive a pregnancy, whether an individual is sexually active, and whether an individual is engaging in unprotected sex;
Reproductive and sexual health-related surgeries and procedures, including termination of a pregnancy;
Use or purchase of contraceptives, birth control, or other medication related to reproductive health, including abortifacients;
Bodily functions, vital signs, measurements, or symptoms related to menstruation or pregnancy, including basal temperature, cramps, bodily discharge, or hormone levels;
Any information about diagnoses or diagnostic testing, treatment, or medications, or the use of any product or service relating to the matters described above; and
Any information described above that is derived or extrapolated from non-health-related information such as proxy, derivative, inferred, emergent, or algorithmic data.
“Reproductive or sexual health information” does not include protected health information under HIPAA, health records for the purposes of Title 32.1, or patient-identifying records for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2.
These amendments to the VCDPA will take effect on July 1, 2025.
Pennsylvania AG Alleges Mortgage Brokers Engaged in Illegal Referral Scheme
On January 17, the Pennsylvania Attorney General filed a civil enforcement action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against a group of mortgage brokers and their manager, alleging that they operated an unlawful referral scheme in violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA), and Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law.
According to the complaint, the defendants offered real estate professionals a mix of financial incentives—such as discounted shares in a joint venture mortgage company, event tickets, and luxury meals—in exchange for directing clients to affiliated mortgage brokerages. These referral arrangements were not disclosed to homebuyers.
The Attorney General alleges that the defendants:
Improperly transferred ownerships interests. Real estate agents were offered discounted, nonvoting shares in affiliated mortgage companies to incentivize referrals, in violation of RESPA and state consumer protection law kickback prohibitions.
Provided high-value entertainment. Agents allegedly received event tickets and luxury dinners in exchange for steering homebuyers, conduct the Attorney General contends violates RESPA and constitutes unfair and deceptive acts under the CFPA.
Disguised payments as legitimate business deals. The scheme was structured to appear as stock sales and profit distributions to conceal kickbacks, allegedly violating RESPA and both federal and state consumer protection statutes.
Failed to meet disclosure requirements. The defendants allegedly did not comply with the legal standards for affiliated business arrangements under RESPA, depriving consumers of material information and transparency.
The lawsuit seeks injunctive relief, restitution, civil penalties, and recovery of attorneys’ fees.
Putting It Into Practice: This state enforcement continues the trend of states ramping up regulation and enforcement of financial services companies (previously discussed here and here). As certain states continue to align themselves with the CFPB’s January recommendations encouraging states to adopt and apply the “abusive” standard under the CFPA (previously discussed here), we expect to see more states ramp up their consumer financial protection efforts.
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RIP Overdraft Rule?
Last month, bills were introduced in the House and Senate to overturn the much-maligned CFPB overdraft rule. You can find our previous write-up on the rule here. The rule would redefine “finance charge” under Regulation Z to sweep up overdraft fees charged by “Very Large Financial Institutions” (total assets exceeding $10 billion). Unless covered entities charged a “breakeven” fee (calculated through a head-spinning formula) or a “benchmark” fee ($5), they would have to treat overdraft fees as an extension of credit under the Truth in Lending Act (i.e., issue a bunch of onerous disclosures).
The rule was questioned when it came out in January 2024—an issue we previously addressed. Several banks ran to court as soon as the final rule was promulgated in December 2024. As we explained, the rule carried potentially drastic consequences that would create exposure beyond overdraft fees and beyond Very Large Financial Institutions.
When former CFPB Director Rohit Chopra unveiled this rule at the beginning of an election year, he probably didn’t anticipate a Republican sweep of Congress and the White House. But, given November’s results, yesterday’s outcome shouldn’t be a surprise: The Senate voted 52-48 to eliminate the overdraft rule pursuant to the Congressional Review Act (5 U.S.C. § 801). If the companion measure passes the House, the matter will go to President Trump’s desk for his signature. If both of those things happen, the overdraft rule cannot be resurrected again except by an act of Congress.
That’s what we expect to happen. But it’s not certain. Overdraft fees may draw the ire of populist elements within the Republican Party. Note that Sen. Josh Hawley broke rank to vote against the measure.
Stay tuned. We’ll keep track of this issue.
A TALE OF TWO REJECTED MOTIONS: Court Denies Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend and Defendant’s Motion to Compel
Hey, TCPAWorld!
Be timely. Don’t skip procedural steps. And always bring receipts.
In SHANAHAN v. MFS SUPPLY LLC, No. 8:23CV475, 2025 WL 885265 (D. Neb. Mar. 21, 2025), both Terrence Shanahan (“Plaintiff”) and MFS Supply LLC, (“Defendant”) filed competing motions. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Modify the First Amended Class Action Complaint and Case Progression Order, aiming to revise the class definition based on new facts uncovered during discovery. Meanwhile, the Defendant filed a Motion to Compel, to Deem Admissions Admitted, and to Enlarge the Number of Interrogatories, requesting the Court to force Plaintiff to respond to discovery requests.
The Court denied both motions.
Background
On October 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed a class action complaint accusing Defendant of sending unsolicited telemarketing texts to consumers on the national Do Not Call Registry (DNC). Plaintiff claims he received two such texts promoting real estate lockboxes and asserts he never gave consent, with his number registered on the DNC since December 17, 2004.
Plaintiff seeks to represent the following class:
“All persons in the United States who: (1) from the last 4 years to present (2) Defendant texted more than once in a 12-month period (3) whose telephone numbers were registered on the Federal Do Not Call registry for more than 30 days at the time the texts were sent.” (Filing No. 1 at p. 4 ). Plaintiff’s Complaint contains one cause of action for violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) by telemarketing to telephone numbers listed on the Federal Government’s National Do Not Call Registry.”
Id. at *2. Plaintiff asserts a single cause of action, alleging that the Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) by making telemarketing calls to phone numbers registered on the National Do Not Call Registry.
Defendant filed an answer broadly denying Plaintiff’s allegations and asserting multiple affirmative defenses, including statutory exclusions and claims that Plaintiff and the putative class consented—either expressly or implicitly—to receiving the messages, among others.
Following the parties’ Rule 26(f) Report, the Court set June 24, 2024, as the deadline for written discovery and July 8, 2024, as the deadline to file a motion to compel. The Case Progression Order required parties to first contact the magistrate judge and receive authorization from the Court before filing a motion to compel.
Discovery
On February 7, 2024, Defendant served discovery requests and later deposed Plaintiff on May 6, revealing new information allegedly not disclosed in prior cases, including that Plaintiff’s phone number was tied to his real estate license and business since 2006. Then on May 8, 2024, Defendant served a second set of discovery requests, which Plaintiff largely objected to as exceeding the interrogatory limit under Rule 33(a), being irrelevant, burdensome, vague, ambiguous, among other objections. After receiving Plaintiff’s responses, the parties engaged in an exchange that would entertain—or agitate—any litigator, and according to the Court, went something like this:
Defense counsel: “These are late.”
Plaintiff’s counsel: “No they’re not.”
Defense counsel: “The admissions were due on the 7th. You are late on the admissions. The remainder of the responses are woefully inadequate…”
Plaintiff’s counsel: “Thank you for your professional courtesy in waiting one day. The requests were all overly broad.”
Defense counsel: No response.
Id. at * 2-3.
Counsel informed the Court of a dispute over whether Plaintiff should be allowed to conduct class discovery, and shortly before the conference, Plaintiff moved to amend the Complaint. During the June 17, 2024, conference, the Court directed Plaintiff to file an amended motion after finding no good cause for missing the amendment deadline under Rule 16(b). Further, the Court declined to grant class discovery or allow a motion to compel, instead directing the parties to resolve the issues through further meet-and-confer efforts.
On June 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed an amended motion to amend the complaint, seeking to revise the class definition and establish standing based on information learned during Defendant’s deposition which revealed that Defendant had sent approximately 34,000 text messages to a nationwide list that included Plaintiff. Plaintiff sought to add the following allegations to his Complaint:
“Defendant obtained Plaintiff’s information when it downloaded a nationwide list of 17,000 (Seventeen Thousand) Berkshire Hathaway Ambassador real estate agents. Plaintiff was unaware and had no knowledge that Defendant obtained Plaintiff’s information. Defendant uploaded the list to Textedly, a text messaging platform, and sent out two text messages soliciting one of its popular products (lockboxes, which are locked boxes for keys that realtors share).
Plaintiff’s phone number ending in 1146 is Plaintiff’s only residential phone number, and Plaintiff does not have a ‘landline.’
Plaintiff’s phone number ending in 1146 is his personal cell phone.
Plaintiff owns a real estate business and maintains four separate phone numbers ending in 6224, 0737, 6430 and 0366 for operational purposes so that people do not call his personal cell phone for matters dealing with routine operation of the business.”
Id. at *3. Plaintiff also sought to amend the class definition as:
“All persons in the United States who: (1) are on the list of Berkshire Hathaway Realtors obtained by MFS Supply LLC; (2) whose telephone numbers were connected to cell phones; (3) registered on the Federal Do Not Call registry; (4) whose owners do not maintain any other residential telephone numbers; and (5) do have separate telephone number(s) for business purposes.”
Id. On July 8, 2024, Defendant filed a Motion to Compel, seeking additional interrogatories and to deem admissions admitted, alleging that Plaintiff’s counsel failed to provide documents, respond to interrogatories, or meet discovery deadlines.
Court’s Analysis of the Competing Motions
The Court starts with analyzing Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend his Complaint.
Under Rule 15(a), courts should freely grant leave to amend when justice requires, but if a scheduling deadline has passed, the party must first show good cause under Rule 16(b). Because Plaintiff filed his motion to amend more than three months after the March 15, 2024 deadline set in the Court’s scheduling order, he must first show good cause.
The primary measure of good cause is the movant’s diligence in trying to meet the deadline. Courts generally do not consider prejudice if the movant was not diligent, and absent newly discovered facts or changed circumstances, delay alone is insufficient to justify amendment. The Court found Plaintiff lacked good cause, finding that the facts were not newly discovered and could have been included earlier with diligence, nor did they alter the legal basis of Plaintiff’s claims which already addressed unsolicited texts sent despite being on the Do Not Call Registry. The Court also stated that granting the amendment after discovery had closed would cause delay, require further discovery, and unfairly prejudice Defendant.
Next, the Court analyzed Defendant’s Motion to Compel.
The Court denied Defendant’s motion for failing to follow procedural requirements, including not requesting a conference with the magistrate judge as required by the Case Progression Order and Civil Case Management Practices. Defendant also failed to show proof of a proper meet and confer, such as the date, time, or attachments any related communications between the parties. Plaintiff, on the other hand, submitted email evidence demonstrating that his counsel requested to meet and confer to resolve discovery issues, however, Defendant ignored the request and instead focused on filing the instant motion.
Moreover, the Court found that even if Defendant’s procedural failures were excused, the motion to compel still lacked the required evidentiary support to challenge Plaintiff’s production or objections, as local rules require supporting evidence for motions relying on facts outside the pleadings.
Specifically, the Court denied Defendant’s request for Plaintiff to respond to its second set of interrogatories, because Defendant exceeded the 25-interrogatory limit under Rule 33(a)(1) and failed to address the merits of Plaintiff’s objections or provide the original set of interrogatories.
Defendant’s request for production was denied as Defendant did not identify which of the 29 requests were deficient or explain why Plaintiff’s objections were invalid.
Finally, the Court denied the requests for admissions. Although Plaintiff’s responses were three days late, the Court, in its discretion, treated them as a request to withdraw deemed admissions and accepted them, finding no prejudice to Defendant and no impact on the merits of the case.
Takeaways
Scheduling Orders are not mere suggestions made by the Court and parties are expected to follow them. While the Court has the discretion to approve untimely requests to amend, the movant must show good cause under Rule 16(b), supported by diligence and not rely on preexisting facts that could have been included earlier.
Further, skipping procedural steps, such as a meet-and-confer, can kill your motion before its merits are weighed.
Finally, if you’re challenging discovery responses, make sure to bring receipts. Courts want precision—not general statements.
FDIC Aims to Eliminate Reputational Risk from Supervision
On March 24, acting FDIC Chairman Travis Hill informed Congress that the agency is preparing to eliminate the use of “reputation risk” as a basis for supervisory criticism. In a letter to Rep. Dan Meuser (R-Pa.), Hill explained that the FDIC has completed a review of its regulations, guidance, and examination procedures to identify and remove references to reputational concerns in its supervisory framework.
Hill stated that the FDIC will propose a rule that ensures bank examiners do not issue supervisory findings based solely on reputational factors, which have faced criticism from lawmakers who argue the concept has been used to discourage banking relationships with lawful but politically sensitive industries.
The FDIC is also reevaluating its oversight of digital asset activities. According to Hill, the agency intends to replace a 2022 policy requiring FDIC-supervised institutions to notify the agency and obtain supervisory feedback before engaging in crypto-related activities. The new approach will aim to provide a clearer framework for banks to engage in blockchain and digital asset operations, so long as they maintain sound risk management practices. Hill noted that the FDIC is coordinating with the Treasury Department and other federal bodies to develop this updated framework.
Putting It Into Practice: This initiative closely mirrors the OCC’s recent decision to eliminate reputational risk as a factor in bank supervision (previously discussed here). Both agencies appear to be responding to criticism that reputational concerns have been used to discourage banking relationships with lawful but disfavored industries. Banks should prepare for changes in examination procedures and evaluate how these developments may impact their compliance strategies.
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FTC Orders Fintech Company to Pay $17 Million for Allegedly Deceptive Subscription Practices
On March 27, the FTC announced that a fintech company offering cash advances through a mobile app has agreed to pay $17 million to resolve allegations that it violated the FTC Act and the Restore Online Shoppers’ Confidence Act (ROSCA). The FTC alleged that the company misrepresented the availability and cost of its services and failed to obtain consumers’ express informed consent before charging recurring subscription fees.
According to the FTC’s complaint, the company marketed its services as free and interest-free, but required users to enroll in a paid subscription plan, often without their knowledge. Consumers allegedly encountered barriers to cancellation, including disabled links and unclear steps, which resulted in unauthorized recurring charges.
Specifically, the lawsuit outlines several alleged deceptive practices, including:
Misleading “no-fee” marketing. The company advertised cash advances as fee-free, but consumers were required to enroll in a paid subscription to access the service.
Delayed access to funds. Although the company promoted instant fund transfers, consumers allegedly had to pay an additional expedited delivery fee to receive funds quickly.
Recurring charges without consent. The company allegedly failed to obtain consumers’ express informed consent before initiating subscription charges.
Insufficient disclosure of trial terms. Consumers were automatically enrolled in a paid subscription following a free trial, without clear and conspicuous disclosures.
Obstructive cancellation process. Some users were allegedly unable to cancel within the app, and others encountered unnecessary and cumbersome hurdles when attempting to prevent further charges.
Retention of charges after cancellation. The FTC alleged that the company kept charging users even after they attempted to cancel their subscriptions.
Under the stipulated order, the company must pay $10 million in consumer redress and a $7 million civil penalty. The company is also expressly barred from misrepresenting product features, charging consumers without affirmative express consent, and using designs that impede cancellation.
Putting It Into Practice: While the CFPB and state regulators continue to recalibrate their supervisory priorities, the FTC has remained consistent in its focus on unfair or deceptive acts and practices. This enforcement underscores the FTC’s longstanding commitment to stamping out deceptive marketing practices (previously discussed here, here, and here). While the CFPB has taken a step back, the FTC has continued its aggressive enforcement posture. Companies should review this enforcement action with an eye towards their own marketing practices.
Illinois Moving Forward with BVO Ban
Illinois is moving forward with the Illinois Food Safety Act to ban brominated vegetable oil (BVO), potassium bromate, propylparaben, and Red No. 3, despite FDA’s BVO ban that went into effect in July 2024 with a one-year compliance period. We previously blogged about Illinois’ bill and the FDA revocation of BVO.
According to Illinois Secretary of State Alexi Giannoulias, FDA’s ban left enforcement gaps, including lingering sales of BVO-containing products. The Illinois bill would ensure that “families aren’t stuck with unsafe leftovers while the feds catch up.” The Illinois ban is intended to enforce the BVO ban at the retail level and “tackle additional chemicals, potentially setting a precedent for stricter state oversight.”
Illinois is not the only state pushing for stricter food additive bans. California banned four additives in 2023, and other states including New York and New Jersey have proposed similar laws. According to the Environmental Working Group, states are “tired of waiting” for FDA to review additives and are “forcing the FDA’s hand.” However, states could face lawsuits claiming federal preemption for the banned chemicals.
States Take Action to Regulate and Limit PFAS in Industrial Effluent Despite Federal Inaction
On January 21, 2025, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) proposed rule seeking to set effluent limitation guidelines for certain per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) under the Clean Water Act (CWA) was withdrawn from Office of Management & Budget (OMB) review following President Trump’s Executive Order implementing a regulatory freeze. Federal action may be halted, but states are beginning to enact legislation that seeks to address PFAS contained in industrial effluent. These laws are currently sparse, with Maryland being the most recent state to establish a robust framework that requires industrial sources to limit PFAS in effluent. A handful of other states have laws establishing monitoring and reporting protocols for PFAS in industrial effluent, and other states have similar frameworks planned for future implementation. While these efforts are not yet widespread, heightened scrutiny of PFAS use suggests that more and more states will seek to monitor and limit PFAS in industrial effluent.
Maryland’s Framework
In May 2024, the Maryland legislature enacted the Protecting State Waters from PFAS Pollution Act. The Act charges the Maryland Department of the Environment (MDOE) with setting PFAS action levels and monitoring and testing protocols. MDOE appears behind schedule for rulemaking to promulgate these requirements, but a regulatory program is on the horizon. Once rulemaking is complete, certain industrial discharges of PFAS will be subject to a range of requirements seeking to monitor and reduce PFAS in effluent.
The Act only implicates discharges of PFAS from Significant Industrial Users (SIU), which MDOE was tasked with identifying by October 1, 2024. An SIU is defined under the Act as an industrial user that is:
subject to 40 C.F.R. Part 403.6;
discharges an average of 25,000 gallons per day to a publicly owned treatment works (POTW); and
contributes a certain percentage of processed wastewater at a POTW; or
is designated an SIU based on potential harm its discharges may cause or due to past violations.
The new monitoring and testing requirements apply only to SIUs “currently and intentionally using PFAS chemicals” that operate under a pretreatment permit.
Once the program is fully established, SIUs regulated under the program will be required to track and reduce the amount of PFAS contained in discharge. SIUs will be tasked with both initial and ongoing monitoring to determine the level of PFAS discharged to POTW and will need to report those monitoring results to MDOE. SIUs will also need to create plans to address PFAS in their effluent through identifying ways to reduce, move away from, and safely dispose of PFAS.
Limitation of PFAS in Industrial Effluent in Other States
Maryland is not the only state looking to limit discharges containing PFAS from industrial sources. New York and Massachusetts, for example, are pursuing monitoring and disclosure requirements for SIU. The New York legislature is currently considering S.B. 4574, which seeks to enact the “PFAS Discharge Disclosure Act” to create a monitoring protocol for “certain industrial dischargers” and for POTWs. The bill includes language requiring that monitoring results under this protocol be made public.
States such as Michigan have enacted compliance procedures to address PFAS discharged from industrial facilities to surface water or to POTWs. Under this guidance, both new and existing industrial facilities are evaluated to determine their potential to discharge PFAS. Facilities determined to have a reasonable potential to discharge PFAS are required to follow monitoring and sampling protocols. Facilities discharging PFAS above certain levels will be asked to enter into a compliance order to address and reduce the PFAS levels.
Other states, such as Colorado and Kansas, are in the beginning stages of studying the impact of discharges containing PFAS from industrial facilities to POTWs with the intention of limiting PFAS in industrial discharges in the future. Kansas has identified PFAS as an area of concern within industrial discharges and is conducting preliminary sampling at certain industrial facilities to learn more about PFAS contamination in the state.
Most of the effluent limitations and pretreatment requirements relate to state National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) programs, but some upcoming rules regarding SIUs and PFAS discharges may stem from other state and federal requirements. Virginia, for instance, plans to require facilities causing or contributing to exceedances of Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) levels for PFAS at Public Water Systems to pretreat and address effluent causing impacts to drinking water. Maryland contemplates adding requirements and limitations for SIUs under its groundwater and stormwater programs, as well.
Commentary
As Maryland and other states bring their programs online, additional states are likely to follow suit. This is especially likely if there is a perception of federal government inaction in this sphere, which is probable. Given that more and more states may take similar action as PFAS continues to be a hot topic, companies intentionally using or manufacturing products with PFAS should consider the implications of compliance moving forward. Reducing or eliminating use of PFAS and substances containing PFAS, when possible, may be a good policy decision as increasing disclosure requirements make the public aware of PFAS usage. Companies unable to move away from PFAS use should closely monitor the status of PFAS regulation in states where they manufacture and process materials and should prepare to address concern that may arise from public disclosure of their PFAS use.
Catherina D. Narigon also contributed to this article.
FDA Announces a “Chemical Contaminants Transparency Tool” to Evaluate Potential Health Risks of Contaminants in Human Foods.
On March 20, 2025, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) announced the availability of a Chemical Contaminants Transparency Tool, a database intended to provide users with a list of contaminant levels in the food supply.
Contaminant levels, such as tolerances, action levels, and guidance levels, are used by FDA to evaluate potential health risks in food. If contaminant levels exceed the permissible threshold, FDA will deem the food to be unsafe.
The database compiles existing information from several sources, including compliance policy guides, guidance for industry, and the Code of Federal Regulations, into a single reference. Information includes the contaminant’s name, commodity, contaminant level type, level value, and its reference source. There are currently 301 records available on the database.
According to the news release, under the direction of Secretary Kennedy, the Chemical Contaminants Transparency Tool is one new initiative intended to modernize chemical safety. The intention behind the database is to offer the American public “informed consent about what they are eating.”
CFPB Moves to Vacate ECOA Settlement Against Illinois-based Mortgage Lender
On March 26, the CFPB filed a motion to vacate its recent settlement against an Illinois-based mortgage lender accused of engaging in discriminatory marketing practices in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) and the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA). The lawsuit, initially filed in 2020, alleged that the lender’s public radio advertisements and commentary discouraged prospective applicants in majority- and minority- Black neighborhoods from applying for mortgage loans.
In its original complaint, the CFPB claimed the mortgage lender had violated fair lending laws by making repeated on-air statements that allegedly discouraged individuals in certain predominantly minority neighborhoods from seeking credit, and by failing to market its services in a manner that would affirmatively reach those communities. According to the CFPB, this conduct constituted unlawful discouragement under the ECOA and CFPA, even where no formal credit application had been submitted. That decision was challenged on appeal and later upheld by the 7th Circuit which found that ECOA also applies to prospective applicants. After losing on appeal, the lender settled the action for $105,000.
Acting Director Russel Vought explained in a March 26 press release that the CFPB “abused its power, unfairly tagged the lender as racist with “zero evidence”, and spent years persecuting and extorting the lender “all to further the goal of mandating DEI in lending via their regulations by enforcement tactics.”
Putting It Into Practice: The CFPB’s order is the latest example of the Bureau reversing course on enforcement actions initiated under the previous administration (previously discussed here and here). This is the rare instance of a federal regulator ripping up an action that was already settled. Perhaps even more noteworthy, the lawsuit against the mortgage lender was filed under the first Trump administration.
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