Navigating the Changing Landscape of Corporate Transparency Act Compliance
Both the U.S. Department of the Treasury and FinCEN, a bureau within the Treasury Department, have issued statements, which, taken together, indicate a significant reduction in the enforcement of the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA) beneficial ownership information (BOI) reporting requirements against U.S. citizens and domestic reporting companies. Specifically, the Treasury Department has indicated its intent to narrow, via forthcoming rule changes, the scope of the BOI reporting requirements to foreign reporting companies only and to halt any penalties or fines against U.S. citizens and domestic reporting companies following implementation of these rule changes.
The Treasury Department has yet to issue the proposed rulemaking reflecting these changes to the scope of BOI reporting requirements, and it will be important to see the proposed rulemaking to better understand how the Treasury Department and FinCEN plan to effect these changes. Items to look out for in any proposed rulemaking include:
Whether U.S. citizens who are beneficial owners of foreign reporting companies will need to comply with BOI reporting efforts of foreign reporting companies.
Whether domestic reporting companies with foreign beneficial owners will be subject to any BOI reporting requirements.
How the language regarding ending enforcement of penalties and fines against U.S. citizens and domestic reporting companies for non-compliance is worded (i.e., eliminating altogether enforcement against all U.S. citizens and domestic reporting companies or a general, discretionary pause by FinCEN).
In addition, the validity or legality of any proposed rulemaking regarding the narrowed scope of the CTA may be challenged in the courts. And, as noted in our previous alert, there are still a number of court cases pending, and Congress is also considering bills that would affect the CTA. Accordingly, this is unlikely to be the last update in the CTA enforcement saga.
The U.S. Department of the Treasury issued the following release regarding enforcement of the CTA:
Treasury Department Announces Suspension of Enforcement of Corporate Transparency Act Against U.S. Citizens and Domestic Reporting Companies
The Treasury Department is announcing today that, with respect to the Corporate Transparency Act, not only will it not enforce any penalties or fines associated with the beneficial ownership information reporting rule under the existing regulatory deadlines, but it will further not enforce any penalties or fines against U.S. citizens or domestic reporting companies or their beneficial owners after the forthcoming rule changes take effect either. The Treasury Department will further be issuing a proposed rulemaking that will narrow the scope of the rule to foreign reporting companies only. Treasury takes this step in the interest of supporting hard-working American taxpayers and small businesses and ensuring that the rule is appropriately tailored to advance the public interest.
“This is a victory for common sense,” said U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. “Today’s action is part of President Trump’s bold agenda to unleash American prosperity by reining in burdensome regulations, in particular for small businesses that are the backbone of the American economy.”
In addition, FinCEN issued the following release regarding enforcement of the CTA:
FinCEN Not Issuing Fines or Penalties in Connection with Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Deadlines
WASHINGTON––Today, FinCEN announced that it will not issue any fines or penalties or take any other enforcement actions against any companies based on any failure to file or update beneficial ownership information (BOI) reports pursuant to the Corporate Transparency Act by the current deadlines. No fines or penalties will be issued, and no enforcement actions will be taken, until a forthcoming interim final rule becomes effective and the new relevant due dates in the interim final rule have passed. This announcement continues Treasury’s commitment to reducing regulatory burden on businesses, as well as prioritizing under the Corporate Transparency Act reporting of BOI for those entities that pose the most significant law enforcement and national security risks.
No later than March 21, 2025, FinCEN intends to issue an interim final rule that extends BOI reporting deadlines, recognizing the need to provide new guidance and clarity as quickly as possible, while ensuring that BOI that is highly useful to important national security, intelligence, and law enforcement activities is reported.
FinCEN also intends to solicit public comment on potential revisions to existing BOI reporting requirements. FinCEN will consider those comments as part of a notice of proposed rulemaking anticipated to be issued later this year to minimize burden on small businesses while ensuring that BOI is highly useful to important national security, intelligence, and law enforcement activities, as well to determine what, if any, modifications to the deadlines referenced here should be considered.
Navigating Disclosure Options for Private Placements: What Issuers Need to Know
When a company is thinking about launching a private securities offering, one of the first questions that arises is what disclosures are required to be provided by the company to investors. The answer to this question can depend on a number of factors, including 1) the number and type of investors the company is soliciting for the offering, 2) the risk tolerance of the company, 3) the company’s budget for the capital raise, and 4) the size of the offering. This article explains the disclosure options available to companies for private placements and key factors management needs to know when deciding which option is best for them.
Securities Law Requirements for Private Placements
State and federal securities laws require issuers to provide investors with full, fair, and complete disclosure of all “material” facts about the offering and the issuer, its management, business, operations, and finances. Information is deemed to be material if a reasonable investor would consider the information important in making an investment decision. While materiality is a difficult concept to define precisely, at a minimum, a fact is “material” if you do not want to disclose the information because if the investors know about it, they would not buy the securities. Facts that are disclosed must be developed fully.
Even though a securities offering may not be required to be registered with the SEC, the issuer and its control persons must comply with state and federal anti-fraud provisions. The federal anti-fraud provisions arise primarily from the well-known Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as well as the lesser-known Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933. Failure to comply with these provisions can result in civil liabilities (i.e., money damages) and, in some instances, criminal liability. The liability can be personal as to the issuer company and its officers, directors, managers, principal equity-holders, promoters, and others associated with the offering. These anti-fraud provisions collectively prohibit any person in connection with the purchase or sale of any security from misrepresenting or omitting a material fact or engaging in any act or practice that constitutes a “fraud” or deceit upon any other person.
Fraud, for securities law purposes, is a much broader concept than it first appears – it includes omissions in disclosure (sometimes even unintentional ones) rather than just deliberate misrepresentations. Therefore, regardless of whether an issuer intends to defraud an investor, should the issuer and its management and principals fail to disclose a material fact, the issuer, as well as its management, promoters, and control persons, may be liable.
If the securities will only be sold to accredited investors under Regulation D of the Securities Act, there are no absolute disclosures that the SEC requires issuers to make in writing to investors. The rationale is that accredited investors are deemed to be sophisticated enough to know the right questions to ask and presumably have the economic leverage to obtain such information. If the issuer is offering and selling securities to non-accredited investors, the issuer may be required to provide certain specific written disclosures that contain substantially the same information as disclosure statements from companies that are registering their securities offerings with the SEC, including audited financial statements. To satisfy these disclosure requirements and comply with the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws, a disclosure document in the form of a Private Placement Memorandum (PPM) or Offering Memorandum is usually prepared that would resemble a prospectus for an initial public offering.
That said, many issuers do not want to go through the time, effort, and cost of producing a PPM for their offering, either because they feel they need to get to market quickly for the offering and they have investors waiting to contribute capital, or the offering amount is low enough where the client does not perceive the utility in preparing and distributing a PPM. In this case, there are other disclosure options available to clients providing varying levels of protection from securities law liability. Following is a summary of the disclosure options available to an issuer for a private securities offering, depending on how much legal protection the issuer wants and how much money and effort the client wants to expend in producing disclosures for investors. These options are presented based on a “continuum” of legal protection, starting with the least protective and moving up to the most protective, which is a PPM.
Continuum of Disclosure Options
No Disclosures and No Subscription Agreement – Under this option, the issuer provides no written disclosures of any nature to investors. The investors sign the operating agreement, partnership agreement, or similar organizational document of the issuing company and make their capital contributions. This provides no legal protection to the issuer or its control persons for securities fraud liability.
Subscription Agreement – The issuer prepares a subscription agreement containing the principal terms of the purchase and sale of the securities, and various reps and warranties from the investor, including a representation that the investor has been given a full opportunity to ask questions and receive materials from the issuer regarding the company and the offering. No separate disclosure document is provided to investors. This option provides little legal protection to the issuer and its control persons, but more protection than providing no disclosures or subscription documents.
Subscription Document Package – The issuer prepares a short disclosure document containing summary descriptions of the offering, company, use of proceeds, capitalization, and rights of the offered securities, along with risk factors. A full subscription agreement and confidential purchaser questionnaire is attached to the disclosure document to establish the investor’s suitability to invest in the offering. This option provides greater legal protection to the issuer and its control persons than the first two options above.
Stock/Securities Purchase Agreement w/ Full Due Diligence Opportunity – The issuer does not provide a disclosure document to the investors, but rather prepares and enters into a detailed stock/securities purchase agreement with the investor(s) with detailed reps and warranties regarding the investor’s investment intent, suitability, accredited investor status, and other matters. The issuer also opens up a data room and provides the investor(s) with a full due diligence opportunity to review company documentation, have meetings with the company’s board and executive officers, and receive full answers to questions. This option is frequently used by more sophisticated private equity and venture capital investors who are confident in their own due diligence processes and would rather rely on those processes to determine whether to invest, rather than receiving a disclosure document that may not provide them what they desire to know about the company and its business. This option provides a high level of legal protection to the issuer and its control persons.
Full PPM – The issuer prepares and distributes a full, detailed PPM to prospective investors providing fulsome disclosures regarding the offering, the company’s business, management, capitalization, organizational documents, risk factors, competitors, and other disclosures. This option provides the highest level of legal protection to the issuer and its control persons.
Many times, deciding the best disclosure option for a company can mean the difference between a successful and unsuccessful private offering. Any company considering launching a private offering should evaluate its options carefully and seek the assistance of experienced counsel.
What Every Multinational Company (Doing Business in Mexico) Should Know About … Mitigating Risks From ATA Scrutiny in a New Enforcement Regime
Mexican cartels dominate large swaths of the Mexico-United States border and the Bajío region (an area encompassing relevant parts of Queretaro, Guanajuato, Aguascalientes, San Luis Potosí, Jalisco, and Michoacán), and they control significant economic segments/activities in these territories. These are the same areas in which multinational companies maintain significant manufacturing operations.
In an Executive Order issued on January 20, 2025[1], the White House announced a shift toward increased enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), which are key statutes in the United States’ fight against terrorism. Though these statutes are not new, the Trump Administration plans to broaden U.S. enforcement activity to cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) by allowing for the designation of cartels or TCOs as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and/or Specially Designated Global Terrorists. This new focus of enforcement resources, along with the expansive inclusion of cartels or TCOs within the purview of the INA and IEEPA, creates a heightened risk for multinational companies doing business in Mexico and other areas where cartels operate, as the companies can be perceived as — and then prosecuted for — engaging in terrorism or aiding terrorists, as explained below.
Under the INA, the Secretary of State can designate groups as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs)[2] based on an assessment of the State Department’s Bureau of Counterterrorism regarding the group’s terrorist activity. Once a group has received an FTO designation, multinationals subject to U.S. jurisdiction — which is interpreted very broadly by U.S. regulators — may face strict criminal and civil penalties under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (the Antiterrorism Act or ATA) if they knowingly provide, or attempt or conspire to provide, “material support or resources” to the FTO.[3]
The State Department currently designates more than 60 organizations as FTOs. Trump’s January 20, 2025, Executive Order directs the State Department to scrutinize drug cartels — especially Mexico-based drug cartels and two cartels mentioned by name, Tren de Aragua (TdA) and La Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) — for designation as FTOs. Since the order, Secretary of State Marco Rubio already has designated eight cartels as FTOs, most of which have operations in Mexico. We anticipate this number will sharply rise as the administration works together with OFAC to identify additional cartels and TCOs. This raises a number of concerns for companies that operate in areas known to have cartel or TCO activities, because the following types of regularly conducted business activities may be viewed through the lens of providing material support or resources to an FTO:
Making payments to secure employee safety or the ongoing operation of a physical plant;
Engaging in business dealings with local companies that themselves are in business with cartels or that are making such payments; and
Recording payments to said local companies or to cartels in the books and records of publicly traded companies.
The expansion of enforcement scrutiny also may expand the types of risks facing companies, including:
Combined OFAC and DOJ investigations of conduct that potentially violates both the INA and OFAC regulations;
Matters that formerly would have been dealt with as civil matters by OFAC can become criminal matters pursued by DOJ;
New designations can be combined with anti-money laundering laws to expand the potential violations of U.S. laws; and
The expansion of the reach of OFAC designations to non-U.S. companies, since the material support statute has extraterritorial effect.
The January 20 Executive Order also heightens the risk of private civil litigation for multinationals doing business in Mexico. The ATA creates a civil remedy for U.S. national victims and their estates or heirs against defendants alleged to have caused an “injury arising from an act of international terrorism committed, planned, or authorized by an organization that had been designated as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of the [INA]” where “liability may be asserted as to any person who aids and abets, by knowingly providing substantial assistance, or who conspires with the person who committed such an act of international terrorism” (emphasis added). Under the ATA, “[a]ny national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any appropriate district court of the United States and shall recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney’s fees.” 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a). The line of culpability under this section remains unsettled, as lower courts attempt to apply recent Supreme Court precedent regarding the “knowing” provision of “substantial assistance” to FTOs.[4] But the designation of cartels and TCOs as FTOs exposes companies that operate in countries with heightened cartel activity to litigation under the ATA.
For several years, Mexican cartels have shifted revenue sources from drug smuggling into the United States to racketeering in Mexico. The latter typically consists of Mexican cartels extorting regular payments from small-to-medium-sized businesses, many of which provide goods or services to larger companies such as the multinationals operating in Mexico. In addition to direct extortion, cartels engage in behaviors such as forcing suppliers on companies that in turn do business with multinational companies, establishing “front” entities to provide miscellaneous services, selling protection against rival organizations, establishing prices for goods or services, and receiving payments for not carrying out threatened violence.
Multinational companies in Mexico are thus in constant risk of having indirect contacts with these cartel FTOs within their local supply chain and, even if they are unaware of such touch points, multinationals must guard against being seen as actively complicit or willfully blind if they fail to take reasonable precautions.
To safeguard against these risks, multinationals subject to U.S. jurisdiction that do business in Mexico should take precautions such as:
Conducting due diligence on all business counterparties, especially when onboarding new suppliers or other new business partners;
Updating due diligence and requiring certifications of compliance with the laws prohibiting conducting business activities with TCOs and FTOs;
Conducting routine OFAC and FTO screenings to assess the company’s risk profile with respect to potential touchpoints with cartels and TCOs;
Mapping supply chains, including for sub-suppliers, to confirm zero contact with cartel or TCO activities throughout the supply chain;
Based on risk assessments, following up and conducting audits to ensure the company’s supply chain is in compliance with the updated legal requirements;
Implementing and maintaining vendor management systems for payments to suppliers and other business partners;
Conducting financial audits on suppliers or other business partners to identify potential payments to cartels or TCOs;
Alerting suppliers or other business partners regarding their potential connections to cartels or TCOs and help monitor to avoid risk; and
Incorporating prohibitions on cartel and TCO connections, in addition to FTO restrictions, into agreements with third parties.
[1] “Designating Cartels and Other Organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists,” Executive Order (Jan. 20, 2025) available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/designating-cartels-and-other-organizations-as-foreign-terrorist-organizations-and-specially-designated-global-terrorists/.
[2] Though this article focuses on the FTO designation under the INA, the Specially Designated Global Terrorist designation under IEEPA creates a separate set of enforcement issues for multinationals, as well as additional sanctions under IEEPA for FTOs. IEEPA is the governing authority for most economic sanctions overseen by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which has long maintained robust restrictions on U.S. persons, or any other person subject to U.S. law, to the primary U.S. economic sanctions. OFAC has sanctioned numerous drug cartels, as well as companies and individuals, using its authorities under its Significant Narcotics Traffickers program pursuant to Executive Order 12978 and the Kingpin Act. Because OFAC uses an expansive definition of U.S. jurisdiction, restrictions under these designations include the activities of non-U.S. persons that take place on U.S. territory, use the U.S. financial system, or otherwise trigger U.S. jurisdiction. Proper compliance requires that any persons with a U.S. jurisdictional nexus take into account all the potential ways U.S. law can apply to them, including both the new emphasis on the INA/IEEPA and the longstanding OFAC regulations.
[3] 18 U.S.C. § 2339A defines “material support or resources” to include “any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel . . . and transportation, except medicine or religious materials.”
[4] See Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh 598 U.S. 471 (2023).
What Every Multinational Company Should Know About … The Rising Risk of Customs False Claims Act Actions in the Trump Administration
On February 20, 2025, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Commercial Litigation Branch at the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Michael Granston, emphasized using the False Claims Act (FCA) to address U.S. Customs & Border Protection (Customs) violations at the Federal Bar Association’s annual qui tam conference. According to Granston, the Trump administration will seek to “aggressively” deploy the FCA as a “powerful” enforcement mechanism against importers that take steps to evade customs duties, including all the new tariffs being imposed by the Trump administration.
The application of the FCA for underpayments of customs tariffs is already a growing trend. The increased tariffs and attention will combine to increase the number of FCA actions targeting tariff underpayments and the potential amount of recoveries. The U.S. government has unparalleled access to detailed import data covering nearly all imports, giving it the ability to run algorithms to see discrepancies and anomalies that might indicate the underpayment of tariffs. The FCA also can be enforced by whistleblowers who file qui tam suits in the government’s name, in hopes of receiving a share of the recovery in successful cases. Taken together, these factors mean the scene is set for a vast expansion of the use of the FCA as a tool to combat tariff underpayments.
Against this scrutiny, importers should ensure they accurately determine and pay all tariffs, including the new Trump tariffs. The remainder of this article summarizes the heightened risks that the FCA poses in the Trump administration, as well as some practical steps companies can take to minimize the risk of an FCA action.
The Application of the False Claims Act to Customs Violations
The False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., is a special form of civil remedy used by the government to recover funds the government paid as a result of fraud — typically, a false statement or document that supports a demand for government monies. The FCA allows the government to recover treble damages plus penalties up to $28,619 for each violation. Thus, the FCA authorizes the government to seek not only any tariff underpayments but also three times the amount of the underpayment and penalties for each instance of underpayment. Needless to say, the FCA poses enormous financial risk to importers.
The statute also enables private individuals to act as whistleblowers (or “relators”) by filing qui tam actions on behalf of the government. If the action is successful, the relator can receive up to 30% of the money recovered in the litigation, plus attorney’s fees, with the rest going to the government. This potential for recovery has spawned an active plaintiffs bar that encourages the filing of qui tam actions.
Indeed, the 979 qui tam actions filed by relators in the fiscal year ending in September 2024 constituted a 37% increase over the prior year and a 60% increase over 2019 filings. In addition, the government also originated 423 investigations on its own — almost triple the number the government originated five years ago. Further, the government reported that it recovered almost $3 billion in settlements and judgments in 2024, which followed a nearly-as-high recovery of $2.8 billion recovered in 2023.
In his speech, Granston explained the FCA could be a powerful tool in recovering under-reported tariffs. With the Trump administration announcing a dizzying array of new tariffs, the amount of tariffs imposed — and the risk of FCA actions — are both certain to increase. The emphasis on tariffs and trade continued at the conference. Jamie Ann Yavelberg, director of the Fraud Section of the Civil Division, identified tariff evasion as a “key area” for enforcement, with a focus on false statements about country of origin, declared value of goods, and the number of goods involved.
The following are examples of the Department of Justice’s use of the FCA to address underpayment of customs duties and show the broad range of customs issues that can support an FCA action:
One importer paid almost $22.8 million to settle FCA allegations that it misclassified its vitamin products to avoid paying the full amount of customs duties due, as well as its failure to pay back duties owed after correcting certain misclassifications.
Another importer paid $22.2 million to settle FCA allegations that it misrepresented the nature, classification, and valuation of its imported construction products to evade antidumping and countervailing duties, as well as improperly claiming preferential treatment under free trade agreements, with the relator receiving $3.7 million.
A third importer paid $45 million to resolve allegations that it misrepresented the country of origin on goods that should have been declared to be of Chinese or Indian origin, thereby evading high antidumping and countervailing duties imposed on the entries from those countries.
A fourth importer paid $5.2 million for allegedly evading antidumping and other duties by falsely describing wooden bedroom furniture imported from China as “metal” or “non-bedroom” furniture on documents submitted to CBP while also manipulating images of their products in packing lists and invoices, directing their Chinese manufacturers to ship furniture in mislabeled boxes and falsifying invoices to try to evade detection.
Finally, another importer paid $4.3 million for allegedly failing to include assists (customer-provided production aids) in the declared value of its entries.
Key areas where FCA cases are most likely to arise include:
The misclassification of goods, to move them from a higher to a lower tariff classification.
The misclassification of goods, to move them out of the coverage of the new Trump tariffs such as those imposed on aluminum and steel derivative products.
Incorrectly declaring the wrong country of origin, to avoid the Section 301 tariffs imposed on China or on countries subject to the new tariff proclamations such as China, Canada, or Mexico.
Failing to pay antidumping or countervailing duties, which often have very high tariff rates.
Failing to accurately declare the correct value of goods.
Failing to include assists (production aids provided by the customer) or royalties within the declared value.
Failing to have a customs transfer pricing study in place, if this results in the undervaluation of goods imported from an affiliated company.
Failing to correct past entry information if Customs notifies the importer of a change that impacts the duty rate, such as by issuing a Form 28 Request for Information or Form 29 Notice of Action. When this occurs, Customs expects that importers will use the Post-Summary Corrections Process to correct all analogous prior entries and to pay back duties on those prior entries.
Another factor that increases FCA risk is that Customs maintains two additional whistleblower programs of its own — one under the Enforcement and Protect Act (EAPA), for reporting of antidumping and countervailing duty evasion, and an eAllegations portal for all other claims of tariff evasion. It remains to be seen whether the new administration will mine these sources for FCA enforcement purposes.
Practical Steps Importers Can Take to Minimize Potential FCA Actions
Given the likelihood of increased enforcement, as well as the sharply rising levels and types of tariffs, importers should prioritize customs compliance, as any underpayments raise the specter not only of customs penalties but also potential FCA damages and penalties.
Customs-Related Steps
In a high-tariff environment, the stakes for compliance miscues are substantial and include potential penalties and interest for underpayments as well as FCA risks. Some key areas to consider for ongoing customs compliance include the following:
Inaccurate classifications can result in incorrect duties or penalties, so confirm your company has procedures to correctly classify goods using the correct Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) codes and maintains a regularly updated import classification index to reflect new products or changes in tariff codes.
Confirm that your organization maintains a detailed customs compliance manual that outlines procedures for classification, valuation, origin determination, recordkeeping, interactions with brokers and Customs, and other relevant matters that impact the accuracy of information reported to Customs and can create underpayments.
Review and ensure there are procedures to track and properly report assists, royalties, or other non-invoice costs that might affect the declared value of imported goods. Misreporting these costs could lead to underpayments of duties and penalties.
Ensure that there are procedures to regularly review entries after entry to identify potential errors in valuation, origin declarations, classification, or other entry-specific items that impact how much duties are owed.
Regularly use post-summary corrections as a means of correcting error, as most entry-related information can be corrected until liquidation without penalty (generally, around 314 days after entry).
In addition to post-entry checks, more detailed customs audits can uncover underlying issues that can lead to customs penalties. Major importers should consider conducting regular customs audits, pulling a judgmental sample of entries for thorough examination to determine if there are areas that contain errors.
Ensure your company maintains procedures for overseeing customs brokers and freight forwarders, including written protocols that are consistently followed to ensure there is proper oversight of customs brokers and freight forwarders.
Customs traditionally has not imposed penalties if an importer initiates a voluntary self-disclosure before the government begins its investigation. Importers should be aggressive in using voluntary self-disclosures to minimize the likelihood of customs penalties and related FCA liability risks.
Request confidential treatment for your company’s import data. Much of the information filed as part of the entry process is available for review by companies, such as PIERS and Panjiva, which aggregate import data and sell it to the public. By filing a government confidentiality request and keeping it up to date, your company can limit the ability of third parties (including competitors and whistleblower law firms) to analyze import data to discern trading patterns, supply chains, and exposure to high-risk regions or high-tariff products.
Compliance and Whistleblower Steps
In addition to the customs-related steps listed above, maintaining a robust corporate compliance program that addresses customs issues and general whistleblowing concerns can help prevent an internal complaint from turning into a qui tam suit. Some measures to consider include the following:
Maintain an Effective Compliance Program. Maintain a corporate compliance program that meets DOJ’s expectations for effectiveness, and ensure the program is coordinated with a well-tailored customs compliance program. Effective compliance programs are marked by senior leadership support, adequate resources, use of risk assessments, well-developed policies and procedures, tailored trainings, encouragement of internal reporting, and meaningful responses to complaints. Given the heightened risk environment, make sure your company has a compliance officer or team that understands customs issues and can follow up on reports of potential customs violations.
Encourage Internal Reporting & Whistleblower Protection. Establish a confidential internal reporting mechanism (e.g., hotline). Protect employees from retaliation to encourage internal reporting over external whistleblower actions. Investigate and address complaints promptly and transparently.
Conduct Regular Training & Education.Train employees on Customs and FCA requirements and the risks of false claims. Effective training is tailored to the roles and responsibilities of given groups of employees.
Strengthen Internal Controls & Audits. Perform regular post-entry checks and internal audits to identify and correct potential customs violations and underpayments.
Respond Proactively to Potential Violations.Act quickly if an issue is detected to correct errors, and consider self-reporting to Customs when necessary, both to lock in a no-penalty situation with Customs and to reduce the likelihood of qui tam suits.
Respond Promptly and Fully to All Customs Forms 28 (Requests for Information), Form 29s (Notices of Action), and Informal Inquiries. Importers should designate an internal employee to be an ACE contact so that your company receives Customs notices at the same time as the customs broker, instead of relying on the broker to forward any notices. Any requests for information or Customs actions should be investigated thoroughly and have a well-supported response (generally required within 30 days).
Follow Through on Customs Notices. If Customs makes a determination, such as reclassifying a product, then Customs requires that the importer search through its recent imports and reflect the Customs decision for all identical or analogous entries. In some cases, substantial customs penalties or FCA liability have arisen from the failure to do so. Ensure that the full implications of any Customs action are thoroughly understood and that your company uses the Post-Summary Corrections process to reflect any changes mandated by Customs. Consider using a voluntary self-disclosure to reflect changes to older entries.
Follow Up Thoroughly on Any Civil Investigative Demand (CID) from DOJ or Any Qui Tam Complaint.The receipt of a CID or qui tam complaint always requires the highest level of attention, given the draconian penalties the FCA authorizes. Follow up on the receipt of these items to take swift action to investigate and defend against those claims, using outside counsel with experience in the FCA and customs issues.
By proactively addressing customs compliance, importers can help minimize the risk not only of customs penalties but also the risk of qui tam lawsuits. Especially in a high-tariff environment, customs compliance and taking all available steps to ensure the proper payment of all tariffs lawfully due is essential and needs to be at the top of the list for any risk-based compliance program.
US Treasury Announces That the Corporate Transparency Act Will Not Be Enforced Against Domestic Companies, Their Beneficial Owners or US Citizens
As noted in our previous Corporate Advisory, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) announced on February 27, 2025, that it will not take enforcement action against a Reporting Company that fails to file or update a Beneficial Ownership Information Report (BOIR) as required by the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA), pending the release of a new “interim final rule.”
On March 2, 2025, the US Department of the Treasury (Treasury) issued a press release expanding on FinCEN’s announcement. The Treasury release states that even “after the forthcoming rule changes take effect[,]” the Treasury will not enforce fines and penalties under the CTA against domestic Reporting Companies, beneficial owners of domestic Reporting Companies or US citizens.
The release also outlines Treasury’s intention to propose additional rulemaking that would limit CTA reporting obligations solely to foreign Reporting Companies. Under the CTA, a foreign Reporting Company is defined as any entity that is formed under the laws of a foreign country and registered to do business in the United States by filing a document with a secretary of state or a similar office under the laws of a State or Indian tribe. As a result, the proposed rulemaking would significantly narrow the CTA’s application.
Given the Treasury’s announcement, non-exempt domestic Reporting Companies and their beneficial owners may wish to consider ceasing CTA compliance efforts until there are further developments in this space. Non-exempt foreign Reporting Companies should continue preparing CTA filings in anticipation of forthcoming guidance regarding extended filing deadlines.
Alexander Lovrine contributed to this article.
First Circuit Adopts But-For Causation Standard for Kickback-Premised False Claims Act Actions
On 18 February 2025, the First Circuit Court of Appeals issued its decision in United States v. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc., determining that “but-for” causation is the proper standard for False Claims Act (FCA) actions premised on kickback and referral schemes under the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS). This issue has divided circuits in recent years, with the Third Circuit requiring merely some causal connection, and the Sixth Circuit and Eighth Circuit requiring the more defendant-friendly proof of but-for causation between an alleged kickback and a claim submitted to the government for payment.
This issue has major implications for healthcare providers, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and other entities operating in the healthcare environment. Both the government and qui tam relators have frequently brought FCA actions premised on alleged kickback schemes, and these actions pose significant potential liability. A higher but-for standard for proving causation represents a key tool for FCA defendants to defend against such actions. There is a good chance that the government petitions the US Supreme Court to review the First Circuit’s decision, and, given the growing split, there is certainly a possibility that this becomes the next issue in FCA jurisprudence that finds itself before the high court.
Background on AKS-Premised FCA Actions and the Growing Circuit Split
To establish falsity in an AKS-premised FCA action, a plaintiff has historically needed to show that the defendant (1) knowingly and willfully, (2) offered or paid remuneration, (3) to induce the purchase or ordering of products or items for which payment may be made under a federal healthcare program. In 2010, Congress added the following language to the AKS at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(g): “a claim that includes items or services resulting from a violation of [the AKS] constitutes a false or fraudulent claim for purposes of [the FCA].” (Emphasis added). Courts have generally agreed that the AKS, therefore, imposes an additional causation requirement for FCA claims premised on AKS violations. However, courts have been divided on how to define “resulting from” and the applicable standard for proving causation.
In 2018, the Third Circuit was faced with this issue and explicitly declined to adopt a but-for causation standard. Relying on the legislative history, the Third Circuit determined that a defendant must demonstrate “some connection” between a kickback and a subsequent reimbursement claim to prove causation.
Four years later, the Eighth Circuit declined to follow the Third Circuit and instead adopted a heightened but-for standard based on its interpretation of the statute. The court noted that the US Supreme Court had previously interpreted the nearly identical phrase “results from” in the Controlled Substances Act to require but-for causation. In April 2023, the Sixth Circuit joined the circuit split, siding with the Eighth Circuit and adopting a but-for causation standard.
Eyes Turn Toward the First Circuit
In mid-2023, two judges in the US District Court for the District of Massachusetts ruled on this causation issue as it related to two different co-pay arrangements, landing on opposite sides of the split. In the first decision, United States v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., the district court adopted the Third Circuit’s “some connection” standard. The court indicated it was following a prior First Circuit decision—Guilfoile v. Shields—though Guilfoile had only addressed the question of whether a plaintiff had adequately pled an FCA retaliation claim, as opposed to an FCA violation. In the second decision, Regeneron, the district court declined to follow Guilfoile (given Guilfoile dealt with the requirements for pleading an FCA retaliation claim); instead, the district court in Regeneron followed the Sixth Circuit and Eighth Circuit in applying a but-for standard. These dueling decisions set the stage for the First Circuit to weigh in on the circuit split.
First Circuit Adopts But-For Standard
On 18 February 2025, the First Circuit issued its opinion in Regeneron, affirming the district court’s decision and following the Sixth Circuit and Eighth Circuit in adopting a but-for standard. The court first determined that Guilfoile neither guided nor controlled the meaning of the phrase “resulting from” under the AKS. Turning to an interpretation of the statute, the First Circuit noted that “resulting from” will generally require but-for causation, but the court may deviate from that general rule if the statute provides “textual or contextual indications” for doing so. After a thorough analysis of the textual language and its legislative history, the First Circuit concluded that nothing warranted deviation from interpreting “resulting from” to require but-for causation. The court also rejected the government’s contention that requiring proof of but-for causation would be such a burden to FCA plaintiffs that the 2010 amendments to the AKS would have no practical effect.
Notably, the First Circuit made clear that its decision was limited to FCA actions premised on AKS violations under the 2010 amendments to the AKS. The court distinguished such actions from FCA actions premised on false certifications, where a plaintiff asserts that an FCA defendant has falsely represented its AKS compliance in certifications submitted to the government.
Takeaways
The growing confusion and disagreement among district and circuit courts over this issue, coupled with the issue’s import to FCA jurisprudence, creates the potential that this could be the next FCA issue decided by the US Supreme Court.
Until this split is resolved, FCA practitioners must pay close attention to the choice of venue for AKS-premised FCA actions.
But-for causation presents an important tool for FCA defendants in AKS-premised FCA actions. But-for causation may allow a defendant to argue that even if it had acted with an intent to induce referrals, no actual referrals resulted from the conduct, which would allow a defendant to avoid FCA liability altogether. Alternatively, but-for causation may allow a defendant to argue that FCA damages are lower than the total referrals made where the plaintiff is unable to prove all referrals “resulted from” the improper arrangement.
While this is a significant win for FCA defendants, its impact may be somewhat limited for FCA actions that are not premised on AKS violations. It also remains to be seen whether the government and relators will begin bringing FCA actions premised on alleged false certifications of compliance with the AKS (rather than solely relying on an alleged AKS violation itself).
The firm’s Federal, State, and Local False Claims Act practice group practitioners will continue to closely monitor developments on this issue, and we are able to assist entities operating in the healthcare environment that are dealing with AKS-premised FCA actions.
First Circuit Joins Other Circuits in Adopting Stricter Causation Standard in FCA Cases Based on Anti-Kickback Statute
On February 18, 2025, the First Circuit joined the Sixth and Eighth Circuits in adopting a “but for” causation standard in cases involving per se liability under the federal Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) and the False Claims Act (FCA). In U.S. v. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, the First Circuit held that for an AKS violation to automatically result in FCA liability, the government must show that the false claims would not have been submitted in the absence of the unlawful kickback scheme. The decision is the latest salvo in the battle over what it means for a false claim to “result from” a kickback, as discussed in our False Claims Act: 2024 Year in Review.
With the fight becoming increasingly one-sided — the Third Circuit remains the only circuit that has adopted a less stringent causation standard — the government may look at alternative theories to link the AKS and FCA.
Key Issues and the Parties’ Positions
As outlined in our previous posts on the issue, the legal dispute revolves around the interpretation of the 2010 amendment to the AKS, which states that claims “resulting from” a kickback constitute false or fraudulent claims under the FCA.
In this case, the government accused Regeneron of violating the AKS by indirectly covering Medicare copayments for its drug, Eylea, through donations to a third-party foundation. The government’s key argument relied on the Third Circuit’s Greenfield decision, the AKS’s statutory structure, and the 2010 amendment’s legislative history to argue that a stringent causation standard would defeat the amendment’s purpose. It urged the court to find that once a claim is tied to an AKS violation, it should automatically be considered false under the FCA — without the need to prove that the violation directly influenced the claim.
Regeneron, on the other hand, argued that an FCA violation only occurs if the kickback was the determining factor in the submission of the claim. Relying on the Eighth and Sixth Circuits’ decisions, prior Supreme Court precedent, and a textual reading of the amendment, Regeneron contended that the phrase “resulting from” could only mean actual causation and nothing less.
The Court’s Decision
The First Circuit sided with Regeneron. It found that, given the Supreme Court’s prior interpretation of “resulting from” phrase as requiring but-for causation, this should be the default assumption when a statute uses that language. While acknowledging that statutory context could, in some cases, suggest a different standard, the court concluded that the government failed to provide sufficient contextual justification for a departure from but-for causation.
The court rejected the government’s argument that, in the broader context of the AKS statutory scheme, it would be counterintuitive for Congress to impose a more stringent causation standard for civil AKS violations than for criminal AKS violations, which require no proof of causation. The court also dismissed the government’s legislative history argument — specifically, the claim that a but-for causation standard would undermine the impetus for the amendment.
Implication: False Certification Theories May Become More Prominent
The First Circuit was careful to distinguish between the per se liability at issue in this case and liability under a false certification theory. While the government must show but-for causation for an AKS violation to automatically give rise to FCA liability, the court said that the same is not true for false certification claims.
Any entity that submits claims for payment under federal healthcare programs certifies — either explicitly or implicitly — that it has complied with the AKS. The court noted that nothing in the 2010 amendment requires proof of but-for causation in a false certification case. The government may take this as a cue to pivot toward false certification claims as a means of linking the AKS and FCA, potentially leaving the 2010 amendment argument behind.
Final Thoughts
The First Circuit’s decision in U.S. v. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals further cements the dominance of the “but for” causation standard in linking AKS violations to FCA liability, making it increasingly difficult for the government to pursue claims under a per se liability theory. With three circuits now aligned on this interpretation and only the Third Circuit standing apart, the tide appears to be turning in favor of a stricter causation requirement.
However, as the court acknowledged, this ruling may not foreclose other avenues for FCA liability — particularly false certification claims, which at least this court has found do not require the same level of causal proof. Given this, the government may shift its focus toward alternative enforcement strategies to maintain the strength of its anti-kickback enforcement efforts. As the legal landscape continues to evolve, healthcare entities and compliance professionals should remain vigilant, as new litigation trends and regulatory responses may reshape the interplay between the AKS and FCA in the years to come.
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Ping-Pong Match Appears Over: US Companies Apparently Definitively Relieved of Compliance Obligations Under the Corporate Transparency Act
The Corporate Transparency Act (the CTA) requires a range of entities, primarily smaller, unregulated companies, to file reports with FinCen, and arm of the Treasury Department, identifying the entities’ beneficial owners, and the persons who formed the entity. The purpose of the CTA was to aid in the detection of terrorism, money-laundering, and tax evasion.
As previously reported, the federal courts in Texas preliminarily enjoined the enforcement of the CTA. When a court recently lifted the last such injunction, FinCen set a new deadline for compliance, but on March 2nd FinCen announced that it would not enforce the CTA pending its issuance of new rules that would make the CTA applicable only to “foreign reporting companies,” as outlined in our client alert.
While we don’t expect any of this to change materially, we advise that you continue to watch this space as the status of the CTA has been quite volatile. We also recommend that you take into account that the CTA is technically effective, just not being enforced. Thus, pending the anticipated adoption of new rules, failure to comply is technically a violation for the purposes, for example, of reps and warranties in transaction documents.
How to Report Anti-Money Laundering Violations and Earn a Whistleblower Award
The Department and Justice (DOJ) and Financial Crime Enforcement Network (FinCEN) actively take enforcement actions against individuals and companies that violate anti-money laundering (AML) laws and Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) regulations. To strengthen these efforts, Congress included a robust whistleblower reward program in the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA) of 2020. The AMLA Whistleblower Reward Program requires the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) to provide monetary awards to whistleblowers who voluntarily provide original information that leads to successful enforcement actions for AML violations.
The AMLA whistleblower law is posed to be a game changer in AML enforcement, enhancing national security by combating illicit financing, including money laundering through banks and cryptocurrency companies. Under the AMLA Whistleblower Reward Program, whistleblowers may receive awards of between 10% and 30% of the monetary sanctions collected in successful enforcement actions. Given the potential for significant fines in AML enforcement actions, whistleblowers have a strong incentive to report AML violations. Additionally, whistleblowers can submit tips anonymously if represented by an attorney.
This article outlines recent enforcement actions for AML violations and explains how whistleblowers can report AML violations and qualify for whistleblower awards.
Recent Enforcement Actions for AML Violations
TD Bank Agrees to Pay $1.8 Billion for Violations of the BSA and Money Laundering
On October 10, 2024, the DOJ and FinCEN announced that TD Bank agreed to pay over $1.8 billion in penalties to resolve investigations into BSA and money laundering violations. This penalty marks the largest-ever fine under the BSA and the largest penalty against a depository institution in U.S. Treasury and FinCEN history.
The DOJ and FinCEN’s investigations revealed that TD Bank failed to maintain an adequate AML program for nearly a decade, allowing criminals to launder hundreds of millions of dollars through its systems. TD Bank neglected to update its compliance measures, prioritizing cost-cutting and customer convenience over legal obligations. Between 2018 and 2024, nearly 92% of TD Bank’s transaction volume went unmonitored, totaling about $18.3 trillion. Consequently, three major money laundering networks moved more than $670 million through TD Bank accounts from 2019 to 2023, with employees even accepting bribes to facilitate illegal transactions.
OKX Crypto Exchange Pays More Than $504 Million for AML Violations
On February 24, 2025, OKX, a major cryptocurrency exchange, pleaded guilty to operating an unlicensed money-transmitting business and agreed to pay over $504 million in penalties.
In the DOJ’s press release announcing the enforcement action, the Acting U.S. Attorney said:
For over seven years, OKX knowingly violated anti-money laundering laws and avoided implementing required policies to prevent criminals from abusing our financial system. As a result, OKX was used to facilitate over five billion dollars’ worth of suspicious transactions and criminal proceeds. Today’s guilty plea and penalties emphasize that there will be consequences for financial institutions that avail themselves of U.S. markets but violate the law by allowing criminal activity to continue.
The DOJ’s investigation found that since 2017, OKX had:
Facilitated over $1 trillion in transactions involving U.S. customers.
Enabled more than $5 billion in suspicious and illicit financial activity.
Failed to implement AML laws, including Know-Your-Customer (KYC) measures.
Allowed customers to bypass verification through VPNs and false information.
Emphasizing the consequences for financial institutions that disregard U.S. regulations, the FBI Assistant Director stated:
Blatant disregard for the rule of law will not be tolerated, and the FBI is committed to working with our partners across government to ensure that corporations that engage in this type of conduct are held accountable for their actions.
How to Report Anti-Money Laundering Violations and Earn a Whistleblower Award
Under the AMLA, the Treasury shall pay an award to whistleblowers who voluntarily provide original information to
their employer,
the Secretary of the Treasury, or
the Attorney General,
and their information leads to a successful enforcement action with monetary sanctions exceeding $1 million. Whistleblower awards range from 10% to 30% of the monetary sanctions collected in the enforcement actions.
Prior to submitting a tip, whistleblowers should consult with an experienced whistleblower attorney and review the AMLA whistleblower law to, among other things, understand eligibility rules and consider the factors that can significantly increase or decrease the size of a future whistleblower award.
Michigan Federal Court Holds CTA Reporting Rule Unconstitutional, Enjoins Enforcement Against Named Plaintiffs
On March 3, 2025, a Michigan federal district court in Small Business Association of Michigan v Yellen, Case No. 1:24-cv-413 (W.D Mich 2025) (SBAM), held that the CTA’s reporting rule is unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment (unreasonable search) and entered a judgment permanently enjoining the enforcement of the CTA reporting requirements against the named plaintiffs and their members only. The district court did not find it necessary to, and did not, rule on the plaintiffs’ separate Article 1 and Fifth Amendment constitutional claims, instead leaving them “to another day, if necessary.”
The SBAM plaintiffs include (a) the Small Business Association of Michigan and its more than 30,000 members, (b) the Chaldean American Chamber of Commerce and its more than 3,000 members, (c) two individual reporting company plaintiffs, and (d) two individual beneficial owner plaintiffs owning membership interests in reporting companies.
We are not aware as of the date of this Alert whether the defendants have, or intend to, appeal the SBAM judgment to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Treasury May Be Shifting CTA Reporting Rule Away from Domestic and Toward Foreign Reporting Companies
On March 2, 2025, the United States Department of Treasury announced that it will not enforce fines or penalties based on the existing deadlines for reporting beneficial ownership information under the CTA beneficial ownership reporting rule.[1] This follows earlier guidance issued by FinCEN.[2]
Treasury further announced that it will be engaging in proposed rule-making to limit the CTA reporting rule to foreign reporting companies, noting that even after the new rules are in effect, it will not enforce any fines or penalties on any U.S. citizens, domestic reporting companies or their beneficial owners. No other details of the proposed rule-making or its timing were announced, including whether any changes might be proposed as to the definitions of domestic[3] or foreign[4] reporting companies under the reporting rule or any exemptions.
Treasury noted that this action is “in the interest of supporting hard-working American taxpayers and small businesses and ensuring that the rule is appropriately tailored to advance the public interest.”
[1] See Treasury Department Announces Suspension of Enforcement of Corporate Transparency Act Against U.S. Citizens and Domestic Reporting Companies | U.S. Department of the Treasury.
[2] On February 18, 2025, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of the Department of Treasury (FinCEN) issued a notice extending beneficial ownership reporting deadlines for most reporting companies to March 21, 2025. See FinCEN Notice, FIN-2025-CTA1, FinCEN Extends Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Deadline by 30 Days; Announces Intention to Revise Reporting Rule (February 18, 2025) and an updated FinCEN Alert (February 19, 2025) Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting | FinCEN.gov. Subsequently, on February 27, 2025, FinCEN announced that it was suspending enforcement of the CTA reporting rule, including any fines or penalties, pending its further extension of reporting deadlines in an interim reporting rule to be issued not later than December 21, 2025. See FinCEN Not Issuing Fines or Penalties in Connection with Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Deadlines | FinCEN.gov.
[3] A “domestic reporting company” is currently defined under the CTA and the reporting rule as any entity that is formed by filing a document with a secretary of state or similar office under the laws of a State or Indian tribe (including, for example, most LPs, LLPs and statutory, business and other trusts if the laws of a state or tribal jurisdiction require such filing to create the entity), subject to exemptions from the definition included in the CTA and the reporting rule. See 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11)(A)(i) and 31 CFR 1010.380(c)1(i)).
[4] A “foreign reporting company” is currently defined under the CTA and the reporting rule as any entity that is formed under the laws of a foreign country and registered to do business in the United States by the filing of a document with a secretary of state or similar office under the laws of a State or Indian tribe subject to exemptions from the definition included in the CTA and the reporting rule. See 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11)(A)(ii) and 31 CFR 1010.380(c)(1)(ii).
CFTC Issues Enforcement Advisory on Benefits of Self-Reporting, Cooperation, and Remediation
On Feb. 25, 2025, the Division of Enforcement (Division) of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) issued an Enforcement Advisory (2025 Advisory) outlining the benefits of self-reporting, cooperation, and remediation for violations of the Commodities Exchange Act (CEA). The 2025 Advisory embodies a further refinement of the Division’s approach over the last decade in connection with evaluating an entity’s or individual’s self-reporting, cooperation, and remediation when recommending enforcement actions to the Commission. The 2025 Advisory and the accompanying statement by CFTC Acting Chairman Caroline Pham underscore that the CFTC is emphasizing efficient use of enforcement resources and pursuing a more structured framework designed to create more concrete financial incentives for self-reporting to, and cooperating with, the Division.
Background
A brief review of the Division’s prior pronouncements in this area provides background and context to the 2025 Advisory. In January 2017, the Division updated the CFTC’s cooperation guidelines (2017 Update) by encouraging entity and individual self-reporting. The 2017 Update provided that self-reporting of wrongdoing and cooperating throughout an investigation could result in speedier settlements, substantially reduced penalties and, in rare cases, no prosecution at all. However, the 2017 Update did not provide specific guidance or concrete reductions, estimated or otherwise, for self-reporting, cooperation, and remediation. In May 2020, the Division issued a memorandum (2020 Memo), which provided further guidance and clarification regarding the factors the Division would consider when recommending civil monetary penalties to the Commission for violations of the CEA or the CFTC’s rules and regulations. The factors referenced in the 2020 Memo were incorporated into the Division’s updated Enforcement Manual. Taking the same general approach as the 2017 Update, however, the 2020 Memo did not provide specific guidance or concrete reductions for self-reporting, cooperation, and remediation.
The 2025 Advisory
The 2025 Advisory attempts to incentivize self-reporting, cooperation, and remediation of potential violations, and the Division’s stated policy objective for the 2025 Advisory is to provide clarity to the benefits of self-reporting and cooperating through reduced penalties. In contrast to the 2017 Update and the 2020 Memo, the 2025 Advisory indicates that the Division will now use a matrix to calculate the applicable mitigation credit (Credit), thereby creating tangible financial incentives for firms and individuals to come forward proactively and receive reduced penalties and/or sanctions. The Division noted that the new policy is aligned with best practices for assessing appropriate penalties used by the Department of Justice and other U.S. financial and commodity regulators. For example, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has a long-standing Policy Statement on Penalty Guidelines (based on the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines) for enforcement actions including credit through reduction in the “culpability score” for self-reporting and cooperation that can reduce civil penalties.
Aligned with the principles of regulatory consistency, transparency, and clarity, the 2025 Advisory details both the structure and framework the Division will utilize when assessing self-reporting, cooperation, and remediation in connection with investigations and enforcement actions. Specifically, with respect to self-reporting and entitlement to Credit, the 2025 Advisory states that the Division will utilize a three-tier scale: No Self-Report, Satisfactory Self-Report, and Exemplary Self-Report. To receive “Exemplary” self-reporting credit, the self-report must be timely and voluntary, made to either the Division or one of the other CFTC divisions with oversight responsibility, provide information that assists the Division in conserving resources in its investigation, and include all material information known at the time of the self-report.
With respect to its evaluation of cooperation and remediation, the 2025 Advisory states that the Division will assess cooperation using a four-tiered scale: No Cooperation, Satisfactory Cooperation, Excellent Cooperation, and Exemplary Cooperation. The Division will assess remediation as a part of its evaluation of cooperation and will consider further whether the entity or individual engaged in efforts to prevent future violations.
The Division’s assessment of the level of cooperation will also consider whether the entity or individual fully complied with subpoenas, voluntarily provided documents and information, made presentations to the Division, and, where applicable, made witnesses available for interviews or testimony. “Exemplary Cooperation” may include all of the foregoing, as well as evidence of significant remediation. The Division also included in the 2025 Advisory examples of behavior considered uncooperative, including untimely subpoena compliance, failure to preserve material information, bad faith attempts to improperly shape testimony, as well as harm to clients, counterparties, or customers.
Finally, the Advisory provides the Credit matrix (Matrix) detailing hypothetical/presumptive Credits. For example, the Matrix indicates that an entity or individual may be eligible to receive a Credit up to 55% for Exemplary Self-Reporting and Exemplary Cooperation, 40% for Exemplary Self-Reporting and Excellent Cooperation, 30% for Exemplary Self-Reporting and Satisfactory Cooperation, and 20% for Exemplary Self-Reporting and No Cooperation. The 2025 Advisory also notes that the Division’s assessment of cooperation is discretionary and will require a case-by-case analysis of the specific facts and circumstances of each matter.
Conclusion
The 2025 Advisory states that it is the “Division’s sole policy on self-reporting, cooperation, and remediation,” superseding all previous advisories and the Division’s Enforcement Manual, and is thus a critical read for any practitioner before the CFTC. Entities and individuals subject to CFTC jurisdiction should carefully consider the various tiers with counsel when contemplating a self-report, and practitioners should consult the 2025 Advisory in order to position clients to receive credit under the newly announced Matrix.