Election Law / Legislative News – Page 7

Trump Administration Announces 90-Day Pause on Country-Specific Tariffs for All Countries Except China

On April 9, 2025, President Trump walked back his April 2, 2025 announcement of increased global tariffs (see our client alert here). Under the April 9 Executive Order, the country-specific tariffs — except those on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) — are suspended until 12:01am EDT on July 9, 2025. The new order does not modify the 10% minimum tariff on all imported goods that came into effect on April 5.
Canada and Mexico remain exempt from both the country-specific and the minimum 10% tariff, but are subject to 25% tariffs if goods do not qualify as “originating” in Canada and Mexico under the USMCA; energy, energy resources, and potash from Canada remain subject to a lower product specific 10% tariff.
For all countries but China, the elimination of the de minimis exception for shipments valued at less than $800 remains in place and comes into effect on May 2, 2025.
In the same order, President Trump increased tariffs on all goods from the PRC, including Hong Kong and Macau, to 125%, in response to retaliation by the PRC to the first round of tariffs. Because the tariffs on China are additive, the U.S. tariff rate on Chinese imports is now effectively 145%. For goods that qualify as de minimis coming from China, the duties have increased to 120%, or if sent via the international postal service, $100 per item until June 1, when they will increase to $200.
The administration has announced that it is entering into country-by-country bilateral negotiations to potentially reduce tariffs before the pause ends. Changes to the tariff rates are expected, but timing is unclear. The impact may vary depending on the product, the country of origin, and the terms of the governing contract. If you are affected by the ongoing tariff uncertainty, we encourage you to contact our Tariff Strategy team to discuss your specific circumstances.
Our Tariff Strategy team suggests that all companies, whether currently impacted or not, should take advantage of the 90-day pause to review their standard contracts and terms and conditions to ensure that they have language specifically addressing tariffs and duties (in addition to any clauses regarding taxes) and have strong force majeure clauses. Companies should also review what INCOTERMS govern their imports.

Navigating the New Tariff Terrain: How Trump’s Latest Policies Impact Global Trade and Shipping

President Donald Trump issued an Executive Order (“EO”) on April 2, 2025, titled Regulating Imports with a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify Trade Practices that Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits. This EO introduces significant changes to the tariff landscape, imposing unprecedented tariff increases on most U.S. trading partners, which will have far-reaching implications for global trade and shipping. Below, we break down the key elements of the new tariff policies and their potential impacts.
Key Elements of the Executive Order
Global Tariff Implementation. The EO imposes a 10 percent global tariff on all imports into the United States, which became effective on April 5, 2025. For 57 countries identified in Annex I of the EO, an additional increase in tariffs for these countries was initially scheduled to take effect April 9, 2025, and has since been put on pause as negotiations take place, but that pause will not apply to sector tariffs. For additional information on the impact of the new tariffs announced in the April 2, 2025, EO, check out Blank Rome’s Recent Alert: Liberation Day: President Trump Unveils Global, Reciprocal Tariffs – What You Need to Know.
Product Exemptions. Annex II of the EO outlines various tariff exemptions, including certain mineral commodities, petroleum products, and pharmaceuticals. Among others, it also exempts items subject to Section 232 tariffs of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, including automobiles and automobile parts, and steel and aluminum goods, from both the global tariff and increased reciprocal tariffs. Goods from Canada and Mexico that meet the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (“USMCA”) requirements are also excluded from these tariffs. However, imports that fail to qualify for duty-free treatment under USMCA remain subject to the 25 percent tariffs introduced in March 2025 (10 percent for energy and potash) under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”).
End of De Minimis Exemption and Chinese Tariffs Generally. The EO ends the de minimis exemption for goods valued at less than $800 from China and Hong Kong, effective May 2, 2025. Following administration’s latest announcement on April 9, 2025, tariffs imposed on Chinese goods surged to 145 percent. (Click here for President Trump’s April 2 amendment to the de minimis EO on China.)
Impact on Freight Rates and Shipping Strategies
Reduced Import Volume and Surge Pricing on Alternative Routes. The imposition of tariffs increases the cost of importing goods, which may lead importers to reduce or cancel shipments to avoid tariff-related costs. This reduction in demand could lead to overcapacity on specific shipping lanes, driving freight rates down.
Meanwhile, shippers may redirect cargo to tariff-free countries, increasing competition on less affected routes, which could lead to a spike in rates for these new trade lanes as carriers adjust to shifts in global trade flows. The net effect will be a rerouting of the world’s trade lanes to some currently unknown extent.
Also, as new tariffs take effect, some importers may be unwilling or unable to pay the new duties, leading to delays in cargo pickup or increased cargo abandonment, especially in container terminals. In the short run, these issues could give rise to additional congestion and delays in container ports, before volumes begin to decline.
Sector-Specific Pricing. Freight rates for diverse types of vessels, e.g., bulk carriers, container ships, and RoRo vessels, likely will experience varying impacts depending on the industries targeted by tariffs. For example, tariffs on high-value manufactured goods can reduce containerized cargo demand, affecting major shipping routes including the trans-Pacific, trans-Atlantic, and Asia-Europe corridors.
Real-World Strategies for Ship Owners
Diversification and Fleet Management. Shifting operations to tariff-free trade routes can help offset losses from lower rates on affected routes. For instance, previous U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods led businesses to relocate manufacturing to other Southeast Asian countries, including Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia, and more such shifts are expected. Maintaining ongoing discussions with key shippers and charterers, adjusting fleet deployments, and conducting fleet repositioning and sailing frequency assessments to align with high-demand routes can optimize utilization and profitability.
Outlook
It is unclear whether the tariffs represent a “new normal” for U.S. trade or whether bilateral agreements will be reached to provide significant tariff relief for impacted countries. The uncertainty makes it difficult for carriers, ports, and shippers to make investment decisions regarding redeployment of vessels and equipment and making capital investments in terminals and logistics infrastructure.
In the United States Congress, bipartisan legislation has been proposed in the Senate regarding the president’s ability to impose tariffs, an authority specifically vested in Congress by the Constitution. However, congressional leaders have indicated that the legislation is unlikely to progress at this time.
In addition, private litigants, including the New Civil Liberties Alliance, have brought lawsuits challenging the president’s unprecedented use of emergency declarations under IEEPA to impose tariffs and reshape foreign trade. In its nearly 50-year history, no other president has ever sought to use IEEPA, the statute that underpins most U.S. trade sanctions programs, as an authorization to impose tariffs on an emergency basis.
Conclusion
A state of flux bests describes today’s global marketplace. Should these tariffs remain in place, trade lanes will evolve and manufacturing likely will shift to lower net production cost locations. The trade landscape demands vigilance, communication, cooperation, and adaptability from shippers and ship owners. Monitoring trade policy shifts, investing in emerging markets, and optimizing fleet deployment strategies are crucial steps to navigate the challenges posed by new tariff policies. By staying informed and proactive, stakeholders can position themselves to seize opportunities and mitigate risks in this dynamic global environment.

Arkansas’ Kids Social Media Law: Another One Bites the Dust

Arkansas’ second attempt at regulating minor’s access to social media – in the form of the Social Media Safety Act (SB 689) – has again been struck down as unconstitutional. The court permanently enjoined the state from enforcing the law. It was a modified version of Arkansas’ 2023 SB 396, that was also blocked. The plaintiff in both challenges was NetChoice, a group familiar to anyone following kids’ social media laws. As a result of NetChoice’s efforts, similar laws have been blocked in California, Utah, Maryland, Mississippi, Ohio, and Texas. Courts in those states, as in Arkansas, found that the laws were unduly burdensome on free speech, with overly broad content restrictions not tailored to prevent harm to minors.
Like prior social media laws, the Arkansas Social Media Safety Act would have required social media companies to verify that users were at least 18 years old. Or obtain verifiable parental consent for the minor to create an account. Companies that did not implement such checks would face monetary penalties. Social media companies would also have been required to use third-party vendors to perform reasonable age verification, which can include digitized identification cards, government-issued identification, or any commercially reasonable method. Social media companies would also have been prohibited from retaining any identifying information after access to the platform has been granted.
The story on children’s privacy and social media does not end here. States have continued to pass laws attempting to regulate kids’ use of social media. The Virginia legislature is seeking to amend the state’s data privacy law to restrict 16 year olds to one hour of social media use a day, along with requiring age screening mechanisms. The amendment is awaiting signature. Arkansas has also rolled out additional legislation targeting social media companies and children. Utah recently implemented app store age limits, with effective dates under the law ranging from May 2025 to December 2026. And Texas – despite prior social media challenges – has introduced House Bill 186. If passed, the law would require age verification to create accounts. Florida has also introduced legislation (SB 868) that would, among other things, permit law enforcement to view messages relevant to an investigation, allow parents to read all messages in a minor’s account, and prohibit minors from using accounts that have “disappearing” messages.
Putting it into Practice: While these laws have not thus far been successful, state legislatures continue to propose laws to regulate kids’ use of social media. We anticipate this flurry continuing, both from state law makers as well as efforts to push back on overly broad provisions.
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New Dates Announced for Maryland’s Delayed FAMLI Program

Takeaway

Payroll deductions will begin 01.01.27, with leave benefits availability slated for 01.03.28.

Executive Order Seeks to Increase Domestic Coal Production

On April 8, 2025, President Trump signed an executive order titled Reinvigorating America’s Beautiful Clean Coal Industry and Amending Executive Order 14241, which builds on the March 20 Executive Order titled Immediate Measures to Increase American Mineral Production (Executive Order 14241). The new order provides for immediate action to remove restrictions on coal leasing, mining and exporting and outlines initiatives to extend coal-power infrastructure and support coal technologies. This order is part of the administration’s holistic strategy to promote coal production in order to support domestic job creation, provide reliable energy supply for resurgent electricity demand from emerging technologies, lower energy costs, capitalize on vast U.S. coal reserves and facilitate coal exports and includes the following initiatives and mandates:
[Section 3 and 9] Designation of coal as a “mineral” under Executive Order 14241 and as a “critical mineral”: The order directs the Chair of the National Energy Dominance Council (NEDC) to designate coal as a “mineral” under Executive Order 14241, enabling coal and coal projects to qualify for the benefits under Executive Order 14241, including streamlined permitting and accelerated financing initiatives, as outlined in our previous blog posts: President Trump Issues Executive Order to Increase American Mineral Production and Executive Order Mandates Immediate Action to Accelerate Funding for Domestic Mineral Production and Processing. The order also directs the heads of the Energy and Interior departments to determine whether coal used in the production of steel qualifies as a “critical material” to be placed on the Department of Energy Critical Minerals List and the Department of the Interior Critical Minerals List.
[Section 4-5] Evaluating and enabling coal mining on federal lands: The order directs the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of Energy to conduct a review of coal resources and reserves contained on federal lands and submit a comprehensive report (i) outlining barriers to mining such coal resources, (ii) making policy proposals to address such barriers in order to facilitate the mining of the identified coal resources and (iii) providing an analysis of the impact the coal resources could have on electricity costs and grid reliability. The order further directs the Secretary of the Interior and Secretary of Agriculture to designate coal leasing activities as the primary land use for such federal lands containing coal resources identified in the report, to expeditiously process royalty rate reduction applications from Federal coal lessees, and to acknowledge the end of the Jewell Moratorium. The Jewell Moratorium, which was established 2016, had established a moratorium on coal leasing on federal lands. The Moratorium had been lifted by a federal court in 2024.]
[Section 10] Extending the life of coal-powered infrastructure: In response to growing electricity demand from artificial intelligence (AI) data centers and other high-performance computing activities, the order directs the Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Energy to identify regions with coal-powered infrastructure sufficient to support AI data centers, evaluate such infrastructure for growth opportunities and submit to the Chair of the NEDC a comprehensive report with findings and proposals.
Expansive support for coal: The order includes an expansive approach to strengthen the coal industry, including a comprehensive review of restrictive practices towards coal production, measures to increase coal exports and support for coal technologies. These initiatives include:

[Section 6] Removing regulatory and policy barriers to coal production and use: The order mandates a comprehensive review of guidance, regulations, programs, and policies of executive departments or agencies that promote an energy transition away from coal production and coal-fired electricity generation, including guidance, policies or agreements of the International Development Finance Corporation, the Export-Import Bank of the United States, and other funding agencies discouraging investment in coal-related projects. Such agencies are directed to eliminate any such preferences against coal use, unless required by law.
[Section 7] Facilitating coal exports: The Secretary of Commerce, in coordination with other agencies, is directed to promote exports of coal technology and coal, including facilitating international offtake agreements for US coal.
[Section 8] Streamlining environmental review of coal projects: Agencies are directed to identify to Council on Environmental Quality any existing, or potential, exclusions under the National Environmental Policy Act that could support the production and export of coal.
[Section 11] Advancing commercial coal technologies: The Secretary of Energy is directed to take necessary actions to accelerate the development and commercialization of coal technologies, using available funding to support innovations in coal use and byproducts, batteries, power generation, and steelmaking.

Additional guidance regarding these programs and initiatives is expected to be issued within 30-90 days after the order was published on April 8.
A copy of the Executive Order is available here. Contact Martin Stratte and Joanna Enns with questions about the Executive Order and related opportunities.

GeTtin’ SALTy Episode 50 | Sine Die: Maryland Legislative Session Wrap-up [Podcast]

In this episode of GeTtin’ SALTy, Nikki Dobay and DeAndré Morrow dive into the Maryland’s legislative session, which adjourned this week. Specifically, they unpack key tax provisions that were proposed and ultimately passed.
From new personal income tax brackets targeting high earners to the controversial 3% tech tax on digital services, they explore the measures passed in the Budget Reconciliation and Financing Act (BRFA) and their potential impact on businesses and consumers. They also discuss some key Maryland politics regarding certain tax policies that keep coming up and whether they expect to see those policies in the future.
DeAndré also highlights other developments like increased taxes on recreational cannabis and sports betting, the removal of IP taxation proposals, and the ongoing discussions surrounding Maryland’s digital advertising tax.
They wrap up the episode with a lighthearted discussion on birthday celebrations.

Understanding the Allocation of Tariff Payments

In the context of the tariffs imposed by the Trump Administration on imported goods, a prevalent misconception has arisen that foreign suppliers automatically bear the cost of these tariffs. The reality, however, is more complex. The actual payment of tariffs is significantly influenced by the specific contractual agreements between U.S. buyers and their foreign suppliers.
The Fundamentals of Tariff Payment
Contrary to popular belief, tariffs are not inherently paid by foreign suppliers. Legally, tariffs are paid by the importer of record at the time the goods enter the United States. Typically, the importer of record is the U.S. buyer or its agent. The ultimate economic burden of these tariffs is determined by the contractual arrangements among the foreign exporter, the U.S. importer, and any downstream customers of the importer. The economic impact of tariffs can thus be considered a shared burden, which is distributed according to contractual terms (and influence by market dynamics such as bargaining leverage), rather than automatically falling on foreign suppliers as sometimes portrayed in political discourse.
Contractual Provisions
International supply contracts frequently include provisions that state which party is responsible for duties and tariffs. If the contract specifies that the importer, usually the U.S. buyer, is responsible, then the importer will bear the cost of the tariffs.
Conversely, if the foreign supplier is designated as responsible for the tariffs, the foreign supplier will pay these costs.
Sometimes the contract sets forth these responsibilities through the use of the ICC’s International Commercial Terms (also known as Incoterms), which provide a shorthand spelling out the responsibilities for various costs in international trade transactions. For instance, the term Delivered Duty Paid (DDP) indicates that the seller is responsible for all costs, including duties and tariffs, until the goods reach the agreed location inside the buyer’s customs territory.
Conversely, terms like EXW (Ex Works) or FOB (Free on Board) place the burden of import duties and tariffs on the buyer.
Some sophisticated contracts have provisions that anticipate potential changes in duties, and include provisions that allow suppliers to adjust prices in response to new tariffs. Such contracts may permit adjustments in prices or allocation of payment burden in the event of changes in laws and regulations, including those on taxes and duties, and their interpretation after the effective date of the contract.
Ambiguous Contracts
Often supply agreements contain only a general provision, such as “The buyer shall pay the duties on the goods purchased from the seller.” Imagine a situation where a new 54% tariff is imposed on goods imported from China subject to such a clause. The Chinese seller will undoubtedly take the position that the buyer must pay. But the combination of a new tariff and a vague contract provisions may lead to a dispute. Additionally, there could be arguments about whether “duties” and “tariffs” are legally distinct, introducing further complexities in international trade law.
Seller might argue that buyer is responsible for all duties, including new tariff. Buyer could counter that its obligation is limited to duties that existed when the contract was signed, arguing that it would not have agreed to the contract if unforeseeable and substantial tariffs were to be buyer’s responsibility.
In such cases, buyer would be tempted to invoke a force majeure clause, if one exists, in light of the unforeseen tariffs. Courts typically do not consider a new tariff to be a standard force majeure event, unless the force majeure clause specifically lists tariffs as a covered event.
Market Dynamics
When the contract does not explicitly address tariff responsibility, the economic burden becomes a matter of negotiation between foreign exporter and U.S. importer. Foreign suppliers will not naturally pay the tariff unless they are obligated or incentivized to do so. Even if the delivery term is DDP (meaning the exporter pays U.S. duties), in high-tariff environment, the exporter may try to raise its price to offset its loss.
If the U.S. buyer is responsible for the tariff (for example, under any Incoterm other than DDP, or in the absence of a contract term), the U.S. buyer will be obligated to pay the tariff to U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Buyer then has three basic options: (a) pay the tariff and absorb the loss; (b) seek to renegotiate pricing with the foreign supplier to shift or at least share the loss; or (c) pass the tariff onto its customer.
The actual outcome will be heavily influenced by the market power or negotiating leverage of the exporter, importer, and customer. Foreign suppliers with unique products or strong market positions may be able to pass tariff costs to U.S. buyers. Conversely, U.S. buyers with significant purchasing power might pressure foreign suppliers to absorb the costs. In competitive markets, suppliers may have no choice but to absorb some or all of the tariff costs to maintain their U.S. customer base.
Conclusion
It is a misconception that tariffs are directly paid by foreign suppliers (unless President Trump intends to seek monetary payments from trade partners to reduce their trade surpluses with the United States). In reality, U.S. importers pay the tariffs to U.S. Customs, and whether the cost is absorbed by the buyer or passed back to the supplier depends entirely on the terms of the contract.
For businesses engaged in international trade, understanding the allocation of tariff payments has practical implications. It is advisable to review existing contracts to understand tariff liability provisions, take steps to clarify duty responsibilities with counterparties, and discuss steps for transactions going forward. Additionally, businesses should consider building flexibility into pricing structures to account for potential trade policy changes and diversifying supply chains to reduce dependency on heavily tariffed countries. Understanding who pays tariffs is not merely a legal or accounting issue; it is a strategic business consideration. In a global marketplace subject to changing trade dynamics, clear contract terms can make the difference between a manageable cost and a profit-killing surprise.

Post Liberation Day –“Secondary Tariffs” Raise Costs Even Higher for International Actors

President Trump has used tariffs as a significant point of geopolitical leverage since the beginning of his second term. Indeed, his administration dubbed April 2, 2025 “Liberation Day” in honor of a sweeping set of tariffs imposed on a variety of goods and counterparties. These included, among others, a 10 percent universal tariff on all imports into the United States effective April 5, 2025.[1] Certain countries and territories have heightened tariffs imposed, such as Japan at 24 percent and the EU at 20 percent, based on the administration’s assessment that these countries are “bad actors on trade.”[2] China, by far, had the largest tariff imposed with 54 percent to account for all imports and fentanyl.[3]
One notable subset of the administration’s approach is the novel concept of “secondary tariffs,” which are tariffs imposed because a trade partner engages with a third country with which the administration is at odds. On March 24, 2025, President Trump amended and reissued Executive Order 13692 (now Executive Order 14245) authorizing this new approach.[4] EO 14245 instructs Secretary of State Marco Rubio, in coordination with the secretaries of the Treasury, Commerce, and Homeland Security, along with the United States Trade Representative, to impose a 25 percent tariff on all goods imported into the United States from any country that directly or indirectly imports Venezuelan oil.[5] EO 14245 was amended on the basis that the “actions and policies of the regime of Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.”[6]
Notably, EO 14245 uses discretionary language to determine whether the 25 percent tariff should be applied. Section 2 states that “a tariff of 25 percent may be imposed on all goods imported into the United States from any county that imports Venezuelan oil, whether directly from Venezuela or indirectly through third parties.”[7] Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick is responsible in the first instance for determining whether a country has directly or indirectly imported Venezuelan oil, as defined by EO 14245, and issue additional regulations, guidance, and determinations as necessary to implement the Order.[8] It is then up to Secretary of State Rubio to determine that a tariff should be imposed on all goods from any such country, and the initial list of impacted countries was slated to be announced April 2, 2025, though it has not yet been released.[9]
The Order follows the Trump administration’s previous actions to wind down US producers’ operations in Venezuela. The Treasury Department ordered a US-based oil and gas company to wrap up Venezuelan operations ahead of the termination of its General License to operate and export crude oil to the United States. Multiple other oil and gas companies that have licenses to operate in Venezuela have received notices that such operational licenses will be revoked, and OFAC is therefore likely to issue additional licenses permitting for wind-down operations only.
The Trump administration’s imposition of discretionary “secondary sanctions” indicates a less lenient stance on Venezuelan oil exports than that of the Biden administration. The U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) issued four general licenses suspending select sanctions in October 2023, which authorized certain transactions involving Venezuela’s oil and gas sector and gold sector and removed secondary trading bans.[10] The Biden administration did so in exchange for promises from the Maduro regime to address human rights abuses and hold free and fair elections.
However, in April 2024, OFAC replaced and superseded General License 44 (“GL44”), which had suspended certain sanctions measures on Venezuelan oil and gas operations, with GL44A on the basis that Maduro and his representatives did not fully meet their commitments as promised.[11] GL44A permits only certain “wind down authorizations” for operations previously authorized by GL44 and is explicit that entering into new business and investments would not be considered “wind-down activity.”[12] On February 26, 2025, President Trump additionally determined that Maduro had not honored certain promises and had failed to expedite migrant returns as President Trump had insisted. As a result, OFAC terminated the aforementioned US-based oil and gas company’s General License and issued a subsequent General Licensing allowing for the wind-down activity of its operations only. As discussed, OFAC will likely follow suit for those companies who have received notices.
Paradoxically, despite taking steps to isolate the Venezuelan oil market the United States imported roughly 222,000 barrels per day from Venezuela in 2024.[13] The U.S. Energy Information Administration additionally reported that as of January 2025, the United States imported 287,000 barrels of crude oil from Venezuela per day.[14] This number is certain to decrease based on expiring licenses and new tariff policies, but exemplifies the difficulty of implementing EO 14245 and presents the question of whether the United States will stop importing Venezuelan oil due to the Order’s stated “national security” concerns or instead continue activity for which it would subject other countries to tariffs. Other countries that rely on Venezuelan oil imports include China, India, Spain, Cuba, Brazil, Turkey, Italy, Russia, Singapore and Vietnam.[15]
Countries who regularly directly or indirectly import Venezuelan oil now face a high-stakes choice if they desire to also continue importing any and “all goods” into the United States. While it is not certain that tariffs would attach given the discretionary application, President Trump has shown great appetite in his first 100 days for making geopolitical statements through tariffs. And once on that ever-evolving list, it is unclear how long a country would stay on it, as the Order provides that the tariff will expire at either “1 year after the last date on which the country imported Venezuelan oil” or at an earlier, discretionary date.[16] Companies who have received US licenses for Venezuelan oil should remain vigilant in the ever-changing landscape to avoid negative and unforeseen implications should such licenses be abruptly revoked. It is also unclear at this time whether the Trump administration will impose its baseline tariffs and additional discretionary tariffs under EO 14545, resulting in double exposure for companies.
In short, EO 14245 combined with the above measures against various companies, demonstrate how the Trump administration is increasing efforts to further disrupt the flow of Venezuela’s oil exports. For more information, reach out to Bracewell’s government enforcement and investigations team in Houston, New York and London for guidance.

[1] Trump Unveils Sweeping Tariffs in Stark Shift in Trade Policy, Wall Street Journal (April 2, 2025), https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/trump-tariffs-trade-war-stock-market-04-02-2025.
[2] Id.
[3] Id.
[4] Executive Order 13692 was originally issued on March 8, 2015 (Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Venezuela) and continued recently on February 27, 2025 (Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Venezuela). It is now listed as Executive Order 14245 within the Federal Register. See Federal Register: Imposing Tariffs on Countries Importing Venezuelan Oil. This alert was published with references to the original Executive Order 13692 and has since been updated to include references to Executive Order 14245.
[5] Imposing Tariffs on Countries Importing Venezuelan Oil – The White House
[6] Id.
[7] Id. (emphases added).
[8] Id.
[9] Id.
[10] In Response to Electoral Roadmap, Treasury Issues New Venezuela General Licenses, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury (Oct. 13, 2023), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1822
[11] https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932821/download?inline
[12] Id.
[13] New Tariffs on Countries Importing Venezuelan Oil, Deringer (March 25, 2025), https://www.anderinger.com/tariffs-importing-venezuelan-oil/.
[14] Petroleum & Other Liquids, Company Level Imports (March 31, 2025), https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/imports/companylevel/.
[15] New Tariffs on Countries Importing Venezuelan Oil, Deringer (March 25, 2025), https://www.anderinger.com/tariffs-importing-venezuelan-oil/.
[16] Imposing Tariffs on Countries Importing Venezuelan Oil – The White House

What’s Next for the U.S. Department of Education?

A recent executive order signed by President Trump focuses on shrinking the Department of Education to prepare it for a possible future closure
Actual closure requires an act of Congress
The executive order directs the department to focus on DEI initiatives while open

President Donald Trump recently signed an executive order directing the secretary of the Department of Education to begin “tak[ing] all necessary steps to facilitate the closure of the Department of Education and return authority over education to the States and local communities while ensuring the effective and uninterrupted delivery of services, programs, and benefits on which Americans rely.”
In preparation for its closure, the Department of Education recently reduced its workforce by nearly 2,000 employees and began determining which federal departments will be responsible for the regulation and enforcement of various federal education laws in the event of the department’s closure.
Department of Education and an Act of Congress
As acknowledged by the administration, while President Trump can reduce the workforce and capacity of the Department of Education, actually closing the department requires Congress’ approval. On March 20, President Trump made it clear that a major purpose of the executive order directing the dismantling of the Department of Education is to prepare for its closure in the event Congress approves.
Uncertain Regulatory Landscape
In the event Congress does approve the Department of Education’s closure, there are still several education-related federal laws and programs requiring regulation and enforcement. While attempting to close the Department of Education, the administration has reportedly begun contemplating which entities will take on regulation and enforcement of these laws, noting special education law regulation and enforcement would likely be handled by the Department of Health and Human Services while the Small Business Administration would administer the federal student loan program. Notably, the administration has not addressed which agency would take over Title IX investigations.
Regulation and enforcement of education-related laws and programs by other agencies could be slow to come, as regulators learn these laws and programs and entities covered by these laws learn to work with new regulators. There will also likely be questions raised regarding whether these agencies possess the delegated authority required to enforce and regulate compliance with these laws.
Focus of the Department of Education Until Closure
While the Department of Education remains open, the executive order directs the secretary to “ensure that the allocation of any Federal Department of Education funds is subject to rigorous compliance with Federal law and Administration policy, including the requirement that any program or activity receiving Federal assistance terminate illegal discrimination obscured under the label ‘diversity, equity, and inclusion’ or similar terms and programs promoting gender ideology,” likely referring to recently issued executive orders on DEI and gender and the requirements of the Department of Education’s recent Dear Colleague Letter and corresponding FAQs. The Department of Education has already begun complying with this directive, investigating universities for alleged race-based admissions processes and scholarships and school districts for allegedly permitting transgender girls to use female changing rooms.
Takeaways
While the executive order did not close the department, the department continues to decrease in size and capacity. The executive order suggests DEI initiatives will be a focus of the department going forward. The administration is reportedly determining distribution of the department’s duties among other federal agencies in the event department closure occurs.

OPINION – The DEI Fight Escalates

In the week since “DEI and Bullying: Where Law, Politics, and Business Need To Align” was published in The National Law Review, the legal industry has seen a dramatic shift in its response to a concerted attack from the White House on law firm DEI practices. It has become a test of professional integrity and political influence as a divide has emerged between the approach of the largest law firms and the rest of the legal sector in managing this challenge.
Shortly after an Executive Order was issued by the Trump Administration against Paul, Weiss, the firm reached a deal with the White House—agreeing to relax DEI hiring policies and to provide $40 million in pro bono work directed toward causes politically aligned with the administration. In the days that followed, Skadden Arps, Wilkie Farr & Gallagher, and Milbank struck similar deals, each committing $100 million to more “administration friendly” pro bono causes.
And, as with the stock market, the world is watching. According to The Guardian, “The settlements come as many have expressed deep alarm at the US president’s effort to target law firms affiliated with his political rivals and see the actions as a thinly-veiled anti-democratic effort to intimidate lawyers from taking cases hostile to the administration.”
These settlements raise uncomfortable questions. What does it mean for DEI efforts when they can be bargained away? And what are the long-term implications of allowing the government to steer law firm priorities?
But in recent days, a powerful counterforce has emerged. On April 4th, in a show of unity, 500 law firms signed an amicus brief supporting Perkins Coie—a firm that has stood firm against political pressure. This collective legal move marks the first organized challenge to the executive order and a significant moment for the legal community. “The judiciary should act with resolve—now—to ensure that this abuse of executive power ceases,” the brief reads.
Notably absent from that list of 500: Big Law. According to Bloomberg Law: “None of the country’s 25 largest firms signed the friend-of-the-court brief, filed in federal court Friday. A total of eight of the 100 largest players joined the more than 500 firms on the brief, which was organized by Munger Tolles & Olson. Their absence speaks volumes as the rest of the industry mobilizes to fight back through the courts.”
Sharon Mahn, Esq., a leading legal recruiter and workplace expert, said “This is no longer just a policy scuffle. It’s now a legal and moral showdown, and we’re only in the opening rounds.”
Let’s hope it’s a short fight as the firms who signed the amicus brief press for a technical knockout. Meanwhile, this is one of several battles between politics and law, as USA Today points out in “Everything’s an ’emergency’: How Trump’s executive order record pace is testing the courts.”

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The National Law Review.

Liberation Day: President Trump Unveils Global, Reciprocal Tariffs – What You Need to Know

President Trump announced new tariffs on April 2, 2025, which he referred to as “reciprocal tariffs,” on almost all imports into the United States. The tariff package will be rolled out in two phases. Tariffs of 10 percent were imposed on all countries as of April 5. On April 9, additional, higher tariffs will be imposed on 57 countries, including the European Union, with which the United States has determined it has the largest trade deficits.
What Are the “Reciprocal Tariffs?”
According to a paper issued by the U.S. Trade Representative, the reciprocal tariffs “are calculated as the tariff rate necessary to balance bilateral trade deficits between the United States and our trading partners.” President Trump decided to impose only half of the rates calculated under that formula, while applying a minimum rate of 10 percent. Country-specific tariff rates span a range from the highest at 50 percent for Lesotho to the lowest at 11 percent for Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The tariffs apply only to the non-U.S. content of an import, provided at least 20 percent of the import’s value is U.S. originating. Importers claiming partial exemption for U.S. content may be subject to rigorous auditing requirements.
President Trump enacted the new tariff package under the authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”). The national emergency that the reciprocal tariffs are intended to address is the threat posed by the trade deficit and “other harmful policies like currency manipulation” that undermine the “national security and economy of the United States.” The President has previously used the IEEPA to impose tariffs on China, Canada, and Mexico to address illegal migration and imports of fentanyl into the United States
The current list of country specific tariff rates, as set out in Annex I of the Executive Order (“EO”), is below:

As President Trump instructed in his January 20 America First Trade Policy Memorandum, the Commerce Department, the Treasury Department, and the U.S. Trade Representative delivered a Report to the President on April 1 covering a wide range of trade issues, including, among others, reviews of steel and aluminum tariff exclusions, investigations on copper and lumber imports, assessments of U.S. trade agreements, and a review of the “de minimis” tariff exemptions for low-value shipments. On February 13, the President directed further review of “non-reciprocal trading practices.” In addition to providing the basis for the April 2 EO, this Report will likely influence the imposition of further tariffs, especially in the ongoing national security investigations on copper and lumber.
The Interaction of the Reciprocal Tariffs with Additional New Tariffs
In a separate but related action, so-called “secondary tariffs” of 25 percent may soon be imposed on imports from any country that the Commerce Department determines is importing oil from Venezuela. It is widely expected that China will be among the countries designated by Commerce. These tariffs will be in addition to all other tariffs already being imposed.
Finally, President Trump signed an EO on April 2 ending de minimis treatment on imports from China beginning May 2. Imports valued at $800 or less have until now been exempt from any tariffs. After that date, these imports will be subject to a duty of either 30 percent or $25 per item, increasing to $50 after June 1. This is in addition to all other tariffs and duties imposed on China thus far.
Are Any Goods Excluded from the Reciprocal Tariffs?
The EO confirmed that imports from Canada and Mexico, currently subject to 25 percent tariffs (10 percent for energy and potash) to address fentanyl and immigration border security issues will not be subject to reciprocal tariffs. However, goods that comply with the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (“USMCA”) preferential origin rules were and will continue to be exempted from the 25 percent and 10 percent fentanyl/migration tariffs. Should the President terminate the fentanyl/migration orders, Canadian and Mexican goods (with the exception of energy and potash) that are not compliant with the USMCA rules of origin will become subject to a 12 percent rate.
Another class of imports that will not be subject to the April 2 tariffs are items that are subject to the 25 percent tariffs that have previously been imposed under section 232 (an action that that allows the President to adjust imports if they are deemed to threaten national security) against a targeted range of goods, including aluminum, steel, and automobiles and their parts. Products that are currently subject to section 232 investigations, such as lumber and copper, and products that are expected to be investigated such as pharmaceuticals and semiconductors, are also excluded. Bullion, energy, and other certain minerals that are not available in the United States, as well as all other products enumerated in Annex II, are exempt.
Click here for President Trump’s reciprocal tariff EO (which includes Annexes I and II as in-text hyperlinks), and here for the accompanying fact sheet. Click here for President Trump’s April 2 amendment to the de minimis EO on China. Click here for the report to the president from Commerce, Treasury, and the United States Trade Representative.

Old North State Report – April 7, 2025

UPCOMING EVENTS
April 8, 2025
NC Chamber Spring Member Roundtable – Raleigh
April 14, 2025
Raleigh Chamber Business After Hours – Raleigh
April 16, 2025
Federalist Society Housing Policy and Regulation in NC – Raleigh
April 17, 2025
Raleigh Chamber Young Professionals Network Social – Raleigh
NC Chamber Building NC – Durham
April 22, 2025
NC Chamber Spring Member Roundtable – Asheville
April 24, 2025
RTAC – Association of Corporate Counsel Spring Reception – (Raleigh)
April 28, 2025
Thinkers Lunch: Rob Christensen
LEGISLATIVE NEWS
PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS LEGISLATION ADVANCES
A bill advancing in the North Carolina legislature, House Bill 163, could change prescription costs for consumers, but opinions differ on its impact. Pharmacists believe the bill would limit profits for pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs), while PBMs argue that restrictions would raise drug prices for patients. Critics claim PBMs are motivated to keep prices high, with only three companies managing 80% of U. S. prescriptions.
PBMs play a significant role in healthcare by negotiating drug prices and determining costs for insurers and pharmacies, often lacking transparency. They can also require patients to use specific pharmacy chains, hurting competition.
The bill would mandate PBMs to pay pharmacies at least the national average drug cost and a $10 dispensing fee, allow patient choice of pharmacies, and share drug rebates with consumers. It passed the House Health Committee, following a similar bill from last session that did not progress in the Senate.
Read more by WRAL NEWS
CON LEGISLATION ADVANCES TO RULES COMMITTEE
State lawmakers in North Carolina are once again looking to change the certificate-of-need rules, which regulate the approval of new healthcare equipment or facilities. On Wednesday, the Senate Health Committee discussed Senate Bill 370, which aims to repeal these rules, and recommended it for further consideration by the Senate Rules Committee.
The North Carolina Healthcare Association supports keeping the rules, stating they help ensure access to care for underserved populations and prevent excess supply, which can raise costs. Opponents argue that the rules limit competition
While the legislature has made minor adjustments to these laws recently, broad repeal efforts have faced strong opposition from the hospital industry. Additionally, a recent ruling from the North Carolina Supreme Court could challenge the rules’ constitutionality. During the committee meeting, various health groups voiced differing opinions on the proposed changes.
Read more by WRAL News
FOSTER CARE LEGISLATION INTRODUCED
House Bill 612, a bill seeking to improve the state’s child welfare system by helping move children from foster care to permanent homes and preventing them from staying in unsafe environments, was introduced on Monday. The bipartisan bill has almost 70 co-sponsors in the House.
Representative Allen Chesser (R-Nash), the bill’s lead sponsor, emphasized that the focus is on achieving better life outcomes for children, promoting an environment that supports permanency and reunification. The Department of Health and Human Services sets policies, but counties implement them, leading to inconsistent practices.
Key points of the bill include:

County social services directors must update reporters of child abuse or neglect within five days about investigations.
Parental rights will not be lost due to inability to pay for care.
Lawyers for county agencies need six hours of yearly training.
Open adoptions are allowed with parental consent and end at age 18.
Foster parents and relatives caring for children over a year can meet judges before placement changes.
The DHHS can review cases and require remedies for rule violations.

The bill has been referred to the House Health Committee.
Read more by NC Newsline
Read more by WUNC
BILL TO EXPAND TREATMENT BY PHARMACISTS
A bill making its way through the Senate, Senate Bill 335, aims to expand pharmacists’ roles in testing and treating influenza and strep throat during a serious flu season. This season, 484 people have died from the flu, including five children, prompting the need for quicker access to treatment.
The bill, whose primary sponsor is Senator Benton Sawrey (R-Johnston), seeks to reduce the time it takes for patients to receive medication. Supported by the North Carolina Board of Pharmacy and the North Carolina Association of Pharmacists, it allows pharmacists to use accurate CLIA-Waived tests to provide rapid results.
The legislation outlines protocols for pharmacists, with some patients still needing referrals to a primary care doctor. Additionally, it mandates insurers to cover care similarly to visits to doctors or urgent care. The bill has passed the Senate Health Committee unanimously and may soon be voted on in the Senate.
Read more by WRAL NEWS
NC SENATE ELECTS NEW MAJORITY LEADER
The Senate Republican Caucus has selected Senator Michael Lee as its new Majority Leader. Lee, serving his fifth term, represents New Hanover County. The position became available after Paul Newton resigned unexpectedly and was appointed general counsel at UNC-Chapel Hill.
Lee was elected by acclamation, as he was the sole candidate. The Majority Leader is the third-highest ranking Senate leader, following Senator Phil Berger (R-Rockingham) and Deputy President Pro Tempore Ralph Hise (R-Alleghany). The Majority Leader leads caucus meetings, where members discuss policies and votes. Before becoming Majority Leader, Lee chaired the Senate Appropriations/Base Budget and Education/Higher Education committees.
Read more by WUNC
WHAT WE’RE LISTENING TO

Under the Dome Podcast
Do Politics Better Podcast
WUNC Politics Podcast
Carolina Newsmakers Podcast
NC Capitol Wrap Podcast

WHAT WE’RE READING

Asheville Citizen Times
Carolina Journal
Charlotte Observer
Fayetteville Observer
Greensboro News & Record
NC Insider
New Bern Sun Journal
News & Observer
North State Journal
Our State Magazine
Triangle Business Journal
Under the Dome
Wilmington Star News
Winston-Salem Journal
WRAL