The Third Time’s A Charm: Colorado Adds Nuclear Energy as a Clean Energy Resource
After considering similar legislation in two prior sessions, the Colorado General Assembly passed, and Gov. Jared Polis signed into law, House Bill 25-1040 which explicitly adds nuclear energy to the state’s statutory definitions of “clean energy” and “clean energy resource” for purposes of complying with Colorado’s carbon dioxide emission reduction requirements and applying for financial assistance under Colorado’s Rural Clean Energy Project Finance Program. In so doing, Colorado joins more than a dozen other states that consider nuclear power to be a clean energy resource under various state energy policies, and is consistent with the growing number of states taking legislative, regulatory, or policy steps to support or at least consider adding nuclear power to their energy mix.
Acknowledging Colorado’s projected growth in peak electricity demand and the potential energy supply, reliability, climate, and economic benefits of nuclear energy, including advanced reactors such as Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), the legislation expands the statutory definitions to include “nuclear energy, including nuclear energy projects awarded funding through the United States Department of Energy’s Advanced Nuclear Reactor Programs.”
Under Colorado’s carbon dioxide emission reduction statute, qualifying retail utilities in Colorado are required to submit to the Colorado Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) a plan detailing how they intend to reduce by 2030 carbon dioxide emissions associated with their electricity sales by 80 percent as compared to 2005 levels, and how they will seek to achieve 100% emission free electricity sales by 2050. For compliance purposes, the Statute incorporates the “eligible energy resources” that can be used to comply with Colorado’s separate Renewable Energy Standards (RES); these include recycled energy, renewable energy resources (wind, solar, geothermal, new small hydropower, and certain biomass), and renewable energy storage, however, nuclear energy is expressly excluded. Recognizing that not all clean energy resources may be considered renewable, the Statute also allows any other “electricity-generating technology that generates or stores electricity without emitting carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.” While this catch-all language arguably encompasses nuclear energy, HB25-1040 amends the statute to remove any doubt and emphasize the potential benefits of nuclear energy.
Colorado’s three largest electric utilities are in the process of implementing their respective CPUC-approved clean energy plan or electric resource plan that meets the state’s emission reduction requirements. While none of the plans presently include nuclear power, Colorado’s largest investor-owned electric utility, Public Service Company of Colorado (PSCo), has indicated it is open to considering nuclear energy resources in the future.
HB25-1040 also expands the types of energy that qualify for potential financial assistance through Colorado’s Rural Clean Energy Project Finance Program. The Program allows certain rural property owners to apply to their board of county commissioners for the issuance of tax-exempt private activity bonds to help finance the construction, expansion, or upgrade of a clean energy project having a capacity of no more than 50 MW and which is owned by and located on the property owner’s land. The electricity generated by such a project would be delivered to the cooperative electric association in whose service territory the project is located. Similar to Colorado’s RES, the Program defined “clean energy” to include only biomass, geothermal, solar, wind, and small hydropower resources as well as hydrogen derived from these resources. As such, only projects using these technologies were eligible for financial assistance under the Program. Now, small nuclear power projects are also eligible for financial assistance under the Program.
Colorado presently has no operating commercial nuclear power plants. From 1979 until 1989, Colorado was home to the Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Power Plant, a 330 MW(e) high temperature gas cooled reactor, owned and operated by PSCo. The plant was decommissioned in 1992 following a series of operational issues and portions of the plant were converted to a natural gas combustion turbine generating plant. The statutory amendments resulting from HB25-1040 do not mean that new nuclear power is coming to Colorado, but they do evidence a state policy environment more favorable to nuclear power and provide practical, incremental improvements that may incentivize utilities and landowners to consider developing nuclear power generating facilities in the state.
For example, PSCo has indicated that new nuclear generation is one possible option to replace the electricity and economic benefits of its Comanche-3 power plant located in Pueblo, Colorado and which is scheduled to retire by January 1, 2031. The ability to count nuclear energy toward PSCo’s carbon dioxide emission reduction obligations may be an additional consideration as PSCo evaluates this option. Furthermore, once advanced reactor designs progress from First-of-a-Kind to Nth-of-a-Kind, cost effective, deployable systems, some SMRs and microreactors could align well with Colorado’s Rural Clean Energy Project Finance Program and become viable power supply options for Colorado’s rural communities.
Ultimately, taking advantage of HB25-1040’s incremental improvements will also require sound legal and regulatory advice related to nuclear matters as well as siting, permitting, environmental, and numerous other issues. If you have questions concerning this legislation or the opportunities it may create, please reach out to the author of this alert or the Womble Bond Dickinson attorney with whom you normally work.
USDA Will Fund 543 Projects in 29 States Through Higher Blends Infrastructure Incentive Program
On March 31, 2025, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) announced that it will release obligated funding under the Higher Blends Infrastructure Incentive Program (HBIIP) for 543 projects totaling $537 million in 29 states. According to the press release, USDA is “aggressively exploring additional ways to unleash American energy and incentivize the production and use of homegrown U.S. biofuels, including working alongside the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to develop Renewable Volume Obligations (RVO) that support the biofuel industry, as well as supporting EPA’s review of any potential emergency fuel waivers to allow the nationwide year-round sale of E15.” USDA provides HBIIP grants to fueling station and distribution facility owners, including marine, rail, and home heating oil facilities, to help expand access to domestic biofuels. USDA notes that expanding the biofuel infrastructure “broadens the availability of fuels like E15, E85, and B20, made from American-made agricultural commodities.”
SEC Climate Disclosures Rules One Step Closer to the Grave; GHG Emissions Disclosures One Step Closer to Becoming a Multi-State Compliance Issue
The slow death of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) climate disclosure rules continued on March 27, 2025, with the SEC Commissioners voting to discontinue the defense of such rules before the Eighth Circuit, Iowa v. SEC, No. 24-1522 (8th Cir.), which is where the numerous complaints challenging the rules were consolidated.[1] The SEC’s action does not withdraw or terminate the rules, but while they remain in place, the SEC’s previous stay of the rules continues. It will be interesting to see if the Democratic attorneys general from a number of states who joined the litigation in support of the rules will continue to defend the rules without the SEC’s support.
While the SEC has made clear that it will not be pursuing its climate disclosure rules[2], companies may still need to comply with climate disclosure laws of other jurisdictions, including the European Union’s Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive and California’s climate disclosure rules. In addition, legislation similar to California’s “Climate Corporate Data Accountability Act” (CA SB 253)[3] which was later amended by California Senate Bill 219[4] has been introduced in New York[5], Colorado[6], New Jersey[7], and Illinois[8] that would require companies with more than $1 billion in annual revenue and doing business in the particular state to annually report their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, similar to what California will require beginning in 2026.
To add to the list of considerations for companies to keep on their radar, U.S. Senator Bill Hagerty recently introduced federal legislation to “prohibit entities integral to the national interests of the United States from participating in any foreign sustainability due diligence regulation, including the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive of the European Union”.[9] While Senator Hagerty’s bill appears to be symbolic and unlikely to be enacted, it has a private right of action that could prove troublesome if the legislation should be enacted.
[1] See, Press Release 2025-58, Securities and Exchange Commission, “SEC Votes to End Defense of Climate Disclosure Rules” (March 27, 2025), https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2025-58.
[2] Securities and Exchange Commission, Final Rule “The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors,” 17 CFR 210, 229, 230, 232, 239, and 249, adopting release available at https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/final/2024/33-11275.pdf.
[3] Cal. Health & Safety Code § 38532.
[4] Senate Bill 219, Greenhouse gases: climate corporate accountability: climate-related financial risk, Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 38532, 38533, Bill Text available at https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=202320240SB219.
[5] New York Senate Bill S3456, “Climate Corporate Accountability Act,” available at https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2025/S3456.
[6] Colorado House Bill 25-1119, “A Bill for an Act concerning requiring certain entities to disclose information concerning greenhouse gas emissions,” available at https://leg.colorado.gov/bills/HB25-1119.
[7] New Jersey Senate Bill 4117, “Climate Corporate Data Accountability Act,” available at https://legiscan.com/NJ/text/S4117/2024.
[8] Illinois House Bill, “Climate Corporate Accountability Act,” available at https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=3673&GAID=18&DocTypeID=HB&LegId=162463&SessionID=114&GA=104.
[9] Senate Bill 985, 119th Congress (2025-2026), ‘‘Prevent Regulatory Overreach from Turning Essential
Companies into Targets Act of 2025’’ or the ‘‘PROTECT USA Act of 2025,’’ Bill Text available at https://www.hagerty.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/HLA25119.pdf
Reorganize EPA? A Very Old Idea
Recent press reports tell of rumors of impactful (some fear catastrophic) budget cuts to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Politically, priority on reducing EPA’s climate programs, along with budget and personnel cuts, are not surprising given the election results. Recent rumors include chatter that the EPA Office of Research and Development (ORD) might be eliminated and/or its staff redistributed, with a specific target on the back of ORD’s Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS).
In recent years, the IRIS program has skirted controversy particularly aimed at its underlying assessment methods and assumptions used in its reports about chemical exposures. In theory the program is an attempt to have a single hazard assessment act as a platform of sorts, for the individual media program offices across EPA (air, water, waste, and toxics) to then present an integrated approach to chemical risks. This singular assessment would then facilitate a cross-media, integrated approach that is easier to implement. Like so many ideas that are good on paper, fulfilling this goal has proven difficult over time (see the tortured history of the IRIS formaldehyde assessment).
Other forums have and will continue to discuss EPA science and assessment methods, both important issues for understanding and achieving EPA’s objectives. Yet what is also interesting is the long-standing, and much less noticed, discussion of EPA’s organizational structure and the ideas for changing the structure first created over five decades ago.
For the record, EPA was created by then-President Nixon in 1970. He had signed Reorganization Plan No. 3, calling for the establishment of EPA in July 1970. After conducting hearings that summer, the House and Senate approved the proposal. The Agency’s first Administrator, William Ruckelshaus, took the oath of office on December 2, 1970. Two days later, President Nixon issued EPA Order 1110.2 — Initial Organization of the EPA.
The original “organization” of EPA was a mix of existing programs, agencies, and departments — dispersed elements of the government working on environmental issues. A November 29, 1990, press release from EPA describes “EPA’s genesis” as “an executive order dealing with a pastiche of 15 programs from 5 agencies involving 5,800 employees and a $1.4 billion budget.
The organization of EPA, and how that organization impacts its effectiveness, has been an issue since its founding. From its earliest days, there have been proposals for making EPA a cabinet-level Department. During the H.W. Bush Administration, to knit together the programs and statures more coherently, the EPA policy office developed a comprehensive draft of possible ways to reorganize the underlying environmental legislation and a parallel EPA structure.
In August of 2006, the EPA Office of Inspector General (OIG) issued a report titled “Studies Addressing EPA’s Organizational Structure.” The objective of the report is to summarize 13 studies’ pertinent findings in a single, “informational document that provides perspectives on what has been problematic and what EPA may need to change regarding its organizational structure.” The OIG review includes research studies, articles, publications, and reports that address the EPA’s organizational structure and provide suggestions to improve performance. The report’s evaluation focuses especially on cross-media management, regional offices, “reliable information,” and “reliable science.”
Most recently, and perhaps most important given the current Administration’s efforts at government reform, the subject of “reorganizing” EPA is included as a chapter in the Project 2025 report. That chapter has led to fears from many that budget and personnel cuts are part of a larger plan to upend the Agency.
Recent press reports (like The Washington Post’s March 27, 2025, article, “Internal White House document details layoff plans across U.S. agencies”) indicate that the “plan” for EPA is to cut 10 percent of its workforce — which would seem less than some aggregated possibilities discussed in the Project 2025 chapter but could still include “firing up to 1,115 people” from ORD alone. Project 2025 suggests large cuts to regional offices, the elimination of the afore-mentioned IRIS program, a “reorganization” of the enforcement office and environmental justice programs, and other changes which would seem to add up to less than a 10 percent cut to the workforce. Attrition rates alone are estimated to be an average of 6 percent, and early retirements accelerated by, among other things, the fear of possible cuts, would likely add up to 10 percent or more.
Does this spell out some kind of preferential treatment for EPA? Unlikely, given the overall rhetoric of this Administration’s efforts. It may be that the larger target savings at EPA are the significant sums included for climate protection grant programs appropriated during the Biden Administration. Or it may be that the workforce cuts at EPA as a percentage contribute less to some unknown target of reducing the overall government payroll. While a 10 percent cut would result in a large impact on EPA capabilities, it is less than other programs eliminated altogether, or the announced 20 percent cut in staff at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) or 50 percent cut at the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
But the goal of reforming, reorganizing, or reducing the workforce is neither a new idea nor one lacking merit. EPA’s organizational structure has been under review since its inception. In the present moment, however, the lack of a cohesive or consistent approach leaves significant questions not only about the underlying motivation but also about the final impact of the effort. “Less bureaucracy” does not necessarily equate to reduced numbers of staff. And as some government functions will now contend with seemingly disorganized staff reductions, public resentment about “the bureaucracy” may only increase. Something to think about as we wait (and hope) to get our social security check or passport – or pesticide registration – on time
Maritime Chokepoints and Freedom of Navigation The US Federal Maritime Commission Investigation Into “Transit Constraints”
On March 14, 2025, the US Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) announced the initiation of a nonadjudicatory investigation into transit constraints at international maritime “chokepoints.”
The Federal Register notice initiating the investigation identified the following seven global maritime passageways that may be subject to such constraints: (1) the English Channel, (2) the Malacca Strait, (3) the Northern Sea Passage, (4) the Singapore Strait, (5) the Panama Canal, (6) the Strait of Gibraltar and (7) the Suez Canal. The FMC announcement is another sign of the continued merger of national security, trade issues and global shipping and transportation issues.
The FMC has a statutory mandate to monitor and evaluate conditions affecting shipping in US foreign trade. 46 U.S.C.42101(a) provides that the commission “shall prescribe regulations affecting shipping in foreign trade … to adjust or meet general or special conditions unfavorable to shipping in foreign trade,” when those conditions are the result of a foreign country’s laws or regulations or the “competitive methods, pricing practices, or other practices” used by the owners, operators or agents of “vessels of a foreign country.” The FMC is also required under 46 U.S.C. 46106 to report to Congress on potentially problematic practices of ocean common carriers owned or controlled by foreign governments, e.g., China. The FMC will conduct this investigation in accordance with its procedures for a nonadjudicatory investigation set forth in 46 CFR Part 502, Subpart R.
The FMC is conducting this investigation into any actions by a foreign country or other maritime interests that might constitute anticompetitive practices, irregular pricing or pricing that is deemed prejudicial to US foreign trade interests, and any other practices of government authorities, vessel owners, operators or agents affecting transit through such passageways. That is an incredibly broad mandate, and there is complete uncertainty as to what “remedies” or “proposed actions” the FMC might recommend so as to remediate any perceived constraints on transit.
However, given the potentially severe and disruptive impact of the proposed actions currently being considered by the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) in relation to the ongoing Section 301 investigation into “China’s Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance,” 1 this new FMC investigation bears careful monitoring and engagement by affected parties.
Some commentators have already concluded that this new FMC investigation is simply a new front in the trade war the US is waging on the Chinese maritime and shipbuilding industries. Seatrade Maritime News claims that the FMC investigation is “not about trade at all,” but rather a continuation of the “China witch hunt” that started with the USTR Section 301 investigation.2 Others see the inclusion of the Panama Canal in the FMC investigation as an extension of the Trump administration’s stated desire to “take back” the canal, although in truth, the recent controversy over the Panama Canal was in part related again to China, and concerns over the involvement of the Panama Ports Company, a subsidiary of Hong Kong-based Hutchison Port Holdings.3 The references in the FMC notice of initiation to “other maritime interests” and “other practices of government authorities,” including irregular pricing or “pricing that is deemed prejudicial to US foreign trade interests,” appear to be a veiled reference to the Panama Maritime Authority and allegations that US vessels were being treated differently. Most commentators now agree that the FMC investigation is another element or tool that the administration intends to use to reduce US reliance on foreign-owned cargo vessels, and indeed force cargo interests to use US vessels.4 In this context, the focus on the Suez Canal may actually be a US ploy to target and extract concessions out of Egypt;5 the English Channel may be more about targeting the UK and France.
The FMC summarizes its individual concerns about (1) the English Channel, (2) the Malacca Strait, (3) the Northern Sea Passage, (4) the Singapore Strait, (5) the Panama Canal (6) the Strait of Gibraltar, and (7) the Suez Canal in the Federal Register notice. In summary, the concerns range from congestion, limited passing opportunities, an elevated risk of collisions, navigational challenges, variable weather conditions, environmental risks, geopolitical tensions, security threats and, in some areas, piracy and smuggling.
With respect to the Northern Sea Passage, the FMC notes that this is emerging as a critical maritime chokepoint as the region’s waters become ice free for longer periods, with it offering a shortcut between Europe and Asia 6. Reference is made to Russia seeking control over the route and its strategic importance being amplified by increased military activity from Russia, China and NATO forces.
In the section on the Panama Canal, while noting that Panama’s ship registry is one of the world’s largest, the FMC notes that remedial measures it can take include “refusing entry to US ports by vessels registered in countries responsible for creating unfavorable conditions.” In addition to Panama, states that control other areas in which chokepoints are located operate some of the world’s other largest ship registries, such as Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. If this investigation leads to the US refusing entry to, or imposing penalties on, vessels flagged in these states, or on vessels owned by interests from these states, it could have very farreaching implications.
As is foreseen in the impact of the Section 301 proposed actions, these measures could have the potential to significantly raise the costs of calling at US ports (either by way of reduced availability of tonnage or the imposition of direct penalties) with these costs being passed down the charterparty chain and then ultimately to customers and consumers.
The FMC notes that other significant constraints affecting US shipping may arise quickly in the global maritime environment. For example, when the Singapore-flagged containership Dali struck a bridge in Baltimore, Maryland in March 2024, six people were killed and maritime access to the Port of Baltimore was blocked, a situation that persisted for many weeks and led to losses that have been estimated to reach as high as US$4 billion.
Interested parties are permitted to submit written comments by May 13, 2025, with experiences, arguments and/or data relevant to the above-described maritime chokepoints, particularly concerning the effects of laws, regulations, practices or other actions by foreign governments, and/or the practices of owners or operators of foreign-flag vessels, on shipping conditions in these chokepoints.
The FMC states that it welcomes comments not only from government authorities and container shipping interests, but also from tramp operators, bulk cargo interests, vessel owners, individuals and groups with relevant information on environmental and resource-conservation considerations, and anyone else with relevant information or perspectives on these matters.
In particular, the FMC has expressed an interest in information and perspectives on the following six questions:
What are the causes, nature and effects, including financial and environmental effects, of constraints on one or more of the maritime chokepoints described above?
To what extent are constraints caused by or attributable to the laws, regulations, practices, actions or inactions of one or more foreign governments?
To what extent are constraints caused by or attributable to the practices, actions or inactions of owners or operators of foreign-flag vessels?
What will likely be the causes, nature and effects, including financial and environmental effects, of any continued transit constraints during the rest of 2025?
What are the best steps the FMC might take, over the short term and the long term, to alleviate transit constraints and their effects?
What are the obstacles to implementing measures that would alleviate the above transit constraints and their effects, and how can these be addressed?
It will be interesting, and indeed imperative, for global shipping interests to monitor the comments received and how the proposed measures are developed accordingly.
A recent Bloomberg News article went so far as to indicate that the “Billion-Dollar US Levies on Chinese Ships Risk a ‘Trade Apocalypse’.”
Interestingly, there are some notable exclusions from the list of the seven “chokepoints,” including some that are significantly more problematic and/or more important to global trade flows, including the Black Sea and the Bosphorus, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Bab Al Mandeb Strait.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published a February 19, 2025 article examining the US motivations behind the Panama Canal gambit.
TradeWinds posits in one article that the FMC may try to ban or detain ships from the “maritime chokepoint” countries, or restrict or ban service to the US by shipping lines or vessel operators that are said to contribute to issues relating to transit through these passageways.
For example, this may be about the US getting preferential deals for US vessels; e.g., US-flagged vessels being given free Suez transits by the Egyptian government, under threat of measures against Egypt being imposed if not.
Although consultant Darron Wadey at Dynaliners in the Netherlands has expressed a view, quoted in Seatrade Maritime News, that this route is “an outlier” in the list and has “zero relevance” to US foreign trade.
March 2025 PFAS Legislative Developments
Federal Legislature
One new bill was introduced.
State Legislature
Sixty six bills were introduced across fifteen states.
Topics include: Exemptions from PFAS bans; PFAS testing requirements; Establishing liability for PFAS contamination; Regulating PFAS contamination in water sources.
State Regulations
NH Env-Dw 1500 was published as a Final Rule. This is a rebate program for well water contaminated by PFAS. The purpose is to establish criteria and procedures for administering the PFAS removal rebate program for private wells.
New Bills This Period
PFAS Legislation
Federal
One new bill introduced.
State
Sixty six bills introduced.
One in CT
One in DE
One in FL
Eight in HI
One in IA
Five in ME
Nine in MA
Eighteen in MN
One in NM
Two in NY
Eight in NC
Two in PA
Four in RI
One in TX
Four in WI
New Life for Nuclear Power: License Extensions and Recommissioning
Key Takeaways:
Secure Financial and Regulatory Support Early
Recommissioning projects (like Palisades and TMI Unit 1) demonstrate the importance of securing strong financial backing (government loans, state support) and long-term PPAs
Early engagement with USNRC is crucial given the complex regulatory process
Leverage Experienced Contractors and Learn from Precedents
Engage experienced regulatory counsel and third-party contractors to identify potential risks early
Study recommissioning cases (like Palisades and TMI Unit 1) as they establish regulatory precedents
Introduction
At its peak, the commercial nuclear power industry in the United States included 112 operating nuclear reactors. Many of those reactors entered operation in the 1970s and 1980s and were typically licensed to operate for 40 years. When some of these reactors reached the end of their operating life, they were decommissioned. Others were taken out of service for various reasons but not fully dismantled. Yet others received extensions of their operating licenses and continue to provide clean, reliable, baseload electricity. The Trump Administration’s recent Executive Order, “Unleashing American Energy,” counts nuclear energy among the resources for which regulatory burdens must be reviewed, and suggests uranium should be included in the US’ list of critical minerals. With the renewed interest in nuclear power, former and existing nuclear power plants will be critical among the opportunities to meet the growing demand for electricity to power a variety of energy intensive industries.
This article explores the challenges and opportunities associated with nuclear power plants at or near the end of their planned operating life.
…there is a growing interest in nuclear power as a non-greenhouse gas emitting source of baseload electricity.
Old Plants, New Licenses : Nuclear Power’s Extended Stay
The average age of currently operating commercial nuclear reactors in the US is more than 40 years.1 Under current regulations,2 the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) may grant a 20-year extension of the plant’s original operating license, and potentially a subsequent 20-year license extension for a total of 80 operating years. Given the economic and regulatory pressures that have driven the retirement of coal-fired baseload generating power plants in recent years, there is a growing interest in nuclear power as a non-greenhouse gas emitting source of baseload electricity. This interest is driving some utilities to consider whether it is appropriate to pursue operating license extensions for nuclear power plants that would otherwise be considered for decommissioning.
A recent example of the confluence of these factors is Pacific Gas & Electric’s two-reactor Diablo Canyon Power Plant – California’s largest power plant. In 2023, driven by concerns related to statewide electricity reliability and climate change, California Senate Bill No. 846 became law and directed PG&E to pursue an extension of Diablo Canyon’s operating license to 2030. Following the conclusion of litigation that sought to prevent the license extension, PG&E’s application is currently under review by USNRC while both reactors continue to operate. Since 2000, USNRC has issued operating license extensions for more than 90 nuclear reactors. 3
The Long Goodbye: Navigating Nuclear Plant Decommissioning
Despite opportunities for life extension, some nuclear plant owners choose decommissioning for financial or operational reasons. In such cases, plant owners must first notify the USNRC of their planned shutdown, then work with the USNRC to coordinate all post-shutdown decommissioning activities including developing and implementing a License Termination Plan. Once these steps are complete, the owner must finish the full decommissioning process within 60 years of terminating plant operations. The final goal is to have the reactor site approved by the USNRC for future use which may be subject to specific restrictions. 4 Navigating this highly regulated process can be challenging in the best of circumstances and, in some instances, may be the subject of litigation, including with respect to disposal of spent reactor fuel. There are currently 20 US commercial nuclear reactors in various stages of the regulated decommissioning process. 5
These risks tend to become more apparent as the DECON phase progresses and the true scope of the necessary decontamination becomes apparent.
Full scale decommissioning and dismantling to obtain release of the USNRC license is a multi-year and costly process fraught with risks. This process includes: 6
Removing the spent nuclear fuel from the reactor.
Storing the spent nuclear fuel, typically in dry storage containers, either on-site or at licensed off-site locations.
Dismantling radioactive systems and equipment; and
Cleaning up contaminated material (e.g., contaminated soil, groundwater, etc.) and packaging and transporting it to a disposal facility.
Nuclear plants can be decommissioned and dismantled in either one or two phases. The first is safe storage (SAFSTOR), where the facility is placed in protective storage for an extended period. During this time, radioactivity naturally decreases in key components like the reactor vessel, fuel pools, and turbines. Spent fuel is removed from the reactor vessel and placed in secure storage, and the plant remains under USNRC oversight throughout this period.
The second phase is decontamination (DECON) during which contaminated equipment and materials are removed from the site. Plant owners with sufficient decommissioning funds may choose to skip SAFSTOR and proceed directly to DECON. However, those needing to accumulate additional funds may opt for SAFSTOR, in part to allow their decommissioning fund to grow over time. As part of DECON, the nuclear plant owner decontaminates and removes contaminated equipment and material. The DECON process can take up to five years, if not longer. 7
Given the number of US commercial nuclear reactors that have been decommissioned or are in the process of decommissioning, a number of third-party contractors have gained vital experience that can help nuclear plant owners better understand the risks inherent in decommissioning. These risks tend to become more apparent as the DECON phase progresses and the true scope of the necessary decontamination becomes apparent. For example, while it is expected that components in close contact with radioactive material will need to be decontaminated, other debris from the dismantling effort may be more contaminated than initially expected, requiring special techniques for removal and disposal. The scope, duration, and expense of decommissioning will further expand, sometimes significantly, if surrounding soil and ground water is also contaminated and requires treatment and removal. These risks cannot be eliminated entirely, but an experienced contractor and knowledgeable regulatory counsel can help the nuclear plant owner identify the potential issues early and develop the most cost-effective and regulatorily efficient solution.
…USNRC has taken a number of regulatory actions to oversee what it describes as a “first of a kind effort to restart a shuttered plant.”
Recommissioning: Back from the Brink
As noted above, some nuclear power plants have been decommissioned but not fully dismantled. For many of the same reasons some plant owners are seeking operating license extensions for existing reactors, other plant owners are seeking to restart reactors that have begun the decommissioning process.
The Palisades Nuclear Plant (PNP) ceased operations in 2022, and Entergy transferred the plant’s operating license to Holtec Decommissioning International for purposes of decommissioning the facility. In 2023, however, citing the need for safe, reliable, carbon-free electricity, Holtec announced plans to seek USNRC approval to restart PNP. Holtec’s plans have received financial assistance from the State of Michigan, a $1.52 billion loan from the US Department of Energy, and the company has entered into a long-term power purchase agreement (PPA). In response to Holtec’s plans, USNRC has taken a number of regulatory actions to oversee what it describes as a “first of a kind effort to restart a shuttered plant.”8 In addition to restarting the plant’s 800 MW reactor by late-2025, Holtec has also announced its intent to explore siting small modular reactors (SMRs) at the facility to make the plant a major clean energy hub for the region.
Similarly, in 2023, Constellation Energy announced its plans to restart operations at Three Mile Island (TMI) Unit 1, the companion to TMI Unit 2 which experienced a partial core meltdown in 1979. TMI Unit 1 ceased operations in 2019 and, like PNP, its license status was changed to SAFSTOR (Safe Storage) to facilitate later decommissioning efforts. Constellation estimates the cost to bring TMI-1 back to operating status at $1.6 billion. The project is supported by a 20-year PPA with Microsoft to purchase all power from the plant to supply its regional data center operations with carbon-free electricity. Assuming all regulatory approvals are obtained, TMI Unit 1, which is to be renamed the Crane Clean Energy Center, is projected to resume operations in 2028.
The future of America’s nuclear power plants stands at a critical crossroads.
In July 2024, NextEra announced that it was considering a possible restart of the 45-year-old Duane Arnold nuclear plant in Palo, Iowa which ceased operations in August 2020. In a clear response to growing electricity demand, on January 23, 2025, NextEra filed with the USNRC a proposed regulatory path for the potential reauthorization of operations at the Duane Arnold power plant.
While there are likely a limited number of nuclear plants that could be considered for recommissioning, recent statements by the Trump Administration suggesting that nuclear energy will be viewed as a priority resource to meet future energy demand may bode well for the regulatory path forward for nuclear plant restarts.
Conclusion
The future of America’s nuclear power plants stands at a critical crossroads. The growing demand for reliable, baseload power, coupled with concerns about climate change and energy security, has sparked renewed interest in preserving and expanding nuclear capacity. As a result, while some nuclear plants may face decommissioning, others are finding new life through license extensions and recommissioning efforts.
Early indications are the Trump Administration intends to “unleash commercial nuclear power in the United States” through the development and deployment of next-generation nuclear technology.9 It is possible that the Administration’s support for nuclear power will extend to optimizing the use of the nation’s existing and former nuclear plants. Similarly, the Administration’s concurrent interest in streamlining regulatory processes may provide more regulatory certainty for existing and former nuclear plants being considered for operating license extensions or for recommissioning.
The story of America’s nuclear plants is thus not simply one of sunset versus second life, but rather one of evolution and adaptation to meet the changing energy needs of the 21st century.
1https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=228&t=3 210 CFR § 543https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications.html#completed 410 CFR § 20 and §§ 50.75, 50.82, 51.53, and 51.955https://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/decommissioning/power-reactor/index.html 6https://www.nei.org/advocacy/make-regulations-smarter/decommissioning 7https:// www.nei.org/resources/fact-sheets/decommissioning-nuclear-power-plants8https://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/reactors/pali.html 9Secretary Wright Acts to “Unleash Golden Era of American Energy Dominance” | Department of Energy
Environmental YIR: 2024 Regulatory Legacies and Impacts
This report provides an overview of major federal environmental regulations and court decisions of 2024. Landmark U.S. Supreme Court decisions with lasting consequences for environmental policy include Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024),1 which ended judicial deference to administrative agencies, and Corner Post v. Federal Reserve, 603 U.S. 799 (2024), which opened the doors of federal courts to many more plaintiffs challenging regulations. These decisions have subsequently bolstered efforts to limit or rollback regulatory actions, both by industry and by members of the Trump administration. The Congressional Review Act (CRA), which allows Congress to rescind or invalidate new regulations, has also been used as the basis for invalidating many of the environmental regulations adopted since August 2024.
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United States: House Committee on Financial Services Urges the SEC to Withdraw Final and Proposed Rules
On 31 March 2025, the House Committee on Financial Services (Committee), in a letter to Acting Chairman of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Mark Uyeda, identified a series of proposed and adopted rules that the SEC should withdraw or rescind. The letter notes the Committee’s view that the SEC, under the prior Chair, had lost sight of its mission. The identified proposals and rules represent significant rulemaking efforts on the part of the SEC, many of which were controversial and subject to significant industry opposition. The specific proposals identified are the following:
Cybersecurity Risk Management, Strategy, Governance, and Incident Disclosure;
Short Position and Short Activity Reporting by Institutional Investment Managers;
Reporting of Securities Loans;
Pay Versus Performance;
Investment Company Names;
Form N-PORT and Form N-CEN Reporting; Guidance on Open-End Fund Liquidity Risk Management Programs;
Conflicts of Interest Associated with the Use of Predictive Data Analytics by Broker Dealers and Investment Advisers;
Open-End Fund Liquidity Risk Management Programs and Swing Pricing;
Regulation Best Execution;
Order Competition;
Position Reporting of Large Security-Based Swap Positions;
Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity;
Outsourcing by Investment Advisers; and
Enhanced Disclosures by Certain Investment Advisers and Investment Companies about Environmental, Social, and Governance Investment Practices.
While the Committee does not have the authority to compel the SEC to take action on any if these final or proposed rules, the letter is a strong indication of support for an overall deregulatory environment and could provide a blueprint for SEC regulatory policy once Paul Atkins is confirmed.
EC Begins Public Consultation on Upcoming EU Bioeconomy Strategy
The European Commission (EC) began a public consultation on March 31, 2025, on the upcoming European Union (EU) Bioeconomy Strategy. The EC states in its March 31, 2025, press release that the Strategy “marks a significant step forward in harnessing the opportunities of the bioeconomy to support European businesses and drive progress towards the EU’s environmental, climate and competitiveness objectives.” According to the call for evidence, the Strategy’s main aims include:
Ensuring the long-term competitiveness of the EU bioeconomy and investment security. The Strategy will identify measures to scale up and commercialize existing and emerging biotechnology solutions and biobased products, in particular by tapping into the significant growth potential of biobased materials substituting fossil-based ones (e.g., sources of alternative proteins, biobased materials, or biochemicals). It will entail looking at practical measures to remove unnecessary barriers to biobased manufacturing and bio-innovation and unleash the full opportunities of primary biobased production;
Increasing resource-efficient and circular use of biological resources, by creating an efficient demand. This means transforming how the EU values and uses biomass resources, prioritizing extended high-value applications while encouraging industries and consumers to embrace circular practices that maximize economic returns from each unit of biomass. It might also entail providing targeted support and incentives for higher value added uses of biomass feedstock and by-products in line with the cascading principle;
Securing the competitive and sustainable supply of biomass, both domestically and from outside the EU. The Strategy will strengthen the role of primary producers, generating wealth in rural areas by creating jobs and diversifying incomes for foresters and farmers and rewarding them for the preservation of ecosystems; and
Positioning the EU in the rapidly expanding international market for biobased materials, biomanufacturing, biochemicals, and agri-food and biotechnology sectors. This will be done by steering existing foreign policy mechanisms in the area of the bioeconomy in the context of the EU’s Global Gateways initiative, exploring the need and appropriateness of bringing bioeconomy under international multilateral fora, and promoting green diplomacy on bioeconomy.
The EC encourages all stakeholders to participate in the online consultation. Comments are due June 23, 2025. Stakeholders can also contribute by participating in targeted sessions on the bioeconomy in upcoming events such as the European Circular Economy Stakeholder Platform (ECESP) Circular Economy Stakeholder Dialogue, taking place on April 10, 2025, and EU Green Week, taking place from June 3 to 5, 2025.
UK Grid Connection Reforms: Breaking the Bottleneck
Go-To Guide:
The UK is transforming its grid connection system to address a backlog of over 739 GW of projects, aiming to streamline access and reduce delays.
New reforms focus on prioritizing projects that are ready for development and essential for grid stability, eliminating the speculative applications.
A structured gate-based queue process would be implemented, requiring projects to meet specific criteria to secure grid connection.
NESO has temporarily paused new grid connection applications pending reform implementation, with certain exceptions.
Investors and lenders may prioritize projects with secured grid access, potentially impacting valuations and project economics.
The UK’s grid connection system is undergoing its most significant transformation in decades. With 739 GW of projects stuck in the queue and over 1,700 new applications in 2023 and 2024 alone, the system has hit a breaking point, clogging the project pipeline and causing years-long delays.
Recognizing the urgency, the National Energy System Operator (NESO) introduced reforms to cut through the backlog and bring order to the chaos. These changes, now under review by the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem), are designed to prioritise viable projects, eliminate speculative applications, and fast-track grid access.
In February 2025, Ofgem gave in-principle approval to the reforms, launching a consultation that closed on 14 March 2025. A final decision is expected by the end of Q1 2025. These reforms would reshape the UK’s energy landscape if implemented, aligning with the government’s Clean Power 2030 Action Plan (CP30 Plan).
What might this mean for businesses? Let’s break it down.
Continue reading the full GT Alert.
Updates on SB 54: CalRecycle to Take a Second Stab at Implementing Regulations
On 7 March 2025, Gov. Gavin Newsom sent the Department of Resources Recycling and Recovery (CalRecycle) back to the drawing board on proposed regulations to implement the state’s Plastic Pollution Prevention and Packaging Producer Responsibility Act (SB 54). Senate Bill (“SB”) 54 is one of many state extended producer responsibility laws that seek to make product manufacturers responsible for the environmental burden associated with single-use packaging and similar materials. Newsom signed SB 54 into law in 2022, and CalRecycle has been working to implement the law since 2023.
SB 54 targets single-use plastic packaging and food service ware (Covered Materials) and has the lofty goals of achieving by 2032 making 100% of Covered Materials recyclable or compostable, reducing the use of Covered Materials by 25%, and actually recycling Covered Materials at a minimum of 65%.
SB 54 mandated CalRecycle to propose permanent regulations for SB 54 by 8 March 2025. The recently rejected proposed regulations were originally released for public comment in February 2024 and underwent two rounds of public comment. After two public comment periods, CalRecycle arrived at the proposed permanent regulations that Newsom declined to accept. Newsom declined to adopt CalRecycle’s proposed regulations due to the unacceptable burdens and costs the proposed regulations would have imposed on businesses. CalRecycle will have to convene another series of stakeholder meetings and develop new regulations, but CalRecycle’s timeline for proposing these new regulations is not yet clear.
In addition to monitoring the updated rulemaking process for California’s SB 54, our firm is keeping up with several other proposed and enacted state regulations impacting food packaging and food-contact material producers, including the following:
Expected release of CalRecycle’s final “material characterization study” required under SB 343 by 4 April 2025; the report will determine what materials are considered “recyclable” for purposes of “chasing arrows” symbols and SB 54.
Introduced 16 January 2025, Minnesota’s Senate File 188/House File 44 would require food-packaging manufacturers and brand owners to test for and report ortho-phthalates. If enacted, the law would take effect 1 July 2026.
On 20 February 2025, California introduced the Safer Food Packing Act of 2025 to regulate antimony trioxide, bisphenols, and ortho-phthalates in food packaging.
Introduced 3 February 2025, Illinois House Bill 2516 will prohibit the sale or distribution of any cookware and food packaging that contains potentially added per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). If passed, this regulation will take effect 1 January 2026.
Introduced 13 February 2025, Hawaii SB 683 will prohibit the sale or distribution of any cookware and food packaging that contains potentially added PFAS. If passed, this regulation will take effect 1 January 2028.