Federal Proposal to Rescind ESA’s ‘Harm’ Definition Raises the Stakes for California’s AB 1319

The United States Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service (collectively, Services) proposed last week to rescind the regulatory definition of “harm” under the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA), sparking intense criticism from environmental advocacy groups. If finalized, the rescission would remove a longstanding protection for the habitat of wildlife species listed as threatened or endangered under the ESA, making regulatory compliance easier for many types of projects across the country. But it would also set up a potential collision between the current president’s deregulation efforts and one of several bills that California’s Legislature is considering as a way to compensate for potential “backsliding” of federal environmental protections, with the regulated community in California likely to be among the losers.
Federal Action Would Remove Prohibition on Habitat Modification
Section 9 of the ESA prohibits the “take” of any endangered species, a prohibition extended to many threatened species by regulation. (16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B)-(C).) Under the ESA, “take” means to “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, collect, or attempt to engage in any such conduct.” (16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) [italics added].) Existing regulations further define “harm” as “an act that actually kills or injures fish or wildlife … [including] significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering.” (50 C.F.R. § 17.3 [italics added]; see also § 22.102.)
The Services have proposed to eliminate the regulatory definition of “harm,” leaving only the statutory definition of “take,” which the Services said they interpret as prohibiting only affirmative acts that are intentionally directed toward particular members of a listed wildlife species. Actions that could indirectly harm listed wildlife by modifying their habitat would no longer be prohibited by the ESA, removing a significant source of potential liability for projects that involve clearing, grading, vegetation removal and similar activities. While effects on listed species’ habitat still could trigger a federal agency’s obligation to consult with the Services under Section 7 of the ESA, many projects lacking a federal “handle” such as a federal approval or funding, likely would be able to forgo seeking ESA authorization.
AB 1319 Aims to Combat Federal ‘Backsliding’ Through Emergency State Listings
AB 1319, a bill introduced in the California Assembly in February 2025, would require the California Fish and Game Commission to consider listing under the California Endangered Species Act (CESA) any California-native species that would receive reduced protection as a result of a “federal action” taken under the ESA after January 19, 2025. Such federal actions specifically include, but are not limited to, those relying in whole or in part on amendments to the ESA regulations. The Commission initially would list new species through adoption of an emergency regulation, a process already authorized by the CESA although seldom used, but then would need to promptly evaluate each species for permanent listing under the CESA procedures that apply to “candidate” species.
The California Department of Fish and Wildlife (CDFW) currently identifies 80 wildlife species in California that are ESA-listed but not CESA-listed, nearly all of which could be eligible for emergency listing if AB 1319 becomes law. Adopting emergency regulations to list those species under the CESA may be fairly straightforward, but evaluating the newly listed species as candidates for permanent protection would place an unprecedented workload on the Commission and the Department. The evaluations almost certainly would drag on for years (as many already do), during which time the candidate species would remain subject to the CESA’s take prohibition and permitting requirements, even though an emergency regulation, by law, may remain in effect for no more than 360 days (including conditional extensions).
Far from experiencing regulatory relief, projects in California, even those already fully approved and permitted, would face the prospect of obtaining incidental take permits to cover a slew of species newly listed (or treated as candidates for listing) under the CESA. CDFW, which issues those permits, is already struggling under a workload that reflects the recent addition of two new candidate species that are relatively widespread, the western burrowing owl and the Crotch’s bumble bee. Additional delay for many types of projects is a sure outcome if AB 1319 becomes law.[1] Thus, Governor Newsom will face a difficult choice if AB 1319 clears the Legislature. In 2019, he vetoed a bill containing nearly identical language over concerns about its effects on the state’s water conveyance projects. This year, he will have to choose between his desire to oppose the current federal administration and his need to show that his own administration can deliver the housing, energy, infrastructure and fire preparedness projects that California urgently needs.

FOOTNOTES
[1] AB 1319 is a non-urgency bill; if enacted, it would take effect on January 1, 2026.
Bella Spies also contributed to this post.

EU Sustainability Omnibus: Now That the Clock Has Stopped, What’s Next?

First, in a record time of less than two months, the so-called ‘Stop the clock’ Directive (EU) 2025/794 was adopted and published in the EU official journal.
The Directive amends the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (‘CSDDD’) and Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (‘CSRD’), thereby delaying the two flagship ESG legislation’s entry into application and transposition deadlines.
This entails the following changes:

The application of CRD reporting requirements is postponed by two years, for large companies that have not yet started reporting, and for listed SMEs; and
In the case of the more recent CSDDD, the transposition deadline is postponed by one year (e.g. 26 July 2027) while the first phase of its application is also postponed by one year.

Member States have until 31 December 2025 to transpose the Stop the clock Directive. Until then, national transposition norms implementing the requirements of the CSRD remain in force.
A period of uncertainty thus remains until their adoption, although we can expect a swift action by the Member States.
Meanwhile, the EU’s co-legislators have made progress with the examination of the proposed Substantive Amendments to the CSRD and CSDDD requirements.
The European Parliament presented a first work timetable, announcing that the JURI Committee in charge of the file would present a draft report (e.g. a draft EP position on the text) on 23-24 June. MEPs will have until 27 June to prepare amendments, with a vote in Committee on 13 October 2025.
The Council’s Presidency on the other hand has issued a first version of its position on the text on 16 April 2025.
This suggests that trilogue discussions between the co-legislations would not be held until the end of the year, with an adoption in 2026 at the earliest.
In this regard, uncertainty will remain for the industry until then, with the possibility that the postponement of deadlines introduced by the Stop the clock Directive be insufficient to account for potentially lengthy negotiations between the two institutions.

Webinar Recording: The European Commissions Proposals to Simplify CBAM and Reduce Administrative Burden on Importers [Video]

We recently hosted a webinar in collaboration with Carboneer, where Thomas Delille and Valerio Giovannini were joined by Simon Göß of Carboneer to discuss the European Commission’s latest proposals to simplify the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and reduce the administrative burden on importers. Watch the recording below.
The session provided an in-depth analysis of the proposed regulatory amendments, examining their impact on compliance obligations for EU importers and the practical implications for third-country exporters. The panel also presented a case study exploring revised methodologies for estimating CBAM certificate costs, including updated data sources, forecasting demand, and pricing implications for 2026–2027. This discussion offers valuable insight for anyone involved in cross-border trade under the evolving CBAM framework.
 

Powering The Future: The UK’s Nuclear Revolution

Introduction
Nuclear power has long been one of the cornerstones of the UK’s energy mix, providing a reliable source of low-carbon electricity. As the UK embarks on its Clean Energy Superpower mission, aiming for a clean electricity system by 2030 under the Clean Power 2030 Action Plan (CPAP) and achieving Net Zero by 2050, nuclear power, alongside renewable sources, will spearhead the transition to a sustainable energy future. Recent policy changes, regulatory adjustments, and legislative initiatives have fostered a favourable environment for both traditional and advanced nuclear technologies as the UK pursues decarbonisation. This article will explore these developments, beginning with the UK’s ambition and vision, and examining governmental support for nuclear projects. Additionally, we will offer insights into fusion and other innovative technologies, illustrating how the UK’s energy landscape is prepared to embrace the nuclear revolution.

This evolution reflects the government’s commitment to sustaining a diverse, home-grown, and resilient energy portfolio, capable of withstanding geopolitical shocks while fostering technological innovation and economic growth.

What is the UK’s ambition and vision for nuclear?
Currently, the UK has 5.9 GW of nuclear installed capacity; however, 4.7 GW are expected to come offline by 2030. In both the British Energy Security Strategy (2022) and the Powering Up Britain strategy (2023), the UK government committed to delivering up to 24 GW of nuclear by 2050 to cover a quarter of the country’s projected demand, placing the technology on equal footing with renewable energy sources. This long-term target was reconfirmed in the Civil Nuclear Roadmap to 2050 (‘Roadmap’) published in 2024, which elucidates the pathway to delivering a mix of large-scale nuclear power plants, innovative technologies such as small modular reactors (SMRs) and advanced modular reactors (ADRs), and fusion. The Roadmap details plans for the biggest expansion of nuclear energy in 70 years, including the construction of a major new nuclear power plant. This evolution reflects the government’s commitment to sustaining a diverse, home-grown, and resilient energy portfolio, capable of withstanding geopolitical shocks while fostering technological innovation and economic growth. The Roadmap’s ambition is reiterated in the latest report on the pathways to achieve Net Zero by 2050, the Future Energy Scenarios (‘FES’) 2024 produced by the new independent energy system operator and planner, the National Energy System Operator (NESO). Finally, CPAP, which is based on FES, concludes that in a renewables-based system, nuclear is essential to deliver a ‘backbone’ of vital firm low-carbon power.
How does the UK support nuclear technologies?
From traditional large-scale nuclear power plants to ground-breaking technologies, the UK has taken important policy, regulatory, financial, and legislative measures to support nuclear. These include a strategic approach to designing the energy system, improved permitting procedures, and funding mechanisms.
Strategic planning
The UK has adopted an integrated and whole-system approach in planning, managing, and operating the energy system, led by NESO. In a geographically constrained area with competing interests such as farming, biodiversity, and aerospace, project developers require more certainty regarding the optimal locations, quantities, and types of energy projects needed to achieve Net Zero. This information will be provided by the Strategic Spatial Energy Plan (SSEP), expected in 2026. The SSEP aims to accelerate and optimise Great Britain’s energy transition, outlining a pathway from 2030 to 2050. The first SSEP focuses on electricity generation and storage, including technologies like large-scale nuclear and SMRs, but excluding ADRs. These will be considered in future iterations of the SSEP. 

Along with the nuclear-specific NPS, the infrastructure permitting system in the UK is undergoing a major reform through the Planning and Infrastructure Bill 2025.

Faster, streamlined, effective, and cost-efficient permitting
The UK government has recently announced important changes in consenting nuclear technologies, easing the permitting procedure. First, they plan to replace the National Policy Statement (NPS) for Nuclear Energy Generation (EN-6), the statutory document that sets out the government’s policy to permit applications for nuclear nationally significant infrastructure projects (NSIPs – projects that exceed a specific power capacity threshold), with a new NPS called EN-7. The new regime will apply to all nuclear – heat and electricity – developments that exceed 50 MW. The NPS removes two restrictions:

A geographical restriction of building nuclear plants in a set list of eight sites. Nuclear sites will be built anywhere in England and Wales on a criteria-based approach, including high standards of safety, security, and environmental protection.
A time-limit restriction to deploy new projects in the eight sites by 2025, providing developers with more certainty and flexibility to build new plants. 

EN-7 also extends the scope of technologies covered and supports cutting-edge technologies, such as SMRs and AMRs, alongside gigawatt-scale plants. Additionally, a Nuclear Regulatory Taskforce will accelerate regulatory reforms and project delivery, including investment incentives. The consultation on EN-7 proposals has recently concluded, with the final version expected to be laid before Parliament in autumn 2025.
Along with the nuclear-specific NPS, the infrastructure permitting system in the UK is undergoing a major reform through the Planning and Infrastructure Bill 2025. The purpose of the Bill is to accelerate consenting for NSIPs, including through alternative routes of permitting on a case-by-case basis, streamlined and shorter consultation requirements, and a stricter judicial review system to limit meritless challenges against decisions that approve major infrastructure. These changes, when finalised, possibly in late 2025, are expected to apply to nuclear projects.
Furthermore, in March 2024, the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), the Environment Agency (EA), and Natural Resources Wales (NRW) developed voluntary guidance for early regulatory engagement for those deploying nuclear projects in Great Britain. This guidance is intended for project developers, technology vendors, and permit holders.
Funding and derisking investment in nuclear
Nuclear projects are expensive to build. The recent examples of billions of budget overruns for the two new large-scale power plants, Sizewell C and Hinkley Point C (each having a capacity of approximately 3.2 GW), underscore the critical need for diverse and robust funding options to ensure the viability of these projects. We examine below some of the options including a new finance model and support from public bodies. 

…, the main issue with CfD is that project developers bear the entire construction risk, whereas under the RAB model, this risk is shared with consumers.

A new finance model: the Nuclear Energy (Financing) Act 2022 (NEFA 2022)NEFA 2022 introduces the use of the regulated asset base (RAB) model to finance new nuclear projects. This model is commonly used for major infrastructure projects such as airports, water, and energy networks because it helps to de-risk private investment. Under the nuclear RAB model, an eligible nuclear company will receive a guaranteed return on investment throughout the lifetime of the nuclear asset, which is reflected in the licence conditions. The RAB model is now preferred for large scale projects and possibly for SMRs, over other financing options, such as the bespoke Contract for Difference (CfD) deal used for financing Hinkley Point C in 2016. The CfD is a subsidy scheme that covers the entire construction costs of the project through a fixed price for electricity output once the plant becomes operational. However, the main issue with CfD is that project developers bear the entire construction risk, whereas under the RAB model, this risk is shared with consumers. Sizewell C has sought support through the RAB model, with the final version of the RAB licence conditions expected to be issued by Ofgem soon.

The role of Great British Nuclear, Great British Energy, and National Wealth FundWith the Energy Act 2023, the UK government has established a new publicly owned company, Great British Nuclear (GBN). GBN is the expert vehicle responsible for driving the delivery of new nuclear projects through each stage of project development, co-funding selected technologies, and ensuring the right financing and site arrangements to meet the 24 GW nuclear target by 2050. GBN’s first priority is to run a competitive process to select the best SMR technologies. This selection process has reached its final stage, with the decision expected this Spring.
The new UK government has created two more new bodies to support investment and provide funding for clean energy projects: Great British Energy (GBE) and National Wealth Fund (NWF). With a capital of £7.3 billion, GBE’s purpose is to develop, invest in, build, and operate clean, home-grown energy projects. GBE aims to accelerate Great Britain’s pathway to energy independence and security by working closely with industry, local authorities, communities, and other public sector organisations. According to GBE’s founding statement, the UK government will explore how GBE and GBN can best work together on delivering the nuclear programme. GBE will be officially established once the Great British Energy Bill becomes an Act.
The National Wealth Fund (NWF), previously known as the UK Infrastructure Bank, has been allocated £27.8 billion to stimulate investment in clean energy projects, including nuclear, and to support the implementation of the new industrial strategy. GBN, GBE, and NWF play crucial roles in nuclear investment, financing, and de-risking. However, the future of nuclear development will also be influenced by the upcoming Industrial Strategy and the Spending Review.

Invest in 2025 and Spending ReviewIn October, the UK government launched a consultation on the green paper ‘Invest 2035: the UK’s modern industrial strategy’. This strategy aims to remove barriers to growth and foster a pro-business environment in eight key sectors, including clean energy industries. Although nuclear projects are typically included under the ‘clean energy’ category, some stakeholders have requested through their responses a specific mention of nuclear technology to avoid any ambiguity. The final industrial strategy will be announced in June, alongside the second phase of the Spending Review.The Spending Review is the government’s process for setting departmental budgets for future years. The first phase of the review, announced in the Autumn Budget 2024, confirmed departmental budgets for 2024-25 and set budgets for 2025-26. The crucial second phase, also known as ‘the envelope,’ will establish spending plans for the next three years over a five-year period to achieve the government’s objectives, including the growth and Clean Energy Superpower missions. As emphasised by various stakeholders, the Spending Review will play a pivotal role in supporting nuclear projects. 

The UK is leading the way in fusion energy development and innovation.

Fusion, the ‘holy grail’ of nuclear
The UK is leading the way in fusion energy development and innovation. Starting with the UK’s fusion strategy in 2021, updated in 2023, the UK became one of the first countries to enact specific fusion legislation through the Energy Act 2023. This new legislation separates the regulations governing fusion energy from those that apply to traditional nuclear technologies by amending the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 to exclude fusion energy projects. As a result, fusion projects will not require licences from or be regulated by ONR, streamlining the path to commercial fusion energy deployment.
In May 2024, the UK government published a proposal for a new fusion-specific National Policy Statement (NPS), EN-8, to support an open-sited and technology-inclusive approach to siting new fusion energy facilities. Similar to EN-7, the fusion-specific NPS will use strategic criteria when identifying and assessing new sites for fusion facilities. The proposal also recommends designating all fusion plants as Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects (NSIPs). The government has not yet published its final decision on EN-8.
In parallel, the UK government continues to advance fusion-specific projects and funding arrangements. Some of these initiatives include:

The pioneering Spherical Tokamak for Energy Production (STEP) programme, supported by £410 million funding from the UK government, aims to commercialise the technology and develop the first viable fusion power plant by 2040.
The landmark UK and US joint project, LEAPS, in partnership with Tokamak Energy.
A new joint private and UK government fusion investment fund, ‘Starmaker One,’ to assist fusion businesses and start-ups in commercialising the technology. The government has invested £20 million in the fund, which has the potential to raise between £100 million and £150 million overall investment. 

…, the UK wants to lead innovation and commercialise the use of alternative nuclear technologies, particularly as these technologies can be cheaper than traditional nuclear…

AMRs, SMRs and the AI twist
AMRs, also known as Generation IV reactors, have the potential to support a variety of applications beyond electricity generation. These include hydrogen production, industrial and domestic heating, and nuclear waste management solutions. To support these technologies, the UK government awarded £196 million last year to build a commercial facility for the production of high-assay low enriched uranium (HALEU), a fuel necessary for powering AMRs.
SMRs also show promising applications. The technology is expected to contribute significantly to the UK’s ambition to become a global leader in the Artificial Intelligence (AI) sector. The AI Opportunities Action Plan (‘AI Plan’) aims to establish ‘AI Growth Zones’ (AIGZs) to facilitate and expedite the deployment of advanced AI data centres. The first AIGZ could be located in Culham, adjacent to the UK Atomic Energy Authority. An AI Energy Council has been launched to identify clean and sustainable energy solutions to meet the considerable power requirements of these AI data centres. SMRs are among the technologies anticipated to fulfil the energy needs of these centres.
Similar to fusion, the UK wants to lead innovation and commercialise the use of alternative nuclear technologies, particularly as these technologies can be cheaper than traditional nuclear due to their size, modularity, and replicability. In a consultation launched in 2024, the UK government explores alternative routes to market for these technologies beyond GBN, HALEU, and the Advanced Nuclear Fund (ANF) that offer support to both SMRs and AMRs. For example, the RAB model might be more suitable for financing cutting-edge nuclear technologies than CfDs. The alternative routes to market proposals, when finalized and taken forward, will be a game changer for the deployment of SMRs and AMRs.
Conclusion
The UK’s nuclear policy is a dynamic and evolving framework that continuously reflects its commitment to a secure, low-carbon, and innovative energy future. This policy also leverages nuclear technology to support other critical sectors such as AI. By promoting a diverse range of nuclear technologies—from large-scale power plants to cutting-edge fusion research—the UK aims to meet its ambitious climate goals, drive innovation, and stimulate substantial economic growth. The opportunities presented by the UK’s nuclear revolution are vast, with new supportive planning frameworks making it easier to capitalise on them. 

Mexico Simplifies Procedures Before Its Federal Commission for Protection Against Sanitary Risks

On March 27, 2025, Mexico’s Federal Commission for the Protection Against Sanitary Risks (COFEPRIS) published an agreement in the Official Gazette of the Federation (DOF) outlining simplification measures for COFEPRIS procedures.
Key simplification actions include:
(i) Eliminating mandatory use of the “Notice of Operation, Sanitary Responsible and Modification or Cancellation” form for filing notices of operation and sanitary responsibility for health-related supply establishments and environmental health establishments, in their various modalities. 
(ii) Eliminating mandatory use of the “Notice of the original establishment responsible for the cancellation of the sanitary responsible” when modifying or cancelling notices of operation and/or sanitary responsibility for health-related supply establishments and environmental health establishments, in its different modalities.(iii) Merging procedures COFEPRIS-05-006-A, COFEPRIS-05-006-B, COFEPRIS-05-006-C, COFEPRIS-05-006-D, and COFEPRIS-05-006-E into “Notice of operations and sanitary responsible for health-related supply establishments,” with different modalities.(iv) Merging procedures COFEPRIS-05-007-A, COFEPRIS-05-007-B, COFEPRIS-05-007-C, COFEPRIS-05-007-D, and COFEPRIS-05-007-E into “Notice of Modification or Cancellation of the Notice of Operation and/or Sanitary Responsibility of the Health-Related Supply Establishments,” with different modalities.
The agreement will enter into force 15 business days after its publication in the DOF.

The Changing Food Regulatory Landscape

You have probably heard the term “ultra-processed food.” What does that mean? Unprocessed food probably requires little explanation. For example, a whole raw apple that has not been cut, cooked or otherwise prepared would be unprocessed. From there, a range of processing might be done – the apple could be cut in slices and packaged for snacking – that would be some degree of processing. It could be mixed with sugar and lemon juice and cooked down to make apple butter. That would be more processing. It could also be mixed with numerous other ingredients, including artificial colors, sweeteners, hydrogenated oils, starches, enriched flours, and preservatives to make shelf-stable snack cakes. That would be an ultra-processed food. Ultra-processed foods provide convenience and help reduce the cost of foods by providing longer shelf life. Many of the current staples of American life are ultra-processed foods – think about chips, crackers, frozen meals, soft drinks, many breakfast cereals, processed meats (like hot dogs), candies, ice cream, and some common fast foods.
Certain ingredients used in ultra-processed foods have been associated with health problems such as cancer, cardiovascular disease, diabetes, mental / behavioral conditions, and obesity. The FDA has authorized the use of ingredients found in ultra-processed foods available in the United States. However, certain countries, including those within the European Union, have prohibited the inclusion of these ingredients in their food supplies.
On January 15, 2025, the FDA banned Red Dye number 3 from food after research linked the dye to higher rates of thyroid cancer in animals, but not humans. While the FDA has not banned many ingredients prohibited in other countries, states have been taking independent action. California leads the nation in regulating food ingredients. In 2023, California passed legislation banning Red Dye number 3, propylparaben (a preservative to prevent the growth of mold and bacteria), potassium bromate (used to make bread rise better and to improve the texture), and brominated vegetable oil (used to stabilize citrus flavorings in drinks).
Other states have also begun to take action. Below is a chart outlining recent and pending state legislation aimed at food regulation.

State
Legislation
Status

Arizona
Banned from public schools food containing:Potassium bromatePropylparabenTitanium dioxideBrominated vegetable oilYellow dye 5Yellow dye 6Blue dye 1Blue dye 2Green dye 3Red dye 3Red dye 40
Passed by the Senate

Arkansas
Prohibited from foods:Potassium bromate Propylparaben

Referred to Senate Public Health Welfare And Labor
If passed, effective 1/1/2028

Connecticut
Prohibits from foods:Red dye number two Red dye number four Green dye number one Green dye number two Violet dye number one Butter yellow dye Orange dye number one Orange dye number two Red dye number forty Yellow dye number fiveYellow dye number six Blue dye number one Blue dye number two Carmoisine Erythrosine
Pending before the Joint General Law Committee

California
Banned from foods:Brominated vegetable oil Potassium bromatePropylparabenRed dye 3 
Enacted on 10/7/23, effective on 1/1/2027

Delaware
Prohibits from food:Red dye number 3Red dye number 40

Pending before the Senate Health & Social Services Committee
If passed, effective 1/15/2027

Florida
Prohibits from food:Brominated vegetable oilPotassium bromatePropylparabenRed dye 3Blue dye 1Yellow dye 5BenzidineButylated hydroxyanisoleButylated hydroxytoluene.

Pending in the Appropriations Committee on Agriculture, Environment, and General Government
Effective 1/1/2028 if passed

Hawaii
Prohibits from foods in public schools:Blue dye number 1 Blue dye number 2 Green dye number 3 Red dye number 40 Yellow dye number 5 Yellow dye number 6

Pending before the Senate Education Committee
Effective 7/1/2025 if passed

Illinois
Prohibits from food:Brominated vegetable oil Potassium bromate Propylparaben Red dye number 3

Pending before the Senate
If passed, effective 1/1/2027

Indiana
Prohibits in food:Blue dye number 1Blue dye number 2 Green dye number 3 Brominated vegetable oil Propylparaben Potassium bromate Red dye number 3Red dye number 40Yellow dye number 5 Yellow dye number 6 

Referred to Public Health Committee
If passed, effective 7/1/2025

Iowa
Prohibits in foods in public schools:Red dye number 40Yellow dye number 7Margarine
Referred to Education Committee

Kentucky
Prohibits in foods in public schools:Brominated vegetable oil Potassium bromatePropylparabenTitanium dioxideRed dye number 3 Red dye number 40Yellow dye number 5 Yellow dye number 6 Blue dye number 1 Blue dye number 2 Green dye number 3 
Referred to Primary and Secondary Education Committee

Louisiana

Prohibits from food in public schools:Blue dye number 1Blue dye number 2 Green dye number 3Red dye number 3 Red dye number 40 Yellow dye number 5 Yellow dye number 6 AzodicarbonamideButylated hydroxyanisole (BHA)Butylated hydroxytoluene (BHT)Potassium bromate PropylparabenTitanium dioxide
Requires warnings on foods containing:Acesulfame potassium.Acetylated esters of mono- and diglycerides (acetic acid ester)Activated charcoalAnisoleAtrazineAzodicarbonamide (ADA)Butylated hydroxyanisole (BHA)Butylated hydroxytoluene (BHT)Bleached flour.Blue dye number 1Blue dye number 2Bromated flourCalcium bromateCanthaxanthinCarrageenanCertified food colors FDACitrus red dye 2 DiacetylDiacetyl tartaric and fatty acid esters of mono- and diglycerides (DATEM)Dimethylamylamine (DMAA).Dioctyl sodium sulfosuccinate (DSS)FicinGreen dye number 3Interesterified palm oilInteresterified soybean oilLactylated fatty acid esters of glycerol and propylene glycolLyeMelatoninMorpholineOlestraPartially hydrogenated oil (PHO)Potassium aluminum sulfatePotassium bromatePotassium iodatePotassium sorbatePropylene oxidePropylparabenRed dye number 3Red dye number 4Red dye number 40Sodium aluminum sulfateSodium lauryl sulfateSodium stearyl fumarateStearyl tartrateSynthetic or artificial vanillinSynthetic trans fatty acidThiodipropionic acidTitanium dioxideToluene.Yellow dye 5 Yellow dye number 6
Restaurants using must disclose to customers the use of the following seed oils:Canola or rapeseed oilCorn oilCottonseed oilFlaxseed oilGrapeseed oilRice bran oilSafflower oilSoybean oilSunflower oil

Pending before the Senate Health & Welfare Committee
If passed, effective for the 2026-2027 school year
If passed, effective 1/1/2027
If passed, effective 1/1/2027

Maryland
Prohibits in foods:Brominated vegetable oil (BVO)Potassium bromate Propylparaben 
If passed, effective 10/1/2028

Massachusetts
Prohibits in schools and school events food and beverages containing:Blue dye number 1Blue dye number 2Green dye number 3Red dye number 3Red dye number 40Yellow dye number 5Yellow dye number 6 
Referred to Public Health CommitteeIf passed, effective 12/31/2028 

Missouri

Requires warning labels for foods containing:AcrylamideArsenicBisphenol A (BPA)Blue dye number 1CadmiumDi(2-ethylhexyl)phthalate (DEHP)LeadMercuryRed dye number 40Yellow dye number 5Yellow dye number 6
Prohibits in foods in public schools:Potassium bromate PropylparabenTitanium dioxide Brominated vegetable oil Yellow dye number 5 Yellow dye number 6Blue dye number 1 Blue dye number 2Green dye number 3Red dye number 3Red dye number 40

Pending before the House
If passed, effective 2026-2027 school year 

New Jersey
Prohibits foods with:Brominated vegetable oil Potassium bromate Propylparaben Red dye number 3 
If passed, effective the first day of the 13th month following enactment

New York

Banned from foods:Red dye number 3Potassium bromate Propylparaben
Banned from foods sold in public schools:Red dye number 3Red dye number 40Blue dye number 1Blue dye number 2Green dye number 3Yellow dye number 5Yellow dye number 6

Pending before the NY Senate
Effective 1 year after passage (with an up to 3 year exception based upon a product’s best by date) 

North Carolina
Prohibiting from foods:Brominated vegetable oil Potassium bromate Propylparaben Red dye number 40 Yellow dye number 5 Yellow dye number 6 Blue dye number 1Blue dye number 2Green dye number 3 
If passed, effective 1/1/2027

Oklahoma

Banned from foods and drugsBlue dye number 1Blue dye number 2Green dye number 3Red dye number 3Red dye number 40Yellow dye number 5Yellow dye number 6.
If the FDA revokes is authorization of use, the following would also be banned:Aspartame; Azodicarbonamide (ADA) Brominated vegetable oil Butylated hydroxyanisole (BHA)Butylated hydroxytoluene (BHT) Ethylene dichlorideMethylene chloride Potassium bromate; Propyl gallate; Propylparaben;Sodium benzoate; Sodium nitrate;

If signed by the governor, ban in foods effective on 1/15/2027 and in drugs on 1/18/2028
Warnings would also be required for the enumerated ingredients. 

Oregon

Prohibits from foods in schools:Red dye number 3Potassium bromatePropylparaben
Also limits fats, sugars, calories and caffeine in some snacks and drinks available for students

If passed, effective 7/1/2017

Rhode Island
Prohibits from foods in schools:Blue dye number 1 Blue dye number 2Green dye number 3Red dye number 40Yellow dye number 5Yellow dye number 6
If passed, effective 1/1/2027

Texas

Prohibits in foods in schools:Blue dye number 1Blue dye number 2 Green dye number 3Red dye number 40Yellow dye number 5Yellow dye number 6 And any additive that is substantially similar to any of the above
Also prohibits in foods in schools:Red dye number 3 Red dye number 40 Yellow dye number 5 Yellow dye number 6 Blue dye number 1 Blue dye number 2 Green dye number 3 caramel
Prohibits from food in schools and foods available through supplemental nutrition programs:Red dye number 3 Red dye number 40 Yellow dye number 5 Yellow dye number 6 Blue dye number 1 Blue dye number 2 Green dye number 3 Citrus red dye number 2 Orange B dye
Prohibits in foods:aspartameartificial flavoringpropylparabenazodicarbonamide (ADAbutylated hydroxyanisole (BHA) Butylated hydroxytoluene (BHT)color additivedimethylpolysiloxane (PDMS)monosodium glutamate (MSG)Tert-butylhydroquinone (TBHQ)Partially hydrogenated oilsSodium benzoateSodium nitrateSodium nitritemethylparaben
Prohibits is foods available under SNAP programs:brominated vegetable oil (BVO)potassium bromate propylparabenazodicarbonamideButylated hydroxyanisole (BHA)Red dye number 3Titanium dioxide.
Prohibits from foods in schools:brominated vegetable oil (BVOpotassium bromatepropylparabenazodicarbonamidebutylated hydroxyanisole (BHAtitanium dioxidered dye 3 blue 1 blue 2 green 3 red 40 yellow 5 yellow 6

Effective immediately upon passage if it receives a 2/3 vote. If passed with less than a 2/3 vote, effective 9/1/2025
Effective immediately upon passage if it receives a 2/3 vote. If passed with less than a 2/3 vote, effective 9/1/2025
If passed, effective 9/1/2025
Effective immediately upon passage if it receives a 2/3 vote. If passed with less than a 2/3 vote, effective 9/1/2025
Effective immediately upon passage if it receives a 2/3 vote. If passed with less than a 2/3 vote, effective 9/1/2025

Utah
Prohibits from foods in public schools:Potassium bromate;Propylparaben;Blue dye number 1Blue dye number 2Green dye number 3Red dye number 3Red dye number 40Yellow dye number 5 Yellow dye number 6
If passed, effective 5/7/2025

Vermont
Prohibits in foods:brominated vegetable oil potassium bromate propylparaben red dye no. 3
If passed, effective 1/1/2027

Virginia
Prohibited in food available in public and secondary schoolsBlue dye number 1Blue dye number 2 Green dye number 3Red dye number 3 Red dye number 40 Yellow dye number 5 Yellow dye number 6 
Signed by the governor on 3/27/2025 with an effective date of 7/1/2027

West Virginia
Banned from foods:butylated hydroxyanisole propylparabenBlue dye number 1Blue dye number 37 Green dye number 3Red dye number 3Red dye number 40 Yellow dye number 5Yellow dye number 6
Approved by the governor on 3/24/2025:Effective 1/1/2028.Dyes prohibited in school foods effective 8/1/2025

Stay tuned for more regulatory changes. With nationwide distribution common among food manufacturers, an ingredient ban in one state can effectively function as a nationwide ban. Plus, with the new administration in Washington, D.C., it is anticipated that the FDA will impose additional regulations on food ingredients. Bottom line, regulations at the state and federal levels may lead manufacturers to reformulate or discontinue some foods.

Will the Shift from Renewable Energy to Oil and Gas Result in Cheaper Energy Prices?

There is clearly a shift in the Trump Administration’s energy policy from renewable energy to foster and sustain more fossil fuel energy. This shift is being promoted by the auctioning of government oil and gas leases.
Public Land Leases
The Interior Department announced in late March that in the first 3 months of 2025, the federal government brought in nearly $40 million in revenue from oil and gas lease sales on public land.
The leases have a one-decade lifespan and as long thereafter as they produce oil and gas in paying quantities.
The U.S. will hold an oil and gas lease sale in the Gulf of Mexico, as planned by the Biden administration. A proposed notice for the auction will be published in June. The Biden administration had planned for 3 Gulf leases (permitting production and drilling rights), a historically low number that angered the oil and gas industry and drilling states.
The Energy Shift
It is likely that the Trump Administration will expand the number of leases from the 3 proposed by the Biden Administration. Doug Burgum, who heads Trump’s energy council, said that “unleashing U.S. energy will lower gasoline and grocery store prices while boosting national security.” Consistent with the shift in energy policy, the Trump administration removed the U.S. from the Paris Agreement on climate change and aims to slash regulations on planet warming emissions from oil, gas, and coal operations.
Different Outcome?
Will this energy policy shift result in cheaper energy prices for the consumer? Some speculate that many oil companies operating in the Gulf of Mexico will likely continue to do what they’ve done for years, which is sit on hundreds of untapped oil leases on millions of acres. The market is saturated with oil, making energy companies reluctant to spend more money drilling because the added product will likely push prices down, cutting into profits. As stated by Exxon Mobil CEO Darren Woods in the previously cited LA Illuminator article, “So, I don’t know that there’s an opportunity to unleash a lot of production in the near term, because most operators in the U.S. are [already] optimizing their productions today.”
Leases have been sold too quickly and cheaply in recent decades, according to a 2021 report by the U.S. Department of the Interior, which oversees BOEM. This fast and loose approach “shortchanges taxpayers” and encourages speculators to purchase leases with the intent of waiting for increases in resource prices, adding assets to their balance sheets, or even reselling leases as profit rather than attempting to produce oil or gas.
Others argue that if you want to slash energy prices, then renewable energy is the way to go, but we are shipping overseas. Shipping LNG overseas contributes to higher electricity and natural gas prices in the U.S., according to a recent U.S. Department of Energy report.
Only time will tell what the future holds for energy prices. Hopefully we will not have a Horizon Deepwater disaster in the meantime.

Comments on Minnesota’s Proposed Rule for Reporting Products Containing Intentionally Added PFAS Are Due May 21, 2025

With the January 1, 2026, reporting deadline fast approaching for reporting on products containing intentionally added per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), on April 21, 2025, the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) published a proposed rule intended to clarify the reporting requirements, specify how and what to report, and establish fees. Written comments on the proposed rule are due May 21, 2025, at 4:30 p.m. (CDT). On May 22, 2025, at 2:00 p.m. (CDT), MPCA will hold a public hearing during which it will accept oral comments on the proposed rule. The hearing will end at 5:00 p.m. (CDT), but additional days of hearings may be scheduled if necessary. The procedural rulemaking documents available include:

Proposed Permanent Rules Relating to PFAS in Products; Reporting and Fees (c-pfas-rule1-06) (proposed rule);
Statement of Need and Reasonableness for PFAS in products reporting and fees rulemaking (c-pfas-rule1-07) (SONAR); and
Notice of intent to adopt rules with a hearing (c-pfas-rule1-05).

Definitions
The proposed rule includes definitions not included in Minnesota’s statute, including:

Component: A distinct and identifiable element or constituent of a product. Component includes packaging only when the packaging is inseparable or integral to the final product’s containment, dispensing, or preservation.
Distribute for sale: To ship or otherwise transport a product with the intent or understanding that the product will be sold or offered for sale by a receiving party after the product is delivered.
Function: The explicit purpose or role served by PFAS when intentionally incorporated at any stage in the process of preparing a product or its constituent components for sale, offer for sale, or distribution for sale.
Homogenous material: One material of uniform composition throughout or a material, consisting of a combination of materials, that cannot be disjointed or separated into different materials by mechanical actions.
Packaging: The meaning given under Minnesota Statutes, Section 115A.03 — “‘Packaging’ means a container and any appurtenant material that provide a means of transporting, marketing, protecting, or handling a product. ‘Packaging’ includes pallets and packing such as blocking, bracing, cushioning, weatherproofing, strapping, coatings, closures, inks, dyes, pigments, and labels.”
Significant change: A change in the composition of a product that results in the addition of a specific PFAS not previously reported in a product or component or a measurable change in the amount of a specific PFAS from the initial amount reported that would move the product into a different concentration range.
Substantially equivalent information: Information that the MPCA commissioner can identify as conveying the same information required under Part 7026.0030 and Minnesota Statutes, Section 116.943, Subdivision 2. Substantially equivalent information includes an existing notification by a person who manufactures a product or component when the same product or component is offered for sale under multiple brands.

For some definitions, the proposed rule expands on definitions that are included in the statute. The statute defines manufacturer, but MPCA proposes additional language to clarify the definition (new language is italicized):

Manufacturer: The person that creates or produces a product, that has a product created or produced, or whose brand name is legally affixed to the product. In the case of a product that is imported into the United States when the person that created or produced the product or whose brand name is affixed to the product does not have a presence in the United States, manufacturer means either the importer or the first domestic distributor of the product, whichever is first to sell, offer for sale, or distribute for sale the product in the state.

According to the SONAR, MPCA inserted the phrase “has a product created or produced” to clarify the parties responsible for reporting. MPCA states that “[s]imilarly, the definition encompasses parties that either import or are the first domestic distributor of the product, whichever is first to sell, offer for sale, or distribute the product for sale in the state.” MPCA intends the revisions to clarify that companies that do not manufacture their own products are subject to the reporting and fee requirements.
Parties Responsible for Reporting
Under the proposed rule, a manufacturer or a group of manufacturers must submit a report for each product or component that contains intentionally added PFAS. Manufacturers in the same supply chain may enter into an agreement to establish their reporting responsibilities. The proposed rule allows a manufacturer to submit information on behalf of another manufacturer if the following requirements are met:

The reporting manufacturer must notify any other manufacturer that is a party to the agreement that the reporting manufacturer has fulfilled the reporting requirements;
All manufacturers must maintain documentation of a reporting responsibility agreement and must provide the documentation to MPCA upon request;
All manufacturers must verify that the data submitted on their behalf are accurate and complete; and
For the verification to be considered complete, all manufacturers must submit the required fee, as applicable.

MPCA states in the SONAR that “[i]t is reasonable to allow a manufacturer to submit the reporting requirements for another manufacturer because of the large overlap in common components used throughout the manufacturing of complex products.” According to MPCA, it will provide detailed guidance on how reporting entities can submit on behalf of multiple manufacturers in the reporting system instructions or in supplemental guidance.
Information Required
Under the statute, the following information must be reported:
(1) A brief description of the product, including a universal product code (UPC), stock keeping unit (SKU), or other numeric code assigned to the product;
(2) The purpose for which PFAS are used in the product, including in any product components;
(3) The amount of each PFAS, identified by its Chemical Abstracts Service Registry Number® (CAS RN®), in the product, reported as an exact quantity determined using commercially available analytical methods or as falling within a range approved for reporting purposes;
(4) The name and address of the manufacturer and the name, address, and phone number of a contact person for the manufacturer; and
(5) Any additional information requested by the commissioner as necessary to implement the requirements of this section.
Rather than requiring information regarding the purpose for which PFAS are used in the product, the proposed rule would require that manufacturers provide “the function that each PFAS chemical provides to the product or its components.” Under the proposed rule’s definition of function (“the explicit purpose or role served by PFAS when intentionally incorporated at any stage in the process of preparing a product or its constituent components for sale, offer for sale, or distribution for sale”), manufacturers would be required to report not only any PFAS intentionally added to the product, but PFAS used during the manufacturing process even if the PFAS are not present in the final product.
A manufacturer would be allowed to group similar products compromised of homogenous materials if the following criteria are met:

The PFAS chemical composition is the same;
The PFAS chemicals fall into the same reporting concentration ranges;
The PFAS chemicals provide the same function; and
The products have the same basic form and function and only differ in size, color, or other superficial qualities that do not impact the composition of the intentionally added PFAS.

If the product consists of multiple PFAS-containing components, the manufacturer would be required to report each component under the product name provided in the brief description of the product. Similar components listed within a product could be grouped together if the components meet the criteria listed above.
The proposed rule will allow manufacturers to report the concentration of PFAS using the following ranges:

Practical detection limit to less than (

Missouri Enacts Significant Utility/Regulatory Omnibus Bill

On April 9, 2025, Missouri Governor Mike Kehoe signed into law a comprehensive Utility Omnibus Bill – Senate Bill 4 (SB 4 or the Bill). Among other things, the Bill significantly changes the regulated electric utility landscape. SB 4 establishes a statutory integrated resource planning framework, requires electrical corporations to add schedules governing large load customers to their tariffs, authorizes recovery of construction work in progress for the development of new natural gas generation facilities and establishes new standards for decommissioning large thermal generation assets.
Integrated Resource Planning
The last section of SB 4 modifies the integrated resource planning (IRP) process under what will become Section 393.1900 RSMo. The Bill makes filing an IRP a statutory requirement, rather than the current IRP process, which is codified by regulations administered by the Missouri Public Service Commission (MPSC). Under the current regulations, utilities file a new IRP every three years with an informational-only “Preferred Plan.” Every year between the triennial filings, utilities provide annual updates. The MPSC does not “approve” the Preferred Plan, and the utility can deviate from the Preferred Plan as long as it provides notice within 60 days of the utility’s determination of the need to deviate. Under the current regulations, adherence to the Preferred Plan does not meaningfully streamline the utility’s need to file for a certificate of convenience and necessity (CCN) prior to beginning construction on a new generation facility.
By contrast, under SB 4, utilities will file its IRP every four years, and CCN approvals will be streamlined if the utility can show consistency with their Preferred Plan. After holding a public hearing, the MPSC is specifically required to determine if the Preferred Plan “represents a reasonable and prudent means of meeting the electrical corporation’s load serving obligations at just and reasonable rates.” If such a finding is made, it “shall constitute the commission’s permission for the electrical corporation to construct or acquire the specified supply-side resources.” Before issuing a CCN, the MPSC will still assess the utility’s qualifications to construct and operate the resources, their ability to finance construction or acquisition of the resources, and siting consideration. The CCN process will be vastly expedited, requiring Commission action in 120-180 days. The IRP requirements of SB 4 begin in August 2027. The MPSC is directed to promulgate rules to implement the new IRP requirements, and such rules will need to be in place prior to August 2027.
Large Load Tariff Schedules
SB 4 requires electric utilities to submit schedules that govern large load customers to the MPSC for inclusion in the utility’s service tariffs. This provision will be codified at Section 393.130(7) RSMo. Utilities with over 250,000 customers must submit schedules for customers who are reasonably projected to exceed 100 megawatts (MW) of annual peak demand. Utilities with fewer than 250,000 customers must submit schedules for customers reasonably projected to exceed 50 MW of annual peak demand. The schedules should be designed to reflect these customers’ representative share of the costs incurred to serve them, to prevent other customer classes’ rates from reflecting any unjust or unreasonable costs arising from service to such customers.
Recovery of Construction Work in Progress for New Natural Gas Generation Facilities
While Missouri law has prohibited electric utilities from charging customers for the costs of construction of new facilities prior to their becoming operational, SB 4 allows electric utilities to recover construction work in progress (CWIP) in its rate base for new natural gas generation units. This provision is codified in new Section393.135(2) RSMo. The amount of CWIP that a utility may recover is limited by the estimated cost of the project and project expenditures made during the estimated construction period for the project. Any recovery of CWIP is subject to refund with interest if the MPSC determines that construction costs were imprudently incurred or if the project is not placed in service within a reasonable amount of time.
Furthermore, the CWIP recovery provision replaces other allowances for recovery of funds used during construction that may have otherwise been recoverable in the rate base for an electric utility. The rate base used to determine a deferred return under Section 393.1400.3(2) RSMo. will now include an offset for the amount of CWIP included in the rate base under Section 393.135.2.
The CWIP recovery provision will sunset in 2035 unless, in a hearing conducted in 2035, the MPSC chooses to extend the provision through 2045 based upon a submission from an electric utility demonstrating good cause for such an extension.
Decommissioning & Replacement of Generation Facilities
SB 4 prescribes a new practice for decommissioning and replacing thermal generation assets. This will be codified in Section 393.401 RSMo. Before closing an existing electric generating power plant on or after January 1, 2025, the electric utility must certify to the MPSC that it has secured and placed an equal or greater amount of reliable electric generation on the grid as accredited power resources based on the relevant regional transmission organization’s resource accreditation for the technology at issue and any loss of load expected by the utility. An “existing electric generating power plant” is defined as a thermal power plant (or generating unit/combination of generating units within a thermal power plant) with over 100 MW of nameplate capacity. Concurrent with the closure of the existing generation asset, the electric utility must have adequate electric transmission lines in place and the replacement reliable electric generation shall be fully operational, unless the new facility uses some or all of the interconnection facilities of the existing asset or the existing asset is closed due to an “unexpected or unplanned event.”
Under SB 4, “dispatchable power resources” shall comprise at least 80 percent of the average of the summer and winter accredited capacity of the replacement reliable electric generation. Section 393.401.2 RSMo. Furthermore, if “existing electric generating power plant” capacity is replaced pursuant to Section 393.401, its capacity shall not be replaced by “replacement resources” as defined in Section 393.1705 RSMo., which includes wind and solar energy. It is unclear from the statute to what extent, if any, renewable energy resources may comprise up to 20 percent of the replacement reliable electric generation.
Renewable Portfolio Standards
SB 4 amended Missouri’s Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) statute: Section 393.1030 RSMo. Renewable energy generated by an electric utility with between 250,000 and 1,000,000 retail customers in Missouri and contracted for by an “accelerated renewable buyer” cannot have its renewable energy certificates (RECs) used to meet the utility’s RPS requirements, and the RECs shall be retired by the accelerated renewable buyer. Evergy is the only electric utility that will be affected by this provision. An “accelerated renewable buyer” is an electric utility customer with an aggregate load over 80 MW that contracts to obtain RECs — as defined in Section 393.1025 RSMo. — or energy and RECs from solar or wind generation located within the Southwest Power Pool and placed into service after January 1, 2020. SB 4 exempts “accelerated renewable buyers” from any RPS compliance costs established by utilities regulated by this section and approved by the MPSC associated with the amount of credits retired pursuant to new Section 393.1030.2.

Key Observations on the FAST-41 Transparency Projects Announced by the Permitting Council on April 18, 2025

On April 18, 2025, the Federal Permitting Improvement Steering Council (Permitting Council) identified ten critical mineral projects as FAST-41 Transparency Projects on the Federal Permitting Dashboard (the Projects). Inclusion on the Dashboard is intended to streamline approvals for qualifying projects by enhancing interagency coordination to facilitate a more efficient permitting process with increased transparency.
This announcement is one of the first concrete actions publicly announced under President Trump’s Immediate Measures to Increase American Mineral Production executive order issued on March 20, 2025 (the Mining Order). The Mining Order, among other things, directed the heads of several agencies to provide the National Energy Dominance Council (NEDC) a list of priority projects that could be expedited for approval and permitting. This list of the first Projects to be identified under this directive reflects a diverse selection of geographies, minerals, and development status.
A few key takeaways:

Geographic Diversity. The list identifies Projects in nine states: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho (with two projects), Michigan, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Utah. In addition, Project sponsors include both US companies and leading mining and mineral processing companies based outside the United States, including Canadian and Australian partners.
Broad Definition of “Critical Minerals.” Consistent with the approach in the Mining Order and subsequent actions, the list applies an expansive definition of “critical minerals,” including minerals previously included on the definition of “critical minerals” under 30 U.S.C. § 1606(a)(3), minerals added in the Mining Order, such as potash and gold, and coal, which was included as minerals through the Reinvigorating America’s Beautiful Clean Coal Industry and Amending Executive Order 14241. The descriptions of the ten Projects identify the following target minerals: antimony, copper, gold, lithium, lithium carbonate, metallurgical coal, molybdenum, phosphate, potash, and silver.
Project Status. Seven of the Projects are in the pre-production phase, with two of those in the exploration stage and four nearing final permitting stages; the remaining Projects include three expansions of existing Projects and one processing facility currently in the permitting stage. Several of the Projects aim to reactivate historical mines while incorporating beneficial reclamation that otherwise may not occur as part of the project.
Reviewing Agencies. The Permitting Dashboard identifies the lead agency for each of the FAST-41 Transparency Projects, with five Projects led by the Department of the Interior Bureau of Land Management (BLM), three led by the Department of Agriculture US Forest Service (USFS), and two led by the Department of Energy (DOE).
What Happens Next? The announcement indicates that additional projects are anticipated to be identified as FAST-41 Transparency Projects on a rolling basis. While inclusion on the FAST-41 list is expected and intended to accelerate the development and approvals for listed projects, the FAST-41 website notes that inclusion on the list does not guarantee favorable review or approval of permits, or eligibility for federal funding.

AI Updates: Committees on Capitol Hill Continue Debate on Future of Emerging Technologies

“And if you study the history of the world, the nations that are the most military and economically domineer [sic] are the nations that are the most innovative,” Sen. Jon Husted (R-OH) remarked at a recent congressional hearing. This sentiment is shared by many of his colleagues on both sides of the aisle on Capitol Hill who recognize the need for America to stay at the forefront of development and deployment of artificial intelligence (AI). Lawmakers continue to be caught in a debate between promoting innovation and allowing for the creation of new technologies domestically while also safeguarding the American people from the risks they pose. 
Last year, we saw action from both the Bipartisan House AI Task Force as well as the Senate AI Working Group releasing recommendations on next steps relating to AI (see here for our summary of the House’s report). Over the past few weeks, there has been renewed momentum in this new session of Congress, with numerous committees, covering a wide range of jurisdictions, holding hearings to discuss AI. The four hearings below range in jurisdiction and continue to show that AI touches nearly every industry:

Harnessing Artificial Intelligence Cyber Capabilities, Senate Armed Services Committee
America’s AI Moonshot: The Economics of AI, Data Centers, and Power Consumption, House Oversight Committee 
Converting Energy into Intelligence: the Future of AI Technology, Human Discovery, and American Global Competitiveness, House Energy and Commerce Committee 
Examining Trends in Innovation and Competition, House Judiciary Committee

Below we offer high level recaps for these hearings. Our team continues to track how Congress is grappling with AI and its impacts on numerous industries, with the expectation that we will continue to see a high level of interest from Capitol Hill and the Trump Administration on how to best regulate this critical technology.
Harnessing Artificial Intelligence Cyber Capabilities
On 25 March 2025, the Senate Armed Services Cybersecurity Subcommittee held a hearing titled Harnessing Artificial Intelligence Cyber Capabilities. Chaired by Sen. Mike Rounds (R-SD) and Ranking Member Senator Jacky Rosen (D-NV), the hearing gathered testimony from cyber-industry leaders and experts, focusing on the implications of integrating AI into the cyber defense and offense strategies of the Department of Defense (DOD). It also contemplated the role of human oversight in AI and the energy demands needed to support AI development. 
Witnesses warned that the pursuit of artificial general intelligence (AGI) could create international tensions akin to that of the nuclear arms race. They argued that DOD will not be exempt from these dynamics. Drawing on the statements of the experts and the Senators, the message was clear: innovate or face an existential threat. As National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) negotiations get underway for fiscal year (FY) 2026, these considerations are sure to be top of mind for many lawmakers as they have been in previous iterations of the bill. See here for our previous publication on AI in the FY 2025 NDAA. 
America’s AI Moonshot: The Economics of AI, Data Centers, and Power Consumption
On 1 April 2025, the House Oversight Committee’s Economic Growth, Energy Policy, and Regulatory Affairs Subcommittee held a hearing titled America’s AI Moonshot: The Economics of AI, Data Centers, and Power Consumption. Like their Senate counterparts on the Armed Services Cybersecurity Subcommittee, the members of the House Oversight Committee warned of the consequences of falling behind in the AI arms race to foreign adversaries. There was not a clear consensus amongst the members, however, on how to meet the energy demand required by data centers used for AI. Natural gas, wind, solar, coal, and nuclear power were all floated as possible sources for energy. The members debated the tradeoffs between environmental impacts and sufficiency of the sources, especially as this relates to local communities where the data centers are or would be located. 
Converting Energy Into Intelligence: The Future of AI Technology, Human Discovery, and American Global Competitiveness
On 9 April 2025, the House Energy and Commerce Committee held a hearing title Converting Energy into Intelligence: The Future of AI Technology, Human Discovery, and American Global Competitiveness, at which members echoed many of the points made during the House Oversight Committee’s hearing, especially in the debate of whether to use renewable or non-renewable energy sources. This, along with efforts from members like Rep. Julie Fedorchak (R-ND), who has started a new AI and Energy Working Group, shows the continued focus on how the US will power AI going forward. Rep. Fedorchak released a request for information in March and is working with stakeholders to develop a legislative framework for powering the future of AI.
Examining Trends in Innovation and Competition
On 2 April 2025, the House Judiciary Subcommittee on the Administrative State, Regulatory Reform, and Antitrust held a hearing titled Examining Trends in Innovation and Competition. This hearing approached AI from a slightly different angle. The Subcommittee narrowed its discussion primarily to what a regulatory framework should look like. During the hearing, there was concern from witnesses that an overreaching framework could have a chilling effect on innovation. Witnesses alluded to the European model, and the GDPR and Digital Markets Act (DMA) in particular. Subcommittee Chair Scott Fitzgerald (R-WI) advocated instead for a framework more reflective of the method that the US has traditionally followed, saying “we need to stay true to what works, and that is free enterprise, open competition and light-touch regulatory approach that allows innovation to flourish.”
Momentum Continues in 2025 
Although these hearings do not represent formal legislative momentum on AI, the bipartisan interest in AI is clear. With the expectation that Congress will continue to address AI writ large with a focus on energy and defense, we are expecting continued movement and robust policy efforts throughout the rest of 2025. This is a critical time for stakeholders to engage in this area, and our team is ready and available to assist.

Webinar Recording: The EU Omnibus Proposals on Sustainability and Simplification – What It Means for Your Reporting and Compliance Strategy [Video]

In April, we hosted a webinar featuring Thomas Delille, Marion Seranne, Begonia Filgueira, and Dr. Nora Thies to discuss the European Commission’s EU Omnibus Proposals, released in February 2025. These proposals could significantly reshape the EU regulatory landscape on sustainability reporting and corporate due diligence, with direct implications for frameworks like Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD), EU Taxonomy and Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM).
Our expert panel covered the latest developments, member state positions, emerging legal risks, and the commercial impact of ESG reforms. With many businesses now facing an uncertain legislative timeline, the discussion focused on how to adapt compliance strategies and reporting plans to this evolving environment.
Watch the full recording below for key insights into how these proposals could affect your ESG obligations and what you can do to stay ahead.