Canada Pauses Mandatory Climate Disclosure Rules
Recently, the Canadian Securities Administrators (the umbrella organization of Canada’s provincial securities regulators) announced that it would pause the development of certain sustainability reporting initiatives, including a proposed mandatory climate-related disclosure rule.
This development is emblematic of an overall retreat from mandatory climate disclosures and similar rules that has occurred over the past several months, stemming in large part from recent political developments in the United States, which have discouraged a climate focus in the financial context. As further evidence of this trend, the EU has begun to retreat from its sustainability reporting through the “Omnibus” process, which is delaying and reducing the scope of CSRD disclosures, and, in perhaps the paradigmatic example, the SEC has abandoned entirely the mandatory climate disclosure rule that it had promulgated under the Biden Administration.
Nonetheless, this trend should not be overstated. Certain key regulators from economically-important jurisdictions–including the State of California–are proceeding vigorously in promulgating mandatory climate disclosure rules and similar regulations. And the “pause” recently announced by the Canadian regulators is not an abandonment of this area of regulation, as this process could easily restart when circumstances change.
Canada’s securities regulators announced that they are pausing their work on the development on key sustainability reporting initiatives, including a new mandatory climate-related disclosure rule and amendments to diversity-related disclosure requirements. According to the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA), the umbrella organization of Canada’s provincial and territorial securities regulators, the move to pause the development of new sustainability reporting requirements is being made “to support Canadian markets and issuers as they adapt to the recent developments in the U.S. and globally.” The announcement follows a series significant changes in the sustainability reporting landscape in major markets, with the EU in the midst of its “Omnibus” process to delay, reduce the scope and simplify disclosure requirements under its CSRD legislation, and the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission in the process of entirely abandoning its climate-related reporting rules.
www.esgtoday.com/…
Project Opponents of Empire Wind Strike Back
As recently reported, on May 19, 2025, the U.S. Department of the Interior reversed the stop work order it issued on April 16, 2025, thereby allowing the $5 billion, 2 GW, Empire Wind project to proceed. On June 3, 2025, a coalition of Empire Wind opponents sued the Trump administration in federal court in New Jersey, claiming the reversal of the stop work order was unjustified. The plaintiffs assert that the bases for the original stop work order were clearly articulated in the administration’s January 20, 2025, executive order, which halted all offshore wind development pending an investigation and review of all related federal permits by the Secretary of the Interior. The plaintiffs claim that the May 19 reinstatement order, allowing Empire Wind to proceed, was issued without explanation or factual basis, in contravention of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). Specifically, they allege that the reinstatement order makes no reference to the results of the “investigation” required by the original stop work order.
In light of the administration’s sudden reversal of a stated policy position, it comes as no surprise that proponents of the original policy are aggrieved. When the reversal comes with no justification or reasoned basis, as plaintiffs allege, the court will need to decide whether it runs afoul of procedures mandated by the APA.
PHMSA Requests Comments on Repealing or Amending Pipeline Safety Regulations and Hazardous Materials Regulations to Eliminate Undue Burdens and Improve Government Efficiency
On June 4, 2025, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) issued two Advance Notices of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) requesting comments whether to repeal or eliminate requirements in the federal pipeline safety regulations (PSR) and the federal hazardous materials transportation regulations (HMR) in order “to eliminate undue burdens on the identification, development, and use of domestic energy resources and to improve government efficiency.” The ANPRMs also request feedback on whether any related guidance documents, letters of interpretation, or materials implementing these regulations should be amended or eliminated. In addition, with respect to the HMR, PHMSA requests input on whether any widely-used hazardous materials special permits with established safety records should be converted into deregulatory provisions so that they have broader applicability.
Comments on both ANPRMs are due August 4, 2025.
The ANPRMs do not propose to amend any existing regulations. The purpose of the ANPRMs is to gather information from stakeholders to inform future notices of proposed rulemakings that will request comment on specific proposed regulatory changes. After receiving comments PHMSA has indicated that it may convene public meetings to supplement or clarify comments and materials received.
The ANPRMs are important because they reflect PHMSA’s ongoing initiative to comprehensively review current pipeline safety regulations and the regulations governing the safe transportation of hazardous materials to ensure that they are cost effective while achieving their safety and environmental objectives. Other related initiatives include PHMSA’s ANPRM seeking comments on repair criteria for gas transmission, hazardous liquid and carbon dioxide pipelines and PHMSA’s ANPRM requesting input on opportunities to amend existing safety regulations governing liquefied natural gas facilities. The ANPRMs provide industry stakeholders a valuable opportunity to inform the regulatory process and influence regulatory amendments that PHMSA is expected to propose in the coming months.
Background The ANPRMs explain that PHMSA has an obligation to ensure that the burdens imposed on stakeholders by the PSR and HMR are necessary to serve the public interest. PHMSA states that, while it has conducted numerous regulatory reviews over the years and that the costs of many, if not most, of the PSR and HMR are justified by their benefits, additional improvements can be made to reduce regulatory burdens and costs. The ANPRMs note that many provisions of the PSR and HMR have been in place for decades without undergoing a comprehensive cost-benefit review. The Pipeline Safety Act did not require cost-benefit analyses for new regulations until 1996, and the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act does not contain the requirement. In addition, federal courts have questioned the rigor of PHMSA’s cost-benefit analyses to support some provisions in recent pipeline safety regulations and the cost-benefit analyses for proposed amendments to the HMR have been questioned by stakeholders and by Congress.
PHMSA also explains that the ANPRMs respond to multiple Executive Orders issued by President Trump requiring that agency heads alleviate unnecessary regulatory compliance burdens and promote the integrity and expansion of U.S. energy infrastructure.
PHMSA is requesting input on whether to repeal or eliminate requirements in the federal PSR (49 C.F.R. Parts 190 – 199), as well as in any related guidance, letters of interpretation, and materials implementing regulatory requirements to achieve the objectives of recent Executive Orders. PHMSA also seeks comments on whether the PSR should contain provisions mandating periodic regulatory reviews.
To inform PHMSA’s initiative to ensure that the benefits of the PSR outweigh their burdens and costs, the PSR ANPRM requests feedback on the following “key topics:”
Identification of regulatory provisions of the pipeline safety regulations, including any implementing guidance, such as letters of interpretation, “that could impose an undue burden on identification, development, and use of domestic energy resources, or that are examples of government inefficiency insofar as they impose outsized compliance burdens for comparatively small safety benefits or limit technological innovation;”
“The nature and magnitude of those burdens, including identification of the regulated entities – i.e., the specific categories of gas and hazardous liquid pipeline facilities – burdened, as well as the compliance costs and implementation challenges experienced by those entities;”
Potential amendments to, or rescission of, those regulatory provisions;
“The incremental compliance costs and benefits (including benefits pertaining to avoided compliance costs, safety harms, and environmental harms) anticipated from those amendments;” and
“The technical feasibility, reasonableness, cost-effectiveness, and practicability of those potential amendments.”
In addition, the PSR ANPRM poses 18 questions focused on procedural regulations and actions and specific pipeline safety regulations, including requirements pertaining to reporting and notification; consensus industry standards; material, design, testing, construction, or corrosion control; operating and maintenance; personnel qualification and training; integrity management; siting of LNG facilities; and drug and alcohol testing.
With respect to incremental cost and benefit information, PHMSA requests “per-unit, aggregate, and programmatic (both one-time implementing and recurring) data.” PHMSA also requests that stakeholders explain the bases or methodologies used in generating both cost and benefit data, including data sources and calculations so that PHMSA can explain its support for any estimates it provides with a proposed rule and so that other commentors may address the validity and accuracy of such data.
ANPRM on Hazardous Materials Program Procedures and Hazardous Materials Regulations the HMR ANPRM poses a total of 34 specific questions related to procedural regulations and actions, hazardous materials program procedures (49 C.F.R. Part 107), and the HMR (49 C.F.R. Parts 171-180). The HMR ANPRM also requests stakeholder feedback on the following “key points:”
Identification of specific regulatory provision in the HMR, along with implementing guidance or interpretations, that may impose an undue burden on identification, development, and use of domestic energy resources. The ANPRM seeks “examples of government inefficiency, where compliance requirements impose significant burdens relative to minimal safety benefits or hinder technological innovation;”
“The nature and magnitude of these burdens, including the specific categories and number of regulated entities affected, as well as the compliance costs and implementation challenges experienced by those entities;”
“Suggestions for potential amendments (including any rescissions) to those regulatory provisions;”
“An assessment of the increased compliance costs and benefits (including benefits pertaining to avoided compliance costs, safety harms, and environmental harm anticipated from those amendments;”
“The safety consequences of any proposed amendments.”
With respect to incremental cost and benefit information, PHMSA requests “per-unit, aggregate, and programmatic (both one-time implementing and recurring) data.” PHMSA also requests that stakeholders explain the bases or methodologies used in generating both cost and benefit data, including data sources and calculations so that PHMSA can explain its support for any estimates it provides with a proposed rule and so that other commentors may address the validity and accuracy of such data.
Nuclear’s Comeback: What Renewables Professionals Should Know
The clean energy transition isn’t a zero-sum game – it’s a team effort. And one player is stepping back into the spotlight with renewed strength: nuclear energy. With the President’s signing of four new Executive Orders on May 23, 2025, nuclear is poised to play a major role in a future defined by clean, reliable power. From next-generation technologies to small modular reactors (SMRs) that promise flexibility and innovation, nuclear is no longer just a legacy option – it’s shaping up to be one of the most exciting frontiers in clean energy. Now’s the time to pay attention – and maybe even get curious.
The four executive orders signed last week are aimed at rapidly expanding the U.S. nuclear energy industry, including reforms to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to accelerate reactor licensing and reduce bureaucratic barriers. These orders set ambitious goals such as tripling nuclear capacity to 400 gigawatts by 2050, completing ten new large reactor designs by 2030, and achieving operational status for three experimental reactors by July 4, 2026. The directives also focus on strengthening the domestic nuclear fuel supply chain, reviving reprocessing capabilities, and expanding the nuclear workforce. Additionally, the orders promote deployment of advanced nuclear reactors for national security, including powering AI infrastructure and military bases, while positioning U.S. nuclear technology for global export leadership.
The four executive orders include “Reinvigorating the Nuclear Industrial Base,” “Reforming Nuclear Reactor Testing at the Department of Energy,” “Ordering the Reform of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,” and “Deploying Advanced Nuclear Reactor Technologies for National Security.”
What is Nuclear Energy?
There are two types of nuclear energy – fission and fusion. Nuclear fission is the process of splitting heavy atoms like uranium to release energy, which is how today’s nuclear power plants – including both large reactors and SMRs – generate electricity. Large plants produce massive amounts of power but require complex infrastructure and many years to build, while SMRs are smaller, factory-built, and designed for faster, safer, and more flexible deployment, with several U.S. projects aiming to break ground before 2030. Nuclear fusion, by contrast, tries to replicate the energy of the sun by fusing lighter atoms (like hydrogen) together, but it’s still in the experimental stages – despite recent exciting breakthroughs, we are likely decades away from building fusion power plants at commercial scale (unless quantum computing accelerates that). In short, fission is here now and evolving, while fusion remains a promising but long-term goal.
What are the IRA Nuclear Incentives and how does the “One Big Beautiful Bill” Support Nuclear Energy?
The Inflation Reduction Act introduced new nuclear incentives:
Section 45U (Zero Emission Nuclear Power PTC) – a production tax credit to incentivize the continued operation of existing nuclear power plants, which offers up to $15/MWh for electricity produced and sold from 2024 to 2032, provided prevailing wage requirements are met. However, this tax credit applies only to facilities that were in service before passage of the IRA.
Section 45Y (Clean Electricity PTC) – includes a production tax credit for new nuclear power plants placed in service after December 31, 2024, which offers $0.003/kWh and can increase to $0.015/kWh if prevailing wage and apprenticeship requirements are met. These statutory amounts are subject to annual inflationary adjustments; additional bonuses are available if the facility is located in an energy community or meets domestic content requirements.
Section 48E (Clean Electricity ITC) – includes provisions allowing nuclear facilities to qualify for a 6% investment tax credit, which can increase to 30% if prevailing wage and apprenticeship requirements are satisfied. Additional increases are available if the facility is situated in an energy community or meets domestic content criteria.
HALEU Funding – the IRA allocated $700 million to the Department of Energy (DOE) to develop a domestic supply chain for high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU), a specialized fuel. This funding supports research, development and safety initiatives, aiming to reduce reliance on foreign sources and ensure a stable supply for future nuclear technologies.
The “One Big, Beautiful Bill” that recently passed by the House and is under Senate review, bolsters the nuclear energy sector by improving regulatory processes, providing financial incentives, supporting technological advancements, and ensuring long-term liability protections. Although the House bill scales back availability of the 45Y and 48E tax credits for all types of technology, nuclear facilities were treated far better than other types of facilities—qualifying nuclear facilities would remain eligible for those credits as long as construction begins by December 31, 2028. As the bill progresses to the Senate, its potential impact on the U.S. nuclear energy landscape will depend on further legislative negotiations and approvals.
Why Should Renewables Professionals be Thinking about Nuclear?
According to the DOE, nuclear accounted for nearly 50% of the carbon-free electricity generated in the U.S. in 2023. Over the next decade, due to new policies and innovative technology, renewables and nuclear will increasingly compete in the same marketplaces – especially for power purchase agreements, in clean hydrogen hubs, and for credit transfer deals. Several traditional tax equity investors are watching SMRs, which may qualify for the ITC and bonus credits that are very familiar to them. Investors looking to purchase transferable tax credits from zero-carbon sources may soon see nuclear as a credit supplier – or even a financing partner on hybrid projects. You may develop a hybrid facility that combines SMRs with renewables to balance reliability and cost. Even if you never work on a nuclear project, you may share a substation with one, compete for transmission capacity, or trade hydrogen with facilities powered by SMRs. As green capital markets grow more inclusive, developers and financiers with cross-technology fluency will be better positioned to innovate and negotiate.
Is Nuclear Technology Safe?
Safety has long been a major concern with nuclear energy due to high-profile accidents that raised fears about radiation, reactor failure, and long-term waste. However, newer nuclear technologies – especially SMRs and advanced reactors – are designed with passive safety systems that automatically shut down without human intervention or external power. They often use safer coolants, operate at lower pressures, and are built underground or in containment structures that reduce risk in extreme events. Additionally, modern regulatory frameworks and real-time monitoring technology greatly enhance safety oversight compared to past decades. Further, the low-enriched uranium that is used is not suitable for making weapons.
What do the Four New Executive Orders Require?
The orders direct government agencies to aggressively “usher in a nuclear energy renaissance” through reforms to the NRC, involving (i) streamlining its licensing process to incorporate fixed deadlines for review of applications, (ii) undertaking a “review and wholesale revision” of its guidance and regulations with final rules and guidance to be issued within 18 months, (iii) reconsidering the linear no-threshold model for radiation exposure (currently that there is no safe threshold of radiation exposure), (iv) expediting the NRC’s review of reactor designs tested by the Department of Defense (DOD) or DOE, and (iv) reorganizing the NRC to focus on the “expeditious processing of licensing applications and adoption of innovative technology.”
Fueling America’s Nuclear Renaissance: How Trump’s Executive Orders Create Strategic Opportunities for the Nuclear Fuel Industry
Key Points
Federal Land Access and Permitting Advantages: The Executive Orders’ directives to facilitate the construction of advanced reactors and privately funded nuclear fuel facilities at Department of Energy and Department of Defense sites create a novel legal pathway that may expedite or bypass many traditional siting and permitting challenges. This represents a strategic competitive advantage for companies that can quickly navigate federal property use agreements as these sites offer pre-existing security infrastructure and potentially expedited environmental reviews under federal jurisdiction rather than more complex state processes.
Defense Production Act Contracting Framework: The Orders’ explicit authorization of Defense Production Act voluntary agreements creates a specialized legal framework for nuclear fuel procurement and fuel supply chain development. The Orders also permit the DOE to play an active role in assuring a demand for nuclear fuel supply chain services and products through appropriate contracts and guarantees with private sector consortia. Companies should develop compliance strategies for this unique contracting environment.
Regulatory Transformation and New Market Entry Opportunities: The Executive Orders signal a significant policy shift by directing the revival of commercial spent fuel reprocessing in the U.S., abandoned since the 1970s. If this initiative moves forward, nuclear fuel companies should prepare for substantial regulatory actions affecting licensing, waste management, and security requirements, while positioning themselves to enter this potentially lucrative market.
Introduction
On May 23, 2025, President Donald Trump issued four Executive Orders – Reinvigorating the Nuclear Industrial Base, Deploying Advanced Nuclear Reactor Technologies for National Security, Reforming Nuclear Reactor Testing at the Department of Energy, and Ordering the Reform of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission – that, collectively, are intended to “usher in a nuclear energy renaissance.”
The Executive Orders articulate the Administration’s support for the nuclear power industry and seek to leverage the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of Defense (DOD) to accelerate the deployment of advanced nuclear reactors and the development of the nuclear supply chain. Given the ambitious and in some respects novel plans outlined in the Executive Orders, it remains to be seen whether the stated goals, including the expansion of U.S. nuclear energy capacity from 100 GW in 2024 to 400 GW in 2050, can be achieved and within the timeframes specified.
These directives mark a significant shift in U.S. policy, particularly for the nuclear fuel sector. Consistent with recent bipartisan support for nuclear expansion, these orders break new ground by having the federal government play an active role in enabling the development of the nuclear fuel supply chain and creating a demand for its products.
Furthermore, the orders explicitly encourage commercial nuclear fuel recycling—a major departure from decades of U.S. policy. The directives call for identifying uranium and plutonium inventories that could be recycled into reactor fuel and prioritize establishing a secure domestic High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium (HALEU) supply chain critical for advanced reactors. Combined with provisions for power uprates at existing plants, the construction of numerous new commercial reactors, and expedited reactor deployment at the DOE and military installations, these policies create substantial new market opportunities for American nuclear fuel companies. However, the industry’s ability to capitalize on this renaissance may hinge on whether the Administration resolves contradictions between its ambitious nuclear goals and proposed budget and staffing cuts at key implementing agencies.
Nevertheless, the Executive Orders may have immediate benefits for the nuclear fuel sector. By prioritizing federal inventories to support nuclear fuel supplies, supporting the development of nuclear fuel infrastructure, and directing the construction of advanced reactors on federal property, the Executive Orders have the potential to accelerate the expansion of the domestic nuclear industrial base and the deployment of the advanced reactors it will support.
…the Executive Orders recognize the importance of assured market demand for nuclear fuel products and services, and authorize the Secretary to “provide procurement support, forward contracts, or guarantees to such consortia as a means to ensure offtake for newly established domestic fuel supply, including conversion, enrichment, reprocessing, or fabrication capacity.”
Nuclear Fuel Supplies
All currently operating commercial nuclear reactors in the United States are fueled with low enriched uranium (LEU); that is, fuel that has been processed to increase the percentage of the fissile isotope Uranium-235 from its natural state of 0.7% to a range of 3%-5%. As discussed below, the United States does not currently have the capability of meeting its own needs from domestic uranium production or processing.
The anticipated fuel requirements of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and microreactors currently under development further exacerbate fuel supply challenges. Many SMRs and microreactors are designed to operate on HALEU; that is, uranium in which the percentage of U-235 has been increased to between 5% and 20%. HALEU is produced by downblending high enriched uranium (HEU) – uranium with greater than 20% U-235) with LEU or by enriching LEU to increase its percentage of U-235 above 5%.
The Executive Orders call for several actions to help assure the fuel supply for the nation’s current reactors and anticipated advanced reactors.
In the short-term, “to fully leverage federally owned uranium and plutonium resources,” the Secretary of Energy is directed to update the DOE’s Excess Uranium Management Policy and Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program to determine how the DOE’s inventories of LEU, HEU, and plutonium not needed for national security purposes can be used to advance the Executive Orders’ policies and goals. Additionally, pursuant to the Defense Production Act (DPA), the Secretary is directed to seek voluntary agreements with domestic nuclear energy companies for the cooperative procurement of LEU and HALEU, including through the establishment of nuclear fuel supply chain consortia. Notably, the Executive Orders recognize the importance of assured market demand for nuclear fuel products and services, and authorize the Secretary to “provide procurement support, forward contracts, or guarantees to such consortia as a means to ensure offtake for newly established domestic fuel supply, including conversion, enrichment, reprocessing, or fabrication capacity.”
The Executive Orders also require the Secretary to “release into a readily available fuel bank not less than 20 metric tons of [HALEU]” for private sector projects authorized and regulated by DOE and located on DOE property “for the purpose of powering AI and other infrastructure,” and to ensure long-term fuel supplies for such projects through domestic fuel fabrication and supply chains. No timeframe is specified for this requirement. It is likely the six HALEU supply chain contracts awarded by the Biden Administration in October 2024 as part of DOE’s HALEU Availability Program will play a key role in the production of the fuel bank’s supply.
In the longer-term, the Secretary is directed to recommend a national policy on the management of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste, including reprocessing and recycling of spent fuel to recover uranium, plutonium, and other products useful to the nuclear fuel cycle or otherwise. While the United Kingdom, France, and certain other countries have long reprocessed spent nuclear fuel, the U.S. has not had a commercial spent fuel reprocessing capability since the 1970s. Therefore, the Executive Orders’ directives related to reprocessing will likely require relevant policy and regulatory changes as well as significant financial support and infrastructure development over a period of years.
…Executive Orders direct the Secretaries of Energy and Defense to utilize their authorities to facilitate the construction of privately funded nuclear fuel fabrication and other fuel cycle facilities at identified DOE and DOD sites.
Nuclear Fuel Infrastructure
In addition to providing potential new supplies for nuclear fuel, the Executive Orders call for several actions focused on expanding domestic uranium conversion and enrichment capabilities.
The nuclear fuel cycle starts with uranium mining. There is very little uranium mining in the United States. As a result, for more than 30 years, U.S. nuclear reactor operators have relied on LEU imported from countries such as Canada, Kazakhstan, and Russia. The Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act of 2024 created further fuel supply challenges for U.S. reactors by banning, subject to certain quotas and potential waivers, imports of Russian sourced LEU.
Two prior Trump Administration Executive Orders, Unleashing American Energy and Immediate Measures to Increase American Mineral Production, addressed uranium as one of the minerals critical to U.S. national and economic security, and included various directives to prioritize and promote its production. After mining and milling, uranium ore concentrate must be converted to uranium hexafluoride (UF6) before it can be fed into the enrichment process to increase the percentage of U-235 for reactor fuel purposes. Currently, there is only one commercial uranium conversion plant in the U.S., and only one commercial enrichment plant with two other plants under development. The current Executive Orders build on the earlier Executive Orders and require the Secretary of Energy to develop within 120 days a plan to expand domestic uranium conversion and enrichment capabilities to meet the nation’s LEU, HALEU, and HEU requirements.
The Executive Orders specifically contemplate use of DPA voluntary agreements “to establish consortia and plans of action to ensure that the nuclear fuel supply chain capacity, including milling, conversion, enrichment, deconversion, fabrication, recycling, or reprocessing, is available to enable the continued reliable operation of the Nation’s existing, and future, nuclear reactors.”
Finally, the Executive Orders direct the Secretaries of Energy and Defense to utilize their authorities to facilitate the construction of privately funded nuclear fuel fabrication and other fuel cycle facilities at identified DOE and DOD sites.
…the Executive Orders declare the policy of the United States is to “facilitate the expansion of American nuclear capacity from approximately 100 GW in 2024 to 400 GW by 2050.”
Nuclear Fuel Demand
Having put in motion steps to improve the supply of nuclear fuel and develop nuclear fuel supply chain infrastructure, the Executive Orders leverage the DOE and DOD to spur demand for nuclear fuels, starting with qualified test reactors. Recognizing that further effort is required to establish the fundamental technological viability of advanced reactor designs, the Executive Orders task the DOE with revising its guidance and regulations to expedite the review, approval, and deployment of qualified test reactors to be operated at DOE facilities with the goal of having three such reactors reach criticality by July 4, 2026. This will create an immediate need for fuel for these reactors.
Additional fuel will be required for a nuclear reactor – likely a stationary or mobile SMR or microreactor – that the Secretary of Defense is directed to operate at a domestic military base or installation by September 30, 2028. Similarly, the Secretary of Energy is required, within 90 days of the date of the Executive Orders, to designate one or more DOE sites for the deployment of advanced reactor technologies and to facilitate, within 30 months from the date of the Executive Orders, the operation of a privately funded advanced reactor at an identified DOE site “for the purpose of powering AI infrastructure, other critical or national security needs, supply chain items, or on-site infrastructure.”
As noted above, the Executive Orders declare the policy of the United States is to “facilitate the expansion of American nuclear capacity from approximately 100 GW in 2024 to 400 GW by 2050.” Given the current state of the domestic nuclear supply chain and the recent experience with construction of the Vogtle 3 and 4 reactors, this will be a very challenging policy goal to accomplish. As part of this expansion, the Executive Orders require the DOE to prioritize efforts to facilitate 5 GW of power uprates at existing commercial nuclear reactors and have ten new “large reactors” under construction by 2030. One means of achieving a power uprate is to refuel the reactor with a higher percentage of new fuel or with slightly higher enriched fuel as is presently being tested at the Vogtle 2 plant in Georgia. In both instances, more fuel will be required. Furthermore, with a typical 1,000 MWe reactor requiring about 27 metric tons of fuel per year, a substantial amount of new fuel will be required to supply the proposed 10 new large reactors, to support the continued operation of the nation’s existing commercial reactors, and to fuel the additional reactors needed to meet the 400 GW policy goal.
By requiring or setting goals for the construction of new reactors in the near future, the Executive Orders may have beneficial implications up and down the nuclear fuel supply chain. Uranium mines and in situ recovery operations, uranium milling and conversion facilities, and fuel fabrication companies will all have more certainty that there is need for their products and services, and advanced reactor developers will be able to place orders for reliable fuel supplies. As such, the Executive Orders help demonstrate that demand will exist for nuclear fuel to justify construction of new nuclear fuel supply chain infrastructure and the necessary private investments and financing.
Conclusion
The four Executive Orders include ambitious requirements and goals and set aggressive timelines to achieve them. Accomplishing these outcomes will require the DOE and DOD to move quickly to develop new nuclear-related programs in areas where little precedent exists. Nevertheless, even if only a portion of the Executive Orders’ outcomes are realized, it could build significant momentum for rebuilding the nation’s nuclear industry, including the nuclear fuel supply chain, and create opportunities for nuclear industry participants.
Industry participants and other stakeholders should carefully monitor plans and actions by the DOE, DOD, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to implement the Executive Orders’ requirements. Nuclear fuel supply chain participants should be familiar with the Defense Production Act and be prepared to take advantage of government contracting opportunities as well as any loan guarantees or direct loans that may be authorized under the Act. Where appropriate, industry participants may even proactively consider forming relevant consortia contemplated by the Executive Orders to take advantage of the DOE’s nuclear fuel supply efforts.
APHIS Begins Public Comment Period on Draft Plant Pest Risk Assessment and Draft Environmental Assessment for Lepidopteran-Protected Maize
On June 3, 2025, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) began a public comment period on a draft plant pest risk assessment (PPRA) and draft environmental assessment (EA) regarding a petition from Bayer U.S.-Crop Science seeking a determination of nonregulated status for maize (corn) event MON 95379 that was developed “using genetic engineering to produce two insecticidal proteins to protect against feeding damage caused by target lepidopteran pests.” 90 Fed. Reg. 23513. The draft PPRA compares the plant pest risk posed by the MON 95379 corn with that of the unmodified variety from which it was derived. The draft PPRA concludes that MON 95379 corn is unlikely to pose an increased plant pest risk compared to the unmodified corn. The draft EA evaluates potential impacts that may result from the commercial production of MON 95379 corn, including potential impacts on conventional and organic corn production; the acreage and area required for U.S. corn production; agronomic practices and inputs; the physical environment; biological resources; human health and worker safety; and animal health and welfare. APHIS notes that the draft EA also explains that Bayer has registered MON 95379 with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The registration is restricted to breeding and seed increases only; commercial plantings are not permitted. APHIS states that regardless of its decision on the petition, the EPA registration limits MON 95379 to small-scale breeding, testing, and seed increase nurseries in the United States to no more than 100 total acres across Nebraska, Hawaii, and Iowa. Comments are due July 3, 2025.
Latest Updates on Per- and Polyfluorinated Substances (PFAS)
European Union
PFAS in consumer products – The European Commission reiterated its support for restricting PFAS in consumer products during a structured dialogue with the European Parliament’s ENVI Committee on 13 May 2025. Vice-President Stéphane Séjourné confirmed that the Commission is prioritising a consumer product-focused approach, citing the current lack of viable alternatives for industrial applications.
Following this statement, the NGO Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) publicly criticised the Commission’s limited scope, warning that a focus primarily on consumer products fails to address industrial emissions and PFAS waste streams.
Universal PFAS restriction – ECHA’s Committee for Socio-Economic Analysis (SEAC) will continue examining the proposed PFAS restriction at its June 2025 meeting, focusing on transport, medical devices, and lubricants.
Chemicals Industry Action Plan and Omnibus Package – The European Commission will unveil its chemicals industry action plan on 2 July 2025, addressing competitiveness amid regulatory challenges. President von der Leyen reaffirmed the Commission’s commitment to aligning industrial competitiveness with consumer protection during an industry dialogue on 12 May. A broader Chemicals Industry Package, including potential REACH simplifications and PFAS clarifications, is planned for year-end.
Classification of Trifluoroacetic Acid (TFA) as a reproductive toxicant – On 26 May 2025, the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) launched a six-week public consultation on the proposed harmonised classification of trifluoroacetic acid (TFA) as a reproductive toxicant. The dossier, submitted by the German Federal Environment Agency, concluded that TFA meets criteria for reproductive toxicity under CLP. TFA, a PFAS-related substance and degradation product of pesticides and fluorinated gases, has demonstrated toxicological effects in animal models at concentrations above environmental levels. Classification may trigger specific labelling obligations and usage restrictions under REACH.
Extension of PFOA exemption and ban on UV-328 under POPs Regulation – On 5 May 2025, the European Commission extended the exemption permitting the use of PFOA in firefighting foams until 3 December 2025, citing industry difficulties in compliance and detection issues. The exemption applies strictly to existing liquid fuel fire suppression systems for class B fires, in line with Stockholm Convention provisions.
Water resilience and PFAS – Ahead of its official presentation by the Commission on 4 June 2025, a leak of the forthcoming Communication on the Strategy for Water Resilience was published by the media on 15 May 2025. Several stakeholders have already criticised the Commission’s draft strategy for its perceived emphasis on remediation rather than the prevention of PFAS pollution at the source. Eureau highlighted that only a swift and comprehensive ban on PFAS can effectively protect public health and condemned the shifting of pollution management costs onto water service providers. Earlier, on 7 May 2025, the European Parliament adopted a non-legislative report urging the Commission to adopt a more robust Water Resilience Strategy. The report advocates, among other measures, for broader PFAS restrictions and calls for a reassessment of the application of the polluter pays principle to the pharmaceutical industry under the Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive (UWWTD).
International / Global
Global ban on Long-Chain Perfluorocarboxylic Acids (LC-PFCAs) – On 2 May 2025, Parties to the Stockholm Convention agreed to list LC-PFCAs under Annex A, instituting a global ban on their manufacture, use, import, and export, subject to limited exemptions. These exemptions include a five-year allowance for semiconductors used in replacement parts and continued use until 2041 or end-of-life for combustion engine vessel parts and out-of-production motor vehicles.
The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism: How to Navigate a Complex Mechanism
This note is dedicated to importers and producers of specific goods from countries outside the European Union, who will be subject to carbon pricing equivalent to that applied to European manufacturers of the same goods, without using third-country goods.
Regulatory Framework
As a reminder, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM or MACF in French) was introduced at European Union (EU) level by three regulations dated 2023:
Regulation (EU) 2023/956 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023; and
Commission implementing regulations (EU) 2023/1773 and 2025/486 dated 17 August 2023 and 17 March 2025.
It should be noted that the legal framework applicable to CBAM is likely to be simplified at EU level (see the paragraph below entitled “Potential simplification”).
Objectives
Directly applicable since 1 October 2023, this regulatory mechanism has nonetheless been implemented gradually in order to eventually bring the carbon footprint of imports into line with European standards, notably by requiring economic players to quantify the CO₂ emissions of their imported goods (the idea being to restore the balance between European and non-European producers by applying a carbon price to products imported into the EU).
This environmental policy measure also marks the phasing-out, at the same time, of the free allocation of allowances under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) created in 2005. As a result, in the medium term, an importer and a producer established in the EU will both pay the same carbon price.
Conditions of Application
An importer[1] or an indirect customs representative acting as an authorized CBAM declarant at the time of import[2] will have to pay the carbon “tax” at the border if the following cumulative conditions are met:
the imported goods are on the list of products referred to in Annex 1 of Regulation 2023/956 (e.g., steel, aluminum, nitrogen fertilizers, cement, hydrogen or electricity)[3];
the imported goods come from a non-EU country (exemptions: Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein, Switzerland or certain territories of member states such as Ceuta, Melilla, Livigno, Helgoland, Büsingen);
the imported goods have an intrinsic value of more than €150 per shipment (the Omnibus Proposal proposes to remove this financial threshold); and
the customs procedure applicable to the imported goods corresponds either to “release for free circulation” (i.e., the imported goods will be consumed and/or move freely within the customs territory of the Union), or to “inward processing” (i.e., the imported goods will be processed and ultimately released for free circulation without being re-exported outside the Union, even if the processed goods are no longer included in the list products referred to in Annex 1 of Regulation 2023/956).
Potential Simplification
Less than a year before the CBAM becomes fully operational, at the end of February 2025 the European Commission published a proposal to simplify the system for the benefit of “small” importers, who in reality represent around 90 percent of the economic players affected by the CBAM (Omnibus Proposal).[4]
In other words, economic players whose cumulative imports of iron, steel, aluminum, cement and nitrogen fertilizers (with the exception of electricity or hydrogen) do not exceed 50 tons over the calendar year would be exempt from any CBAM obligation. This Omnibus Proposal should considerably reduce the administrative burden for the majority of importers, while ensuring that 99 percent of carbon emissions remain covered by the CBAM.
Regarding the Omnibus Proposal, requests for “Authorized CBAM Declarant” status and access to the definitive CBAM portal will be processed by the Directorate General for Energy and Climate (called in French “DGEC”) as follows:
priority to businesses that imported more than 50 metric tons of goods in 2024 or that can demonstrate that they plan to import more than 50 metric tons in 2025 or 2026;
access to the portal maintained, but processing of the application for “Authorized CBAM Declarant” status postponed to the secondhalf of 2025 for economic operators who imported between 10 and 50 tons of goods in 2024;
refusal of both access to the registry and processing of applications for “Authorized CBAM Declarant” status for economic operators importing less than 10 tons of goods in 2024.
Since the endorsement of the Omnibus Proposal by the European Parliament on 22 May 2025, all eyes are now on the Council, who will have to examine and validate the Omnibus Proposal by end of 2025/early 2026.
CBAM Obligations
Obligations
From 1 October 2023 to 31 December 2025 (“Transitional phase“)
From 1 January 2026 (“Operational phase“)
Reporting obligations
Quarterly filing report in the CBAM Transitional Registry.
Annual filing report (even if actual imports are zero in a given year). This will be known as a “CBAM declaration” for the year Y-1, and will be made no later than 31 May of each year on the declarant’s account in the CBAM final Registry. The first CBAM declaration is due no later than 31 May 2027.
Please note: the Omnibus Proposal proposes shifting the annual filing deadline to 31 August of each year.
No payments, no adjustments.
Verification report of the CBAM declaration by an independent third-party auditor accredited (by COFRAC[5] in France) becomes compulsory and at the importer’s expense.
Please note: the Omnibus Proposal proposes relaxing the obligation to verify the calculation of imported emissions for goods for which actual emissions data (rather than default data) are used.
Data collected (non-exhaustive and different if the declarant is an importer/producer):
– total quantity of each type of merchandise– total real intrinsic direct emissions (emissions linked to the production process)– total indirect emissions (emissions linked to electricity consumption during the production process)– production process used, information about the production site– details of the emissions calculation method used– carbon price paid in a country of origin, taking into account any rebates or other forms of compensation available
When using default data, a mark-up will be automatically integrated into the data itself, impacting the carbon price.
An implementing regulation specifying the content of the annual CBAM declaration is expected in summer 2025.
CBAM Authorized Declarant” status obtained
As of 31 March 2025, it is recommended to apply for ASAP status directly on the definitive CBAM definitive registry, as this status will become mandatory and will be required prior to all imports.
Please note: the application processing time may vary between 4 and 6 months, if additional information is requested by the DGEC. If an application for CBAM status is in progress on 1 January 2026, it will not be possible to import CBAM goods.
Mandatory Obtaining this status has the value of an import license (also known as an “import permit”) The issuance of this status is conditional upon the submission of the following two documents:– proof of tax status less than 3 months old (available from impôts.gouv.fr); and– if you have been established for more than two years, the tax return; or– if you have been established for less than two years, a financial guarantee such as a surety bond issued by a bank or insurance company (guarantee to be released immediately after 31 May of the second year in which the application was made; exact amount to be specified by the DGEC). Once the status has been obtained, it will be valid in all member states.
Purchase and management of CBAM certificates, via a purchasing platform interconnected with the definitive CBAM registry
N/A
1 CBAM certificate = 1 t CO2eq. Minimum stock required at the end of each quarter corresponding to 80% of intrinsic emissions linked to the import of goods since the beginning of the calendar year. Importers will need to anticipate the number of CBAM certificates they will need to cover the emissions generated by the goods they plan to import. Each week, the Commission calculates the price of CBAM certificates as the average closing price of emission allowances in the European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). In the event of an excess of certificates, and up to a limit of one-third of the total number of certificates purchased during year N-1, the excess may be bought back by the DGEC at the price at which the importer purchased it[6] On 1 July of each year, the European Commission cancels the certificates purchased during year Y-2 and remaining in the account.
Please note: the Omnibus Proposal envisages a reduction in the minimum stock of certificates from 80% to 50% (making the financial commitment of the importer represented by these certificates more acceptable), and the obligation to purchase certificates should only begin in February 2027 (it being specified that the deadline for repurchasing certificates would be set at 30 September of each year, while the cancellation of certificates by the Commission would be postponed to 1 October).
CBAM Registry Connection Mode Changes
The CBAM registry connection mode will change on 1 January 2026.
If the importer already has access to the CBAM registry (i.e., by creating an account based on the EORI SIRET number and accessing it via the douane.gouv website), the 2025 quarterly reports must continue to be filed via the current CBAM account. The OLGA online service will remain active to address any problems of access to these “old” CBAM accounts via the douane.gouv website. However, it is recommended that you save the pdf and xml formats of the quarterly reports linked to this account, to keep them after 2026 in view of the future withdrawal of access, the date of which has yet to be determined.
Without waiting for 1 January 2026, you will need to contact the CCE (in French cellule-conseil aux entreprises) within the economic action unit of the regional customs directorate responsible for the company’s head office, to request the creation of a new account on the CBAM registry, based on the EORI SIREN number (accessible free of charge via the SOPRANO online service available on the douane.gouv website). To secure the data in this new account, an EU Login will be needed for each connection to the register
In practice, you will need to email the relevant CCE a completed form requesting the creation of a new CBAM account on the permanent registry (form available on the douane.gouv website), with “UUMDS “CBA/ MACF” account creation request” in the subject line.
If the importer is not located in an EU member state and does not have an EORI, he will not be able to obtain Authorized CBAM Declarant status directly. In this case, an indirect customs representative will be required to take the necessary steps on the importer’s behalf (since the indirect customs representative has an EORI).
Once the account has been created, and from 1 January2026, it will be possible to access the definitive CBAM registry directly via the TAXUD European authentication portal (https://cbam.ec.europa.eu/authorised-declarant).
Takeaway
At this stage, importers should:
Follow up closely the Omnibus Proposal (amendment, adoption, etc.);
Continue to provide information and training to suppliers, to ensure that they receive a satisfactory flow of information on time, and to ensure the quality of reporting.
Contacts
The Carbon Markets Office of the French Directorate General for Energy and Climate (DGEC; [email protected]) is responsible for all practical and methodological questions relating to emissions calculations.
As far as customs are concerned, you should contact the Restrictions and Securing Trade office of the General Directorate of Customs and Indirect Taxation (DGDDI; [email protected]).
[1] Economic actor established in an EU member state identified by a Community identification number called “EORI”; this number has been essential since 2023 to manage relations with intra-Community customs authorities, and you can request it by logging on to douane.gouv.fr via the Soprano platform: https://www.douane.gouv.fr/service-en-ligne/demande-dautorisation-douaniere-et-fiscale-soprano.
[2] In particular, if the importer uses a DDP incoterm (Delivered Duty Paid) and is not established in an EU member state, he will use an indirect representative
[3] The identification of imports covered by CBAM is based on the customs nomenclature. To find the CN product code associated with the imported merchandise, you need to refer to the RITA database (please note that the CN codes 7616 and 7326 refer respectively to “other articles” in aluminum and steel, as these codes are likely to cover a wider range of products; they are referred to as “sweeper” codes, extending CBAM to a large number of merchandise items).
[4] Omnibus I – COM(2025)87
[5] France’s leading certification body. The list of accredited auditors is not yet available.
[6] It will not be possible to trade or sell certificates between authorized CBAM declarants (unlike on the ETS market). However, an authorized CBAM declarant will be able to optimize purchases of CBAM certificates by acquiring hedging products on the ETS market, or by purchasing more CBAM certificates in year Y than anticipated imports, which will enable the registrant to request reimbursement of the most expensive certificates.
Read this article in French
House Proposes Cutbacks to Clean Energy Tax Credits
On May 14, 2025, the House Ways and Means Committee approved its markup of H.Con.Res.14, 119th Cong., 2025 (House Bill), which includes proposed changes that would modify substantially the clean energy tax incentives expanded by the IRA. The House Rules Committee released a manager’s amendment to the House Bill on May 21, 2025 (Manager’s Amendment). On May 22, 2025, the House passed the combined legislation.
The House Bill, as amended, is the first major step in the budget reconciliation process and is expected to undergo significant changes in the Senate.
The House Bill includes:
Early sunsets for the credits for clean electricity production tax credit (Section 45Y), clean electricity investment tax credit (Section 48E), clean nuclear facilities (Section 45U) and clean hydrogen production (Section 45V);
Transferability is preserved for the Section 48E ITC and the Section 45Y PTC, although these credits now terminate for projects that begin construction more than 60 days after the date of enactment or are placed in service after Dec. 31, 2028; and
Substantial new restrictions based on foreign ownership or influence that could disqualify taxpayers from credit eligibility, and which may introduce uncertainty and compliance difficulties.
Taxpayers should evaluate how the proposed changes could affect planned projects, financing strategies, supply chain arrangements, and the potential for mitigating the proposals’ effects.
This GT Alert summarizes the key energy-related provisions in the final House Bill.
Proposed Terminations
The House Bill proposes to sunset the following credits on Dec. 31, 2025:
Section 25C – Energy Efficient Home Improvement Credit
Section 25D – Residential Clean Energy Credit
Section 25E – Previously-Owned Clean Vehicle Credit
Section 30C – Alternative Fuel Vehicle Refueling Property Credit
Section 30D – Clean Vehicle Credit
Section 45L – Energy Efficient Home Credit
Section 45W – Qualified Commercial Clean Vehicles Credit
The Manager’s Amendment does not modify these proposed termination dates.
Modified Phaseouts and Other Proposals
In addition to the 2025 sunsets, the House Bill proposes accelerated phaseouts and other changes to many of the IRA’s cornerstone credits.
Phaseouts / Other Proposals
Credit
House Bill
Manager’s Amendment
45U Zero-Emission Nuclear Power Production
Phasedown beginning after Dec. 31, 2028; fully terminated after Dec. 31, 2031
Eliminates phaseout; credit ends after Dec. 31, 2031
45V Clean Hydrogen Production
Terminated for facilities that begin construction after Dec. 31, 2025
No change
45X Advanced Manufacturing Production
Wind components ineligible for credits after Dec. 31. 2027
Other eligible components phased down beginning after Dec. 31, 2028; fully terminated after Dec. 31, 2031
No change
45Y Clean Electricity Production
Phasedown beginning for projects placed in service after Dec. 31, 2028; fully terminated for projects placed in service after Dec. 31, 2031
Eliminates phaseout; credit ends for projects beginning construction more than 60 days post-enactment or placed in service after Dec. 31, 2028; exceptions for (i) advanced nuclear facilities beginning construction on or before Dec. 31, 2028, and (ii) expansion of approved nuclear facilities provided the expansion begins on or before Dec. 31, 2028
No credit available for leased wind or solar systems that otherwise qualify for Section 25D credits
45Z Clean Fuel Production
Extended through Dec. 31, 2031; requires that feedstock be grown or produced in the U.S., Canada, or Mexico for fuel sold after Dec. 31, 2025; excludes land use changes from lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions
No change
48 Energy Investment Credit
New phaseout for geothermal heat pump property; fully terminated for geothermal heat pump property that begins construction after Dec. 31, 2031
No change
48E Clean Electricity Investment Credit
Phasedown beginning for projects placed in service after Dec. 31. 2028; fully terminated for projects placed in service after Dec. 31, 2031
Low-income bonus credit sunsets after Dec. 31, 2031
Eliminates phaseout; credit ends for qualified facility or energy storage technology beginning construction more than 60 days post-enactment or placed in service after Dec. 31, 2028; exceptions for advanced nuclear facilities beginning construction on or before Dec. 31, 2028
No credit available for leased wind or solar systems that otherwise qualify for Section 25D credits
The House Bill extends 100% bonus depreciation under Section 168(k) for property acquired and placed in service after Jan. 19, 2025, and before Jan. 1, 2030 (or 2031 for certain long-lead property). The Manager’s Amendment does not make any changes to this extension.
Neither the House Bill nor the Manager’s Amendment would accelerate the phaseout or termination of Section 45Q carbon capture credits.
Repeal of Credit Transferability
The House Bill would significantly curtail the ability to transfer credits under Section 6418.
Transferability Cutoff
Credit
House Bill
Manager’s Amendment
45Q Carbon Oxide Sequestration
Equipment beginning construction more than 2 years after enactment
No change
45U Zero-Emission Nuclear Power Production
Electricity produced and sold after Dec. 31, 2027
Preserves transferability through the full credit period, which extends to Dec. 31, 2031
45X Advanced Manufacturing Production
Components sold after Dec. 31, 2027
No change
45Y Clean Electricity Production
Facilities beginning construction more than 2 years after enactment
Preserves transferability, subject to the sunset of the credits for projects that begin construction more than 60 days after enactment, or that are placed in service after Dec. 31, 2028
45Z Clean Fuel Production
Fuels produced after Dec. 31, 2027
No change
48 Energy Investment Credit:
Geothermal Heat Pump Property
Property beginning construction more than 2 years after enactment
No change
48E Clean Electricity Investment Credit
Facilities beginning construction more than 2 years after enactment
Preserves transferability, subject to the sunset of the credits for projects that begin construction more than 60 days after enactment, or that are placed in service after Dec. 31, 2028
Restrictions on Prohibited Foreign Entities
The House Bill would disqualify taxpayers from claiming certain energy credits where there is foreign ownership, control, or involvement from “prohibited foreign entities.”
Key definitions:
Specified Foreign Entity: Includes foreign terrorist organizations, Chinese military companies, entities identified under U.S. national security laws, and foreign-controlled entities.
Foreign-Influenced Entity: Includes entities with specified foreign entity ownership ≥10% (or ≥25% in the aggregate), significant debt holdings, board appointment rights, or substantial payments made to foreign entities.
Material Assistance: Includes any component, subcomponent, or critical mineral in an energy property that is extracted, processed, recycled, manufactured, or assembled by a prohibited foreign entity, or any design based on such entity’s intellectual property. Limited exceptions apply for non-unique parts or materials not predominantly produced by prohibited foreign entities.
The House Bill uses the above terms to impose restrictions on eligibility for various credits. The Manager’s Amendment does not alter the House Bill’s definition of prohibited foreign entities, specified foreign entities, foreign-influenced entities, or material assistance.
Taxpayers that are controlled by, or make certain payments to, a specified foreign entity may be disqualified from claiming credits in the first taxable year after enactment. Foreign-influenced entities would become ineligible two years after the date of enactment. In some cases, making a payment to a prohibited foreign entity could trigger full recapture of previously claimed credits.
The Manager’s Amendment does, however, modify the effective date of restrictions under Sections 48E and 45Y related to material assistance from prohibited foreign entities. Under the House Bill, qualified facilities and energy storage property that received material assistance from a prohibited foreign entity were disqualified if construction began more than one year after the date of enactment. The Manager’s Amendment replaces this floating one-year deadline with a fixed date: Dec. 31, 2025.
Supreme Court Reins in NEPA Reviews—Clearing the Path for Developers
On May 29, 2025, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County, No. 23-975, 605 U.S. ___ (2025), sharply limiting the scope of environmental review obligations under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). In a unanimous ruling, the Court held that federal agencies may reasonably focus their environmental reviews on the direct impacts of the projects they are charged with reviewing. Agencies, the Court emphasized, are not required to consider the environmental ripple effects of unrelated or future projects—particularly those lying within the jurisdiction of other regulators.
In so doing, the Court swept aside a line of D.C. Circuit and lower court decisions that had gradually expanded NEPA’s reach, turning what was once a procedural check into an onerous, open-ended roadblock to project development. Under that now-rejected approach, agencies often found themselves compelled to analyze speculative downstream effects with little relevance to the core project under consideration.
The ruling returns NEPA to its statutory roots—as a procedural tool designed to inform agency decision-making, not paralyze it. The Court’s opinion expressly seeks to restore balance, cautioning against what Justice Kavanaugh called the transformation of NEPA into a “blunt and haphazard tool employed by project opponents” to stall or derail infrastructure development.
The Court’s ruling carries significant implications for environmental law and infrastructure development:
1. Clearer Constraints on Environmental Reviews: Seven County reinforces the principle that under NEPA, agencies are required to evaluate only the environmental effects of the specific project or action before them. NEPA does not require agencies to analyze the environmental impacts off separate projects that differ in time, location, or fall outside of the agency’s regulatory authority.
2. Agency Expertise: The Court stressed that reviewing courts must afford “substantial deference” to agencies under NEPA. Unlike Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024), which limited deference to agency statutory interpretations, NEPA grants reviewing agencies discretion about “where to draw the line—including (i) how far to go in considering indirect environmental effects from the project at hand and (ii) whether to analyze environmental effects from other projects separate in time or place from the project at hand. “On those kinds of questions… agencies possess discretion and must have broad latitude to draw a ‘manageable line.’”
3. Greater Certainty for Infrastructure Development: By narrowing the scope of required environmental analysis, the decision reduces litigation risk for energy, transportation, and infrastructure projects—especially in the fossil fuel sector. It curtails the use of NEPA as a tool to delay projects through demands for broad climate or downstream pollution analysis. For example, an environmental review of a FERC-jurisdictional pipeline would generally not need to consider the downstream greenhouse gas emissions from the gas combustion facilities it supplies. As a result, we may see fewer NEPA challenges based on indirect or cumulative effects.
May 2025 PFAS Legislative Developments May Legislation Tracking (May 1 – May 31)
Current Trends in Legislation – May 2025
Federal Legislature
One new bill was introduced, which seeks to accelerate the development of PFAS-free equipment for firefighters.
State Legislature
Eighteen bills were introduced across eight states.
Topics include: Health screenings; MCLs in drinking water; comprehensive PFAS bans.
State Regulations
ME 06-096 Ch. 90 was published 5/7/2025. This establishes criteria for currently unavoidable uses of intentionally added PFAS in products and implement the sales prohibitions and notification requirements for products containing intentionally added PFAS but determined to be a currently unavoidable use pursuant to the amended 38 M.R.S. § 1614.
New Bills This Period
PFAS Legislation
Federal
One new bill introduced.
State
Eighteen bills introduced.
Two in ME
One in MA
Four in MI
Two in MN
Three in NJ
Four in NY
One in OH
One in PA
Signed into Law
•HB 167 (NH) signed into law. The bill prohibits the sale of ski, boat, and board waxes that contain intentionally added PFAS.• SB 91 (OR) signed into law. The bill prohibits fire departments from using PFAS firefighting foam in Oregon.• SB 5033 (WA) signed into law. The bill requires local governments to implement biosolid management protocol relating to sludge, with attention to the presence of PFAS.• SP 419 (ME) signed into law. The bill provides certain exemptions from PFAS restrictions, specifically clarifying that the exemption does not apply to any textile article or refrigerant that is included in or as a component part of such products. The exemption applies to certain products containing PFAS, including motor vehicle equipment, off-highway vehicles, specialty motor vehicles and personal assistive mobility devices.• SP 66 (ME) signed into law. This bill requires the Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Forestry to establish the PFAS Response Program for the purpose of abating, cleaning up and mitigating threats and hazards posed by PFAS that affect agricultural producers in the State and the food supply; providing support to affected commercial farms; supporting critical PFAS research; and allowing for the department to strategically and effectively respond to PFAS concerns and issues as they arise.
New York City’s Climate-Focused Local Law 97 Upheld By New York Court of Appeals
On May 22, 2025, the New York Court of Appeals–the highest court in New York State–unanimously upheld New York City’s Local Law 97 against a challenge brought by certain property owners. This law–Local Law 97–is “aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions and transitioning to clean energy in order to combat climate change,” and does so by imposing strict restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions for large buildings (25,000 square feet or larger), and assessing penalties for non-compliance. While the trial court had dismissed the lawsuit challenging the law, the intermediate appellate court had reinstated the challenge solely on the grounds of “field preemption,” a legal position which has now been decisively rejected by the courts of the State of New York.
According to the legal doctrine of field preemption, local laws are preempted when a state has indicated its “intent to occupy a particular field”; here, the challengers argued that a certain New York State climate law meant that “the State [of New York] has preempted the field of regulating greenhouse gas emissions.” In rejecting that contention, the Court of Appeals held “that the legislature has neither expressed nor implied any intent to preempt the field of regulating greenhouse gas emissions,” and, indeed, there was no “inten[t] to prevent localities from taking measures that would help the State [of New York] achieve its overall emissions goals.”
While the legal ruling here is closely tied to the specific language at issue in the varying state and local laws, the overall decision is highly significant–not only does New York City’s Local Law 97 survive (an aggressive effort to counter climate change), but the New York Court of Appeals has effectively blessed similar efforts by other localities in New York State in the future. And this decision could encourage similar efforts in other states, providing further impetus to laws seeking to mitigate the effects of climate change.
New York City isn’t preempted by state law from regulating greenhouse gas emissions from large buildings, the state’s highest court said Thursday. The state’s climate law “recognizes that local government plays an important role in this area” and doesn’t “expressly prohibit local regulation of emissions,” Court of Appeals Associate Judge Anthony Cannataro wrote for the unanimous court. The ruling reverses an appellate court order reinstating and remanding to the trial court the preemption claims brought by the board presidents of two co-ops in Queens and the owner of a mixed-use building in Manhattan. The plaintiffs argued the legislature intended for the state’s Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act—which aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions across the state by 40%—to preempt New York City law that sets limits on building emissions and imposes penalties for exceeding those limits.
www.bloomberglaw.com/…