DOJ and CFPB Terminate $9 Million Redlining Consent Order with Southern Regional Bank
On May 21, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee granted a joint motion by the CFPB and DOJ to terminate a 2021 redlining settlement with a regional bank, vacating the consent order and dismissing the case with prejudice. The original lawsuit, filed in October 2021, alleged violations of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) and Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA).
The complaint accused the bank of engaging in unlawful redlining from 2014 to 2018 by failing to serve the credit needs of majority-Black and Hispanic neighborhoods in the Memphis Metropolitan Statistical Area.
Specifically, the complaint alleged that the bank:
Located nearly all mortgage officers in white neighborhoods. The bank assigned no mortgage loan officers to branches in majority-Black and Hispanic census tracts.
Failed to advertise or conduct outreach in minority neighborhoods. Marketing was concentrated in commercial media outlets and business-focused publications distributed in majority-white areas.
Lacked internal fair lending oversight. The bank allegedly did not conduct a comprehensive internal fair lending assessment until 2018.
Significantly underperformed peer lenders. Only 10% of mortgage applications and 8.3% of originations came from majority-Black and Hispanic neighborhoods—less than half the peer average.
Under the consent order, the bank agreed to pay a $5 million civil penalty, invest $3.85 million in a loan subsidiary fund, open a mortgage loan production office in a minority neighborhood, and spend an additional $600,000 on community development and outreach. The consent order was scheduled to last five years, but was terminated early after the agencies found that the bank had disbursed all required relief and was in “substantial compliance” with the orders terms.
Putting It Into Practice: By ending the redlining settlement early, the CFPB continues to back away from redlining enforcement actions launched under the prior administration (previously discussed here). While institutions should remain focused on fair lending compliance, these moves suggest federal scrutiny of redlining—particularly cases built on statistical evidence or marketing practices—may be easing.
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CFPB Seeks to Vacate Open Banking Rule
On May 23, the CFPB notified a Kentucky federal court that it now considers its own 2023 open banking rule “unlawful” and plans to set the rule aside. The Bureau announced its intent to seek summary judgement against the rule, which was issued under Section 1033 of the Dodd-Frank Act to promote consumer-authorized data sharing with third parties.
The original rule (previously discussed here), issued in October 2023 under former Director Rohit Chopra, was designed to implement Section 1033’s mandate by requiring financial institutions to provide consumers and authorized third parties with access to their transaction data in a secure and standardized format. The rule aimed to promote competition and consumer control over financial information by enabling the use of fintech apps and digital tools to manage personal finances.
The lawsuit, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, challenged the rule on several grounds, including claims that the CFPB exceeded its statutory authority and imposed obligations not contemplated by Congress. Key points raised in the challenge include:
Alleged lack of CFPB authority. Plaintiffs argue the Bureau overstepped by mandating free, comprehensive data access and imposing new compliance burdens without clear congressional authorization.
Interference with industry-led initiatives. The plaintiffs asserted that the rule would disrupt private-sector open banking frameworks already set in place, which they claim serve hundreds of million of Americans.
Concerns about data security and consumer harm. The rule’s opponents caution that mandating third-party data access could increase risks of misuse or breaches.
Putting It Into Practice: While the litigation had previously been paused to give the agency time to evaluate the regulation, the Bureau’s latest filing confirms that Acting Director Russel Vought no longer supports the rule and now views it as unlawful. This move effectively puts the rule’s validity in the hands of the court, even as compliance deadlines—set to begin April 1, 2026—technically remain in place unless the rule is vacated. Given the rule’s prior bipartisan support and its importance to fintech stakeholders, market participants should continue monitoring this litigation closely for further developments.
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Maryland Enacts Earned Wage Access Law
On May 28, Maryland Governor Wes Moore signed House Bill 1294 into law, establishing a comprehensive regulatory framework for Earned Wage Access (EWA) providers operating in the state. Effective October 1, the new law provides for licensing of both employer-integrated and consumer-directed EWA providers under the Maryland Consumer Loan Law, while also introducing a host of new consumer protection requirements.
The law is a response to prior regulatory guidance that restricted EWA services in the state and prompted many providers to exit the market. Like previous bills passed by other states, the bill codifies permissible EWA practices by formally defining employer-integrated and consumer-directed models (previously discussed here), clarifying that these services are not loans if providers do not charge interest and comply with specific statutory conditions. It also creates a special licensing framework that enables complaint providers to legally reenter the Maryland market while adhering to detailed operational requirements designed to protect consumers.
To address compliance and consumer protection concerns, the law includes the following key provisions:
Mandatory licensing of EWA providers. All EWA providers must be licensed under Maryland’s Consumer Loan Law unless exempt, and are subject to oversight by the Office of Financial Regulation (the “OFR”). In addition, there is annual reporting to the OFR.
Non-recourse obligations. EWA transactions are non-recourse and a user can cancel their EWA transaction at any time.
Coverage of both EWA models. The law applies to both “employer-integrated” and “consumer-directed” EWA models. Employer-integrated models involve arrangements where the provider contracts directly with the employer and receives payroll data from the employer or its processor. Consumer-directed models rely on employment and income data provided by the worker without any employer relationship.
No-cost option requirement. Providers must offer at least one “reasonable” no-cost method for consumers to access their earned wages, regardless of whether fee-based options are available.
Fee limitations for expedited delivery. Fees for expedited delivery are capped at $5 for transfers of $75 or less and $7.50 for amounts above $75.
Tip regulation. Providers that solicit tips must treat them as voluntary, set default amounts to zero, ensure they do not influence access or terms, and refund any portion that would result in impermissible interest charges.
Prohibition on traditional lending practices. Providers are prohibited from charging interest or late fees, conditioning service on tipping, using or furnishing credit reports, or enforcing repayment through litigation, collections, or debt sales.
Disclosures and consumer rights. Providers must disclose all fees and changes clearly, explain how to select the no-cost option, allow users to cancel without penalty, and reimburse overdraft fees caused by failed repayment attempts, unless due to fraud.
Putting It Into Practice: Maryland becomes the latest state to adopt EWA-specific regulations (previously discussed here, here, here, and here). Maryland’s framework affirms that EWA products are not loans when structured in compliance with statutory safeguards. As more states implement similar statutes, EWA providers should continue to monitor evolving regulatory trends and adapt their compliance practices accordingly.
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DOL Rescinds 2022 Guidance Cautioning Against 401(k) Plan Investments in Cryptocurrencies
On May 28, 2025, the Department of Labor (“DOL”) issued Compliance Assistance Release No. 2025-01 which rescinds the DOL’s prior Compliance Assistance Release No. 2022-1 which had warned 401(k) plan fiduciaries against adding cryptocurrencies as direct investment options under their plans.
The 2022 guidance (described in more detail here) cautioned 401(k) plan fiduciaries to exercise “extreme care” when considering offering direct investments in cryptocurrencies, digital assets or other similar products to a defined contribution plan’s investment lineup. In the 2022 guidance, the DOL noted that these types of investments “present significant risks and challenges to participants’ retirement accounts, including significant risks of fraud, theft, and loss” due to (among other things) the evolving regulatory environment surrounding these investments, their speculative nature, valuation concerns, and the likely inability of the average participant to be able to sufficiently understand the investment and make an informed decision.
In rescinding the 2022 guidance, the DOL takes a more neutral stance towards cryptocurrencies by reverting to its historical approach of neither endorsing nor disapproving of offering cryptocurrency investments in 401(k) plans.
Takeaways for Plan Fiduciaries: The 2025 guidance does not change a plan fiduciary’s duties of prudence, loyalty and diversification when considering whether to add an investment option (cryptocurrency-related or otherwise) to their plan’s investment lineup. Notwithstanding the seemingly warmer approach towards allowing cryptocurrency investments in 401(k) plans, without a safe harbor protecting plan fiduciaries who offer such an investment option, it remains to be seen whether this guidance will actually impact the offering of cryptocurrency in defined contribution plans.
Vermont Enacts Law Prohibiting Medical Debt Reporting and Funding Debt Relief Initiative
On May 16, Vermont Governor Phil Scott signed into law S. 27, a medical debt relief measure that prohibits the inclusion of medical debt on consumer credit reports and establishes a state-funded initiative to abolish qualifying medical debt held by Vermont residents.
Under the new law, scheduled to take effect on July 1, 2025, the State Treasurer is authorized to contract with a nonprofit entity to purchases and eliminate medical debts owed by Vermont residents. The legislation appropriates $1 million in FY2026 to support this effort. In addition to abolishing the debts, the contracted nonprofit must coordinate with credit reporting agencies to remove adverse credit information associated with the debt and provide written notice to affected individuals.
To be eligible, debtors must either have household income at or below 400% of the federal poverty level or owe medical debt amounting to at least 5% of their household income. Additionally, the debt must remain outstanding after standard collection efforts have concluded.
The legislation also introduces permanent changes to Vermont’s consumer credit reporting framework, including:
Medical debt reporting banned. Credit reporting agencies are prohibited from reporting or maintaining any information related to medical debt.
Nonprofit exemption for eligibility checks. Tax-exempt organizations may access consumer credit reports when determining eligibility for medical debt abolition.
Healthcare facility restrictions. Large healthcare facilities are prohibited from selling medical debt, except to qualifying nonprofits whose purpose is to cancel the debt.
Expanded notice and disclosure requirements. Updated credit disclosures will include a notice about Vermont’s prohibition on medical debt reporting and permitted nonprofit access.
Putting It Into Practice: Vermont’s new law barring the inclusion of medical debt on credit reports follows the CFPB’s recent repeal of its own rule that would have imposed similar restrictions at the federal level (previously discussed here). While the CFPB continues to roll back rules and guidance issued under prior administrations (a trend we previously discussed here), states are increasingly stepping in to fill the void by expanding consumer protection measures (previously discussed here, and here). Credit reporting agencies and debt collectors should actively monitor state credit reporting laws to ensure continued compliance as regulatory frameworks evolve.
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CFPB Drops Lawsuit Against Lease-to-Own Fintech Following Adverse Credit Ruling
On May 27, the CFPB filed a notice of dismissal with prejudice in its lawsuit against a lease-to-own fintech provider. The lawsuit, filed in July 2023, alleged that the company’s rental-purchase agreements violated several federal consumer financial laws, including the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA), the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), and the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA).
In its original complaint, the CFPB alleged that the company targeted consumers with limited access to traditional credit—internally referred to as “ALICE” consumers (Asset-Limited, Income-Constrained, Employed)—with financing agreements that often required consumers to pay more than twice the cash price of the financed merchandise over a 12-month period. The Bureau claimed the agreements were misleadingly presented as short-term lease-purchase options, when they were in fact credit arrangements subject to federal disclosure and servicing requirements.
Specifically, the complaint’s allegations against the fintech provider included:
Failure to provide required TILA disclosures. The Bureau asserted that the company’s agreements qualified as credit sales under TILA and Regulation Z, triggering disclosure obligations the company allegedly failed to meet.
Conditioning credit on preauthorized electronic fund transfers. The CFPB alleged the company violated EFTA and Regulation E by requiring consumers to authorize recurring ACH debits as a condition of receiving financing.
Deceptive and abusive marketing and contracting practices. According to the complaint, the company misled consumers about the cost and structure of the agreements, impeded consumers from terminating repayment obligations, and failed to ensure consumers had an opportunity to review agreement terms before signing.
Unfair collection and credit reporting practices. The Bureau alleged that the company threatened actions it did not take, sent payment demands to consumers who had no outstanding obligations, and lacked reasonable written policies for furnishing consumer data, in violation of FCRA and Regulation V.
Putting It Into Practice: The dismissal of this case is another clear example of the CFPB stepping back from enforcement actions initiated from the previous administration (previously discussed here, here, and here). Although the Bureau has scaled back its use of certain enforcement powers, state regulators and other federal agencies have not slowed their efforts to enforce UDAAP violations (previously discussed here and here). Financial institutions should ensure their compliance programs are up to date to avoid scrutiny from state and federal regulators.
SEC Expands the Ability of Registered Closed-End Funds to Invest in Private Funds
Since 2002, the staff of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) consistently issued comments during the registration statement review process to closed-end funds (CEFs) registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (1940 Act) that required CEFs either (1) to limit investing in private funds1 to no more than 15 percent of a CEF’s net assets, or (2) restrict sales of a CEF’s shares to investors who are accredited investors2 and impose a minimum initial investment requirement of $25,000 per investor. As a result of this informal position, which was not based on a statute or rule, the SEC staff typically would not accelerate the effectiveness of a CEF’s registration statement without a commitment by the CEF to implement these restrictions.
At the “SEC Speaks in 2025” conference held on May 19-20, 2025, SEC Chairman Paul Atkins called upon the SEC to expand retail investor access to private markets. Following on this theme, on the second day of this conference, SEC Director of Investment Management Natasha Vij Greiner indicated in her prepared remarks that the SEC staff will no longer issue these comments during the registration statement review process of CEFs. Instead, the SEC staff will focus on ensuring that appropriate disclosures around conflicts of interest, liquidity and fees are included in registration statements of CEFs.
We expect that this change will expedite the registration statement review process of CEFs and meaningfully facilitate retail investor access to private investment strategies by allowing sponsors of CEFs to invest more than 15 percent of a CEF’s net assets in private funds without imposing restrictions on the investor base or the minimum investment amount. Moreover, this should expand the potential investor base for private fund managers by allowing more CEFs to invest alongside traditional institutional investors in private funds.
1 Private funds have generally been defined for this purpose as those that would be investment companies but for the exceptions provided in sections 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the 1940 Act. Thus, this did not preclude investments in underlying private issuers relying on other exemptions from investment company status, including real estate funds relying on section 3(c)(5) of the 1940 Act. Recently, the SEC staff agreed to allow certain infrastructure funds relying on section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the 1940 Act to be excluded from this limitation.
2 As such term is defined in Regulation D’s Rule 501(a) under the Securities Act of 1933.
AB 1415 Passed by California Assembly with Amendments
Key Takeaways
While MSOs and certain parent entities are no longer defined as “health care entities,” they must still notify OHCA when entering into material change transactions with health care entities.
The amendments clarify and narrow several definitions, affecting how and when notice obligations apply under AB 1415.
OHCA’s authority would expand to evaluate and potentially regulate additional entities, signaling increased oversight of health care transactions in California.
On May 15, 2025, the California Assembly passed AB 1415 with some amendments. AB 1415 seeks to expand the jurisdiction of the California Office of Health Care Affordability (OHCA) by requiring additional entities to notify OHCA when entering into material change transactions.1 Among other changes detailed below, the amendments slightly narrowed the notice requirements for management services organizations (MSOs) by requiring them to submit notice to OHCA only when entering into material change transactions with a “health care entity.” The bill is now under consideration with the California Senate, which has until the end of the legislative session (August 31, 2025) to act on the bill.
The amendments to AB 1415 include the following:
MSOs and certain parent entities that own, operate or control a provider were removed from the definition of “health care entity.” However, such entities would be required to submit notice to OHCA when entering into material change transactions with health care entities. These amendments slightly narrow the scope of notice requirements for such entities to those transactions where the counterparty is a health care entity.
The word “hospital,” for purposes of defining a “health system,” was clarified to include general acute care hospitals, acute psychiatric hospitals, specialty hospitals, psychiatric health facilities and chemical dependency recovery hospitals.
The definition of “health system” was expanded to include combinations of hospitals and other providers, rather than hospitals and physician organizations.
The definition of “provider” was amended to remove entities that own, operate or control other entities identified under the definition of “provider.”
OHCA would be empowered to research and evaluate payors, providers, MSOs and fully integrated delivery systems to determine if the definitions and provisions of OHCA’s governing statute include entities that significantly affect health care cost, quality, equity and workforce stability. The current law does not include MSOs within OHCA’s scope of research and evaluation.
OHCA would be empowered to establish requirements for MSOs to submit data “as necessary to carry out the functions of the office.”
These amendments demonstrate California’s interest in expanding OHCA’s jurisdiction to review a greater number of health care transactions occurring within the state. Even with these amendments, the passage of AB 1415 would require MSOs and companies that own, control or operate a provider to submit transaction notices to OHCA when entering into material change transactions with health care entities, adding to the existing health care regulatory and filing burdens already in place and potentially delaying further investment by some in the California health care sector.
[1] Our prior discussion of AB 1415 can be found here: https://www.polsinelli.com/publications/california-bill-seeks-to-expand-scope-of-ohca-review
Arbitration Rights Are Not Indestructible: Appellate Division Finds Waiver Based on Litigation Conduct
Arbitration provisions are a cornerstone of dispute-resolution strategy. As the Appellate Division recently made clear in Hopkins v. LVNV Funding, LLC, however, the right to arbitrate is not self-executing—and can be forfeited through strategic delay or active participation in litigation. A party that eschews arbitration in favor of judicial process may find those rights extinguished when invoked later. The decision demonstrates that arbitration rights are preserved not merely by contract but by conduct consistent with their enforcement. Put simply, a contractual right to arbitrate means little if a party’s litigation conduct signals abandonment rather than preservation.
In response to LVNV Funding, LLC’s (“LVNV”) complaint alleging that it had defaulted on its account with Credit One Bank, N.A., incurring $746.71 in debt, Randy Hopkins (“Hopkins”) filed an answer and “class action counterclaim” in May 2022 against several LVNV-affiliated debt purchasers and collectors (“Defendants”). Hopkins v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 481 N.J. Super. 49, 56 (App. Div. 2025). Hopkins alleged that Defendants violated the New Jersey Consumer Finance Licensing Act and the Consumer Fraud Act by attempting to collect consumer debts without the requisite state licenses. Id. at 57. Though represented by counsel, Defendants waited almost sixteen months before moving to compel arbitration. Id. at 64. During that time, they filed a motion to dismiss which the trial court granted in part, resulting in the dismissal of Hopkins’s unjust enrichment claim. Id. at 58. When Defendants ultimately filed an answer to Hopkins’s remaining claims, not only had they failed to assert arbitration as an affirmative defense, id. at 65, but their Rule 4:5-1(b)(2) certifications expressly disclaimed any pending or contemplated arbitration, id. at 58.
Only after Hopkins moved to compel their long-overdue discovery responses, did Defendants finally invoke the arbitration clause and move to compel arbitration. Id. at 59. The trial court granted the motion to compel arbitration, reasoning that the parties had not engaged in sufficiently “prolonged litigation” to support a finding of waiver. Id. In doing so, however, the court focused primarily on the passage of time. It gave little weight to Defendants’ litigation conduct, including their earlier motion to dismiss, omission of arbitration from their pleadings, and affirmative disclaimer of arbitration in the Rule 4:5-1 certifications accompanying the pleadings. Ibid. The Appellate Division reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court failed to conduct the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis required under Cole v. Jersey City Medical Center, 215 N.J. 265, 280–81 (2013). Hopkins, 481 N.J. Super. at 59.
Applying Cole, the Appellate Division considered seven non-exclusive factors to determine whether Defendants had waived their right to arbitrate. These include:
(1) the delay in making the arbitration request; (2) the filing of any motions, particularly dispositive motions, and their outcomes; (3) whether the delay in seeking arbitration was part of the party’s litigation strategy; (4) the extent of discovery conducted; (5) whether the party raised the arbitration issue in its pleadings, particularly as an affirmative defense, or provided other notification of its intent to seek arbitration; (6) the proximity of the date on which the party sought arbitration to the date of trial; and (7) the resulting prejudice suffered by the other party, if any.[Cole, 215 N.J. at 280-81.]
In analyzing all of the above factors, the court first found that the delay was substantial. Defendants waited nearly sixteen months to raise arbitration, a period the appellate court found particularly unreasonable given that they were represented by counsel and had actively litigated the case. Hopkins, 481 N.J. Super. at 64. Second, the motion practice supported waiver. Defendants filed a dispositive motion to dismiss and secured dismissal of a claim, which signaled submission to the trial court’s adjudicative authority. Ibid. Third, the appellate court found the timing of the arbitration demand to be strategic, noting that Defendants sought arbitration only after gaining partial dismissal and when discovery pressure mounted. Ibid. Fourth, although Defendants had not served discovery, they failed to respond to Hopkins’s discovery requests and filed for arbitration two days after Hopkins moved to compel those responses. Id. at 64-65. Fifth, Defendants’ failure to raise arbitration in their pleadings—combined with express representations in their Rule 4:5-1(b)(2) certifications that no arbitration was pending or contemplated—weighed heavily in favor of a finding of waiver. Id. at 65. Sixth, the proximity to trial weighed against a finding of waiver, as no trial date had been set. Ibid. Seventh, the appellate court found prejudice based on Hopkins’s investment of time and resources in litigating the matter and the fact that a claim (unjust enrichment) had already been dismissed through motion practice. Id. at 66. The Appellate Division concluded that considering the totality of the circumstances, Defendants’ conduct was inconsistent with the right and that the “purported right” had therefore been waived. Ibid.
Hopkins reinforces the importance of asserting arbitration rights early, clearly, and consistently. Parties wishing to preserve arbitration should assert their right to the dispute resolution mechanism at the outset of litigation—typically in a pre-answer motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration or in an answer. If that motion is denied, it is subject to immediate appellate review pursuant Rule 2:2-3, which treats such orders as final for appeal purposes.
If an answer is filed, the Rule 4:5-1(b)(2) certification must invoke the possibility of arbitration. Disclaiming any pending or contemplated arbitration in a Rule 4:5-1(b)(2) certification can later be used as evidence of waiver. Although attorneys often treat this certification as routine, Hopkins serves as a reminder that courts will hold parties to the representations made pursuant to Rule 4:5-1—especially where subsequent conduct reinforces the appearance that arbitration is off the table. The Appellate Division also emphasized that Rule 4:5-1 certifications carry a continuing obligation to amend if arbitration later becomes a viable or intended course of action. Id. at 65. A failure to amend the certification in a timely manner—especially when coupled with dispositive motion practice, participation in discovery, or delay until adverse rulings loom—can weigh heavily in a court’s waiver analysis.
To avoid these pitfalls, attorneys should flag and assess arbitration provisions at the outset of a case. Strategic inconsistency is risky and may result in the permanent forfeiture of a bargained-for right. Ultimately, Hopkins sends a cautionary message to all litigants who intend to rely on arbitration clauses—whether in low-stakes consumer matters or complex commercial disputes: courts will enforce such provisions only when parties treat arbitration as a right to be proactively preserved, not casually presumed.
CMS Issues Guidance and Requests Information to Promote Hospital Price Transparency Compliance and Enforcement Efforts
On May 22, 2025, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) took a series of actions to promote enhanced price transparency compliance by hospitals and identify challenges thereto, in order to inform future price transparency enforcement activities and policies. These actions were taken in furtherance of the President’s February 2025 Executive Order No. 14221 (which we previously analyzed here), and include the following actions of particular relevance for hospitals:
CMS issued updated Price Transparency Guidance here emphasizing that:
Hospitals must include dollar amounts in their machine-readable files (MRFs) (if they can be calculated) in order to make hospital pricing more transparent, “including the amount negotiated for the item or service, the base rate negotiated for a service package, and a dollar amount if the standard charge is based on a percentage of a known fee schedule”; and
Hospitals should no longer include the code “999999999 (nine 9s)” in MRFs for estimated allowed amounts and “should instead encode an actual dollar amount.”
CMS issued a Request for Information here (RFI) that is intended to “identify challenges and improve compliance and enforcement processes” related to hospital price transparency efforts, and specifically in connection with concerns regarding the “accuracy and completeness of” standard charge information in hospital MRFs.
The RFI seeks information from stakeholders in response to the following questions from CMS:
Should CMS specifically define the terms “accuracy of data” and “completeness of data” in the context of HPT requirements, and, if yes, then how?
What are your concerns about the accuracy and completeness of the HPT MRF data? Please be as specific as possible.
Do concerns about accuracy and completeness of the MRF data affect your ability to use hospital pricing information effectively? For example, are there additional data elements that could be added, or others modified, to improve your ability to use the data? Please provide examples.
Are there external sources of information that may be leveraged to evaluate the accuracy and completeness of the data in the MRF? If so, please identify those sources and how they can be used.
What specific suggestions do you have for improving the HPT compliance and enforcement processes to ensure that the hospital pricing data is accurate, complete, and meaningful? For example, are there any changes that CMS should consider making to the CMS validator tool, which is available to hospitals to help ensure they are complying with HPT requirements, so as to improve accuracy and completeness?
Do you have any other suggestions for CMS to help improve the overall quality of the MRF data?
Responses to the CMS RFI are due by midnight on July 21, 2025, and must be submitted on that same webpage. CMS is interested in feedback from a variety of stakeholders who interact with MRFs and/or rely on the price transparency tools, including hospitals, payers, employers, innovators, and consumers.
We will continue to monitor oversight and enforcement of federal price transparency laws, and the impact these activities may have on hospitals and other health care organizations.
Key Compliance Tips on How to Respond to Information Requests from OFSI
On 8 May 2025, the United Kingdom’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) of HM Treasury published a penalty notice regarding a breach of financial sanctions by a UK registered company—Svarog Shipping & Trading Company Limited (Svarog). OFSI imposed a monetary penalty of £5,000 on Svarog for failing, without reasonable excuse, to respond to a Request for Information (RFI) issued by OFSI.
Request for Information
OFSI has statutory powers to request documents and information for certain purposes, including establishing whether financial sanctions may have been breached or monitoring compliance with certain financial sanctions regulations or licences. OFSI will specify the legislative basis for the request and the time period within which the information should be provided (if no period is specified, the information must be provided within a reasonable time). Failure to comply with an RFI is a criminal offence which can lead to prosecution or a monetary penalty.
OFSI issued an RFI to Svarog on 26 January 2024 pursuant to OFSI’s statutory powers under Regulation 72 of The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (Russia Regulations). OFSI directed that a response was required by 9 February 2024. Despite OFSI sending a number of reminders, Svarog did not respond by the deadline. Svarog only responded to the RFI once OFSI contacted Svarog’s auditors. OFSI concluded that Svarog had failed to respond to OFSI’s RFI and, in the absence of a reasonable excuse, had breached Regulation 74(1)(a) of the Russia Regulations. OFSI imposed a monetary penalty of £5,000 for the breach.
Key Compliance Lessons
This case emphasises the importance of timely and accurate responses to RFIs and highlights a number of key compliance lessons, which are summarised below.
Respond Promptly to RFIs
Do not ignore the request. Failing to respond to an RFI can act as an aggravating factor in OFSI’s overall assessment of the severity of the breach.
Seek clarification if the request seems unclear or the deadline is challenging to adhere to.
If you believe you have missed a statutory deadline but you have a reasonable excuse, you should provide that excuse proactively for OFSI to consider, accompanied by a full explanation of the circumstances.
Recipients of RFIs should be aware of the importance of responding promptly, failing which can significantly impede OFSI’s ability and effectiveness to assess compliance, enforce financial sanctions and maintain compliance with the sanction’s regimes.
Understand the Legal Basis
Determine the statutory basis of OFSI’s RFI. If you are unsure, seek advice from sanctions or regulatory legal teams.
Engage Proactively and Candidly With OFSI When It Comes to RFIs
Be aware of any time limits specified in the RFI.
Provide accurate information to OFSI, ensuring it is truthful and accurate.
Engage with OFSI’s published guidance and seek professional advice on sanctions obligations if necessary.
Have Effective Communication and Monitoring Systems in Place
Keep detailed records of compliance procedures, risk assessments and responses to the RFI.
Demonstrate awareness of sanction compliance duties, including record keeping.
Appoint responsible personnel, monitoring and maintaining up-to-date contact information to ensure effective communication with OFSI RFIs.
OFSI expects firms to have effective communication and monitoring systems in place so that firms can promptly identify and respond to any RFI they might receive from OFSI.
Plan for Follow Up
Be prepared for follow-up queries or interviews. OFSI may ask for clarification, more documents or meetings after the initial response.
Consider Other Compliance and Reporting Obligations
Whilst the penalty in this case related to the failure to respond to an RFI without a reasonable excuse, other types of failures to provide information can also constitute breaches leading to penalties. For example:
Non-compliance with reporting obligations, including both failure to report and late reporting without reasonable excuse.
Incomplete or otherwise non-compliant reporting on specific and general licences, reporting requirements on licences and failures to report frozen assets.
Conclusion
You should ensure you are aware of your obligations and your requirement to comply with an RFI by OFSI.
The SEC’s Latest Agenda
In December of last year we posted on Hunton’s Retail Law Resource Blog about the changing of the guard at the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) with the new administration. Paul Atkins was nominated by President Donald J. Trump on January 20, 2025, confirmed by the U.S. Senate on April 9, 2025, and sworn in as the 34th Chairman of the SEC on April 21, 2025.
The Practicing Law Institute annually presents a conference titled “SEC Speaks” in cooperation with the SEC, and Chairman Atkins spoke on his agenda at this year’s program on May 19, 2025. Chairman Atkins began by stating his intent to discuss innovation and how the SEC should “embrace and champion it” rather than fear it. He provided a recent history lesson of progress that has come from a proactive SEC. His timeline started with the computerization of securities in the 1970s, highlighted other innovation such as the earliest exchange-traded fund launching in the 1990s, and led us to his first agenda point titled “Crypto Innovation” in his written remarks. Chairman Atkins announced that Commission staff across policy divisions has been directed to begin drafting crypto proposals and to “maintain transparent interactions with the public” to help provide useful insights. We should expect the SEC to provide clear rules related to crypto under this administration, but an anticipated date for such was not provided.
Continuing with his theme of innovation, the second point of Chairman Atkins’s agenda was to integrate the functions of the SEC’s Strategic Hub for Innovation and Financial Technology (“FinHub”) into other parts of the agency. Chairman Atkins explained that FinHub was created during a critical time of emerging technologies but believes it is too small to be efficient for more than its current focus. Congress has to approve the reprogramming, but integrating the priorities FinHub was founded under into the culture of the SEC will be key for Chairman Atkins.
The third point of Chairman Atkins’s agenda was on investing in private funds. Specifically, to reconsider the practice and 23-year position of the SEC that investments by closed-end funds of 15% or more of their assets in private funds should impose minimum initial investment requirements and restrict sales that satisfy the accredited investor standard. Chairman Atkins noted that important disclosure issues need to be considered and resolved, but we should expect to see more on this. Finally, Chairman Atkins announced that he had instructed the SEC staff to undertake a comprehensive review of the Consolidated Audit Trail (“CAT”). He requested the costs of the system be examined, as well as reporting requirements and the scope of what is collected by the CAT.
From beginning to end, the new Chairman highlighted promoting innovation. We will continue to watch for the written and spoken guidance of the SEC to see how they “embrace and champion” these above agenda points.