On the Hot Seat: Brian Quintenz Faces Senate Spotlight in CFTC Confirmation Hearing
Brian Quintenz appeared before the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, & Forestry (Senate Ag Committee) for his June 10th nomination hearing for Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC or Commission) Chairman. Committee members questioned Mr. Quintenz on a range of topics, including the regulation of digital assets, event contracts and prediction markets, the Commission’s approach to innovation and technology, and resource allocation. Largely reaffirming the principles that guided his prior tenure as a commissioner, Mr. Quintenz emphasized his commitment to promoting responsible innovation while protecting investors, supporting a technology-forward approach to all aspects of the Commission’s functions, and preserving the CFTC’s role as a principles-based regulator. For a discussion of Mr. Quintenz’s previous term and policy views, see this Katten post.
The major themes from the hearing are outlined below:
The CFTC’s Role in the Regulation of Digital Assets. Mr. Quintenz reaffirmed that the CFTC is the appropriate regulator for digital commodities and called upon Congress to provide clear statutory authority to oversee spot digital commodity markets. He expressed concern over past regulatory actions that have resulted in the debanking of crypto-related firms, noting that such actions have stifled innovation by restricting access to essential banking services. Additionally, Mr. Quintenz called for greater jurisdictional clarity, referencing inconsistent determinations by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on which crypto products are securities as making it difficult for market participants to comply with applicable laws. He articulated that regulatory clarity on digital assets does not preclude robust enforcement against fraud and misconduct by bad actors.
CEA Supports CFTC Jurisdiction Over Event Contracts. Responding to questions on the regulatory implications of event contracts, Mr. Quintenz stated that the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) permits contracts based on events “associated with a potential financial, economic, or commercial consequence,” as such events create price risks similar to those in traditional commodity markets.[1] Addressing some senators’ concerns related to gaming laws and Tribal sovereignty, he committed to convening a stakeholder roundtable to ensure diverse viewpoints and industry stakeholders are heard. He acknowledged the ambiguity between the statutory framework of CEA section 5c(c)(5)(C) and the regulatory framework of CFTC Regulation 40.11 where the statute grants the Commission the power to determine that an event contract is contrary to the public interest and disallow it, without clearly defining what “the public interest” entails.[2]
Vision for Innovation and a Technology-First Approach. Mr. Quintenz highlighted the CFTC’s existing use of advanced technology for surveillance and oversight, committing to continue this trajectory and find new uses for state-of-the-art tools to enhance the agency’s efficiency. He stressed the importance of technology in safeguarding the integrity of systemically important clearinghouses.
A Time and a Place for 24/7 Trading. On market structure and 24/7 trading hours, Mr. Quintenz acknowledged that these innovations may be appropriate for some markets more so than others, citing the importance of understanding end users’ liquidity needs and preferences, especially those in the agricultural community. He noted the importance of ascertaining the views of risk managers and hedgers.
The Statutory Mandate, Bipartisanship and Governance. Reflecting on his prior tenure as commissioner, Mr. Quintenz noted that the Commission has, at multiple times, functioned with as few as two confirmed commissioners. He pledged to preserve the Commission’s bipartisan nature and emphasized the value of public feedback in shaping rulemakings, particularly when the Commission is operating with a limited number of commissioners.
Deploying Agency Resources and Fair Competition. Mr. Quintenz supported increasing the CFTC’s budget and staff if new authorities over spot digital markets were granted, beyond the current enforcement authority over fraud and market manipulation. He also addressed concerns about delays in application reviews, stressing the need for timely and transparent processing. He welcomed the idea suggested by several Senate Ag Committee members of internal performance metrics to improve responsiveness and shrink timelines in registrant applications or product offering reviews.
Conflicts of Interest and Recusal from Certain Matters. Addressing potential conflicts stemming from his private sector experience, Mr. Quintenz committed to full compliance with all applicable ethics rules. He indicated that he would recuse himself from matters as appropriate. Moreover, he noted that an in-house staff member will review matters to ensure that his impartiality is maintained.
Next Steps in the Confirmation Process and Commission Status
Senate Ag Committee Chairman John Boozman is expected to schedule a meeting to vote on advancing Mr. Quintenz’s nomination. If approved, the nomination will be placed on the Senate Executive Calendar for a full Senate vote. Then, a simple majority is required for confirmation. This entire process may take as little as a few weeks or as long as several months to complete. The Commission currently has two members, Acting Chairman Caroline Pham and Commissioner Kristin Johnson, whose term has expired, but may presumably remain in office through the August congressional recess. Acting Chairman Pham has announced she will step down upon Mr. Quintenz’s confirmation. For more on the implications of a temporarily reduced Commission, see this Katten post.
[1] 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47)(A).
[2] 7 U.S.C. § 7a-2(c)(5)(C); 17 C.F.R. § 40.11; Brian D. Quintenz, Comm’r, CFTC, “Statement of Commissioner Brian D. Quintenz on ErisX RSBIX NFL Contracts and Certain Event Contracts” (Mar. 25, 2021), available at: https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/quintenzstatement032521.
PPP Loan Credits and Government Contracts: What Contractors Need to Know During Incurred Cost Reviews
As federal contractors continue to navigate the post-pandemic compliance landscape, a recurring issue has emerged in government audits and incurred cost reviews: whether and how contractors must credit the government for Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan forgiveness amounts received during the performance of cost-reimbursement contracts. The issue has raised significant questions regarding allowability, allocability, and the application of credit principles under the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).
This blog post outlines the legal and regulatory framework governing PPP loan forgiveness in the context of cost-reimbursement contracts, highlights recent developments in audit and review practices, and offers guidance for contractors preparing for incurred cost submissions or Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) reviews.
The Basics: PPP Loans and Forgiveness
The PPP was created under the CARES Act to provide emergency financial assistance to businesses affected by COVID-19. Contractors who received PPP loans could apply for forgiveness if the loan proceeds were used for eligible expenses, such as payroll costs, rent, and utilities.
While the loans were designed to provide economic relief, federal cost principles under the FAR present a separate compliance hurdle for contractors, especially those with cost-type contracts.
FAR Requirements for Credits and Cost Allowability
The key regulatory provision is FAR 31.201-5, which addresses the treatment of applicable credits. It states:
“The applicable portion of any income, rebate, allowance, or other credit relating to any allowable cost and received by or accruing to the contractor shall be credited to the Government either as a cost reduction or by cash refund.”
When a contractor receives PPP loan forgiveness covering costs also billed to the government, the forgiven amount may constitute an “applicable credit” under this provision.
Additionally, FAR 31.201-1 (Composition of total cost) and FAR 31.201-4 (Allocability) further reinforce that costs must be properly allocated and cannot result in the government subsidizing costs not actually borne by the contractor.
DCAA and Agency Audit Practices
In the years following widespread PPP loan forgiveness, the DCAA and other audit agencies have begun scrutinizing contractor cost submissions more closely. During incurred cost reviews, auditors are examining whether contractors received loan forgiveness and, if so, whether they appropriately credited the government.
Some agencies, including the Department of Defense, have issued guidance emphasizing that contractors generally must not be reimbursed for costs covered by PPP loans that were forgiven. Where contractors billed the government for payroll or other expenses and also received PPP forgiveness for the same costs, auditors may seek cost reductions or refunds.
Challenges and Legal Considerations
Contractors face several challenges in responding to PPP credit issues:
Tracking and Documentation – Contractors must be able to show how PPP funds were used and how those costs were allocated across contracts, including distinguishing between commercial and government work.
Timing of Forgiveness – Since forgiveness often occurred after costs were incurred, some contractors did not know at the time of billing whether the costs would ultimately be credited. This timing mismatch can complicate how credits are reflected in incurred cost submissions.
Double Recovery Risks – The central legal risk is “double-dipping”: recovering the same cost from both the government and through PPP loan forgiveness. Contractors must be vigilant in avoiding this outcome.
Best Practices for Contractors
Identify and segregate PPP-funded costs from government-reimbursed costs wherever possible.
Maintain detailed documentation of how PPP funds were used and the specific costs covered.
Amend incurred cost submissions to reflect forgiven PPP amounts as credits if necessary.
Consult with legal and accounting professionals to ensure compliance with FAR credit requirements.
Engage proactively with auditors, especially if PPP forgiveness occurred during or after the relevant cost periods.
Conclusion
While PPP loans were a lifeline for many businesses during the pandemic, they come with continuing compliance obligations for government contractors. The government’s position — reinforced in audits and reviews — is clear: Contractors must not profit from forgiven PPP amounts when those costs were already billed to federal contracts. Understanding and applying the FAR’s credit principles are critical to avoiding audit findings, repayments, or potential False Claims Act exposure.
Contractors should take a proactive approach, review incurred cost submissions, and seek professional advice when necessary. As agencies continue to revisit pandemic-related relief, being prepared for PPP-related scrutiny is more important than ever.
STOP! START AGAIN! JUST KIDDING, STOP AGAIN! SEC Provides 11th Hour Extension of Compliance Date for Amended Form PF
With less than a day to go before the 12 June 2025 compliance date for the SEC and CFTC’s jointly adopted amendments to Form PF, the SEC, together with the CFTC, voted today to further extend the compliance date for the amended form to 1 October 2025.
Citing concerns regarding “gobbledygook” within the form instructions, among other difficulties raised by impacted filers, Chairman Atkins indicated that the further extension would provide filers and the staff with additional time to work through issues with the amended form.
In addition to the extension, in a hint of possible further SEC actions ahead, Chairman Atkins also indicated that he has directed the staff to undertake a “comprehensive review” of Form PF in its entirety to confirm that the data collected is consistent with the form’s stated purpose of permitting agencies to monitor systemic risk.
House Unveils CLARITY Act
On May 29, 2025, a bipartisan group of members in the House of Representatives from the Financial Services and Agriculture Committees introduced the Digital Asset Market Clarity (CLARITY) Act. The bill seeks to establish a comprehensive regulatory framework for digital assets in the United States, with regulatory jurisdiction primarily split between the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).
Central to the bill is the definition of “digital commodity,” which includes “a digital asset that is intrinsically linked to a blockchain system, and the value of which is derived from or is reasonably expected to be derived from the use of the blockchain system.” Under the bill, digital commodities would be excluded from the definition of a security under the federal securities laws, and the CFTC would be primarily responsible for spot markets in digital commodities as well as the registration and oversight of various categories of intermediaries transacting in digital commodities. Digital commodities sold pursuant to an investment contract would also not deemed investment contracts themselves under the Howey test. Additionally, the bill creates a detailed mechanism for the offering of an investment contract that includes a digital commodity, which would be overseen by the SEC.
The bill covers a number of other topics relating to digital commodities, including facilitating secondary trading of digital commodities on mature blockchains, operation of alternative trading systems involving digital commodities, transactions in certain payment stablecoins, and custody of digital commodities. Certain decentralized finance activities involving digital commodities (such as providing user interfaces for a blockchain network, publishing and updating software, and developing blockchain wallets) would be exempted from regulation. The bill further authorizes the SEC and CFTC to engage in rulemaking to implement certain provisions of the legislation, and instructs various federal agencies (including the CFTC and SEC) to produce various studies involving digital commodities.
A detailed section by section summary of the bill is here.
FCA Outlines Next Steps on Potential Motor Finance Redress Scheme
On 5 June 2025, the United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA“) has published a statement (“Statement“) setting out its current thinking on the possible implementation of a redress scheme for motor finance customers who may have been affected by discretionary commission arrangements (“Redress Scheme”).
This follows the FCA’s earlier decision to pause complaint handling in light of the pending appeals to the United Kingdom Supreme Court in Hopcraft & Ors (the “Supreme Court Appeals”). In March 2025, the FCA stated that if, following the outcome of the Supreme Court Appeals, it concludes that motor finance consumers have lost out, it is likely to consult on an industry-wide consumer Redress Scheme.
In the Statement, the FCA confirms that, subject to the outcome of the Supreme Court Appeals, it is likely to consult on a Redress Scheme that would require firms to proactively assess and compensate affected customers. The FCA’s preference is for a streamlined, industry-wide solution that avoids the need for individual complaints or reliance on claims management companies.
The Statement also outlines the principles that would underpin any such scheme, including:
A focus on fair outcomes for consumers who suffered financial loss due to non-disclosure of discretionary commission arrangements;
A firm-led approach to identifying and compensating affected customers;
A commitment to efficiency and consistency, with the FCA potentially setting out a standardised methodology for redress.
The FCA has indicated that the Redress Scheme would likely operate on an opt-out basis. This means eligible consumers would automatically be included unless they actively choose not to participate. The opt-out model is intended to maximise consumer reach and reduce friction, particularly for those who may not otherwise engage with a complaint-led process.
The Supreme Court’s decision in the Supreme Court Appeals is expected in July 2025. The FCA has reiterated that it will make a final decision on whether to proceed with a Redress Scheme within six weeks of the Supreme Court’s ruling. In the meantime, the pause on complaint handling remains in place until at least 4 December 2025.
This latest development signals a potentially significant shift in the regulatory landscape for motor finance. Firms should continue to monitor the situation closely and consider how they might operationalise a redress process if required.
Ratings Agency Announces That It Will Analyze Physical Climate Risk When Evaluating Certain Assets
Recently, Fitch Ratings issued a discussion paper that outlined a “contemplated framework for the analysis of physical climate risk for [Structured Finance] and [Covered Bonds] for the potential negative implications of physical climate events on asset performance, and, ultimately, on ratings.” In essence, a major credit ratings agency has effectively announced that physical climate risk–including “acute wildfire, wind, flood, drought, precipitation, and hail risk”–should be included when analyzing and issuing credit ratings.
This development provides further evidence for how companies are integrating climate risk into day-to-day operations, and the increasing salience of this issue for a number of different industries (e.g., finance, insurance). For example, here, with respect to the covered bond market, the physical risk posed by climate change to the underlying asset could have a significant impact on the risk profile of the security–and thus upon its price.
Irrespective of the extent to which climate data is subject to mandatory climate disclosures by governmental authorities, the private sector is nonetheless demanding certain climate data in order to function properly and profitably.
Against that backdrop, Fitch is now in the process of integrating physical climate risks into credit assessments. The move reflects an evolving concern among ratings firms and regulators alike that climate change is hitting the mortgage market — and the bonds that finance it — in ways that have yet to be adequately reflected in valuations. What happened in Switzerland should serve as a reminder that when climate shocks hit, their impact can be devastating, Rossiter said.
news.bloomberglaw.com/…
Investment Advisers to Launch AML Programs January 1, 2026
Beginning January 1, 2026, many investment advisers will be required under federal law to implement anti-money laundering (“AML”) programs.[1] These requirements are intended to deputize investment advisers to help law enforcement prevent money laundering, terrorist financing, and other illicit finance activity throughout the investment adviser industry. An investment adviser AML program must consist of (i) internal policies, procedures and controls reasonably designed to mitigate AML risk, (ii) independent testing of the investment adviser’s AML program, (iii) an AML compliance officer, (iv) ongoing AML training, and (v) appropriate risk-based procedures for conducting ongoing “customer” due diligence. Hunton has deep experience with designing, implementing and managing AML programs for other categories of financial institutions and can assist investment advisers with tailoring and rolling out their AML program in advance of the January 1, 2026 implementation date.
For more information, please see below.
Why are investment advisers required to have an AML program?
Beginning in the 1970s, Congress began passing a series of laws that collectively became known as the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”). These laws required banks to help law enforcement fight money laundering. Over time, these laws were extended to apply to additional categories of financial institutions, such as broker-dealers, insurance companies and money services businesses.
The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), a federal agency that is part of the Treasury Department and has rulemaking and enforcement authority with respect to the BSA, has long sought to bring investment advisers within the federal AML framework. FinCEN first attempted to bring investment advisers under AML regulation in 2002 and 2003, when it proposed separate rules that covered unregistered and registered investment companies, respectively.[2] Both proposals met heavy opposition from investment advisers and the private fund industry, and were withdrawn in 2008. In 2015, FinCEN again proposed an AML framework for investment advisers.[3] Again, industry opposition led FinCEN to abandon its proposal. FinCEN released its third proposal for the investment adviser industry in 2024.[4]
Are all investment advisers covered by the AML requirement?
The scope of the rule is found in the definition of investment adviser (31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(nnn)). It applies to:
(1) Any person, other than a person identified in (2), wherever located, who is registered or required to register with the SEC under section 203 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Act”), or any person who is exempt from SEC registration under section 203(l) (the venture capital adviser exemption) or 203(m) (the private fund adviser exemption).
(2) For the purposes of this subpart, investment adviser does not include:
any person who is registered or required to register with the SEC under section 203 of the Act only because such person is an investment adviser that meets the conditions of
mid-sized adviser, as set forth in Section 203A(a)(2)(B) of the Act (AUM of $25-$100 million),
a pension consultant, as defined under 17 CFR 275–203A–2(a), or
multi-state adviser, as defined under 17 CFR 275–203A–2(d).
any person who is registered or required to register with the SEC under section 203 of the Act and does not report any assets under management, as defined under Section 203A(a)(3) of the Act, on its most recently filed initial Form ADV or annual updating amendment to Form ADV (17 CFR 279.1).
If you are an investment adviser that meets this definition, then the AML requirements apply to you.
How do the AML requirements for investment advisers compare with the AML requirements for other financial institutions?
The AML program requirements for investment advisers are based on, and largely identical to, the AML requirements for banks and many other categories of financial institutions. Accordingly, hiring BSA officers and other AML compliance personnel from outside of the investment adviser industry may help investment advisers fulfill their AML compliance obligations.
What does an investment adviser AML program consist of?
Other financial institutions frequently refer to AML programs as consisting of five pillars:
Internal controls;
Independent testing;
AML Officer;
AML training; and
Customer due diligence.
Investment adviser AML programs are required to have these same five pillars as part of their AML program. Investment advisers must also have suspicious activity reporting processes as part of its AML program.
Notably, investment adviser AML programs are not required to have a customer identification program (“CIP”) or collect beneficial ownership data and information for legal entity customers (these two requirements apply to other categories of financial institutions). However, it is likely that these requirements will be implemented through other rulemakings.[5]
What constitutes an investment adviser’s “customer” for AML compliance?
The investment adviser’s diligence and similar obligations apply only with respect to the investment adviser’s “customers.” The final rule “[u]ses the term ‘customers’ for those natural and legal persons who enter into an advisory relationship with an investment adviser.”
The final rule also says that in order to make risk-based assessments of funds that are customers of an investment adviser, an investment adviser must conduct some level of investor diligence:
FinCEN expects an investment adviser that is the primary adviser to a private fund or other unregistered pooled investment vehicle to make a risk-based assessment of the money laundering, terrorist financing, and illicit finance activity risks presented by the investors in such investment vehicles by considering the same types of relevant factors, as appropriate, as the adviser would consider for customers for whom the adviser manages assets directly. As noted above, the risk-based approach of the rule is intended to give investment advisers the flexibility to design their programs to meet the specific risks presented by their customers, including any funds they advise. In assessing the potential risk of a private fund under the rule, investment advisers generally should gather pertinent facts about the structure or ownership of the fund, including the extent to which the adviser is provided with relevant information about the investors in that private fund, who may or may not themselves also be customers of the investment adviser, and the nature of such investor-related information that they investment adviser receives.[6]
When do I need to file a suspicious activity report?
Investment advisers must file a suspicious activity report (a “SAR”) if a transaction
(1) is conducted or attempted by, at, or through an investment adviser;
(2) it involves or aggregates funds or other assets of at least $5,000; and
(3) the investment adviser knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect that the transaction (or a pattern of transactions of which the transaction is a part):
Involves funds derived from illegal activity or is intended or conducted in order to hide or disguise funds or assets derived from illegal activity (including, without limitation, the ownership, nature, source, location, or control of such funds or assets) as part of a plan to violate or evade any Federal law or regulation or to avoid any transaction reporting requirement under Federal law or regulation;
Is designed, whether through structuring or other means, to evade any requirements of this chapter or any other regulations promulgated under the Bank Secrecy Act;
Has no business or apparent lawful purpose or is not the sort in which the particular customer would normally be expected to engage, and the investment adviser knows of no reasonable explanation for the transaction after examining the available facts, including the background and possible purpose of the transaction; or
Involves use of the investment adviser to facilitate criminal activity.
If I use a third party administrator, do we both have these obligations? How much can I delegate to my third-party fund administrator?
An investment adviser may delegate its AML obligations to a third party, including to fund administrators. However, “if an investment adviser delegates the implementation and operation of any aspects of its AML/CFT program, the investment adviser will remain fully responsible and legally liable for, and be required to demonstrate to examiners, the program’s compliance with AML/CFT requirements and FinCEN’s implementing regulations.”[7]
How will compliance with the AML program requirements be assessed?
FinCEN has delegated its examination authority for investment advisers to the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) given the SEC’s expertise in the regulation of investment advisers and the existing delegation to the SEC of authority to examine broker-dealers and mutual funds for compliance with FinCEN’s regulations implementing the BSA. Once the rule goes into effect, investment advisers should expect the SEC’s Examination Division to focus on these new requirements during examinations.
What are the penalties for AML program violations?
FinCEN has overall authority for enforcement and compliance with its regulations, including coordination and direction of procedures and activities of all other agencies exercising delegated authority. Further, pursuant to 31 C.F.R. § 1010.810(d), FinCEN has the authority to impose civil penalties for violations of the BSA and its regulations.
What should investment advisers be doing now?
Investment advisers should work with their internal and external compliance and legal functions to design and implement an AML program that complies with these new requirements. We encourage investment advisers to have these programs implemented by the beginning of the fourth quarter of 2025 in order to test and prepare for the January 1, 2016 implementation date.
Footnotes
[1] Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism Program and Suspicious Activity Report Filing Requirements for Registered Investment Advisers and Exempt Reporting Advisers, 89 Fed. Reg. 72,156, (Sept. 4, 2024).
[2] Anti-Money Laundering Programs for Unregistered Investment Companies, 67 Fed. Reg. 60,617 (Sept. 26, 2002). Anti-Money Laundering Programs for Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 23,646 (May 5, 2003).
[3] Anti-Money Laundering Program and Suspicious Activity Report Filing Requirements for Registered Investment Advisers, 80 Fed. Reg. 52,680 (Sept. 1, 2015).
[4] Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism Program and Suspicious Activity Report Filing Requirements for Registered Investment Advisers and Exempt Reporting Advisers, 89 Fed. Reg. 12,108 (Feb. 15, 2024).
[5] See Customer Identification Programs for Registered Investment Advisers and Exempt Reporting Advisers, 89 Fed. Reg. 44,571 (May 21, 2024).
[6] 89 Fed. Reg. at 72,191.
[7] 89 Fed. Reg. at 72,188.
First Amendment Freedoms and Federal Funds: Why Harvard’s Stand Matters for All Americans
On April 11, 2025, the Trump Administration sent its now-infamous demand letter to Harvard University, the country’s oldest institution of higher learning, identifying ten conditions Harvard must satisfy to maintain its stream of government funding.1 Harvard’s lawyers responded by letter on April 14, vowing that Harvard would not comply with demands deemed “in contravention of the First Amendment” and thus unlawful.2 In retaliation, the Administration froze $2.2 billion in grant funding and threatened to revoke Harvard’s tax-exempt status.3 Harvard then sued the Administration in federal court in Massachusetts, asserting that the government’s threats flout the First Amendment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and other federal laws and regulations.4
While the Administration justifies its funding cuts as a response to concerns about antisemitism and viewpoint diversity, Harvard’s well-pleaded Complaint reframes the debate as a defense of our First Amendment freedoms and a call to sustain scientific research that benefits all Americans. The First Amendment, our nation’s most prized fundamental right, is at the forefront of Harvard’s Complaint. Harvard argues that the government’s attempt to exert a “pressure campaign to force Harvard to submit to the Government’s control over its academic programs” is antithetical to First Amendment principles.5 The Supreme Court recognized as early as 1943, in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, that “[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official . . . can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.”6 Moreover, “[t]he classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas’ that the First Amendment is designed to safeguard,” Harvard argues, quoting from Healey v. James.7 Accordingly, the Administration’s move to “interfere with private actors’ speech to advance its own vision of ideological balance”8 and its ‘threat of invoking legal sanctions and other means of coercion’” to suppress disfavored speech9 imperil both truth-seeking and our shared First Amendment rights.
In addition to undermining First Amendment principles, the practical stakes of funding cuts to scientific research are just as profound for all Americans, as laid out by Harvard’s Complaint. Since World War II, the federal government and U.S. universities have engaged in a shared mission to tackle some of our nation’s most pressing problems and develop groundbreaking solutions.10 Congress, through its spending power, authorizes funding and grants to those best positioned to maximize the utility of those funds—other federal agencies, universities, and researchers who have specialized skills, knowledge, and capacity to develop medicines, tools, technologies, and discoveries that improve the lives of American families.
This symbiotic relationship has served as the bedrock of America’s world-class innovation for almost a century. The Administration now moves to dismantle this funding infrastructure without Congressional authorization or any showing as to how cutting federal research dollars is a narrowly tailored response to antisemitic conduct or lack of viewpoint diversity on campus. As Harvard asserts, “[t]he Government has not—and cannot—identify any rational connection between antisemitism concerns and the medical, science, technological and other research it has frozen that aims to save American lives, foster American success, preserve American security, and maintain America’s position as a global leader in innovation.”11
The consequences of cutting federal research funding impact everyday Americans in a very real way. “There is so much goodness, love and care that goes into our work—work that is making homes, schools, and communities safer for people across the U.S., perhaps even for you and/or someone you care about—and if it is ended, the effects will be calamitous,” warns Dr. Katie Edwards, a professor of social work at the University of Michigan and the director of the Interpersonal Violence Research Laboratory.12
At Harvard, faculty are pursuing solutions to urgent challenges that affect millions,13 including research on cancer, infectious diseases, microbiomes, toxin reduction, microplastics, Parkinson’s disease, Alzheimer’s disease, space-related radiation, traumatic battlefield injuries, limb regeneration, antibiotic resistance, and so on.14 Similarly, at Princeton, federal funding suspensions threaten projects funded by the Energy Department, the Defense Department, NASA, and the National Institutes of Health, impacting research in climate science, quantitative biology, gene sequencing, and other critical fields.15
Michael Gordin, a renowned historian of science and dean of the college at Princeton, warns that in the history of modern science, “we only have one example of an industrialized, leading scientific country that starved its scientists, and that was the former Soviet Union. The results were quite catastrophic. In the first decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia lost 70% of its scientists. A small fraction left the country, but most just got other jobs.”16
Unlike in post-Soviet Russia, universities here rely on donors and corporations to help fund research programs. However, this private funding is not enough to counter cuts in federal funding. Research is expensive and time-consuming, and corporations often prioritize short-term returns on investment over “blue sky” research.17 At Princeton, for example, the university still faces a $25 million annual shortfall to support faculty research.18 Dipping into these universities’ endowments is not a simple fix. Harvard’s endowment consists of more than 14,000 individual funds, many of which are donor-restricted.19 Harvard and other universities make withdrawals from their endowments to meet operating expenses, but withdrawing enormous funds to offset government funding cuts can jeopardize universities’ long-term financial stability.20
The Administration’s campaign to erode First-Amendment principles and kneecap federal funding for our nation’s scientists and researchers for political gain is alarming. Harvard’s Complaint underscores how research is critical to addressing diseases and health issues that reach every family and individual. The Administration’s demands, if met, would undermine academic freedom and harm the health, safety, and security of millions of Americans. We commend Harvard and its peer institutions for standing up for the rule of law and calling to protect research funding that benefits all Americans, regardless of one’s political leanings.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not necessarily of her law firm, Dilworth Paxson LLP or The National Law Review.
1 Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Gen. Servs. Admin., & U.S. Dep’t of Educ. to Alan Garber, President, Harvard Univ. (Apr. 11, 2025) https://www.harvard.edu/research-funding/wp- content/uploads/sites/16/2025/04/Letter-Sent-to-Harvard-2025-04-11.pdf.
2 Letter from Harvard Univ. to U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Gen. Servs. Admin., & U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (April 14, 2025), https://www.harvard.edu/research-funding/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2025/04/Harvard- Response-2025-04-14.pdf.
3 Ginia Bellafante, Harvard’s Endowment is $53.2 billion. What Should It Be For?, N.Y. Times (April 26, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/26/business/harvard-endowment-trump.html.
4 President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 1:25-cv-11048 (D.Mass. Apr. 21, 2025) (complaint).
5 President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 1:25-cv-11048 (D.Mass. Apr. 21, 2025) (complaint), at ¶ 11.
6 W. Va. State Bd. Of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
7 President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 1:25-cv-11048 (D.Mass. Apr. 21, 2025) (complaint), at ¶ 98.
8 President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 1:25-cv-11048 (D.Mass. Apr. 21, 2025) (complaint), at ¶ 7 (quoting Moody v. NetChoice, 603 U.S. 707, 741 (2024))
9 President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 1:25-cv-11048 (D.Mass. Apr. 21, 2025) (complaint), at ¶ 7 (quoting Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Vullo, 602 U.S. 175, 189 (2024)).
10 President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 1:25-cv-11048 (D.Mass. Apr. 21, 2025) (complaint), at ¶ 1 (quoting Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Vullo, 602 U.S. 175, 189 (2024) (citation omitted)).
11 President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 1:25-cv-11048 (D.Mass. Apr. 21, 2025) (complaint), at ¶ 10.
12 Katie Edwards, The Trump Administration Just Made Catastrophic Cuts That Will Affect You or Someone You Know, HuffPost (Apr. 27, 2025), https://www.msn.co/en-us/news/us/the-trump-administration-just-made- catastrophic-cuts-that-will-affect-you-or-someone-you-know/ar-AA1DHWWH?ocid=BingNewsSerp.
13 Chelsea Bailey, Harvard’s Fight with the Trump Administration Is Just Getting Started. The Cost Is Already High, CNN (Apr. 23, 2025), https://edition.cnn.com/2025/04/23/us/harvard-funding-freeze-trump- impact/index.html.
14 President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 1:25-cv-11048 (D.Mass. Apr. 21, 2025) (complaint), at ¶ 36.
15 Sena Chang, ‘Devastating’ and ‘Shocking’: What Princeton Stands to Lose from Trump’s Science Freeze, The Daily Princetonian (Feb. 6, 2025), https://www.dailyprincetonian.com/article/2025/02/princeton-news-research- funding-freeze-trump-confusion?utm_source=chatgpt.com
16 Liz Fuller-Wright, The Partnership That Drives America’s Leadership in Medical Discovery: How It Works and What’s at Stake, Princeton Univ. Office of Comm. (Feb. 18, 2025), https://www.princeton.edu/news/2025/02/18/partnership-drives-americas-leadership-medical-discovery-how-it- works-and-whats.
17 Liz Fuller-Wright, The Partnership That Drives America’s Leadership in Medical Discovery: How It Works and What’s at Stake, Princeton Univ., Office of Comm., (Feb. 18, 2025), https://www.princeton.edu/news/2025/02/18/partnership-drives-americas-leadership-medical-discovery-how-it- works-and-whats.
18 Rachel Abrams, The University President Willing to Fight Trump, The Daily (N.Y. Times Apr. 9, 2025) (podcast), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/09/podcasts/the-daily/princeton-university-trump.html.
19 Alan Blinder & Stephanie Saul, Can Harvard Withstand Trump’s Financial Attack?, N.Y. Times (April 22, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/22/us/harvard-trump-funding-endowment.html.
20 Alan Blinder & Stephanie Saul, Can Harvard Withstand Trump’s Financial Attack?, N.Y. Times (April 22, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/22/us/harvard-trump-funding-endowment.html.
DOL Plans to Replace ESG Rule for Retirement Plan Fiduciaries
The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) indicated in court documents that it intends to begin new rulemaking to replace a previous rule that permitted 401(k) plan fiduciaries to consider environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors when choosing investment options in the plan.
Quick Hits
The DOL will no longer apply a previous rule that allowed retirement plan fiduciaries to take ESG factors into account when selecting investment options.
Twenty-six states challenged the rule in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Plan fiduciaries may continue to rely on financial factors to make decisions about which investments to include in the plan.
Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), retirement plan fiduciaries are required to select and monitor plan investments in accordance with ERISA’s fiduciary duties. Among those duties are the requirements to prudently select and monitor plan investments, to diversify plan investments in most cases, and to act solely in the interests of the plan participants and beneficiaries when doing so. Plan fiduciaries are required to follow the plan’s written investment policy outlining factors to be considered in this process.
In December 2022, the DOL published a final rule that clarified that fiduciaries may consider climate change and other ESG factors when they select retirement plan investments and exercise shareholder rights, such as proxy voting. For example, ESG factors may include a company’s carbon emissions, water usage, waste management, diversity and inclusion policies, hiring and labor practices, workplace safety, philanthropy, board structure, and ethical standards. This issue arises not just when investment fiduciaries select individual stock holdings for pension plans, but also when they select 401(k) investment option menus, typically comprised of many mutual funds representing a balanced variety of asset classes, investment philosophies, and risk levels. Some mutual fund managers expressly take ESG factors into account when selecting fund holdings.
Background on the Case
Twenty-six states and three private-sector plaintiffs sued the DOL over its 2022 final rule. They argued that ERISA precludes fiduciaries from considering nonmonetary factors when making plan investment decisions.
On September 21, 2023, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas concluded the DOL’s rule did not violate ERISA and was a permissible exercise of agency rulemaking authority under the federal Administrative Procedure Act. That court relied on the DOL’s interpretation of ERISA’s fiduciary standards and concluded that taking ESG factors into consideration can be part of a prudent investment selection process designed to maximize returns at various risk levels.
However, on July 18, 2024, the Fifth Circuit vacated the District Court’s decision and remanded the case for consideration of the impact of the Supreme Court of the United States’ 2024 ruling in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo. In Loper Bright, the Supreme Court overruled Chevron deference, a legal doctrine that called for courts to defer to a federal agency’s reasonable interpretation when a law is ambiguous.
On February 14, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas again upheld the Biden-era rule, even without the Chevron deference. The states appealed the case, and on April 28, 2025, the Fifth Circuit granted a motion to put on hold the case for one month. Then the DOL filed a letter stating its intention to replace the ESG rule.
Next Steps
The DOL’s rulemaking process typically takes several months and involves issuance of a new proposed rule, and a notice and comment period prior to finalizing the new rule.
In the meantime, retirement plan fiduciaries may continue to rely on prudent investment selection factors outlined in the plan’s written investment policy statement when selecting and monitoring plan investments. While it is anticipated that a new rule will not permit plan fiduciaries to consider ESG factors, it remains to be seen whether a prudent investment selection process will be limited to a review of financial factors, such as revenue, earnings, profitability, and reasonable fees, or whether other nonquantitative factors will continue to be permissible criteria for fiduciaries to consider.
The DOL’s statement in this case came at the same time as the agency rescinded previous guidance that discouraged fiduciaries from including cryptocurrencies in 401(k) plans. Although the DOL had previously cautioned plan fiduciaries that it did not view cryptocurrencies as prudent investment options for employer-sponsored retirement plans due to their lack of transparency, increased volatility, and high-risk profile, the agency now says it neither endorses nor disapproves of the inclusion of cryptocurrencies in 401(k) investment options.
As with all investment decisions, plan fiduciaries considering the inclusion of cryptocurrencies may want to consult their written investment policy statement to determine what criteria will be used for selecting and monitoring those investments.
TCPA INSURANCE TO THE RESCUE?: Small Debt Collector Walks Away From Class Suit For Under Policy Limits
TCPA insurance used to be very difficult to come by but slowly carriers are starting to write policies to protect companies from TCPA liability.
Most of the policies are low limit high deductible affairs– $1MM is the max that I have seen, and we all know that doesn’t go very far in TCPAWorld.
But perhaps it goes far enough, at least in some cases.
For instance, in Daughter v. Credit Bureau Services 2025 WL 1618354 (S.D. Tex. June 6, 2025) the parties agreed to settle a TCPA class action for $850,000.00.
The class consisted of:
All persons throughout the United States to whose cellular telephone number Credit Bureau Services Association placed an artificial or prerecorded voice call from December 2, 2019 through February 11, 2025.
This is a bit of an overly broad class since the Defendant surely had consent for some of the messages it was leaving. But better to have a broad class for the same amount of money (especially when it is sonebody else’s money.)
In assessing the settlement the court noted the defendant really didnt have much money to spend here:
Additionally, the parties represent that Defendant is a very small debt collector that employs less than a handful of collectors, and its only applicable insurance policy, which is eroding, limits TCPA class action liability coverage to $1,000,000. So after a year-and a-half of contested litigation, the parties represent that the $850,000 settlement fund almost certainly amounts to something very close to a real-world maximum recovery for settlement class members.
Get it?
Since the policy limits were $1MM and eroding–i.e. the cost of defense comes out of the policy limits– the plaintiff’s counsel agreed to accept what was essentially a policy limit demand.
So the policy is wiped out but the small defendant lives on– and crucially its officers and directors weren’t sued individually.
That last piece may be the true value of insurance– providing a parachute that keeps company managers out of trouble. In the absence of insurance these individuals might end up sued personally to make up for the underfunded enterprise that made the calls.
Something to think about.
A New Gateway for Cross-Border Enforcement: Hague Judgments Convention Comes into Effect in the UK on 1 July 2025
The Hague Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (the “Hague Judgments Convention”) will come into effect in the UK on 1 July 2025. The process of enforcing UK judgments[1] in other contracting states (including all EU Member States (except Denmark), Ukraine and Uruguay) will now be far more streamlined in most cases, thereby reducing the delay, cost and uncertainty of enforcement in those jurisdictions.
While the entry into force of the Hague Judgments Convention in the UK is a welcome step in the facilitation of cross-border dispute resolution, particularly post-Brexit, there are some notable limitations to its scope. For instance, it does not provide for the automatic recognition and enforcement of relevant judgments, judgments must meet certain requirements, and it will apply only to UK judgments where the underlying proceedings were commenced on or after 1 July 2025.
Scope and purpose of the Hague Judgments Convention
The Hague Judgments Convention provides a uniform and simplified legal framework for the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters across contracting states, without the need to re-examine the substance of the case in fresh proceedings (provided that certain criteria are met; see below). For example, only a specified group of documents will need to be produced in every case[2].
Importantly, the Hague Judgments Convention applies to judgments where the dispute falls within both exclusive and non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses (in contrast to the 2005 Hague Convention[3], for example, which applies only to exclusive choice of court agreements), making it widely applicable to many cross-border contracts.
A broad range of civil and commercial matters are within its scope, including both contractual and tort claims. Several types of cases are excluded, however, including: status and legal capacity of natural persons; family law; defamation; insolvency; tax; customs; revenue; administrative law matters; anti-trust; privacy; activities of armed forces; carriage of passengers and goods; and intellectual property matters[4]. Arbitration and related proceedings are also expressly excluded[5].
Eligibility criteria for recognition and enforcement and other limitations
There are several limitations as to the scope and applicability of the Hague Judgments Convention, which will apply only to UK judgments where the underlying proceedings were commenced on or after 1 July 2025.
Notably, it does not provide for the automatic recognition and enforcement of judgments, unlike the simplified EU regime[6]. To be eligible for recognition and enforcement, a judgment must fall within one of the specified bases[7]. These include (but are not limited to) the defendant: having expressly submitted to the jurisdiction of the court of origin; having been habitually resident in the state of origin at the time it became a party to the relevant proceedings; or having had their principal place of business in the state of origin at the time it became a party to the proceedings, with the dispute arising out of activities of that business.
Recognition and enforcement may be refused in certain (relatively limited) cases. These include cases where: (1) a judgment has been obtained by fraud; (2) the defendant was not notified of the proceedings in sufficient time to arrange a defence; (3) recognition would be manifestly incompatible with public policy of the state in which enforcement is requested; (4) a judgment is inconsistent with a judgment given by a court of the requested state in a dispute between the same parties; or (5) a judgment is inconsistent with an earlier judgment given by a court of another state between the same parties on the same subject matter[8]. Any refusal by the requested state to enforce a judgment under the Hague Judgments Convention does not prevent a subsequent application for recognition or enforcement of the judgment in that state, however.
Further, the law of the requested state (i.e. the country in which recognition and enforcement is sought) governs the applicable procedure (unless the Hague Judgments Convention provides otherwise). This is likely to introduce some uncertainty around timing and process, albeit the relevant court is still required to act expeditiously[9]. Any pre-existing treaties to which a contracting state is a party will also continue to apply, although the contracting states must as far as possible interpret the Hague Judgments Convention to be compatible with any other treaties that are in force[10].
Geographic reach: other contracting states
The Hague Judgments Convention has broad geographic reach (where matters fall within its scope).
As at the date of publication (June 2025), contracting states include all EU Member States (except Denmark), Ukraine and Uruguay (and the UK from 1 July 2025) [11].
Albania, Andorra and Montenegro each have ratified the Hague Judgments Convention, where it is expected to come into force in 2026[12]. Meanwhile, the United States, Israel, Costa Rica, Kosovo, North Macedonia and Russia have all signed the Hague Judgments Convention, thus signalling an intention to join, although those states will not be bound until they ratify it.
Significance for the UK and its judicial system
Since leaving the EU, the UK has not benefited from certain mechanisms that facilitate cross-border enforcement of civil judgments across EU Member States, such as the Brussels I Recast Regulation 2015 (“Brussels Recast 2015”) and the Lugano Convention 2007. For example, Brussels Recast 2015 provided for automatic recognition of judgments across EU Member States without the need for a declaration of enforceability.
Since the end of the post-Brexit transition period on 31 December 2020, enforcement of UK judgments has followed the domestic rules in – and (where applicable) bilateral agreements with – overseas jurisdictions, all of which vary and can lead to legal uncertainty and increased costs.
The Hague Judgments Convention helps to fill this post-Brexit enforcement gap to some extent – albeit with the caveat that (as noted above) it does not provide for the automatic recognition and enforcement of judgments as does the simplified EU regime.
Accordingly, while the Hague Judgments Convention (re)strengthens the attractiveness of the UK as a forum for resolving international commercial disputes by providing a reliable enforcement mechanism in participating countries, it remains to be seen how the courts of contracting states will apply it in practice in terms of both procedure and any pre-existing treaties in place.
Conclusion
The entry into force of the Hague Judgments Convention in the UK is a welcome step in the facilitation of cross-border dispute resolution, particularly post-Brexit. The clear and streamlined framework for the recognition and enforcement of judgments across other contracting states will be of benefit to businesses and individuals who are engaged in international commerce and who wish to rely upon the UK courts to uphold their legal rights. Despites its limitations, the Hague Judgments Convention is still expected to improve legal efficiency and enhance enforcement predictability, whilst also reinforcing the UK’s position as a global legal hub.
[1] I.e. Judgments issued by the courts of England & Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.
[2] Article 12.
[3] Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements.
[4] Article 2.
[5] Article 2(3)).
[6] E.g. under the Brussels I Recast Regulation 2015; see further below.
[7] Article 5.
[8] Article 7.
[9] Article 13(1).
[10] Article 23.
[11] Contracting states at the time of publication are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine and Uruguay. For the latest status, see: https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=137 (links to a third party website).
[12] On 1 March 2026 in Albania and Montenegro; and on 1 June 2026 in Andorra.
Regulation Round Up May 2025
Welcome to the Regulation Round Up, a regular bulletin highlighting the latest developments in UK and EU financial services regulation.
Key developments in May 2025:
30 May
Trade Settlement: The Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) published a press release on the faster settlement of trades in funds.
29 May
FCA Regulation Round‑up: The FCA has published its regulation round-up for May 2025. Among other things, it covers a future data request for the advisers and intermediaries’ sector, and an upcoming webinar on the FCA’s recent consultation paper on simplifying its insurance rules.
28 May
Cryptoassets: The FCA has published a consultation paper (CP25/14) on proposed prudential rules and guidance for firms carrying on the regulated activities of issuing qualifying stablecoins and safeguarding qualifying cryptoassets.
27 May
Liquidity Risk Management: The International Organization of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”) has published its final report on its updated liquidity risk management recommendations for collective investment schemes alongside final guidance for the effective implementation of its revised recommendations.
23 May
FCA Handbook: The FCA has published Handbook Notice 130, which sets out changes to the FCA Handbook made by the FCA board on 1 May and 22 May. The changes relate to payment optionality for fund managers, consumer credit regulatory reporting and handbook administration.
19 May
Consumer Credit: HM Treasury published a consultation paper on the first phase of its proposed widescale reforms to the Consumer Credit Act 1974.
16 May
Bank Resolution: The Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Act 2025 was published. The Act will amend the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and the Banking Act 2009 to introduce a new mechanism allowing the Bank of England to use funds provided by the banking sector to cover certain costs associated with resolution under the special resolution regime.
15 May
UK Sanctions: The UK Government published its cross‑government review of sanctions implementation and enforcement.
Artificial Intelligence: The European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs published a draft report on the impact of artificial intelligence (“AI”) on the financial sector (PE773.328v01‑00). The report provides policy recommendations to enable the use of AI in financial services and outlines concerns of regulatory overlaps / legal uncertainties, indicating potential early tensions with the proposed AI Act. The report also calls on the European Commission to ensure clarity and guidance on how existing financial services regulations apply to the use of AI in financial services.
PISCES: The Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 (Private Intermittent Securities and Capital Exchange System Sandbox) Regulations 2025 were published and laid before parliament. The regulations establish the Private Intermittent Securities and Capital Exchange System (“PISCES”) Sandbox, including providing the framework for potential PISCES operators to apply to operate intermittent trading events for participating private companies and investors.
14 May
Insurance: The FCA published a consultation paper (CP25/12) on proposals to simplify its insurance rules for insurance firms and funeral plan providers.
12 May
Investment Research: The FCA has published a policy statement (PS25/4) on investment research payment optionality for fund managers.
8 May
Solvency II: The Prudential Regulation Authority (“PRA”) has updated its webpage on Solvency II to note that it will delay the implementation of the updated mapping of external credit rating agency ratings to Credit Quality Steps (“CQSs”) for use in the UK Solvency II regime.
Small Asset Managers: The FCA has published a webpage setting out the findings from its review of business models for smaller asset managers and alternatives.
7 May
MAR and MiFID II: The European Securities and Markets Authority (“ESMA”) has published a final report containing technical advice to the European Commission on the implications of the Listing Act on the Market Abuse Regulation (596/2014) (“MAR”) and the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (2014/65/EU) (“MIFID II”).
6 May
ESG: The European Commission has published a call for evidence about revising Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 on sustainability‑related disclosures in the financial services sector (“SFDR”). Please refer to our dedicated article on this topic here.
2 May
ESG: ESMA has published a consultation paper on regulatory technical standards under Regulation (EU) 2024/3005 on the transparency and integrity of ESG rating activities.
Cryptoassets: The FCA has published a discussion paper (DP25/1) seeking views on its future approach to regulating cryptoasset trading platforms, intermediaries, cryptoasset lending and borrowing, staking, decentralised finance, and the use of credit to buy cryptoassets.
FCA Handbook: The FCA published Handbook Notice 129, which sets out changes to the FCA Handbook made by the FCA board on 27 March 2025.
Sulaiman Malik & Michael Singh also contributed to this article.