Crafting Composition Claims: Federal Circuit Reverses ITC on Diamond Polycrystalline Diamond Compact Patent Eligibility
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently reversed an International Trade Commission decision that found certain composition claims for a polycrystalline diamond compact patent ineligible
This ruling provides valuable insights for companies drafting composition of matter claims in materials science, particularly when the claims involve measurable properties that reflect material structure
Companies drafting composition of matter claims should define a specific, non-natural material with measurable parameters, provide detailed specification support for enablement, and link measurable properties to structural features
In a significant decision for the materials science and patent law communities, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has overturned a ruling by the International Trade Commission (ITC) that found certain claims of a polycrystalline diamond compact (PDC) patent ineligible under U.S. patent laws. The case, US Synthetic Corp. v. International Trade Commission, decided on Feb. 13, 2025, offers important guidance on the patentability of composition of matter claims involving measurements of natural properties.
US Synthetic Corp. (USS) filed a complaint with the ITC alleging violations of customs laws known as Section 337 based on the importation and sale of products infringing its U.S. Patent No. 10,508,502 (‘502 patent), titled “Polycrystalline Diamond Compact.”
A PDC includes a polycrystalline diamond table bonded to a substrate, typically made from a cemented hard metal composite like cobalt-cemented tungsten carbide. PDCs are manufactured using high-pressure, high-temperature (HPHT) conditions. The process involves placing a substrate into a container with diamond particles positioned adjacent to it. Under HPHT conditions and in the presence of a catalyst (often a metal-solvent catalyst like cobalt), the diamond particles bond together to form a matrix of bonded diamond grains, creating the diamond table that bonds to the substrate.
The ‘502 patent describes several key properties of the PDC. It exhibits a high degree of diamond-to-diamond bonding and a reduced amount of metal catalyst without requiring leaching. The PDC’s magnetic properties reflect its composition, including coercivity, specific magnetic saturation, and permeability.
The patent discloses that USS developed a manufacturing method using heightened sintering pressure (at least about 7.8 GPa) and temperature (about 1400°C) to achieve these properties without resorting to leaching, which can be time-consuming and may decrease the mechanical strength of the diamond table.
ITC’s Initial Determination
The ITC initially found the asserted claims infringed and not invalid under Sections 102, 103, or 112 of U.S. patent laws. However, it determined they were patent ineligible under Section 101, preventing a finding of a Section 337 violation. Specifically, the ITC concluded the asserted claims were directed to the “abstract idea of PDCs that achieve . . . desired magnetic . . . results, which the specifications posit may be derived from enhanced diamond-to-diamond bonding,” and that the magnetic properties are merely side effects of the unclaimed manufacturing process.
Federal Circuit’s Analysis
The Federal Circuit focused its analysis on claim 1 and 2 of the ‘502 patent. Claim 1 recited, “a polycrystalline diamond table, at least an unleached portion of the polycrystalline diamond table including: a plurality of diamond grains bonded together via diamond-to-diamond bonding … a catalyst including cobalt … wherein the unleached portion of the polycrystalline diamond table exhibits a coercivity of about 115 Oe to about 250 Oe; wherein the unleached portion of the polycrystalline diamond table exhibits a specific permeability less than about 0.10 G∙cm3/g∙Oe.” Claim 2, depending from claim 1, further recited, “wherein the unleached portion of the polycrystalline diamond table exhibits a specific magnetic saturation of about 15 G∙cm3/g or less.”
The court emphasized that the claims were directed to a composition of matter, not a method of manufacture. It noted that USS had developed a way to produce PDCs with high diamond-to-diamond bonding and reduced metal catalyst content without leaching, addressing known issues in the field.
The Federal Circuit delved deeper into the relationship between the claimed magnetic properties and the structure of the PDC. The court recognized that coercivity, specific magnetic saturation, and specific permeability provide information about the quantity of metal catalyst present and the extent of diamond-to-diamond bonding, which were key features of the inventive PDC. As the court summarized, “Each of these magnetic properties provides information about the quantity of metal catalyst present in the diamond table and/or the extent of diamond-to-diamond bonding.”
The court also highlighted the importance of the specification’s disclosure, which included comparative data between the claimed PDCs and conventional PDCs. This data demonstrated that the claimed PDCs exhibited significantly less cobalt content and a lower mean free path between diamond grains than prior art examples. The court recognized that the prior art examples “exhibit a lower coercivity indicative of a greater mean free path between diamond grains and thus may indicate relatively less diamond-to-diamond bonding between the diamond grains.”
The Federal Circuit engaged in the two-step analysis established by Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International. Applying Alice step No. 1, the court determined that the claims were directed to a specific composition of matter having particular characteristics, rather than being directed to an abstract idea and did not reach Alice step No. 2. The court found that, in view of the recitation of “a polycrystalline diamond table, at least an unleached portion of the polycrystalline diamond table,” a “plurality of diamond grains,” a “catalyst including cobalt,” and the limitations of magnetic properties, dimensional parameters, and the interface topography between the polycrystalline diamond table and substrate, the claims are plainly directed to matter.
In so holding, the court found the ITC erred when it concluded that the asserted claims are directed to the “abstract idea of PDCs that achieve . . . desired magnetic . . . results, which the specifications posit may be derived from enhanced diamond-to-diamond bonding.” The court also disagreed with the commission’s apparent expectations for precision between the claimed properties and structural details of the claimed composition. As the court noted, a perfect proxy is not required between the recited material properties and the PDC structure.
The court also affirmed the ITC’s finding that the claims were enabled under Section 112, indicating that the specification provided sufficient information for a person of ordinary skill to make and use the invention without undue experimentation. This determination was based on the detailed manufacturing methods and examples provided in the patent specification.
Takeaways
This decision provides valuable guidance for patent practitioners in the materials science field and reinforces the importance of carefully crafting claims and specifications to withstand Section 101 challenges. Composition of matter claims can remain patent-eligible under Section 101 even when they involve measuring natural properties, as long as they claim a non-naturally occurring composition.
When drafting claims for materials science inventions, practitioners should consider including specific, measurable parameters that distinguish the invention from naturally occurring substances or prior art.
The decision also highlights the importance of providing detailed descriptions in the specifications of how to measure claimed properties and how they relate to the composition’s structure or function.
CSRD and CSDDD Officially Delayed, With Huge Majority of MEPs in Support
On 3 April 2025, the European Parliament voted to postpone the implementation dates for corporate sustainability due diligence and reporting requirements, as the first step in the European Commission’s “Omnibus” simplification package to reduce administrative requirements of companies and aimed to bolster the competitiveness of the European Union. With 531 votes for, 69 against and 17 abstentions, Members of the European Parliament overwhelmingly supported the European Commission proposal.
Key Aspects of the Postponement:
Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (“CSRD”):
The application of CSRD has been delayed by two years for certain companies.
“Large companies”, as defined in CSRD, are now required to report on financial year of 2027, to be published in 2028.
Listed small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) will commence reporting one year later on their 2028 financial year, to be published in 2029.
The second stage of the Omnibus is proposed to alter these thresholds, to significantly reduce the scope of companies needing to report, which we covered in our alert here.
Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (“CSDDD”):
Member States now have until 26 July 2027 to transpose the due diligence directive into national law, extending the deadline by one year.
Large EU companies with over 5,000 employees and a net turnover exceeding €1.5 billion, as well as non-EU companies meeting the same turnover threshold within the EU, are required to comply with the rules starting in 2028.
Similarly, EU companies with more than 3,000 employees and a net turnover above €900 million, along with equivalent non-EU companies, will also need to adhere to these regulations from 2028.
To expedite the adoption of these postponement measures, the European Parliament agreed on 1 April 2025 to handle the proposals under its urgent procedure. The draft law now awaits formal approval by the Council of the European Union, which endorsed the same text on 26 March 2025.
Whilst the updates to the reporting standards and exact scope of companies required to report remains under development as part of the second stage of the Omnibus, as we reported on here, there is at least certainty for businesses on a delay.
Using International Arbitration to Resolve Retaliatory Tariff Disputes in Global Supply Chains
As trade tensions rise, retaliatory tariffs are disrupting global supply chains—particularly in the automotive industry and other manufacturing sectors. These unexpected costs are sparking disputes over who should bear the financial burden under cross-border contracts. International arbitration is increasingly seen as the forum of choice for resolving these conflicts.
Retaliatory Tariffs Disrupting Global Supply Chains
Retaliatory tariffs—duties imposed by one country in response to another’s tariffs—have lately become a harsh reality. These tit-for-tat measures are upending global supply chains, especially in the manufacturing sector. Companies suddenly face higher import costs, squeezed profit margins, and unpredictable regulations as countries strike back with their own duties. The automotive industry is particularly exposed, as tariffs on steel, aluminum, or automotive parts drive up production costs and disrupt just-in-time supply lines. In short, retaliatory duties are injecting uncertainty at every tier of global manufacturing.
This uncertainty is not just an economic nuisance—it’s a legal flashpoint. Contracts that once made financial sense can become unprofitable or impossible to perform when an unexpected tariff hits. Common points of contention include:
Who pays for newly imposed tariffs—supplier or buyer?
Can pricing be adjusted when costs spike?
Is non-performance excused under force majeure or hardship clauses?
We’ve already seen cases of suppliers threatening to halt deliveries or buyers refusing shipments because a new tariff tipped a deal into the red. Such scenarios often trigger formal disputes. Many companies are discovering too late that their agreements didn’t fully account for politically driven tariff shocks. In this turbulent landscape, businesses need a robust way to resolve disputes fairly and efficiently—and so they are increasingly considering international arbitration.
Why International Arbitration Works
International arbitration offers a neutral, enforceable, efficient, confidential, and competence-driven way to resolve these disputes:
Neutrality. Unlike court litigation, where you might end up suing or being sued by a foreign partner in an unfamiliar legal system, arbitration provides a neutral forum agreed upon by both parties. Companies can avoid the “home court” advantage that one side would have in its local courts. In arbitration, the dispute is heard by an independent tribunal, often with arbitrators of neutral nationalities. This level playing field is crucial when a tariff dispute pits businesses from different countries against each other.
Enforceability. Another major advantage is enforceability. An arbitration award (the final decision of the arbitrators) can be enforced almost anywhere in the world, thanks to a treaty called the New York Convention. Over 170 countries—including the U.S., EU nations, China, Mexico, and many others—are signatories to the New York Convention, which obligates their courts to recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards. This means if a manufacturer wins an arbitration against an overseas supplier, the award can be taken to the supplier’s home country and converted into a local court judgment for payment. Such global reach is not guaranteed with a normal court judgment, which might not be enforceable abroad. For businesses facing losses from a tariff dispute, knowing that any resolution will hold up internationally can be a huge relief.
Efficiency: International arbitration is also typically faster and more flexible than litigating through court systems in multiple countries. Procedural rules can be streamlined in arbitration, which can significantly speed things along. There is only a limited right to appeal. Many arbitral institutions have expedited rules, and some allow the parties to resolve their disputes remotely via Teams or Zoom.
Expertise: The fact that parties can select arbitrators with industry experience can also help to resolve disputes more quickly than in court. An arbitrator who understands customs duties, supply chains, manufacturing timelines, the auto industry, and standard international commercial terms will grasp the issues more quickly than most judges and juries. Arbitrators with relevant expertise can expeditiously determine whether a dispute can be resolved with money damages, or whether it instead should be resolved with emergency interim relief such as a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, both of which arbitrators typically have the power to award.
Confidentiality: Unlike litigation in court, arbitration proceedings are private and confidential by default, which helps companies manage sensitive commercial issues outside the spotlight.
Practical Steps for Companies to Protect Themselves
In the short term, you should consider adding an arbitration clause to your agreements or updating the one you already have. Alternatively, if you’re already in the midst of a dispute, and you don’t have an arbitration clause in your supply agreement, you and your counterparty can nevertheless agree to arbitrate your dispute. Ask your lawyer to help you select the arbitration rules and institution—such as the International Chamber of Commerce, International Centre for Dispute Resolution, or Singapore International Arbitration Centre, among others—that best fit your needs.
Select the governing law carefully. The governing law is the national law that will be used to interpret the contract. This is important if, for instance, you want a legal system that recognizes sudden tariffs as a valid reason to adjust obligations, or, conversely, one that enforces contracts strictly.
Select the seat of arbitration (legal place of the arbitration) carefully. The seat determines the procedural framework, and which courts have limited oversight of the arbitration. Choose a seat in a neutral, arbitration-friendly jurisdiction such as New York, London, Singapore, or Geneva.
Retaliatory tariffs are likely to remain a feature of international trade for the foreseeable future, and global manufacturers—especially in industries like automotive, where supply chains cross many borders – will continue to feel the effects. International arbitration has emerged as a critical tool for resolving the disputes that inevitably arise from these trade frictions. It offers a neutral, enforceable, and effective way to get parties back on track when a deal is derailed by retaliatory tariffs. Businesses should see international arbitration not as a last resort, but as a built-in safety valve that can give all sides confidence to continue trading despite an uncertain tariff environment.
President Trump Announces “Reciprocal” Tariffs Beginning 5 April 2025
On 2 April 2025, President Trump announced a series of “reciprocal” tariffs on US imports from all countries. The tariffs apply at different rates by country, starting at a baseline of 10% and reaching as high as 50%.
The tariffs, which are being implemented under the authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), will go into effect at a rate of 10% on 12:01 am ET on 5 April 2025. For some countries (see the complete list at the end of this alert), the 10% tariff baseline will increase to a higher per-country rate effective 12:01 am ET on 9 April 2025.
The latest tariffs are intended to address the customs duties and related VAT and non-tariff barriers imposed by each covered trading partner on US exports, as summarized in the National Trade Estimate Report issued by the Office of the US Trade Representative on 31 March 2025.
The reciprocal tariffs announced on 2 April 2025 will not apply to:
Certain news publications and other similar media;
Goods that are already subject to c Section 232 tariffs on steel, aluminum, and autos/auto parts;
Certain metals and minerals, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, lumber, electronics, energy, and other products identified in Annex II to the president’s Executive Order;
Imports from countries such as North Korea and Cuba subject to “Column 2” customs duty rates; and
Any goods that later become subject to tariffs pursuant to future Section 232 trade actions.
Additionally, for goods that incorporate US content, the reciprocal tariffs will apply only to the non-US content – provided at least 20% of the value of the good is US content (defined as produced or substantially transformed in the United States). Thus, for example, a good that incorporates 15% US content will be dutiable at its entire value, whereas a good incorporating 25% US content will be dutiable at 75% of its value.
Goods from Canada and Mexico that qualify for tariff-free treatment under USMCA will not face additional tariffs. Any goods from Canada or Mexico that do not qualify for USMCA will continue to be subject to the tariffs of 10% (for certain energy and mineral products) or 25% (all other products) that were announced in February 2025. In the event the President decides to terminate these 10-25% tariffs, goods from Canada or Mexico that do not qualify for USMCA treatment will be subject to a 12% reciprocal tariff.
In addition to the latest reciprocal tariffs, goods from China and Hong Kong will continue to be subject to the 20% tariffs implemented in February and March pursuant to the President’s IEEPA authority as well as (for most products from China) existing Section 301 tariffs of 25%. Further, starting 2 May 2025 at 12:01 a.m. ET, US tariffs will apply to products from China and Hong Kong that are imported through the Section 321 “de minimis” exception for low value shipments to a single US recipient on a single day.
According to President Trump, the United States will consider removing the latest reciprocal tariffs if US trading partners lower their tariff rates on US exports and take other steps to open their markets to US products. Countries that retaliate against the latest US tariffs may face even higher tariff rates.
Companies importing goods from the covered countries should carefully evaluate the list of covered imports and consider appropriate measures to determine their tariff exposure and potentially mitigate risks arising from the tariffs.
Countries Subject to “Reciprocal” Tariffs Higher than 10% (Effective 9 April 2025)
Countries and Territories
Reciprocal Tariff Rate
Algeria
30%
Angola
32%
Bangladesh
37%
Bosnia and Herzegovina
36%
Botswana
38%
Brunei
24%
Cambodia
49%
Cameroon
12%
Chad
13%
China
34%
Côte d`Ivoire
21%
Democratic Republic of the Congo
11%
Equatorial Guinea
13%
European Union
20%
Falkland Islands
42%
Fiji
32%
Guyana
38%
India
27%
Indonesia
32%
Iraq
39%
Israel
17%
Japan
24%
Jordan
20%
Kazakhstan
27%
Laos
48%
Lesotho
50%
Libya
31%
Liechtenstein
37%
Madagascar
47%
Malawi
18%
Malaysia
24%
Mauritius
40%
Moldova
31%
Mozambique
16%
Myanmar (Burma)
45%
Namibia
21%
Nauru
30%
Nicaragua
19%
Nigeria
14%
North Macedonia
33%
Norway
16%
Pakistan
30%
Philippines
18%
Serbia
38%
South Africa
31%
South Korea
26%
Sri Lanka
44%
Switzerland
32%
Syria
41%
Taiwan
32%
Thailand
37%
Tunisia
28%
Vanuatu
23%
Venezuela
15%
Vietnam
46%
Zambia
17%
Zimbabwe
18%
Karla M. Cure, Myeong S. Park, Ted Saint, and Brian J. Hopkins also contributed to this article.
SEC Climate Disclosures Rules One Step Closer to the Grave; GHG Emissions Disclosures One Step Closer to Becoming a Multi-State Compliance Issue
The slow death of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) climate disclosure rules continued on March 27, 2025, with the SEC Commissioners voting to discontinue the defense of such rules before the Eighth Circuit, Iowa v. SEC, No. 24-1522 (8th Cir.), which is where the numerous complaints challenging the rules were consolidated.[1] The SEC’s action does not withdraw or terminate the rules, but while they remain in place, the SEC’s previous stay of the rules continues. It will be interesting to see if the Democratic attorneys general from a number of states who joined the litigation in support of the rules will continue to defend the rules without the SEC’s support.
While the SEC has made clear that it will not be pursuing its climate disclosure rules[2], companies may still need to comply with climate disclosure laws of other jurisdictions, including the European Union’s Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive and California’s climate disclosure rules. In addition, legislation similar to California’s “Climate Corporate Data Accountability Act” (CA SB 253)[3] which was later amended by California Senate Bill 219[4] has been introduced in New York[5], Colorado[6], New Jersey[7], and Illinois[8] that would require companies with more than $1 billion in annual revenue and doing business in the particular state to annually report their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, similar to what California will require beginning in 2026.
To add to the list of considerations for companies to keep on their radar, U.S. Senator Bill Hagerty recently introduced federal legislation to “prohibit entities integral to the national interests of the United States from participating in any foreign sustainability due diligence regulation, including the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive of the European Union”.[9] While Senator Hagerty’s bill appears to be symbolic and unlikely to be enacted, it has a private right of action that could prove troublesome if the legislation should be enacted.
[1] See, Press Release 2025-58, Securities and Exchange Commission, “SEC Votes to End Defense of Climate Disclosure Rules” (March 27, 2025), https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2025-58.
[2] Securities and Exchange Commission, Final Rule “The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors,” 17 CFR 210, 229, 230, 232, 239, and 249, adopting release available at https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/final/2024/33-11275.pdf.
[3] Cal. Health & Safety Code § 38532.
[4] Senate Bill 219, Greenhouse gases: climate corporate accountability: climate-related financial risk, Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 38532, 38533, Bill Text available at https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=202320240SB219.
[5] New York Senate Bill S3456, “Climate Corporate Accountability Act,” available at https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2025/S3456.
[6] Colorado House Bill 25-1119, “A Bill for an Act concerning requiring certain entities to disclose information concerning greenhouse gas emissions,” available at https://leg.colorado.gov/bills/HB25-1119.
[7] New Jersey Senate Bill 4117, “Climate Corporate Data Accountability Act,” available at https://legiscan.com/NJ/text/S4117/2024.
[8] Illinois House Bill, “Climate Corporate Accountability Act,” available at https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=3673&GAID=18&DocTypeID=HB&LegId=162463&SessionID=114&GA=104.
[9] Senate Bill 985, 119th Congress (2025-2026), ‘‘Prevent Regulatory Overreach from Turning Essential
Companies into Targets Act of 2025’’ or the ‘‘PROTECT USA Act of 2025,’’ Bill Text available at https://www.hagerty.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/HLA25119.pdf
El-Husseiny v Invest Bank – Expanding Office Holder Claims? (UK)
S423 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) provides a route for office holders to challenge transactions where a person deliberately transfers assets at an undervalue to put them beyond the reach of creditors. The Supreme Court in El-Husseiny and another (Appellants) v Invest Bank PSC (Respondent) [2025] UKSC 4 recently confirmed what is meant by “transaction” in the context of s423 – and that the same meaning should be given to “transactions” caught by s238 and s339 of the IA 1986.
Claims under s423 can be more difficult to establish than claims under s238 of the IA 1986 because although both claims require there to have been a transaction at an undervalue (or for no consideration) s423 also requires an office holder to prove that there was an intention to put assets beyond the reach of creditors. An office holder is therefore more likely to bring a claim under s238 than s423, and for that reason, this judgment is helpful because it broadens the types of transactions that might fall within the definition of “transaction”.
Transaction is defined in s436 to include “a gift, agreement or arrangement” and the Supreme Court was not prepared to restrict the meaning of this and decided that a “transaction” includes assets not directly legally or beneficially owned by the debtor.
It is helpful to know the facts of this case to give some context to the particular transaction the court had to consider.
Facts and Decision
The s423 claim was brought in this case by Invest Bank in their capacity as a creditor of the appellants’ father, Mr Mohammad El-Husseini (not as an officeholder – but the findings apply equally to office holder claims).
Invest Bank had successfully obtained a judgment against Mr El-Husseini in Abu Dhabi for circa £20m, and they identified UK based assets against which they could enforce the judgment. Invest Bank argued Mr El-Husseini had transferred assets (most notably a property in London) to put them beyond the reach of Invest Bank.
While there were multiple assets caught by the s423 claim, the judgment focused on the transfer of the London property.
Before the London Property was transferred, it was legally and beneficially owned by a Jersey company, Marquee Holdings Limited (“Marquee”). It was worth about £4.5 million. At the time of the transfer, Mr El-Husseini was the beneficial owner of all the shares in Marquee.
Mr El-Husseini arranged with one of his sons, Ziad Ahmad El-Husseiny (“Ziad”), that he would cause Marquee to transfer the legal and beneficial ownership of the London property for no consideration.
In June 2017, Mr El-Husseini caused Marquee to transfer the legal and beneficial title to the London property to Ziad. Ziad did not pay any money or provide any other consideration either to Marquee or to Mr El-Husseini in return for the London Property.
The effect of the transfer was that Mr El-Husseini’s shareholding in Marquee was now significantly reduced, prejudicing Invest Bank’s ability to enforce its judgment against him.
The issue on appeal was whether s423 could apply to a transaction such as this – where a debtor procures a company which he owns to transfer a valuable asset owned by the company for no consideration or at an undervalue which has the effect of reducing or eliminatating the value of the debtor’s shareholding in the company, or whether such a transaction is not caught because the debtor does not personally own the asset.
The court at first instance held that the fact that the London property was not directly owned by Mr El-Husseini did not prevent the arrangement being a “transaction” for the purposes of s423. The point was appealed, and the Court of Appeal agreed with findings of the court at first instance. Ultimately as the issue raised an important point of statutory construction the Supreme Court considered the point and judgment was given.
The Supreme Court upheld the findings of the High Court and the Court of Appeal regarding the meaning of a “transaction”. The language and purpose of s423(1) is not confined to dealing with an asset that is legally or beneficially owned by the debtor but extends to this type of transaction. Restricting transactions to those that directly involve property owned by a debtor would not only require an implied restriction to be read into the provision but doing that would also seriously undermine the purpose of s423.
Concluding Comments
Despite the Bank’s claim not succeeding in this case (it was unable to demonstrate that Mr El- Husseini had the requiste intention when transferring the London property), the decision is nonetheless helpful to insolvency practitioners, as it confirms the wide meaning of the word “transaction” within s423, s238 and s339.
It also helpfully confirms that a debtor does not need to legally or beneficially own an asset for a transaction to be caught under those provisions. The most obvious example where this is likely to be the case is in situations such as those considered in this case – where a debtor owns shares in a company and causes that company to transfer valuable assets thereby reducing the value of the shareholding.
ICO Fines Advanced Computer Software Group £3 Million Following Ransomware Attack
On March 27, 2025, the UK Information Commissioner’s Office (“ICO”) announced that it had issued a fine against Advanced Computer Software Group (“Advanced”) for £3.07 million (approx. $4 million) for non-compliance with security rules identified through an investigation following a ransomware attack which occurred in 2022.
The ICO’s investigation found that personal data belonging to 79,404 people was compromised, including details of how to gain entry into the homes of 890 people who were receiving care at home. According to the ICO, hackers accessed certain systems of a group subsidiary via a customer account that did not have multi-factor authentication. The ICO also noted that it was widely reported that the security incident let to the disruption of critical services. The ICO concluded that the group subsidiary had not implemented adequate technical and organization measures to keep its systems secure.
Initially, the ICO intended to issue a higher fine against Advanced. However, it took into consideration Advanced’s proactive engagement with the UK National Cyber Security Centre, the UK National Crime Agency and the UK National Health Service in the wake of the attack, along with other steps taken to mitigate the risk to those impacted. The final fine represents a voluntary settlement agreed between the ICO and Advanced.
Maritime Chokepoints and Freedom of Navigation The US Federal Maritime Commission Investigation Into “Transit Constraints”
On March 14, 2025, the US Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) announced the initiation of a nonadjudicatory investigation into transit constraints at international maritime “chokepoints.”
The Federal Register notice initiating the investigation identified the following seven global maritime passageways that may be subject to such constraints: (1) the English Channel, (2) the Malacca Strait, (3) the Northern Sea Passage, (4) the Singapore Strait, (5) the Panama Canal, (6) the Strait of Gibraltar and (7) the Suez Canal. The FMC announcement is another sign of the continued merger of national security, trade issues and global shipping and transportation issues.
The FMC has a statutory mandate to monitor and evaluate conditions affecting shipping in US foreign trade. 46 U.S.C.42101(a) provides that the commission “shall prescribe regulations affecting shipping in foreign trade … to adjust or meet general or special conditions unfavorable to shipping in foreign trade,” when those conditions are the result of a foreign country’s laws or regulations or the “competitive methods, pricing practices, or other practices” used by the owners, operators or agents of “vessels of a foreign country.” The FMC is also required under 46 U.S.C. 46106 to report to Congress on potentially problematic practices of ocean common carriers owned or controlled by foreign governments, e.g., China. The FMC will conduct this investigation in accordance with its procedures for a nonadjudicatory investigation set forth in 46 CFR Part 502, Subpart R.
The FMC is conducting this investigation into any actions by a foreign country or other maritime interests that might constitute anticompetitive practices, irregular pricing or pricing that is deemed prejudicial to US foreign trade interests, and any other practices of government authorities, vessel owners, operators or agents affecting transit through such passageways. That is an incredibly broad mandate, and there is complete uncertainty as to what “remedies” or “proposed actions” the FMC might recommend so as to remediate any perceived constraints on transit.
However, given the potentially severe and disruptive impact of the proposed actions currently being considered by the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) in relation to the ongoing Section 301 investigation into “China’s Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance,” 1 this new FMC investigation bears careful monitoring and engagement by affected parties.
Some commentators have already concluded that this new FMC investigation is simply a new front in the trade war the US is waging on the Chinese maritime and shipbuilding industries. Seatrade Maritime News claims that the FMC investigation is “not about trade at all,” but rather a continuation of the “China witch hunt” that started with the USTR Section 301 investigation.2 Others see the inclusion of the Panama Canal in the FMC investigation as an extension of the Trump administration’s stated desire to “take back” the canal, although in truth, the recent controversy over the Panama Canal was in part related again to China, and concerns over the involvement of the Panama Ports Company, a subsidiary of Hong Kong-based Hutchison Port Holdings.3 The references in the FMC notice of initiation to “other maritime interests” and “other practices of government authorities,” including irregular pricing or “pricing that is deemed prejudicial to US foreign trade interests,” appear to be a veiled reference to the Panama Maritime Authority and allegations that US vessels were being treated differently. Most commentators now agree that the FMC investigation is another element or tool that the administration intends to use to reduce US reliance on foreign-owned cargo vessels, and indeed force cargo interests to use US vessels.4 In this context, the focus on the Suez Canal may actually be a US ploy to target and extract concessions out of Egypt;5 the English Channel may be more about targeting the UK and France.
The FMC summarizes its individual concerns about (1) the English Channel, (2) the Malacca Strait, (3) the Northern Sea Passage, (4) the Singapore Strait, (5) the Panama Canal (6) the Strait of Gibraltar, and (7) the Suez Canal in the Federal Register notice. In summary, the concerns range from congestion, limited passing opportunities, an elevated risk of collisions, navigational challenges, variable weather conditions, environmental risks, geopolitical tensions, security threats and, in some areas, piracy and smuggling.
With respect to the Northern Sea Passage, the FMC notes that this is emerging as a critical maritime chokepoint as the region’s waters become ice free for longer periods, with it offering a shortcut between Europe and Asia 6. Reference is made to Russia seeking control over the route and its strategic importance being amplified by increased military activity from Russia, China and NATO forces.
In the section on the Panama Canal, while noting that Panama’s ship registry is one of the world’s largest, the FMC notes that remedial measures it can take include “refusing entry to US ports by vessels registered in countries responsible for creating unfavorable conditions.” In addition to Panama, states that control other areas in which chokepoints are located operate some of the world’s other largest ship registries, such as Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. If this investigation leads to the US refusing entry to, or imposing penalties on, vessels flagged in these states, or on vessels owned by interests from these states, it could have very farreaching implications.
As is foreseen in the impact of the Section 301 proposed actions, these measures could have the potential to significantly raise the costs of calling at US ports (either by way of reduced availability of tonnage or the imposition of direct penalties) with these costs being passed down the charterparty chain and then ultimately to customers and consumers.
The FMC notes that other significant constraints affecting US shipping may arise quickly in the global maritime environment. For example, when the Singapore-flagged containership Dali struck a bridge in Baltimore, Maryland in March 2024, six people were killed and maritime access to the Port of Baltimore was blocked, a situation that persisted for many weeks and led to losses that have been estimated to reach as high as US$4 billion.
Interested parties are permitted to submit written comments by May 13, 2025, with experiences, arguments and/or data relevant to the above-described maritime chokepoints, particularly concerning the effects of laws, regulations, practices or other actions by foreign governments, and/or the practices of owners or operators of foreign-flag vessels, on shipping conditions in these chokepoints.
The FMC states that it welcomes comments not only from government authorities and container shipping interests, but also from tramp operators, bulk cargo interests, vessel owners, individuals and groups with relevant information on environmental and resource-conservation considerations, and anyone else with relevant information or perspectives on these matters.
In particular, the FMC has expressed an interest in information and perspectives on the following six questions:
What are the causes, nature and effects, including financial and environmental effects, of constraints on one or more of the maritime chokepoints described above?
To what extent are constraints caused by or attributable to the laws, regulations, practices, actions or inactions of one or more foreign governments?
To what extent are constraints caused by or attributable to the practices, actions or inactions of owners or operators of foreign-flag vessels?
What will likely be the causes, nature and effects, including financial and environmental effects, of any continued transit constraints during the rest of 2025?
What are the best steps the FMC might take, over the short term and the long term, to alleviate transit constraints and their effects?
What are the obstacles to implementing measures that would alleviate the above transit constraints and their effects, and how can these be addressed?
It will be interesting, and indeed imperative, for global shipping interests to monitor the comments received and how the proposed measures are developed accordingly.
A recent Bloomberg News article went so far as to indicate that the “Billion-Dollar US Levies on Chinese Ships Risk a ‘Trade Apocalypse’.”
Interestingly, there are some notable exclusions from the list of the seven “chokepoints,” including some that are significantly more problematic and/or more important to global trade flows, including the Black Sea and the Bosphorus, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Bab Al Mandeb Strait.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published a February 19, 2025 article examining the US motivations behind the Panama Canal gambit.
TradeWinds posits in one article that the FMC may try to ban or detain ships from the “maritime chokepoint” countries, or restrict or ban service to the US by shipping lines or vessel operators that are said to contribute to issues relating to transit through these passageways.
For example, this may be about the US getting preferential deals for US vessels; e.g., US-flagged vessels being given free Suez transits by the Egyptian government, under threat of measures against Egypt being imposed if not.
Although consultant Darron Wadey at Dynaliners in the Netherlands has expressed a view, quoted in Seatrade Maritime News, that this route is “an outlier” in the list and has “zero relevance” to US foreign trade.
Judge Blocks DHS Secretary Noem’s Termination of Venezuelan TPS
Recission of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for approximately 350,000 Venezuelans has been halted temporarily. U.S. District Court Judge Edward Chen’s Order applies to Venezuelans who registered for TPS under the Oct. 3, 2023, designation of Venezuela for TPS. National TPS Alliance, et al. v. Noem, et al., No. 25-cv-01766 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2025).
Before the issuance of the Order, these individuals faced the loss of their TPS-based work authorizations on April 2 and the expiration of TPS itself on April 7. They will now remain in TPS and authorized to work for the duration of the court order.
The Order gives DHS one week to file notice of appeal and the plaintiffs one week to file a motion to postpone Secretary Kristi Noem’s decision to rescind Haiti’s TPS designation, currently set to expire Aug. 3, 2025.
Judge Chen found Secretary Noem’s recission of Venezuela’s TPS designation a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.
Judge Chen wrote that Secretary Noem’s recission of Venezuela’s TPS designation “threatens to: inflict irreparable harm on hundreds of thousands of persons whose lives, families, and livelihoods will be severely disrupted, cost the United States billions in economic activity, and injure public health and safety in communities throughout the United States.”
He stated that DHS had failed to identify any “real countervailing harm in continuing TPS for Venezuelan beneficiaries” and that plaintiffs will likely succeed in showing that Secretary Noem’s decision is “unauthorized by law, arbitrary and capricious, and motivated by unconstitutional animus.”
The Order does not address Secretary Noem’s Mar. 25, 2025, announcement that humanitarian parole, and related work authorizations, for citizens of Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela (also known as the CHNV program) will expire on April 24, 2025, or the expiration date of individuals’ humanitarian parole, whichever occurs first.
Navigating the Termination of CHNV Parole Programs: Insights on I-9 Reverification and INA Compliance for Employers
On March 25, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced the termination of the parole processes for citizens or nationals of Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela (CHNV parole programs). This decision will affect employers who must navigate the employment eligibility of affected individuals while ensuring compliance with anti-discrimination provisions outlined in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The termination of these programs means that any parole status and employment authorization derived through CHNV parole programs will end by April 24, 2025. Employers must take steps to manage the reverification of affected employees’ employment eligibility without engaging in discriminatory practices.
Understanding the Challenges
As part of the CHNV parole programs, employment authorization documents (EADs) issued to beneficiaries bear the category code (C)(11). However, this code is not exclusive to CHNV beneficiaries, making identification difficult. Additionally, some CHNV beneficiaries may have updated their Forms I-9 with EADs that have validity dates extending beyond April 24, 2025. Employers who wish to ensure compliance face a complex challenge: how to identify affected employees for reverification without inadvertently violating the INA’s anti-discrimination provisions.
Employers who complete and retain paper I-9 forms, do not keep copies of identity and employment authorization documents, and do not participate in E-Verify may find the process particularly challenging. Sorting and extracting Forms I-9 based on “Foreign Passport and Country of Issuance” in Section 1, or by identifying Forms I-9 listing EADs in Section 2, may result in List A displaying overly broad findings, as these methods may capture individuals who are not CHNV beneficiaries and who hold valid employment eligibility.
Legal Compliance Considerations
The INA’s anti-discrimination provisions, particularly 8 USC § 1324b(a)(1)(A) and (a)(6), prohibit employers from treating employees differently based on citizenship, immigration status, or national origin. Employers are also prohibited from requesting additional or different documentation from employees based on these factors. The Department of Justice’s Immigrant and Employee Rights (IER) Section, formerly the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), has emphasized that employers should avoid making employment decisions—including reverification processes—based on an employee’s citizenship, immigration status, or national origin.
In the meantime, employers should consider:
Maintaining thorough records of the reverification process to demonstrate compliance with federal requirements and anti-discrimination provisions.
Conducting internal audits to ensure that no employees are treated differently based on citizenship, immigration status, or national origin during the reverification process.
Providing training to HR personnel and compliance teams on how to handle reverification without violating INA provisions, emphasizing the importance of treating all employees consistently and fairly.
Tracking the expiration dates of employees whose employment eligibility needs to be reverified.
Notifying affected employees of their upcoming need to provide updated documentation, regardless of their citizenship or immigration status. Do not request specific documents or additional information beyond what is required.
Key Takeaways
This issue represents new territory which has not been thoroughly analyzed or reviewed to date by authorities. IER technical guidance may be forthcoming on what U.S. employers should do if a particular classification of employment eligibility is suddenly terminated by the government, but some beneficiaries in that classification have updated their Forms I-9 with employment authorization validity dates that go beyond the termination date (April 24, 2025).
EU: New European Consumer Protection Guidelines for Virtual Currencies in Video Games
On March 21, 2025, ahead of a consultation and call for evidence on the EU’s Digital Fairness Act, the Consumer Protection Cooperation (CPC) Network[1] highlighted the pressing need for improved consumer protection in the European Union, particularly regarding virtual currencies in video games. This move comes in response to growing concerns about the impact of gaming practices on consumers, including vulnerable groups such as children. The CPC Network has defined a series of key principles and recommendations aimed at ensuring a fairer and more transparent gaming environment. These recommendations are not binding and without prejudice to applicable European consumer protection laws[2] but they will likely guide and inform the enforcement of consumer protection agencies on national level across the EU.
What Are the Key Recommendations for In-Game Virtual Currency?
The CPC Network’s recommendations are designed to enhance transparency, prevent unfair practices, and protect consumers’ financial well-being. These principles are not exhaustive but cover several crucial areas:
Clear and Transparent Price Indication: The price of in-game content or services must be shown in both in-game currency and real-world money, ensuring players can make informed decisions about their purchases. (Articles 6(1)(d) and 7 of the UCPD, and Article 6 (1) (e) of the CRD)
Avoiding Practices That Obscure Pricing: Game developers should not engage in tactics that obscure the true cost of digital content. This includes practices like mixing different in-game currencies or requiring multiple exchanges to make purchases. The goal is to avoid confusing or misleading players.(Articles 6 (1) (d) and 7 of the UCPD, and Article 6 (1) (e) of the CRD)
No Forced Purchases: Developers should not design games that force consumers to spend more money on in-game currencies than necessary. Players should be able to choose the exact amount of currency they wish to purchase.(Articles 5, 8 and 9 of the UCPD)
Clear Pre-Contractual Information: Prior to purchasing virtual currencies, consumers must be given clear, easy-to-understand information about what they are buying. This is particularly important for ensuring informed choices.(Article 6 of the CRD)
Respecting the Right of Withdrawal: Players must be informed about their right to withdraw from a purchase within 14 days, particularly for unused in-game currency. This is crucial for ensuring consumers’ ability to cancel transactions if they change their mind.(Articles 9 to 16 of the CRD)
Fair and Transparent Contractual Terms: The terms and conditions for purchasing in-game virtual currencies should be written clearly, using plain language to ensure consumers fully understand their rights and obligations.(Article 3 (1) and (3) of the UCTD)
Respect for Consumer Vulnerabilities: Game developers must consider the vulnerabilities of players, particularly minors, and ensure that game design does not exploit these weaknesses. This includes providing parental controls to prevent unauthorized purchases and ensuring that any communication with minors is carefully scrutinized.(Articles 5-8 and Point 28 of Annex I of the UCPD)
These principles reflect the growing concern by European regulators of exploitation of consumers, particularly vulnerable groups such as children, in the gaming world. The European Consumer Organisation (BEUC) has strongly supported these measures, which aim to provide a safer, more transparent gaming experience for players.
Enforcement Actions and Legal Proceedings
On the same day, coordinated by the European Commission the CPC Network initiated legal proceedings against the developer of on online game. This action, driven by a complaint from the Swedish Consumers’ Association, addresses concerns about the company’s marketing practices, particularly those targeting children. Allegations include misleading advertisements urging children to purchase in-game currency, aggressive sales tactics such as time-limited offers, and a failure to provide clear pricing information.
A Safer Gaming Future
This enforcement action, along with the introduction of new principles, is part of the European Commission’s stated objective to ensure better consumer protection within the gaming industry. The Commission aims to emphasize the importance of transparency, fairness, and the protection of minors within gaming platforms.
What Should Video Game Companies and Gambling Operators Do Next?
In light of these new developments, video game companies and gambling operators especially those offering virtual currencies are well advised to review their practices to ensure ongoing compliance with existing EU consumer protection laws.
Failure to align with the above principles does not automatically mean that consumer laws are infringed but as the recent enforcement action shows could result in investigations and enforcement actions under the CPC Regulation or national laws. If gaming content is available across multiple EU countries, a coordinated investigation may be triggered, with the possibility of fines up to 4% of a company’s annual turnover.
To further support the industry, the European Commission is organising a workshop to allow gaming companies to present their strategies for aligning with the new consumer protection standards. This will provide a valuable opportunity for companies to share their plans and address any concerns related to these proposed changes. If you would like to know more, please get in touch.
FOOTNOTES
[1] The CPC Network is formed by national authorities responsible for enforcing EU consumer protection legislation under the coordination of the European Commission.
[2] Reference is made to Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 on unfair commercial practices (UCPD); the Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights (CRD); the Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (UCTD).
EC Begins Public Consultation on Upcoming EU Bioeconomy Strategy
The European Commission (EC) began a public consultation on March 31, 2025, on the upcoming European Union (EU) Bioeconomy Strategy. The EC states in its March 31, 2025, press release that the Strategy “marks a significant step forward in harnessing the opportunities of the bioeconomy to support European businesses and drive progress towards the EU’s environmental, climate and competitiveness objectives.” According to the call for evidence, the Strategy’s main aims include:
Ensuring the long-term competitiveness of the EU bioeconomy and investment security. The Strategy will identify measures to scale up and commercialize existing and emerging biotechnology solutions and biobased products, in particular by tapping into the significant growth potential of biobased materials substituting fossil-based ones (e.g., sources of alternative proteins, biobased materials, or biochemicals). It will entail looking at practical measures to remove unnecessary barriers to biobased manufacturing and bio-innovation and unleash the full opportunities of primary biobased production;
Increasing resource-efficient and circular use of biological resources, by creating an efficient demand. This means transforming how the EU values and uses biomass resources, prioritizing extended high-value applications while encouraging industries and consumers to embrace circular practices that maximize economic returns from each unit of biomass. It might also entail providing targeted support and incentives for higher value added uses of biomass feedstock and by-products in line with the cascading principle;
Securing the competitive and sustainable supply of biomass, both domestically and from outside the EU. The Strategy will strengthen the role of primary producers, generating wealth in rural areas by creating jobs and diversifying incomes for foresters and farmers and rewarding them for the preservation of ecosystems; and
Positioning the EU in the rapidly expanding international market for biobased materials, biomanufacturing, biochemicals, and agri-food and biotechnology sectors. This will be done by steering existing foreign policy mechanisms in the area of the bioeconomy in the context of the EU’s Global Gateways initiative, exploring the need and appropriateness of bringing bioeconomy under international multilateral fora, and promoting green diplomacy on bioeconomy.
The EC encourages all stakeholders to participate in the online consultation. Comments are due June 23, 2025. Stakeholders can also contribute by participating in targeted sessions on the bioeconomy in upcoming events such as the European Circular Economy Stakeholder Platform (ECESP) Circular Economy Stakeholder Dialogue, taking place on April 10, 2025, and EU Green Week, taking place from June 3 to 5, 2025.