Category: Global

Competition Currents | April 2025

In This Issue1
United States | Mexico | The Netherlands | Poland | Italy | European Union

United States
A. Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
1. FTC staff reaffirms opposition to proposed Indiana hospital merger.
On March 17, 2025, the FTC advised the Indiana Department of Health to deny the merger application of Union Hospital, Inc. (Union Health) and Terre Haute Regional Hospital, L.P. (THRH). According to the FTC’s comment letter, this second attempt to merge under a proposed certificate of public advantage (COPA) has the same anticompetitive harms as their original application. The FTC warned that the merger poses substantial anticompetitive risks, such as higher healthcare costs for patients and lower wages for hospital workers. In September 2024, the FTC issued a similar letter opposing the same parties’ proposed COPA, which the parties later withdrew in November 2024. 
2. FTC launches joint labor task force to protect American workers.
A newly established Joint Labor Task Force as of Feb. 26, 2025, consisting of the FTC’s Bureau of Competition, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Bureau of Economics, and Office of Policy Planning, will focus on identifying and prosecuting deceptive, unfair, and anticompetitive labor-market practices that negatively impact American workers. The task force will also work on developing information-sharing protocols between the FTC’s bureaus and offices to exchange best practices for investigating and uncovering such practices, as well as promoting research on harmful labor-market issues to guide both the FTC and the public. The FTC chairman created the Joint Labor Task Force to streamline the agency’s law-enforcement efforts and ensure labor issues are prioritized in both consumer protection and competition-related matters.
3. FTC approves final order requiring building service contractor to stop enforcing a no-hire agreement.
The FTC, on Feb. 26, 2025, has finalized a consent order that mandates Planning Building Services and its affiliated companies to cease enforcing no-hire agreements. In January 2025, the FTC filed a complaint against Planned Building Services, Inc., Planned Security Services, Inc., Planned Lifestyle Services, Inc., and Planned Technologies Services, Inc., collectively known as Planned Companies (Planned). The complaint claimed that the companies used no-hire agreements to prevent workers from negotiating for higher wages, better benefits, and improved working conditions. Under the final consent order, Planned must stop enforcing no-hire agreements, both directly and indirectly, and must not inform any current or potential customer that a Planned employee is bound by such an agreement. The order also requires Planned to eliminate no-hire clauses from their customer contracts and notify both customers and employees that the existing no-hire agreements are no longer enforceable.
B. U.S. Litigation
1. D’Augusta v. American Petroleum Institute, Case No. 24-800 (U.S. Mar. 31, 2025).
On March 31, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to take up a putative class action alleging that the governments of Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United States entered into an anticompetitive agreement in 2020 to cut oil production. According to the lawsuit, the multinational agreement arose during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, when oil prices declined substantially due to decreased demand. In dismissing the case, the Ninth Circuit held that any alleged agreement between foreign nations and the U.S. government were matters of foreign policy and therefore outside of the judicial branch’s jurisdiction. As is tradition, the U.S. Supreme Court did not issue a separate opinion explaining its reasons for refusing to consider the appeal.
2. Dai v. SAS Institute Inc., Case No. 4:24-cv-02537 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2025).
On March 24, 2025, the Honorable Judge Jeffrey S. White dismissed allegations brought against SAS Institute, Inc., the creator of an artificial intelligence algorithm that others allegedly used to fix hotel prices. According to the complaint, subsidiary IDeaS Inc. licensed SAS’s software to various hotel chains, whom plaintiffs claim used the algorithm to set increased room rates nationwide. While Judge White did not issue an opinion regarding the remaining defendants’ pending motions to dismiss, he stated that at least with respect to SAS, there is no allegation or proof of a direct contract between SAS as a parent company and these hotel chains, and the mere fact that SAS’s software allegedly “powered” the anticompetitive activity was not enough to make it a defendant.
3. State of Tennessee v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, Case No. 3:24-cv-00033 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2025).
Also on March 24, a federal district judge in the Eastern District of Tennessee approved the settlement of a class action that four states and the District of Columbia brought against the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). The states brought the suit on behalf of their respective colleges and universities to challenge the NCAA’s rule that prohibited those schools from marketing potential name, image, and likeness (NIL) compensation to prospective athletes as part of the school’s recruitment. According to the settlement, the NCAA will cease enforcing its existing rules that prevent athletes from learning about or negotiating potential NIL contracts as part of college recruitment. 
4. Davitashvili v. Grubhub, Inc., Case No. 23-521 and 23-522 (2d Cir. Mar. 13, 2025).
On March 13, 2025, a divided Second Circuit held that while food delivery service Uber Technologies Inc. could force customers to arbitrate “the arbitrability” of their antitrust claims, a court would decide if fellow defendant and competitor Grubhub Inc.’s antitrust claims were subject to the arbitration. The appeals arise out of allegations that both Uber and Grubhub require restaurants to agree not to sell food at lower prices than those offered on their platforms, which plaintiffs claim resulted in increased prices to consumers. According to the court, the differing results arise in part because Uber’s terms of service more clearly state that the question of whether antitrust suits are subject to the arbitration clause is itself a question that is left to the arbitrator, whereas Grubhub’s terms of service fail to sufficiently require an arbitrator to determine questions of arbitrability. In a dissenting opinion, the Honorable Judge Richard J. Sullivan disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that claims against Grubhub were “unrelated” to consumers’ use of the app, noting that “what gave Grubhub the market power to commit the alleged antitrust violations” was the very fact that consumers used the app.
Mexico
SCJN endorses COFECE’s fine against Aeromexico; emails were key in the decision.
The Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (SCJN) has ratified the investigative powers of the Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFECE), concluding more than five years of litigation Aeromexico initiated.
The airline had challenged a fine of MEX 88 million ($4.21 million) that COFECE imposed in 2019 for colluding to manipulate airline ticket prices on several routes, affecting more than 3 million passengers. The Second Chamber ultimately confirmed the sanction.
In this and other cases, much of the evidence against Aeromexico was obtained through surprise verification visits, a key tool of COFECE. These visits allow access to the offending companies’ offices to collect crucial physical and electronic evidence that may otherwise be destroyed. During one of these visits, COFECE found emails between airline executives, where, using nicknames, codes, and false email addresses, they allegedly conspired to manipulate prices.
Aeromexico argued before the SCJN that these emails were “private communications” and, therefore, could not be used as evidence. However, the Second Chamber determined that these communications are not protected by the right to privacy and can be used to investigate and sanction monopolistic practices that affect consumers, especially when it comes to commercial communications between companies or their personnel.
The Netherlands
A. Dutch ACM Statements
1. ACM provides guidance for car dealership concentrations.
The Dutch competition authority (ACM) has issued a detailed guideline outlining its approach to assessing mergers and acquisitions within the car dealership sector. This guideline aims to provide clarity to the industry by offering a step-by-step overview of the information car dealerships must submit and the analyses they must conduct when filing merger notifications. The objective is to ensure an efficient and precise evaluation process for both the ACM and the companies involved.
To minimize administrative burdens on businesses, the guideline introduces threshold values. Companies operating below these thresholds need only provide a straightforward market share analysis. For companies exceeding these thresholds, further procedural steps are outlined. This approach is designed to support companies in complying with notification requirements efficiently.
2. ACM may investigate possible violations under the Digital Markets Act.
The ACM now has the authority to investigate compliance with the Digital Markets Act (DMA). This European legislation, in effect since May 2023, aims to foster competition in digital markets and provide better protection for consumers. The DMA imposes obligations on major digital platforms, known as “gatekeepers.” Key obligations for gatekeepers include offering fair terms in app stores, providing businesses free access to their own data, and ensuring interoperability between apps and hardware. The ACM will work closely with the European Commission (“EC”) through joint investigative teams to address these matters.
The ACM is authorized to investigate complaints from businesses facing access issues with these platforms and collaborates with the EC, which holds exclusive enforcement powers under the DMA. Since the Dutch implementation law took effect March 10, 2025, the ACM has gained investigative authority. The ACM encourages businesses to report any difficulties encountered with gatekeepers.
3. ACM investigates the acquisition of Ziemann Nederland by Brink’s and is advocating for a ‘call-in power.’
The ACM has initiated an investigation into the recent acquisition of Ziemann Nederland by Brink’s, a leading player in the Dutch cash-in-transit sector. As a result of the takeover, Ziemann will exit the Dutch market, heightening the ACM’s concerns regarding reduced competition.
Brink’s has stated that the acquisition did not require prior notification to the ACM as the turnover thresholds were not met. However, the ACM is now examining whether the transaction may breach competition laws, including the prohibition on abusing a dominant market position. Furthermore, the ACM is advocating for a ‘call-in power,’ which would enable it to investigate smaller acquisitions that may have adverse effects, even if they fall below the turnover thresholds. Such a measure would enhance the ability to address market power and its associated risks, both at the national and European levels.
B. Dutch Court Decision
Dutch Supreme Court to rule on follow-on claims from a single, continuous breach of European competition law.
The central issue in this case concerns the determination of the applicable law for claims seeking damages resulting from a single and continuous infringement of the European cartel prohibition under Article 101 TFEU, known as follow-on claims. The dispute involves cartel damages stemming from an international cartel of airlines that coordinated prices for fuel and security surcharges between 1999 and 2006. The EC has previously issued fines to the airlines involved, while claims-vehicles Equilib and SCC are seeking compensation on behalf of the affected parties.
Both the lower court and the court of appeals ruled that Dutch law applies to these cartel damage claims under the Unjust Act Conflicts Act (WCOD). The court of appeals held that a single and continuous infringement gives rise to one damages claim per injured party, regardless of the number of transactions that party undertakes. It also noted that the WCOD contains a gap in cases where multiple legal systems could govern a single-damages claim. The court suggested that this gap may be addressed by allowing a unilateral choice of law, in line with Article 6(3) of the Rome II Regulation.
The case is now before the Supreme Court, which is questioning whether the concept of a “single and continuous infringement” should be defined under European Union law or whether this determination is left to the member states’ national laws. The Supreme Court is considering referring a preliminary question to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The proposed question seeks to establish whether EU law, particularly the principle of effectiveness, mandates that a single and continuous infringement be treated as a single wrongful act resulting in one damage-claim per injured party, or whether member states are permitted to classify each transaction as separate damages claim.
Poland
A. UOKiK Continuous Enforcement Actions Against RPM Agreements
In the March edition of Competition Currents, we reported on the continued interest of the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK President) in resale price maintenance (RPM) agreements, and the actions taken in the last year. UOKiK’s scrutiny of RPM remains strong and in recent weeks, UOKiK has taken further enforcement actions.
1. Fines imposed on Jura Poland and retailers for coffee machine resale price maintenance.
The UOKiK President has imposed fines exceeding PLN 66 million (approx. EUR 16 million/USD 18 million) on Jura Poland and major electronics retailers for engaging in a decade-long price-fixing scheme regarding Jura coffee machines. Additionally, a top executive at Jura Poland faces a personal fine of nearly PLN 250 thousand (approx. EUR 60 thousand/USD 65 thousand).
According to the UOKiK President, Jura Poland, the exclusive importer of Jura coffee machines, colluded with its retail partners to maintain minimum resale prices, preventing consumers from purchasing them at lower prices. The agreement covered both online and in store sales and extended to promotional pricing and bundled accessories.
Evidence gathered through on-site inspections revealed that Jura Poland was actively monitoring compliance, pressuring retailers to adhere to fixed prices under the threat of supply restrictions or contract termination. The scheme’s communication channels included emails, phone calls, messaging apps, and SMS messages.
The anti-competitive arrangement reportedly lasted from July 2013 to November 2022. The UOKiK President imposed fines of PLN 30 million (approx. EUR 7.1 million/USD 7.7 million) on the owner of one retailer, and of PLN 12.2 million (approx. EUR 2.8 million/USD 3.1 million) on Jura Poland. The other retailers received fines ranging from PLN 6.5 million (approx. EUR 1.5 million/USD 1.6 million) to PLN 10.5 million (approx. EUR 2.5 million/USD 2.7 million).
The decision is not yet final and can be appealed to the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection.
2. UOKiK investigates alleged collusion in agricultural machinery sales.
The UOKiK President has launched two antitrust investigations into potential collusion in the sale of agricultural machinery. The first investigation is focusing on major brands in the industry. The second investigation concerns the Claas brand. Allegations of market sharing and price fixing, which may lead to higher costs for farmers, have been made against 15 companies and two executives.
The UOKiK President suspects that dealers were assigned exclusive sales territories, restricting farmers from purchasing machinery outside the designated areas. Customers who attempted to buy from other dealers may have been redirected or offered less favorable prices. Additionally, businesses allegedly exchanged pricing information to discourage cross-regional sales.
If the UOKiK proceedings confirm competition-restricting agreements, the companies could face fines of up to 10% of their annual turnover, while managers risk penalties of up to PLN 2 million (approx. EUR 479 thousand/USD 517 thousand). Under Polish law, anticompetitive provisions in agreements are invalid. Entities suffering harm as a result of an anticompetitive agreement may also seek damages in civil court.
B. UOKiK imposes fines for obstruction of investigation and dawn raids
Companies failing to cooperate with the UOKiK President may face severe penalties. Under Polish law, non-disclosure of the required information may result in penalties of up to 3% of the company’s annual turnover. Sanctions for procedural violations during proceedings, particularly for obstructing or preventing the conduct of an inspection or search, may be imposed on managers, with a financial penalty of up to 50 times the average salary (approx. PLN 430,000/EUR 103,000/USD 109,000).
Last month, the UOKiK President issued three decisions, imposing a total of PLN 1.1 million (approx. EUR 263,000/USD 284,000) in fines.
Another case concerned suspected bid-rigging in the supply of cooling and ventilation equipment. M.A.S. executives refused to grant UOKiK access to the work phones and email accounts of two employees involved in the case. One employee’s data was submitted with a two-month delay, while the other’s was never provided. As a result, the UOKiK President issued two decisions with fines: PLN 350,000 (approx. EUR 84,000/USD 90,000) on M.A.S. and PLN 50,000 (approx. EUR 12,000/USD 13,000) on its CEO. The fine imposed on M.A.S. was relatively high, amounting to approximately 2% of the company’s turnover, while the maximum possible fine was 3%.
Italy
Italian Competition Authority (ICA)
1. Update of turnover thresholds for concentration notifications.
On March 24, 2025, the ICA increased the first of two cumulative turnover thresholds that determine when preventive notification of concentrations becomes mandatory. This threshold, which concerns the total national turnover generated by all companies involved in a transaction, was raised from EUR 567 million to EUR 582 million. The second threshold, which requires at least two of the involved companies to individually generate a national turnover of EUR 35 million, remains unchanged.
2. New guidelines on applying antitrust fines.
On March 10, 2025, following a public consultation, ICA adopted new guidelines on fines, aimed at enhancing the deterrent effectiveness of its sanctioning activities. The innovations include:

the introduction of a minimum percentage, equal to 15% of the sales value, for price-fixing cartels, market allocation, and production limitation cartels;
the possibility of increasing the sanction by up to 50% if the responsible company has particularly high total worldwide turnover relative to the value of sales of the goods or service subject to the infringement, or belongs to a group of significant economic size;
the possibility of further increasing the fine based on the illicit profits the company responsible for the infringement made; and
the consideration of mitigating circumstances in a case of adopting and effectively implementing a specific compliance program, as well as introducing the so-called “amnesty plus,” i.e., the possibility of further reducing the fine if the company has provided information ICA deems decisive for detecting an additional infringement and falling within the scope of the leniency program.

3. New guidelines on antitrust compliance.
On March 10, 2025, ICA adopted new guidelines on antitrust compliance. In particular, the ICA has introduced:

a maximum reduction of penalties up to 10% – instead of the previous 15% – reserved for compliance programs that have proven to be effective (i.e. if the application is submitted before ICA launches an investigation);
a reduction of up to 5% -instead of 10%- in the case of compliance programs that are not manifestly inadequate, adopted before ICA launches an investigation, provided that the program is adequately integrated and implemented within six months;
a reduction of up to 5% for companies with manifestly inadequate programs or for programs adopted newly after the start of the investigation only in cases where substantial changes have been made after the proceeding’s initiation;
no reduction for companies that repeatedly infringed and that had already benefited from a reduction of the fine for a previous compliance program. Moreover, no reduction will be granted to a repeat offender, already having a compliance program, involved in a subsequent proceeding.

4. ICA investigates Rete Ferroviaria Italiana S.p.A.and Ferrovie dello Stato Italiane S.p.A. for potential abuse of dominant position.
On March 18, 2025, ICA launched an investigation against Rete Ferroviaria Italiana S.p.A. (RFI) and Ferrovie dello Stato Italiane S.p.A. (FS) for an alleged abuse of dominant position, in violation of Article 102 TFEU. According to ICA, access to the national railway infrastructure has been slowed down, and in some cases obstructed, impeding the new high-speed passenger transport operator, SNCF Voyages Italia S.r.l. (SVI)’s entry.
The contested behaviors were implemented in the national railway infrastructure market, in which RFI holds a dominant position due to the legal concession granting (D.M. Oct. 31, 2000, No. 138), the company a legal monopoly over the national railway network. In this case, access primarily concerns the high-speed (AV) network. However, the infrastructure involved in the allegedly abusive conduct also includes part of the railway infrastructure intended for regional and medium-long distance transport services. From a geographical perspective, considering the widespread nature of the access conditions across the entire Italian railway network, the actions in question seem to have a national scope.
The alleged abusive conduct carried out in the upstream market of railway infrastructure appears to have hindered SVI’s entry into the passenger railway transport market on the AV network, which is the downstream market where anti-competitive effects would have occurred. ICA carried out inspection activities at the offices of Rete Ferroviaria Italiana S.p.A., Ferrovie dello Stato Italiane S.p.A., and also at the offices of Trenitalia S.p.A. and Italo – Nuovo Trasporto Viaggiatori S.p.A., as they were considered to have information relevant to the investigation.
European Union
A. European Commission
European Commission drops interim measures proceedings against Lufthansa.
The European Commission has closed its interim measures antitrust proceedings against Lufthansa, concluding that the legal conditions for such measures under Article 8 of Regulation 1/2003 were not fully met. The proceedings aimed to require Lufthansa to restore Condor’s access to feed traffic at Frankfurt Airport, as previously agreed between the airlines.
These interim measures were part of a broader investigation into potential competition restrictions on transatlantic routes involving the A++ joint venture between Lufthansa and other airlines. The investigation, launched in August 2024, examines whether the joint venture complies with EU competition rules.
While the interim measures proceedings have been closed, the European Commission continues its main investigation into the competitive impact of the A++ joint venture on transatlantic routes, including the Frankfurt-New York route.
B. ECJ Decision
A parent company can be sued in its home country for its subsidiary’s antitrust violations in another EU member state.
On Feb. 13, 2025, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) issued a landmark ruling confirming that a parent company may be sued in its home country for antitrust violations its subsidiary committed in another EU member state. The case concerned a Greek subsidiary, Athenian Brewery SA, which the Greek competition authority had sanctioned for abusing its dominant position. Macedonian Thrace Brewery SA subsequently filed a claim for damages before a Dutch court against both the subsidiary and its Dutch parent company, invoking Article 8(1) of the Brussels I bis Regulation. This provision allows for the joint adjudication of claims when they are closely connected.
The CJEU clarified that a parent company and its subsidiary may be regarded as forming a single “economic unit,” thereby justifying both joint liability and international jurisdiction. Furthermore, the CJEU reaffirmed the existence of a rebuttable presumption that a parent company exercises decisive influence over its subsidiary if it holds nearly all of the subsidiary’s shares. This presumption is significant for determining both liability and jurisdiction, provided the claims are substantively interconnected and the risk of contradictory judgments is mitigated.
This ruling carries implications for competition law enforcement within the EU. Aggrieved parties are now able to pursue damage claims in the parent company’s jurisdiction, even if the subsidiary committed the antitrust infringement in another member state. However, national courts must ensure that the conditions for establishing international jurisdiction have not been artificially created, while also allowing the parent company the opportunity to rebut the presumption of decisive influence.

1 Due to the terms of GT’s retention by certain of its clients, these summaries may not include developments relating to matters involving those clients.
Holly Smith Letourneau, Sarah-Michelle Stearns, Alexa S. Minesinger, Miguel Flores Bernés, Valery Dayne García Zavala, Hans Urlus, Dr. Robert Hardy, Chazz Sutherland, Robert Gago, Filip Drgas, Anna Celejewska-Rajchert, Ewa Głowacka, Edoardo Gambaro, Pietro Missanelli, Martino Basilisco, and Yongho “Andrew” Lee also contributed to this article. 

Is Insurtech a High-Risk Application of AI?

While there are many AI regulations that may apply to a company operating in the Insurtech space, these laws are not uniform in their obligations. Many of these regulations concentrate on different regulatory constructs, and the company’s focus will drive which obligations apply to it. For example, certain jurisdictions, such as Colorado and the European Union, have enacted AI laws that specifically address “high-risk AI systems” that place heightened burdens on companies deploying AI models that would fit into this categorization.
What is a “High-Risk AI System”?
Although many deployments that are considered a “high-risk AI system” in one jurisdiction may also meet that categorization in another jurisdiction, each regulation technically defines the term quite differently.
Europe’s Artificial Intelligence Act (EU AI Act) takes a gradual, risk-based approach to compliance obligations for in-scope companies. In other words, the higher the risk associated with AI deployment, the more stringent the requirements for the company’s AI use. Under Article 6 of the EU AI Act, an AI system is considered “high risk” if it meets both conditions of subsection (1) [1] of the provision or if it falls within the list of AI systems considered high risk and included as Annex III of the EU AI Act,[2] which includes, AI systems that are dealing with biometric data, used to evaluate the eligibility of natural persons for benefits and services, evaluate creditworthiness, or used for risk assessment and pricing in relation to life or health insurance.
The Colorado Artificial Intelligence Act (CAIA), which takes effect on February 1, 2026, adopts a risk-based approach to AI regulation. The CAIA focuses on the deployment of “high-risk” AI systems that could potentially create “algorithmic discrimination.” Under the CAIA, a “high-risk” AI system is defined as any system that, when deployed, makes—or is a substantial factor in making—a “consequential decision”; namely, a decision that has a material effect on the provision or cost of insurance.
Notably, even proposed AI bills that have not been enacted have considered insurance-related activity to come within the proposed regulatory scope.  For instance, on March 24, 2025, Virginia’s Governor Glenn Youngkin vetoed the state’s proposed High-Risk Artificial Intelligence Developer and Deployer Act (also known as the Virginia AI Bill), which would have applied to developers and deployers of “high-risk” AI systems doing business in Virginia. Compared to the CAIA, the Virginia AI Bill defined “high-risk AI” more narrowly, focusing only on systems that operate without meaningful human oversight and serve as the principal basis for consequential decisions. However, even under that failed bill, an AI system would have been considered “high-risk” if it was intended to autonomously make, or be a substantial factor in making, a “consequential decision,” which is a “decision that has a material legal, or similarly significant, effect on the provision or denial to any consumer of—among other things—insurance.
Is Insurtech Considered High Risk?
Both the CAIA and the failed Virginia AI Bill explicitly identify that an AI system making a consequential decision regarding insurance is considered “high-risk,” which certainly creates the impression that there is a trend toward regulating AI use in the Insurtech space as high-risk. However, the inclusion of insurance on the “consequential decision” list of these laws does not definitively mean that all Insurtech leveraging AI will necessarily be considered high-risk under these or future laws. For instance, under the CAIA, an AI system is only high-risk if, when deployed, it “makes or is a substantial factor in making” a consequential decision. Under the failed Virginia AI Bill, the AI system had to be “specifically intended to autonomously make, or be a substantial factor in making, a consequential decision.”
Thus, the scope of regulated AI use, which varies from one applicable law to another, must be considered together with the business’s proposed application to get a better sense of the appropriate AI governance in a given case. While there are various use cases that leverage AI in insurance, which could result in consequential decisions that impact an insured, such as those that improve underwriting, fraud detection, and pricing, there are also other internal uses of AI that may not be considered high risk under a given threshold. For example, leveraging AI to assess a strategic approach to marketing insurance or to make the new client onboarding or claims processes more efficient likely doesn’t trigger the consequential decision threshold required to be considered high-risk under CAIA or the failed Virginia AI Bill. Further, even if the AI system is involved in a consequential decision, this alone may not deem it to be high risk, as, for instance, the CAIA requires that the AI system make the consequential decision or be a substantial factor in that consequential decision.
Although the EU AI Act does not expressly label Insurtech as being high-risk, a similar analysis is possible because Annex III of the EU AI Act lists certain AI uses that may be implicated by an AI system deployed in the Insurtech space. For example, an AI system leveraging a model to assess creditworthiness in developing a pricing model in the EU likely triggers the law’s high-risk threshold. Similarly, AI modeling used to assess whether an applicant is eligible for coverage may also trigger a higher risk threshold. Under Article 6(2) of the EU AI Act, even if an AI system fits the categorization promulgated under Annex III, the deployer of the AI system should perform the necessary analysis to assess whether the AI system poses a significant risk of harm to individuals’ health, safety, or fundamental rights, including by materially influencing decision-making. Notably, even if an AI system falls into one of the categories in Annex III, if the deployer determines through documented analysis that the deployment of the AI system does not pose a significant risk of harm, the AI system will not be considered high-risk.
What To Do If You Are Developing or Deploying a “High-Risk AI System”?
Under the CAIA, when dealing with a high-risk AI system, various obligations come into play. These obligations vary for developers[3] and deployers[4] of the AI system. Developers are required to display a disclosure on their website identifying any high-risk AI systems they have deployed and explain how they manage known or reasonably foreseeable risks of algorithmic discrimination. Developers must also notify the Colorado AG and all known deployers of the AI system within 90 days of discovering that the AI system has caused or is reasonably likely to cause algorithmic discrimination. Developers must also make significant additional documentation about the high-risk AI system available to deployers.
Under the CAIA, deployers have different obligations when leveraging a high-risk AI system. First, they must notify consumers when the high-risk AI system will be making, or will play a substantial factor in making, a consequential decision about the consumer. This includes (i) a description of the high-risk AI system and its purpose, (ii) the nature of the consequential decision, (iii) contact information for the deployer, (iv) instructions on how to access the required website disclosures, and (v) information regarding the consumer’s right to opt out of the processing of the consumer’s personal data for profiling. Additionally, when use of the high-risk AI system results in a decision adverse to the consumer, the deployer must disclose to the consumer (i) the reason for the consequential decision, (ii) the degree to which the AI system was involved in the adverse decision, and (iii) the type of data that was used to determine that decision and where that data was obtained from, giving the consumer the opportunity to correct data that was used about that as well as appeal the adverse decision via human review. Developers must also make additional disclosures regarding information and risks associated with the AI system. Given that the failed Virginia AI Bill had proposed similar obligations, it would be reasonable to consider the CAIA as a roadmap for high-risk AI governance considerations in the United States. 
Under Article 8 of the EU AI Act, high-risk AI systems must meet several requirements that tend to be more systemic. These include the implementation, documentation, and maintenance of a risk management system that identifies and analyzes reasonably foreseeable risks the system may pose to health, safety, or fundamental rights, as well as the adoption of appropriate and targeted risk management measures designed to address these identified risks. High-risk AI governance under this law must also include:

Validating and testing data sets involved in the development of AI models used in a high-risk AI system to ensure they are sufficiently representative, free of errors, and complete in view of the intended purpose of the AI system;
Technical documentation that demonstrates the high-risk AI system complies with the requirements set out in the EU AI Act, to be drawn up before the system goes to market and is regularly maintained;
The AI system must allow for the automatic recording of events (logs) over the lifetime of the system;
The AI system must be designed and developed in a manner that allows for sufficient transparency. Deployers must be positioned to properly interpret an AI system’s output. The AI system must also include instructions describing the intended purpose of the AI system and the level of accuracy against which the AI system has been tested;
High risk AI systems must be developed in a manner that allows for them to be effectively overseen by natural persons when they are in use; and
High risk AI systems must deploy appropriate levels of accuracy, robustness, and cybersecurity, which are performed consistently throughout the lifecycle of the AI system.

When deploying high risk AI systems, in-scope companies must carve out the necessary resources to not only assess whether they fall within this categorization, but also to ensure the variety of requirements are adequately considered and implemented prior to deployment of the AI system.
The Insurtech space is growing in parallel with the expanding patchwork of U.S. AI regulations. Prudent growth in the industry requires awareness of the associated legal dynamics, including emerging regulatory concepts nationwide.

[1] Subsection (1) states that an AI system is high-risk if it is “intended to be used as a safety component of a product (or is a product) covered by specific EU harmonization legislation listed in Annex I of the AI Act and the same harmonization legislation mandates that he product hat incorporates the AI system as a safety component, or the AI system itself as a stand-alone product, under a third-party conformity assessment before being placed in the EU market.”
[2] Annex 3 of the EU AI Act can be found at https://artificialintelligenceact.eu/annex/3/
[3] Under the CAIA, a “Developer” is a person doing business in Colorado that develops or intentionally and substantially modifies an AI system.
[4] Under the CAIA, a “Deployer” is a persona doing business in Colorado that deploys a High-Risk AI System.

Shenzhen Releases Patent Subsidy Data – Huawei Received Over 35 Million RMB for Foreign Patent Grants

On April 14, 2025, the Shenzhen Municipal Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) released the List of recipients of the second batch of special funds for intellectual property rights in Shenzhen in 2023 for foreign invention patent authorization (深圳市2023年第二批知识产权领域专项资金国外发明专利授权资助领款名单). Combined with the List of recipients of Shenzhen’s 2023 special fund for intellectual property rights for foreign invention patent authorization (深圳市2023年知识产权领域专项资金国外发明专利授权资助领款名单) published on March 28, 2024 Shenzhen’s SAMR has subsidized Huawei a total of 35,168,904 RMB for foreign patents granted in 2023. Huawei also received 2,619,103 RMB for Chinese invention patents that granted in 2023. ZTE and Tencent also received significant subsidies for foreign patent grants. Note that these statistics do not include subsidies for subsidiaries located in other cities. Note that direct subsidies for grants will end this year.

The top 5 total 2023 subsidies for foreign patent grants are:

No.
Name of the recipient
Amount

1
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
CNY 35,168,904.98

2
ZTE Corporation
CNY 19,605,473.78

3
Tencent Technology (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd.
CNY 13,358,477.67

4
Shenzhen Goodix Technology Co., Ltd.
CNY 7,249,009.85

5
Shenzhen DJI Innovations Technology Co., Ltd.
CNY 6,430,024.87

The original data for the first tranche is here (Chinese only) and second tranche here (Chinese only). Translated datasets are available here: DomesticPatent1; ForeignPatent1; ForeignPatent2; and DomesticPatent2.

Europe: Central Bank of Ireland updates its UCITS Q&A on Portfolio Transparency for ETFs

In a move that will be welcomed by asset managers conducting ETF business in Ireland, or those who are hoping to move into the Irish ETF space, the Central Bank of Ireland has moved to allow for the establishment of semi-transparent ETFs by amending its requirements for portfolio transparency.
Previously, the Central Bank’s UCITS Q&A 1012 provided that the Central Bank would not authorise an ETF unless arrangements were put in place to ensure that information is provided on a daily basis regarding the identities and quantities of portfolio holdings.
The revised Q&A however, while retaining the ability for ETFs to publish holdings on a daily basis, now provides flexibility in that “periodic disclosures” are now permissible, once the following conditions are adhered to:

appropriate information is disclosed on a daily basis to facilitate an effective arbitrage mechanism;
the prospectus discloses the type of information that is provided in point (1);
this information is made available on a non-discriminatory basis to authorised participants (APs) and market makers (MMs);
there are documented procedures to address circumstances where the arbitrage mechanism of the ETF is impaired;
there is a documented procedure for investors to request portfolio information; and
the portfolio holdings as at the end of each calendar quarter are disclosed publicly within 30 business days of the end of the quarter.

These new semi-transparent ETFs will be most attractive for active asset managers who have previously been dissuaded from establishing an ETF in Ireland due to their reluctance to share their proprietary information.

AIFMD 2.0 – Draft RTS and Final Guidelines Published on Liquidity Management Tools

On 15 April 2025, the European Securities and Markets Authority (“ESMA”) published draft regulatory technical standards (the “Draft RTS”) and final guidelines (the “Guidelines”) on Liquidity Management Tools (“LMTs”), as required under the revised Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (EU/2024/927) (“AIFMD 2.0”).
 
Under AIFMD 2.0, ESMA is required to develop:

regulatory technical standards to specify the characteristics of the liquidity management tools set out in Annex V of AIFMD 2.0; and
guidelines on the selection and calibration of liquidity management tools by alternative investment fund managers (“AIFMs”) for liquidity risk management and mitigating financial stability risk.

The Draft RTS and Guidelines have been published following a consultation period by ESMA. The amendments introduced following the consultation are broadly seen as positive developments from ESMA, introducing greater flexibility for alternative investment funds (“AIFs”) in several cases.
Draft RTS
Some of the key provisions set out in the RTS include:
Redemption Gates
Redemption gates must have an activation threshold and apply to all investors. In the Draft RTS, ESMA has introduced flexibility in expressing activation thresholds for redemption gates. For AIFs, thresholds can be expressed in a percentage of the net asset value (“NAV”), in a monetary value (or a combination of both), or in a percentage of liquid assets. In addition, either net or gross redemption orders shall be considered for the determination of the activation threshold.
ESMA has also introduced a new alternative method for the application of redemption gates – redemption orders below or equal to a certain pre-determined redemption amount can be fully executed while orders above this amount are subject to the redemption gate. The purpose of this mechanism is to avoid small redemption orders being affected by larger redemption orders, that drive the amount of orders above the activation threshold.
Side Pockets
ESMA did not include any provisions in the Draft RTS relating to the management of side pockets, as ESMA concluded there was no mandate within the empowerment of the Draft RTS to allow them to do so.
Applicability of LMTs to Share Classes
The previously published version of the Draft RTS included provisions on the application of LMTs to share classes, requiring the same level of LMTs to be applied to all share classes (e.g. when AIFMs extend the notice period of a fund, the same extension of notice period shall apply to all share classes). ESMA has removed these provisions from the Draft RTS.
Use of other LMTs
Recital 25 of the Draft RTS clarifies that additional LMTs not selected in Annex V of AIFMD 2.0 may be used. These may include, for example, “soft closures” that consist of suspending only subscriptions, only repurchases or redemptions of the AIF.
Other Provisions
Other topics covered in the Draft RTS include swing pricing, dual pricing and anti-dilution levies, as well as redemptions in kind.
Guidelines
Some of the key provisions set out in the Guidelines include:
Selection of LMTs
In the selection of the two minimum mandatory LMTs in accordance with AIFMD 2.0 (set out in Annex V of AIFMD 2.0), ESMA states that AIFMs should consider, where appropriate, the merit of selecting at least one quantitative-based LMT (i.e. redemption gates, extension of notice period) and at least one anti-dilution tool (i.e. redemption fees, swing pricing, dual pricing, anti-dilution levies), taking into consideration the investment strategy, redemption policy and liquidity profile of the fund and the market conditions under which the LMT could be activated.
Governance Principles
AIFMs should develop an LMT policy, which should form part of the broader fund liquidity risk management process policy document, and should document the conditions for the selection, activation and calibration of LMTs. AIFMs also should develop an LMT plan, that should be in line with the LMT policy, prior to or immediately after the activation of suspensions of subscriptions, repurchases and redemptions and prior to the activation of a side pocket.
Disclosure to investors
AIFMs should provide disclosures to investors on the selection, activation and calibration of LMTs in the fund documentation, rules or instruments of incorporation, prospectus and/or periodic reports.
Depositaries
Depositaries should set up appropriate verification procedures to check that AIFMs have in place documented procedures for LMTs.
Other Provisions
The Guidelines also include certain other provisions that impose restrictive obligations on the selection, activation and calibration of LMTs (for example, preventing the systematic activation of redemption gates for funds marketed to retail investors).
Next Steps
The European Commission has three months (i.e. until 15 July 2025) to adopt the Draft RTS, although this period can be extended by one month. The European Commission also has the ability to amend the Draft RTS as required.
Once adopted by the European Commission, the Draft RTS will come into force 20 days following publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
The Guidelines will be applicable from the day after the Draft RTS comes into force, although AIFMs of funds existing before the date of application of the Guidelines will have a 12-month grace period.

Munich Court Addresses Implementer’s Obligation To Provide Security in FRAND Negotiations

The Munich Higher Regional Court issued a decision concerning the fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) negotiation process and an implementer’s obligation to provide security if a license offer for standard essential patents (SEPs) is rejected. HMD Global v. VoiceAge, Case No. 6 U 3824/22 Kart, (Judgment of 20 March 2025).
In this case, the Munich Higher Regional Court attempted to fill a gap left by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Huawei v. ZTE regarding an implementer’s obligation to provide adequate security for royalties. This obligation arises when an implementer rejects a SEP holder’s license offer and the SEP holder rejects the implementer’s counteroffer, so there is no agreement on a license.
The Munich Court found that the implementer, HMD Global, provided an inadequate security that was based on HMD Global’s lower counteroffer. The Court explained that it is the SEP holder’s, here VoiceAges, final offer (i.e., the requested royalty) that is determinative for calculating the security amount that an implementer should provide. This is because a willing licensee must accept the SEP holder’s offer if a court declares it to be FRAND and the royalties subject to this offer must be covered by the security. The Court emphasized that an implementer can only establish that it is a willing licensee by making a counteroffer and providing adequate security after rejecting the offer.
However, the Munich Court left open the issue of whether security must be provided if the SEP holder’s final offer is obviously not FRAND, noting that there may be “special cases” where the SEP holder’s final offer may not be determinative of the security without further defining those cases.
The CJEU’s Guidelines to FRAND Negotiations Are Not a Rigid Set of Rules
The Munich Court also took a critical stance in response to the European Commission’s amicus curiae brief and found that the FRAND guidelines set by the CJEU in Huawei v. ZTE are not to be viewed as a rigid set of rules but rather as a “dynamic concept for negotiation.” A court is not limited to assessing the FRAND defense by strictly examining in sequence each step of the CJEU’s guidelines, which includes the following:

The SEP holder must send a notice of infringement to the implementer.
The implementer must declare to be a willing licensee.
The SEP holder must make a FRAND offer.
If the offer is not FRAND, the implementer is allowed to reject it but must make a counteroffer.
The implementer must provide adequate security for royalties if the SEP holder rejects the implementer’s counteroffer.

The European Commission argued that a court must examine each step before moving on to the next one. This means that, for example, once a court has found that the implementer is a willing licensee, the court must leave the implementer’s subsequent (possibly non-FRAND) conduct out of consideration and cannot undermine the implementer’s established willingness to take a license. A court must then assess whether the SEP holder’s offer was FRAND.
Instead, in view of the Munich Court (a view that is also shared by the Unified Patent Court (Local Division Munich, judgment of 18 December 2024, Case No. ACT_459771/2023, UPC_CFI_9/2023)), a court may consider the entirety of the parties’ conduct, including subsequent conduct, during FRAND negotiations. Therefore, a party may not rely on a formal omission by the other party, such as the absence (or inadequacy) of an infringement notice or a declaration to be a willing licensee in the early stages of negotiations, if the omission was remedied by the party’s subsequent conduct and the parties continued to negotiate with the goal of concluding a license. On the other hand, the implementer’s subsequent non-FRAND conduct may undermine its established willingness to take a license.
No Review of the SEP Holder’s Final Offer if the Implementer Fails to Comply With Its FRAND Obligations After Rejecting the Offer
The Munich Court found that it need not review whether the SEP holder’s final offer was FRAND before assessing the implementer’s conduct after rejecting the offer.
The Munich Court explained that in general, whether a SEP holder’s final offer is FRAND is not decisive to the success of a FRAND defense because even if a SEP holder’s offer is not FRAND, the implementer cannot simply walk away from the negotiations. Instead, to comply with its CJEU negotiation obligations, the implementer must take further action, such as making a counteroffer and providing adequate security, to maintain a FRAND defense against a SEP holder’s injunction claim. In other words, the implementer will lose its FRAND defense anyway if it does not comply with its own FRAND obligations. Therefore, a court is only required to perform the time-consuming examination of whether the SEP holder’s final offer is FRAND if the implementer has complied with its own CJEU FRAND obligations.
Practice Notes
This judgment by the Munich Court strengthens the position of SEP holders. Implementers should consider providing security for royalties in the amount of the SEP holder’s final offer even if the relevant royalties seem to slightly exceed what might be considered as FRAND. Otherwise, an implementer risks a finding that it is an unwilling licensee, thus losing its FRAND defense.
It is also noteworthy that the Munich Court expressly allowed an appeal to the German Federal Court of Justice. This is rare in German case law and shows that the Munich Court is aware that its decision touches on a fundamental issue of FRAND law that still needs to be clarified by the German Federal Court of Justice. The appeal has already been filed (Case No. KZR 10/25).

EU Deforestation-Free Products Regulation (EUDR): Simplification is Taking Shape in EU Commission’s Guidance

On 15 April 2025, the European Commission issued a series of documents with a view to simplifying and amending Regulation (EU) 2023/1115 on deforestation-free products (‘EUDR’).
In line with the broader simplification trend that marks the beginning of the second Von der Leyen Commission, the documents bring about an easing in reporting requirements as well as clarification. They are expected to bring about together a 30% reduction of administrative costs, and considerably reduce the number of due diligence statements that companies need to file.
The initiative follows a period of high uncertainty in the end of 2024, during which discussions on the postponement of the EUDR’s application by one year were associated with a strong push for a reopening of discussions on the substance of the EUDR obligations. To avoid lengthy discussions, the Council and the European Parliament had at the time decided to only amend EUDR provisions setting out delays.
The updated EUDR Guidance and FAQ seem to aim to remedy certain concerns raised since, notably by the conservative majority at the Parliament (EPP), by introducing the following simplification elements:

Companies can reuse existing due diligence statements when goods, that had been previously placed on the market are reimported;
An authorised representative can now submit a due diligence statement on behalf of members of company groups;
Companies may submit their due diligence statements annually instead of a batch-specific declaration;
Non-SME operators and traders can now fulfill their duty to ‘ascertain upstream due diligence’ by collecting and referencing their direct suppliers’ DDS numbers, without systematically checking every single statement or being required to collect information included under Article 9

They are accompanied by a Draft delegated Act submitted for consultation until 13 May 2025, providing further precisions to the list of products included under Annex I of the EUDR (e.g. that are subject to the due diligence requirements), notably considering the exemption of certain packaging elements from the EUDR requirements.
While the above simplifications appear to remedy certain concerns of the industry, the choice of non-binding guidance ensures an efficient decision-making process but leaves some uncertainties in the implementation of the EUDR requirements. Ultimately, clarification by way of an amendment to the text of the EUDR itself could be required to bring about further clarity.
Nayelly Landeros Rivera contributed to this article

Skating on Thin Ice: The CAS Re-affirms the Field of Play Doctrine in the ‘Kyiv Capitals’ Case

What is the Field of Play Doctrine?
Regardless of the sport or the level of competition, refereeing decisions are inevitably the subject of question and complaint. Players, managers, clubs, fans, commentators, pundits and casual observers may all criticise the merits of officiating decisions – something undoubtedly made all the more prevalent by the multitude of camera angles, slow-motion replays and technology that define modern broadcast sport.
The “Field of Play” doctrine, a concept enshrined in the so-called lex sportiva and consistently applied by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”), is based on the belief that the rules of the game, in the strict sense of the term, are not subject to judicial control. The rationale behind this “qualified immunity”[1] is twofold: (1) to ensure that match officials have the requisite authority and autonomy to make decisions, and (2) that sporting contests will be completed and thus deliver a result.
As per the 2017 CAS case of Japan Triathlon Union v International Triathlon Union[2], for the doctrine to apply, the following two conditions are needed:

“that a decision at stake was made on the playing field by judges, referees, umpires and other officials, who are responsible for applying the rules of a particular game” and
“that the effects of the decision are limited to the field of play.”[3]

Nonetheless, the doctrine is not absolute, meaning that field of play decisions may be disputed in narrow circumstances relating to integrity. These include instances where there is evidence of bad faith, malicious intent, fraud, bias, prejudice, arbitrariness and corruption.[4] 
Hockey Club Kyiv Capitals v Ice Hockey Federation of Ukraine[5]
(i) Introduction
In an Award handed down by the CAS on 20 February 2025, the Ice Hockey Federation of Ukraine (the “Federation”) successfully argued that the CAS had no authority to review officiating decisions. The appeal to the CAS had been brought by Hockey Club Kyiv Capitals (the “Club”) in connection with a match during the 2023/2024 Ukrainian Men’s Ice Hockey Championship season.
(ii) Factual Background
The case concerns an incident that occurred on 3 February 2024 during a match between the Club and the Hockey Club of Dnipro (“Dnipro”). 
Throughout the match, several incidents occurred which resulted in both teams receiving penalties. The Club received a total of 13 penalties for unsportsmanlike conduct (including kneeing, tripping, elbowing, and roughing) which were committed by several players and their Head Coach, Vadym Shahraichuk. By contrast, Dnipro received three penalties.
With 50 minutes and 48 seconds of the match played, the Club refused to continue and instead left the ice hockey rink, the score being tied a 2-2 at the time. This decision was, according to their Head Coach, due to “unfair and one-sided refereeing.”[6]
(iii) Procedural Background
Following the match, the Club appealed to the Federation Refereeing Quality Assessment Committee (the “RQAC”), citing twelve occasions during the match where the referees failed to impose a sanction. Although the RQAC subsequently ruled that the majority of the refereeing decisions were correct, they did identify several which had been overlooked.[7]
The Disciplinary Committee of the Federation consequently initiated proceedings to determine the application of sanctions against the Club, later opting to impose disciplinary and monetary sanctions on 5 February 2024.[8]
The Club responded by filing an appeal against the Disciplinary Committee’s decision to the Appeals Committee. However, this was unanimously dismissed on 26 February 2024.
Finally, having received confirmation that they could appeal the Appeals Committee ruling to the CAS, the Club consequently filed a Statement of Appeal requesting that the CAS set aside the decision.
Arguments advanced before the CAS
(i)  The Club
 In seeking relief, the Appellant Club advanced five core arguments:

That the technical defeat should not have been awarded. In supporting this argument, the Club maintained that the game had begun and so the referees had exclusive authority to determine the outcome. The Federation’s competence only extended to matches that did not take place and the referees could therefore not delegate to the Federation. The Club further submitted that the game had been stopped too soon (i.e. after only two minutes rather than 5 minutes) due to an error in the translation of the Official Rule Book on the Federation’s website.
The violation of the principles of publicity and openness, namely that the Club had not been furnished with sufficient information about the proceedings, the receipt of statements from third parties, the hearing (including the time, place and composition of the authority), and the opportunity to renew statements and provide objections.
The violation of the right to an effective remedy, with the Club alleging that the Federation conducted a secret proceeding which deprived the Club of an effective defence.
The violation of ethical norms due to conflicts of interest, with the Club alleging a “direct connection between the Referee and the Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson of the Appeals Committee.”[9]
The violation of the right to a fair trial, namely as a result of the aforementioned arguments.

(ii) The Federation
In response, the Federation advanced nine core arguments:

The inadmissibility of the Appeal. In advancing this argument, the Federation submitted that the CAS lacked authority relating to future issues and that the Club failed to identify the point being appealed along with the exact basis of appeal.
The lack of interest and/or legitimacy of the Appellant. The Federation argued that the Club had neither the direct nor personal interest required to appeal certain aspects of the decisions. As part of this argument, the Federation maintained that the Club’s Head Coach should have appealed the decisions in his personal capacity and that the Club’s final league position was not impacted by the technical defeat awarded.
The binding nature and correct application of the Federation Rules. In invoking the “chain of references”[10] principle, the Federation contended that the Club had, by participating in the championship, consented to and agreed to be bound by the rules of the Federation.
The fair trial objection according to the de novo principle. In invoking the de novo principle[11], the Federation further contended that the Club’s submissions concerning the lack of a fair trial were immaterial and that the CAS would correct “all procedural flaws.”[12]   
The field of play doctrine. By relying on the doctrine, the Federation argued that the on-field decisions made by the referees were not reviewable by the CAS. 
The absence of any conflict of interest in earlier proceedings. In rebutting the allegation that there was a violation of ethical norms due to conflicts of interest, the Federation asserted that there was no conflict of interest or corruption. They further highlighted that such an argument had only been raised by the Club upon appeal to the CAS and could have been submitted in earlier proceedings.
The respect of the principles of publicity and openness. Far from not being in receipt of information relating to the proceedings, the Federation considered that the Club had been made provided with the first instance decision. They submitted that they were thus “informed of the entire proceeding, including evidence and facts.”[13]
The absence of determination of the outcome of the Match by the Referees. The Federation asserted that the technical defeat finding was a “logical sanction” rather than “an unlawful “determining of outcome””[14] after the Club departed the hockey rink.   
The troublesome widespread effect of CAS decision annulling the technical defeat. Finally, and perhaps most persuasively, the Federation highlighted that “annulling the appealed decisions would justify and legalize the abandonment of matches as a means of remedy against field of play decisions and would represent a precedent allowing clubs to abandon games if they are not in their favor.”[15]

Ruling of the CAS
The sole arbitrator, Ms Carine Dupeyron, held that jurisdiction of the CAS had been established in the case and that the Club’s appeal had been filed within the relevant time limits.
Ms Dupeyron further found that the Club’s appeal was both admissible and that the Club had a legal interest in appealing the decisions.
Moreover, Ms Dupeyron concluded that the relevant International Ice Hockey Federation and the Federation rules and regulations applied in the case, with Swiss Law and case law also applying due to the arbitration’s seat in Lausanne, Switzerland.  
With regard to the match itself and in applying the Federation Rules, Ms Dupeyron reasoned that the game period had not ended when the Club departed the hockey rink and refused to continue playing. Despite ruling that the referees had applied Rule 73.2 rather than Rule 73.3[16] of the Official Rule Book 2023/24, this did not impact the ability of both the Disciplinary Committee and the Appeals Committee to examine the case.
In considering the disciplinary and financial sanctions imposed on the Club, Ms Dupeyron concluded that the Disciplinary Committee and the Appeals Committee had both the authority to impose such sanctions and to impose a technical defeat on the Club.
Finally, the Club’s submissions regarding the violation of ethical norms due to conflicts of interest did not find favour with Ms Dupeyron. She instead concluded “that the de novo appeal before the CAS cured the potential procedural flaws regarding the appealed decisions”.[17]
Therefore, Ms Dupeyron declined to allow the appeal – thus confirming the decision of the Appeals Committee of the Federation.
Impact of Ruling
The ruling serves as a timely reminder that the Field of Play doctrine will prevent sporting contestants from simply leaving the arena and appealing the decisions of officials, including in situations where appeal boards subsequently find refereeing to have overlooked inappropriate or unfair acts that occurred within matches.
Moving forwards, participants should therefore continue to be mindful of the doctrine and that it will apply save for specific circumstances relating to integrity. If such circumstances are not apparent, then participants are walking on thin ice when choosing to abandon matches prematurely and seeking subsequent judicial relief. As the case demonstrates, the likelihood is that the doctrine will be upheld, certainly before a CAS tribunal, and participants will suffer the regulatory consequences of their abandonment.
The full CAS Award is available here: CAS 2024/A/10449 Hockey Club Kyiv Capitals v. Ice Hockey Federation of Ukraine

[1] CAS OG 02/2007 Korean Olympic Committee v. International Skating Union; 2015/A/4208 Horse Sport Ireland & Cian O’Connor v. FEI.
[2] CAS 2017/A/5373.
[3] Ibid [Paragraph 51].
[4] For example, see the following cases: CAS 2004/A/727 Vanderlei De Lima & Brazilian Olympic Committee (BOC) v. International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF), CAS 2008/A/1641 Netherlands Antilles Olympic Committee (NAOC) v. International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) & United States Olympic Committee (USOC), Aino-Kaisa Saarinen & Finnish Ski Association v. Fédération Internationale de Ski (FIS) CAS 2010/A/2090, CAS 2015/A/4208 Horse Sport Ireland (HSI) & Cian O’Connor v. Fédération Equestre Internationale (FEI).
[5] CAS 2024/A/10449.
[6] [Paragraph 9].
[7] These overlooked instances included “a tripping, a blocking, a player interference, and a hand-checking on behalf of the opponent team” [Paragraph 11].
[8] These included disciplinary and monetary sanctions on the Club; imposing a technical defeat in the match on the Club / awarding a technical victory to Dnipro; warning the Club that repeated refusal to continue upcoming matches will result in automatic exclusion from the Ukrainian Men’s Ice Hockey Championship; imposing two disciplinary sanctions on the Club’s player Pavlo Taran; imposing a disciplinary sanction on the Club’s player Serhii Chernenko; obligating the Club’s Head Coach Vadym Shahraichuk to familiarise himself and the players with the Federation’s golden rules; and warning the Head Coach that he would receive one-match suspensions for each major, disciplinary or game misconduct penalty of the Club’s players.
[9] [Paragraph 85].
[10] [Paragraph 97].
[11]De novo refers to the standard of review employed by an appellate court, with the appellate court reviewing the decision of a lower court as if the lower court had not rendered a decision.
[12] [Paragraph 103].
[13] [Paragraph 112].
[14] [Paragraph 114].
[15] [Paragraph 115].
[16] Rule 73.2 permits the team refusing to play only 15 seconds to resume the match when already on the ice, whereas Rule 73.3 permits 5 minutes for the team to return to the ice.
[17] [Paragraph 179].
Jonathan Mason also contributed to this article. 

Germany’s Supply Chain Law at a Crossroads: The Implications of the Proposed Shift to the CSDDD

In April 2025, CDU, CSU, and SPD – the coalition parties almost certainly forming Germany’s next federal government – announced their intention to repeal the German Supply Chain Due Diligence Act (Lieferkettensorgfaltspflichtengesetz (LkSG)) as part of a broader initiative to reduce administrative and economic burdens. According to the coalition agreement, the LkSG shall be replaced with legislation implementing the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) in a bureaucracy-light and enforcement-friendly manner. The reporting obligations under the LkSG shall be abolished immediately, and enforcement of existing obligations shall be suspended, except in cases of grave human rights violations, until the new EU-aligned framework enters into force and is implemented in German law.
This legislative shift is causing widespread uncertainty among companies, many of which have already undertaken significant efforts to implement the LkSG since it came into force in January 2023. The law currently obliges large enterprises with more than 1,000 employees since 2024 onwards to establish comprehensive due diligence mechanisms, including annual risk assessments, grievance mechanisms, and supply chain monitoring, with potential fines reaching up to 2% of global turnover in the event of non-compliance.
While some industry associations have welcomed the repeal as a step toward deregulation, the announcement has also raised significant concerns within the business and legal communities. Numerous companies have already made considerable investments to comply with the LkSG, establishing compliance systems, internal governance structures, and supplier monitoring mechanisms. The prospect of a repeal, especially after only a short period of application, has introduced legal uncertainty and operational ambiguity, particularly with respect to future compliance expectations.
From a legal perspective, the formal abolition of the LkSG would require a new act adopted by the parliament. Earlier attempts to initiate such a legislative reversal failed due to insufficient parliamentary support. Nevertheless, the linkage of national legislation with the EU’s CSDDD offers a feasible path for reform by way of harmonized substitution rather than outright repeal. The CSDDD covers both human rights and environmental obligations and applies not only to direct suppliers but, under certain conditions, also to indirect supply chain actors. Notably, the CSDDD introduces civil liability provisions and imposes obligations on a broader spectrum of business activities, including downstream operations such as recycling and distribution.
The EU Commission’s Omnibus proposals aim to address some of the implementation challenges previously identified under the LkSG. Proposed key modifications include limiting the scope of due diligence to direct business partners unless specific risks are identified further down the supply chain, reducing the frequency of effectiveness monitoring from annually to once every five years, and restricting the information that can be demanded from SMEs. These reforms are intended to strike a balance between ensuring substantive sustainability commitments and preserving economic viability, particularly for companies operating within complex global value chains.
Despite these developments, civil society organizations have strongly opposed the dismantling of the LkSG. The “Initiative Lieferkettengesetz”, a coalition of over 140 NGOs, religious institutions, and trade unions, has described the planned repeal as a serious regression in the protection of human rights and environmental standards. They argue that the LkSG has already led to tangible structural improvements and that weakening it sends the wrong signal to companies that have acted in good faith.
Meanwhile, supervisory authorities such as the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA) have begun to enforce the LkSG with targeted inquiries and audits, particularly in high-risk sectors. These enforcement activities prompted many companies to accelerate their compliance efforts, contributing to the establishment of internal processes that may now remain relevant under the forthcoming CSDDD regime.
Considering the transitional phase between the phasing out of the LkSG and the implementation of the CSDDD, companies are advised to avoid dismantling existing due diligence systems prematurely. While certain regulatory relief may be on the horizon, reputational and legal risks remain, particularly in the event of adverse public exposure or litigation. Moreover, the CSDDD will introduce new obligations concerning environmental risks, for which most businesses will need to gather additional information and develop appropriate compliance tools.
In conclusion, the repeal of the LkSG marks a turning point in Germany’s supply chain regulation. While the transition to EU-level harmonization promises simplification in some areas, it also brings new challenges and legal uncertainties. Companies are well advised to maintain a forward-looking compliance posture, preparing not only for reduced national reporting burdens but also for the broader and more integrated responsibilities under the CSDDD.

Combatting Scams in Australia, Singapore, China and Hong Kong

Key Points:

Singapore’s Shared Responsibility Framework
Comparing scams regulation in Australia, Singapore and the UK
China’s Anti-Telecom and Online Fraud Law
Hong Kong’s Anti-Scam Consumer Protection Charter and Suspicious Account Alert Regime

The increased reliance on digital communication and online banking has created greater potential for digitally-enabled scams. If not appropriately addressed, scam losses may undermine confidence in digital systems, resulting in costs and inefficiencies across industries. In response to increasingly sophisticated scam activities, countries around the world have sought to develop and implement regulatory interventions to mitigate growing financial losses from digital fraud. So far in our scam series, we have explored the regulatory responses in Australia and the UK. In this publication, we take a look at the regulatory environments in Singapore, China and Hong Kong, and consider how they might inform Australia’s industry-specific codes.
SINGAPORE
Shared Responsibility Framework
In December 2024, Singapore’s Shared Responsibility Framework (SRF) came into force. The SRF, which is overseen by the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) and Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA), seeks to preserve confidence in digital payments and banking systems by strengthening accountability of the banking and telecommunications sectors while emphasising individuals’ responsibility for vigilance against scams. 
Types of Scams Covered
Unlike reforms in the UK and Australia, the SRF explicitly excludes scams involving authorised payments by the victim to the scammer. Rather, the SRF seeks to address phishing scams with a digital nexus. To fall within the scope of the SRF, the transaction must satisfy the following elements:

The scam must be perpetrated through the impersonation of a legitimate business or government entity;
The scammer (or impersonator) must use a digital messaging platform to obtain the account user’s credentials;
The account user must enter their credentials on a fabricated digital platform; and
The fraudulently obtained credentials must be used to perform transactions that the account user did not authorise.

Duties of Financial Institutions
The SRF imposes a range of obligations on financial institutions (FIs) in order to minimise customers’ exposure to scam losses in the event their account information is compromised. These obligations are detailed in table 1 below.

Table 1

Obligation  
Description

12-hour cooling off period

Where an activity is deemed “high-risk”, FIs must impose a 12-hour cooling off period upon activation of a digital security token. During this period, no high-risk activities can be performed.
An activity is deemed to be “high-risk” if it might enable a scammer to quickly transfer a large sum of money to a third party without triggering a customer alert. Examples include:

Addition of new payee to the customer’s account;
Increasing transaction limits;
Disabling transaction notification alerts; and
Changing contact information.

Notifications for activation of digital security tokens
FIs must provide real-time notifications when a digital security token is activated or a high-risk activity occurs. When paired with the cooling off period, this obligation increases the likelihood that unauthorised account access is brought to the attention of the customer before funds can be stolen.

Outgoing transaction alerts  
FIs must provide real-time alerts when outgoing transactions are made. 

24/7 reporting channels with self-service kill switch  
FIs must have in place 24/7 reporting channels which allow for the prompt reporting of unauthorised account access or use. This capability must include a self-service kill-switch enabling customers to block further mobile or online access to their account, thereby preventing further unauthorised transactions.

Duties of Telecommunications Providers
In addition to the obligations imposed on FIs, the SRF creates three duties for telecommunications service providers (TSPs). These duties are set out in table 2 below.

Table 2

Obligation    
Description

Connect only with authorised alphanumeric senders
In order to safeguard customers against scams, any organisation wishing to send short message service (SMS) messages using an alphanumeric sender ID (ASID) must be registered and licensed. TSPs must block the sending of SMS messages using ASIDs if the sending organisation is not appropriately registered and licensed.

Block any message sent using an unauthorised ASID
Where the ASID is not registered, the TSP must prevent the message from reaching the intended recipient by blocking the sender.

Implement anti-scam filters
TSPs must implement anti-scam filters which scan each SMS for malicious elements. Where a malicious link is detected, the system must block the SMS to prevent it from reaching the intended recipient.

Responsibility Waterfall
Similar to the UK’s Reimbursement Rules explored in our second article, the SRF provides for the sharing of liability for scam losses. However, unlike the UK model, the SRF will only require an entity to reimburse the victim where there has been a breach of the SRF. The following flowchart outlines how the victim’s loss will be assigned.

HOW DOES THE SRF COMPARE TO THE MODELS IN AUSTRALIA AND THE UK?
Scam Coverage
The type of scams covered by Singapore’s SRF differ significantly to those covered by the Australian and UK models. In Australia and the UK, scams regulation targets situations in which customers have been deceived into authorising the transfer of money out of their account. In contrast, Singapore’s SRF expressly excludes any scam involving the authorised transfer of money. The SRF instead targets phishing scams where the perpetrator obtains personal details in order to gain unauthorised access to the victim’s funds. 
Entities Captured
Australia’s Scams Prevention Framework (SPF) covers the widest range of sectors, imposing obligations on entities operating within the banking and telecommunications sectors as well as any digital platform service providers which offer social media, paid search engine advertising or direct messaging services. The explanatory materials note an intention to extend the application of the SPF to new sectors as the scams environment continues to evolve. 
In contrast, the UK’s Reimbursement Rules only apply to payment service providers using the faster payments system with the added requirement that the victim or perpetrator’s account be held in the UK. Any account provided by a credit union, municipal bank or national savings bank will be outside the scope of the Reimbursement Rules.  
Falling in-between these two models is Singapore’s SRF which applies to FIs and TSPs.
Liability for Losses
Once again, the extent to which financial institutions are held liable for failing to protect customers against scam losses in Singapore lies somewhere between the Australian and UK approaches. Similar to Singapore’s responsibility waterfall, a financial institution in Australia will be held accountable only if the institution has breached its obligations under the SPF. However, unlike the requirement to reimburse victims for losses in Singapore, Australia’s financial institutions will be held accountable through the imposition of administrative penalties. In contrast, the UK’s Reimbursement Rules provide for automatic financial liability for 100% of the customer’s scam losses, up to the maximum reimbursable amount, to be divided equally where two financial institutions are involved. 
CHINA 
Anti-Telecom and Online Fraud Law of the People’s Republic of China
China’s law on countering Telecommunications Network Fraud (TNF) requires TSPs, Banking FIs and internet service providers (ISPs) to establish internal mechanisms to prevent and control fraud risks. Entities failing to comply with their legal obligations may be fined the equivalent of up to approximately AU$1.05 million. In serious cases, business licences or operational permits may be suspended until an entity can demonstrate it has taken corrective action to ensure future compliance.
Scope
China’s anti-scam regulation defines TNF as the use of telecommunication network technology to take public or private property by fraud through remote and contactless methods. Accordingly, it extends to instances in which funds are transferred without the owner’s authorisation. To fall within the scope of China’s law, the fraud must be carried out in mainland China or externally by a citizen of mainland China, or target individuals in mainland China. 
Obligations of Banking FIs
Banking FIs are required to implement risk management measures to prevent accounts being used for TNF. Appropriate policies and procedures may include:

Conducting due diligence on all new clients;
Identifying all beneficial owners of funds:
Requiring frequent verification of identity for high-risk accounts:
Delaying payment clearance for abnormal or suspicious transactions: and
Limiting or suspending operation of flagged accounts.

The People’s Bank of China and the State Council body are responsible for the oversight and management of Banking FIs. The anti-scams law provides for the creation of inter-institutional mechanisms for the sharing of risk information. All Banking FIs are required to provide information on new account openings as well as any indicators of risk identified when conducting initial client due diligence.
Obligations of TSPs and ISPs
TSPs and ISPs are similarly required to implement internal policies and procedures for risk prevention and control in order to prevent TNF. This includes an obligation to implement a true identity registration system for all telephone/internet users. Where a subscriber identity module (SIM) card or internet protocol (IP) address has been linked to fraud, TSPs/ISPs must take action to verify the identity of the owner of the SIM/IP address.
HONG KONG
Hong Kong lacks legislation which specifically deals with scams. However, a range of non-legal strategies have been adopted by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) in order to address the increasing threat of digital fraud.
Anti-Scam Consumer Protection Charter
The Anti-Scam Consumer Protection Charter (Charter) was developed in collaboration with the Hong Kong Association of Banks. The Charter aims to guard customers against digital fraud such as credit card scams by committing to take protective actions. All 23 of Hong Kong’s card issuing banks are participating institutions.
Under the Charter, participating institutions agree to:

Refrain from sending electronic messages containing embedded hyperlinks. This allows customers to easily identify that any such message is a scam.
Raise public awareness of common digital fraud.
Provide customers with appropriate channels to allow them to make enquiries for the purpose of verifying the authenticity of communications and training frontline staff to provide such support.

More recently, the Anti-Scam Consumer Protection Charter 2.0 was created to extend the commitments to businesses operating in a wider range of industries including:

Retail banking;
Insurance (including insurance broking);
Trustees approved under the Mandatory Provident Fund Scheme; and
Corporations licensed under the Securities and Futures Ordinance.

Suspicious Account Alerts
In cooperation with Hong Kong’s Police Force and the Association of Banks, the HKMA rolled out suspicious account alerts. Under this mechanism, customers have access to Scameter which is a downloadable scam and pitfall search engine. After downloading the Scameter application to their device, customers will receive real-time alerts of the fraud risk of:

Bank accounts prior to making an electronic funds transfer;
Phone numbers based on incoming calls; and
Websites upon launch of the site by the customer.

In addition to receiving real-time alerts, users can also manually search accounts, numbers or websites in order to determine the associated fraud risk. 
Scameter is similar to Australia’s Scamwatch, which provides educational resources to assist individuals in protecting themselves against scams. Users can access information about different types of scams and how to avoid falling victim to these. Scamwatch also issues alerts about known scams and provides a platform for users to report scams they have come across.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
Domestic responses to the threat of scams appear to differ significantly. Legal approaches explored so far in this series target financial and telecommunications sectors, seeking to influence entities in these industries to adopt proactive measures to prevent, detect and respond to scams. While the UK aims to achieve this by placing the financial burden of scam losses on banks, China and Australia adopt a different approach by imposing penalties on entities failing to comply with their legal obligations. Singapore has opted for a blended approach whereby entities which have failed to comply with the legal obligations under the SRF will be required to reimburse customers who have fallen victim to a scam. However, where the entities involved have met their legal duties, the customer will continue to bear the loss.
Look out for our next article in our scams series.
The authors would like to thank graduate Tamsyn Sharpe for her contribution to this legal insight.

Powering Africa’s Digital Future: The Challenge of Energy for Data Center Development

As the global economy increasingly digitizes, the infrastructure supporting this shift must evolve accordingly. In Africa, where the demand for digital services is surging — fueled by mobile penetration, fintech innovation, and a young, connected population — the case for expanding data center capacity is clear. However, the continent’s potential is hindered by underdeveloped energy infrastructure, presenting a significant bottleneck.
Why Data Centers Matter
Data centers form the backbone of digital transformation, underpinning cloud storage, AI applications, e-commerce platforms, and digital government services. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), global electricity consumption by data centers is projected to exceed 800 TWh by 2026, up from 460 TWh in 2022. A significant portion of this demand comes from generative AI and machine learning applications, which consume up to 10 times more energy than traditional searches.
Africa, despite being one of the fastest-growing regions for digital adoption, accounts for less than 1% of the world’s data center capacity. The Africa Data Centres Association estimates that the continent requires at least 1,000 MW of new capacity across 700 facilities to meet demand. Yet, meeting this need will depend not only on digital infrastructure investments but also on solving a persistent and costly energy challenge.
The Energy Challenge: Costs, Capacity, and Volatility
Data center development will play a pivotal role in ensuring digital sovereignty and fostering a resilient, domestically-driven digital economy in Africa.
Sub-Saharan Africa exemplifies both the promise and the challenges of this transformation. While demand for digital services is accelerating, access to reliable energy remains a major obstacle. Many countries across the region grapple with limited energy access, high electricity costs, and outdated infrastructure characterized by frequent outages and heavy reliance on imported fuel sources.
This interplay of costs and reliability poses significant challenges for energy-intensive data centers. According to recent industry analysis, energy supply has emerged as the single most critical issue facing digital infrastructure investors. As demand for electricity rises—driven by AI, cloud computing, and the digitization of public services—grid expansion is struggling to keep pace. As a result, securing reliable, affordable power is now a top strategic priority for data center developers and investors alike.
Despite these challenges, several sub-Saharan countries—including Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, and Senegal—are making significant progress. While legacy grid issues persist, these countries are actively investing in renewable energy projects that could create the enabling environment needed for sustainable data center growth.

Côte d’Ivoire: In June 2023, the country launched its largest solar power plant in Boundiali, delivering 37.5 MWp of capacity with an expansion target of 83 MWp by 2025. This project aligns with  Côte d’Ivoire’s national goal to source 45% of its electricity from renewable energy by 2030.
Senegal: The Taiba N’Diaye Wind Farm, commissioned in 2021, is West Africa’s largest wind energy project, with a total capacity of 158 MW. It plays a central role in Senegal’s broader strategy to diversify its energy mix and reduce dependence on imported fossil fuels.
Gabon: Though less frequently spotlighted, Gabon is actively positioning itself as a renewable energy leader in Central Africa. In 2021, the government launched a hydropower development strategy to boost clean energy capacity. Notably, the Kinguélé Aval Hydroelectric Project, co-financed by the African Development Bank and IFC, will add 35 MW of capacity upon completion and help stabilize electricity supply in the Estuaire province, home to Libreville—the capital and potential hub for digital infrastructure. Gabon has also attracted investment in solar hybrid systems for rural electrification, aiming to reduce diesel reliance and support the decentralization of energy access. These initiatives create a more stable power framework suitable for future data center deployment.

Lessons from Leading Data Center Markets
Morocco is emerging as a pivotal player in North Africa’s data center market, driven by international energy investments and its strategic position connecting Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Major global tech companies, including Oracle, Microsoft, Google, and Amazon Web Services (AWS), are drawn to Morocco’s rapidly expanding digital economy and its modern infrastructure. The country is fostering a favorable environment for data center growth through government-backed initiatives that enhance ICT infrastructure, making Morocco an attractive destination for both local and international data center operators.
The country’s stability and investments in renewable energy further position it as a sustainable choice for data center operations. With projects like those from Africa Data Centres, Gulf Data Hub, and N-ONE Datacenters, Morocco’s growing data center ecosystem is poised to meet the increasing demand for cloud computing and data storage across North Africa and beyond. By 2028, Morocco is expected to be a key hub for digital services, offering world-class data center facilities.
Looking to other pioneers in the continent, countries like Kenya and South Africa offer valuable lessons. Kenya, rich in geothermal resources, has attracted significant investments such as a $1 billion geothermal-powered data center from Microsoft and G42. This clean, non-intermittent energy solution provides a reliable power source for data centers. Similarly, South Africa is leading solar integration, with projects like the 12 MW solar farm being developed by Africa Data Centres and Distributed Power Africa, designed to power critical centers like Johannesburg and Cape Town. Such initiatives showcase the potential for public-private partnerships to address challenges of grid unreliability and position Africa as a growing leader in sustainable data center infrastructure.
These examples underscore the importance of strategic planning, infrastructure investment, and the integration of renewable energy sources in building resilient, sustainable data centers.
Policy and Legal Implications
From a legal perspective, developing a data center project requires meticulous contractual structuring. Long-term Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) and Behind-the-Meter (BtM) agreements introduce project-specific risks — notably, the risk that delays in one part of the project (either the power plant or the data center) could lead to disruptions. Legal advisors must anticipate and address potential regulatory challenges, grid permitting complexities, and the need for future-proofing clauses to safeguard the project’s viability.
A comprehensive review of existing legislation, identification of key obstacles, and potential time-consuming issues (such as securing land) are crucial steps in ensuring the project’s success. Moreover, structuring energy supply projects to support data center operations is fundamental for ensuring the project’s bankability.
Conclusion: A Call to Action
Africa stands at a crossroads: with the right investments in both digital and energy infrastructure, the continent could leapfrog into a new era of economic autonomy and technological resilience. However, if energy bottlenecks are not addressed head-on, Africa risks falling behind just as the world accelerates into a data-driven future.
The roadmap is clear: invest in renewables, embrace innovative models like BtM PPAs, partner across sectors, and establish clear regulatory frameworks. Energy is no longer a background concern for digital infrastructure investors — it is the cornerstone. Data center growth and power sector development must now proceed hand-in-hand.
For Africa, this is not just a technical challenge — it is a strategic imperative.

Cross-Border Catch-Up: The Growing Global Trend of the Right to Disconnect [Podcast]

In this episode of our Cross-Border Catch-Up podcast series, Lina Fernandez (Boston) and Kate Thompson (New York/Boston) discuss the growing trend of “right to disconnect” laws that permit employees to disengage from work-related communications and activities during non-working hours. Kate and Lina explore how right-to-disconnect legislation is being implemented in various countries, including Spain, Peru, Colombia, Thailand, and Canada. Lina and Kate also highlight the importance for global employers to stay informed and compliant with these evolving regulations.