Regulatory Clarity and Practical Challenges: Unpacking CFTC Letters 25-09 and 25-10
Derivatives market participants continue to process the implications of two significant interpretive letters issued by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) staff earlier this year. Letter 25-09 effectively eliminates the pre-trade mid-market mark (PTMMM) disclosure requirement for swap dealers, while Letter 25-10 concludes that Window FX Forwards should be classified as “foreign exchange forwards,” and that package foreign exchange transactions (as defined below) should not be considered swaps.
This article highlights a number of interpretive and practical considerations that swap dealers face as they seek to implement the relief and guidance in these letters.
Letter 25-09: Relief from PTMMM Disclosures
As noted in a prior Katten article,[1] CFTC Staff Letter 25-09 effectively removes the requirement for swap dealers to provide pre-trade mid-market mark disclosures to counterparties. This represents a substantive regulatory shift, with the Market Participants Division (MPD) acknowledging that the PTMMM requirement “does not provide any significant informational value to a Swap Entity’s counterparties” while imposing “significant operational burdens on Swap Entities.” MPD issued this relief after receiving a letter from three industry trade associations requesting no-action relief from MPD staff that it will not recommend an enforcement action against a swap dealer that does not provide its counterparty with a PTMM disclosure.
Following MPD’s issuance of Letter 25-09 on April 4, 2025, some swap dealers have raised a number of implementation and operational challenges that they are facing as they try to take advantage of the relief.
Communication. Before deciding whether or how to cease providing PTMMM disclosures to its non-swap dealer counterparties, swap dealers should consider how best to communicate changes in their PTMMM practices to ensure counterparties understand the implications for trade execution and price transparency.
Operational Approach. Swap dealers have spent significant resources building compliance programs designed to comply with the PTMMM disclosure requirements. One key question that some swap dealers are considering is whether to dismantle these programs completely or maintain them, given their programs’ established infrastructure.
Client Service Model. Another consideration is whether to take a more client-specific approach in determining whether to eliminate or maintain their PTMMM disclosure programs. Should swap dealers consider providing PTMMM disclosures only upon counterparty request? This approach would acknowledge that some counterparties may still find value in PTMMM disclosures while reducing the costs and risks of disclosures, which are no longer required.
Alternative Mid-Market Pricing. Some swap dealers might find it commercially useful to provide alternative mid-market pricing to their non-swap dealer counterparties. Should swap dealers replace PTMMM with alternative pricing transparency tools that provide comparable information in a more client-friendly format?
Letter 25-10: Foreign Exchange Product Classification
Issued on April 9, CFTC Staff Letter 25-10 provides important interpretive guidance on two distinct categories of foreign exchange products that have created regulatory uncertainty in the market.
First, the letter clarifies that Window FX Forwards — transactions where counterparties may settle the exchange of currencies on one or more dates within an agreed window or series of dates — should be considered “foreign exchange forwards” as defined in section 1a(24) of the Commodity Exchange Act. This classification significantly exempts such instruments from the “swap” definition pursuant to the Treasury Determination.[2]
The Division’s analysis focuses on the statutory language that a foreign exchange forward is “a transaction that solely involves the exchange of 2 different currencies on a specific future date at a fixed rate agreed upon on the inception of the contract covering the exchange.” The interpretive position concludes that the “specific future date” requirement is satisfied when settlement will occur by a defined end date, even when flexibility exists regarding intermediate settlement dates.
Second, the letter addresses package foreign exchange spot transactions, particularly “tom/next” transactions, where parties execute two spot transactions that settle on consecutive days. The CFTC staff determined these should not be considered foreign exchange swaps or otherwise subject to swap regulations, provided they are executed, confirmed and settled as individual bona fide spot transactions within the customary T+2 timeline.
While providing welcome clarity, Letter 25-10 has sparked a couple of interpretive questions, including to what extent the interpretive principles articulated in the letter can be applied to other foreign exchange products not specifically addressed.
Practical Considerations for Market Participants
As market participants adapt to these regulatory developments,[3] several practical implementation steps warrant consideration.
Policy and Procedure Updates. Internal compliance frameworks must be revised to reflect the changed regulatory status of PTMMM disclosures and certain foreign exchange products.
Documentation Review. Trading documentation, including master agreements, confirmations and disclosure statements, may need to be modified to accurately reflect new regulatory classifications and operational practices.
Systems Assessment. Technology infrastructure supporting trade execution, confirmation and settlement processes may require reconfiguration, particularly if modifying PTMMM disclosure practices or reclassifying certain foreign exchange transactions.
Client Communications. Proactive engagement with counterparties regarding the implementation approach is essential, particularly for swap dealers modifying their PTMMM disclosure practices.
As implementation practices develop, market participants should document their interpretive positions and maintain open communication with regulators around remaining areas of uncertainty.
[1]See Katten’s Quick Reads coverage of Letter 25-09 here.
[2] Determination of Foreign Exchange Swaps and Foreign Exchange Forwards Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 69,694 (Nov. 20, 2012) (Treasury Determination).
[3]See Katten’s Quick Reads coverage of the expected impact of the 2024 presidential election on swap dealers here.
European Commission Proposes Expansion to Records of Processing Derogation
On May 21, 2025, the European Commission published a proposal for a new regulation simplifying certain regulatory requirements for “small mid-cap enterprises” (the “Simplification Regulation Proposal”). Small mid-caps will be companies with fewer than 750 employees and either up to €150 million in turnover or up to €129 million in balance sheet.
As part of its simplification efforts, the European Commission proposes amending the EU General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) by extending the derogation from the obligation to maintain records of processing activities (Article 30(5) of the GDPR) to small mid-caps. The current version of the derogation is only applicable to companies employing fewer than 250 persons.
The amended derogation would apply unless an organization carries out processing activities that are likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of individuals, expanding the current formulation. In this context, the European Commission proposes clarifying that the processing of special categories of personal data which is necessary for the purposes of carrying out the obligations and exercising specific rights of the controller or of the individual in the field of employment and social security and social protection law will not impact the derogation under Article 30(5) of the GDPR.
In addition, the Simplification Regulation Proposal also proposes amending the GDPR to require that the needs of small mid-caps be specifically considered when drafting GDPR codes of conduct, certification mechanisms, seals, and marks.
The Simplification Regulation Proposal will now be subject to the EU’s legislative procedure and may be further amended by the European Parliament or the Council.
Read the Simplification Regulation Proposal.
Historic US Presidential Visit to the Middle East
The President of the United States, Donald Trump, recently concluded a landmark tour of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) visiting Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
This was his first official foreign visit, with a clear focus on deepening economic ties and securing trade deals with GCC nations. Key announcements included an estimated US$600 billion in trade agreements with Saudi Arabia, US$1.2 trillion with Qatar, and further investments of US$200 billion with the UAE (taking the amount committed by the UAE to US$1.4 trillion).
Key Sectors and Agreements
The new trade corridor features substantial investments across several critical sectors.
Qatar Airways signed a US$96 billion agreement with Boeing to purchase up to 210 widebody aircraft—Boeing’s largest-ever widebody order.
In the artificial intelligence (AI) and semiconductor space, Saudi Arabia’s sovereign-backed AI firm, Humain, confirmed a US$3.2 billion deal with Nvidia for 18,000 high-performance Graphics Processing Units. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. also announced a US$10 billion joint AI development initiative in Saudi Arabia. These announcements follow the rollback of the AI Diffusion Rule by the US administration, lifting restrictions on the export of advanced AI chips to the region.
Amazon Web Services, Inc has committed US$5.3 billion towards building a new “AI Zone” in Saudi Arabia, while Supermicro is investing US$20 billion in data center infrastructure across both the United States and Saudi Arabia through a joint venture with DataVolt.
In the defense sector, Qatar agreed to US$3 billion in contracts with Raytheon and General Atomics involving next-generation drone and counter-drone systems. Continued investment into the US Air Force’s Al Udeid base in Qatar underscores the long-standing defense partnership between the two nations.
These developments represent a major influx of capital and opportunities across both regions, but navigating the legal and regulatory frameworks on both sides remains critical to success.
Some Legal Considerations
For Middle Eastern Investors Entering the United States:
Investors from the Middle East looking to capitalize on opportunities in the United States will need to be mindful of several key regulatory and legal issues.
One of the primary considerations is compliance with the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, which reviews transactions involving foreign investment that could affect national security. This is particularly relevant in sensitive sectors such as defense, technology, infrastructure, and data.
The US legal landscape can be complex, especially for those unfamiliar with its dual federal and state systems. Laws relating to tax, employment, corporate governance, and securities can differ significantly between states and must be analyzed carefully in each case. Structuring investments through appropriate vehicles is essential for managing risks and limiting liability, particularly in sectors subject to close regulatory scrutiny.
Shari’ah-compliant investors are increasingly exploring opportunities in the United States, especially in real estate and private equity. However, these require tailored structuring to ensure alignment with the requirements of Shari’ah supervisory boards while still complying with US legal and tax frameworks.
Unlike many Middle Eastern jurisdictions, the United States is a highly litigious environment. The risk of regulatory disputes, shareholder actions, employment litigation, and antitrust investigations is considerably higher. The US antitrust and competition laws, for example, are far more robust and frequently enforced compared to their relatively nascent counterparts in the Middle East. Securities laws, especially in public market transactions, are similarly stringent and must be factored in from the outset.
State-level differences also play a critical role. States such as Delaware are particularly attractive due to their favorable corporate, tax, and litigation environments. Selecting the right jurisdiction for incorporation and operation can significantly impact regulatory exposure and operational flexibility.
For US Investors Entering the Middle East:
For US companies investing into the Middle East, it is important to understand that the region is not a monolith; legal systems and business cultures vary widely between countries.
First, US companies must consider the sanctions and export control regimes administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control, especially when dealing with sovereign wealth funds, defense entities, or dual-use technologies in the region. With the recent relaxation of the AI Diffusion Rule, there is now greater potential for AI exports to the Middle East—but this still requires close attention to the scope of US export controls.
Legal systems in the Middle East are primarily based on civil law, unlike the common law system in the United States. This means there is often greater judicial discretion and less reliance on precedent. Contracts and dispute resolution mechanisms must be carefully drafted, particularly in jurisdictions where court decisions may be unpredictable.
Each country in the region offers different investment incentives and legal structures. Free zones have played a major role in attracting foreign capital by allowing full foreign ownership and profit repatriation. Qatar’s Financial Centre and free zones, for instance, provide flexible regulatory frameworks tailored to global investors. The UAE hosts more than 30 free zones designed for specific industries, offering bespoke legal and commercial environments.
In recent years, there has been a concerted effort across the Middle East to reform key areas of business law, including company formation, insolvency, taxation, and dispute resolution. Many of these reforms are designed to meet international standards and increase investor confidence. Incentive programs—including multi-billion-dollar funds to attract asset managers and tech firms—are now available and should be assessed early when planning market entry.
Sector-specific regulations are also evolving quickly. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE have implemented modern data protection regimes and frameworks supporting cloud computing and digital infrastructure. There is a strong focus on aligning digital transformation with ethical considerations rooted in local culture, particularly in areas like AI, surveillance, and data localization.
While competition laws are still developing in the region, they are gaining traction and should not be overlooked. Employment and immigration rules are often more flexible than in the United States, but enforcement can vary widely and must be understood in context.
Next Steps
Despite the complexity of legal and regulatory environments in both regions, the depth of capital and collaboration stemming from this new wave of bilateral investment offers unparalleled opportunities.
With 25 offices in the United States, and a well-established presence in the Middle East, the firm is well positioned to support clients looking to capitalize on this strengthened trade corridor.
Sustainable Aviation Fuel: An Overview of the Current Regulatory Landscape in the UK, EU And USA
Introduction
We have set out below an overview of the current regulatory frameworks governing Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF) in the key jurisdictions of the UK, EU and USA.
SAF has emerged as a critical component in the global drive to decarbonise the aviation sector, a significant contributor to greenhouse gas emissions. Unlike conventional jet fuels, SAF offers substantial reductions in lifecycle carbon emissions by incorporating renewable feedstocks and innovative production technologies.
Recognising its potential to drive sustainable growth, policymakers across the UK, EU, and USA are actively shaping regulatory frameworks to accelerate its deployment and adoption.
Note that this is an evolving regulatory landscape that is subject to change – however, this overview sets out the current regulations and initiatives of each of the UK, EU and USA – and strongly indicates the direction of travel of each of these jurisdictions.
We conclude with a comparison of these jurisdictions and analyse their strengths and limitations in fostering market growth. We also examine potential pathways for future development, including harmonisation of international standards, technological advancements, and policy synergies.
By presenting such analysis and exploring projected trends, this overview offers insights into the role of regulation in shaping the trajectory of SAF as an essential enabler of sustainable aviation.
United Kingdom
The UK SAF landscape
Current Status and Future Developments
The UK’s SAF industry is progressing rapidly, driven by a number of policy measures that integrate SAF into the UK’s broader decarbonisation goals. With increasing regulatory and financial support, the UK aims to position itself as a global leader in SAF development, production, commercialisation and use.
A key component of this strategy is the SAF Mandate, alongside other legislative and market-based incentives designed to accelerate SAF adoption. Under these principles, SAF is defined based on achieving a minimum level of greenhouse gas emission reductions and specific sustainability criteria.
The key features include the introduction of compulsory, incrementally increasing SAF supply requirements, a buy-out mechanism to enforce compliance, and funding incentives to support industry growth.
The Jet Zero Taskforce (JZT) (building on the previous Government’s Jet Zero Council) was announced by the UK Government in November 2024 to advance sustainable aviation. Members include UK Government ministers, industry leaders and academics. Established to accelerate the transition to net zero aviation by 2050, the JZT aims to streamline aviation decarbonization priorities and support the development, production, commercialisation and use of SAF in the UK and globally.
Legislation
The UK is at the forefront of SAF development as the one of the first countries in the world to legislate for mandatory SAF requirements. The UK’s key policy to decarbonize aviation and secure demand for SAF is the SAF Mandate.
SAF Mandate
Key terms (2025 onwards):
The Renewable Transport Fuel Obligations (Sustainable Aviation Fuel) Order 2024 came into force on January 1, 2025. This introduced compulsory SAF requirements for suppliers of at least 15.9 terajoules (c.468,000 litres) per year of aviation fuel to the UK: from 2025, SAF is required to make up 2% of the total UK aviation fuel mix, increasing to 10% by 2030 and 22% by 2040.
SAF suppliers earn Renewable Transport Fuel Certificates for SAF supplied to the UK that meets certain GHG emission reductions and sustainability criteria (SAF must comprise fuel that achieves minimum GHG emission reductions of 40% relative to traditional fossil fuel-based jet fuel). Evidence of the SAF supplied to UK needs to be provided to the Department for Transport to assess and award corresponding certificates. The number of certificates issued will be proportionate to the level of GHG emission reductions achieved by the fuel delivered (i.e. the greater the reductions, the greater the number of certificates issued). Suppliers can either use their certificates to demonstrate that they have complied with their obligations or trade them to other suppliers.
HEFA Caps (2027 onwards):
SAF produced through hydro-processed esters and fatty acids (HEFA) can contribute 100% of SAF for the first 2 years of the Mandate and thereafter decreasing to 71% in 2030 and 35% in 2040.
This is due primarily to HEFA’s emission reduction inefficiencies (when compared to SAF alternatives) and feedstock sustainability concerns.
Power to Liquid (PtL) Obligations (2028-2040):
A separate PtL obligation requires 0.2% of UK aviation fuel to be sourced from PtL commencing in 2028 and thereafter rising to 4.4% by 2040.
PtL requires energy-derived production of aviation fuels (from e.g. green hydrogen and captured carbon dioxide).
Buy-out Mechanism (2025 onwards):
Fuel suppliers unable to meet their SAF Mandate requirements must pay a buy-out price determined by their SAF or PtL shortfall amounts.
The aim is to create a financial incentive to prioritize SAF, with the buy-out prices (currently £4.70 per litre for SAF and £5.00 per litre for PtL) being set at a level to encourage the supply of SAF over the use of the buy-out.
SAF Revenue Support
The Sustainable Aviation Fuel (Revenue Support Mechanism) Bill (2024) was announced in the King’s speech on 17 July 2024, proposing a revenue certainty mechanism for SAF producers investing in UK-based facilities. A number of funding options were proposed and, in January 2025, the UK Government confirmed that the Guaranteed Strike Price mechanism was the preferred option.
The Guaranteed Strike Price is envisaged to operate akin to a contract-for-difference (as utilised in the UK renewable power sector), offering price stability for UK SAF producers. The mechanism will operate through a private law contract between a UK SAF producer and a designated Government agency, establishing a strike price (being the guaranteed price the producer will receive for eligible SAF over a specified period). If the reference price surpasses the strike price, the producer reimburses the Government agency for the difference, and, if the reference price falls below the strike price, the Government agency compensates the producer for the shortfall.
In line with the “polluter pays” principle, the UK Government has confirmed that it intends for the revenue certainty mechanism to be funded by aviation fuel suppliers.
Further SAF Incentives
To further promote UK SAF development, the UK Government has implemented various financial incentives:
Advanced Fuels Fund: First launched in 2022 with £165 million of grant funding available, the Advanced Fuels Fund aims to support the establishment and development of first-of-a-kind SAF projects in the UK.
SAF Clearing House: Any new aviation fuel must meet strict specifications and undergo testing to meet industry standards; the cost and complexity of which can be a significant barrier to new fuels entering the market. The UK SAF Clearing House provides technical support and funding to SAF producers.
Furthermore, aircraft operators can reduce their obligations under the UK Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) by using eligible SAF, which qualifies for emissions reductions under the scheme.
Projections and Insight
It is estimated that, by 2050, the global aviation industry will need approximately 400 million tonnes of SAF annually to meet international decarbonization goal and, whilst the SAF market is still in a nascent stage of its development, the UK is positioned to play a significant role in the global effort to decarbonize aviation. The development of SAF production facilities in the UK are key for the successful implementation of the UK Government’s SAF goals.
The SAF Mandate has only just come into force and the revenue certainty mechanism for SAF producers has yet to be finalized and take effect. As such it remains to be seen whether these mechanisms will be sufficient to meet international decarbonization goals and position the UK as a leader in SAF development, production, commercialisation and use:
The success of the buy-out mechanism in incentivizing the production and use of SAF will depend on the future production costs of SAF. Whilst the buyout rates are currently projected to exceed SAF production costs, if the buy-out price is set too low (for example, if production costs spiral), suppliers may choose to simply pay the buy- out price.
With respect to the revenue certainty mechanism, there are a number of questions and policy decisions that remain outstanding: what will be used as the “reference price” (unlike in the power market where there is a published market price for electricity, no such benchmark exists for SAF)? How will the strike price adjust over time? Precisely how will the mechanism be funded? At a most fundamental level, the deployment of significant capital into SAF development will require further clarity regarding the revenue certainty mechanism.
For further clarity on the information above, we set out below (at Figure 1) a timeline of key projected regulatory developments in the UK SAF market.
UK SAF Timeline
Figure 1: UK SAF Timeline
European Union
The EU SAF Landscape
Current Status and Future Developments
Despite efforts to curb its growth, commercial flights in the EU could rise by up to 42% by 2040 compared to 2017. Recognizing the pressing need to address the climate impact of the aviation sector, the EU has prioritized the development of a SAF market. By leveraging the collective action potential of its member states, the EU is uniquely positioned to lead in SAF implementation.
SAF is defined by the EU as a “drop-in” aviation fuel, including advanced biofuels or biofuels produced from sustainable feedstocks, recycled carbon fuels, or synthetic fuels.
With mandates introduced in 2023 and effective as from January 2025, the European Union is meticulously crafting a policy framework to stabilize the SAF market, foster innovation, and create a level playing field, driving progress toward its Fit-to-55 climate goals.
Legislation
The European regulatory framework for sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) has been shaped by two key legislative milestones: the Renewable Energy Directives (RED) and the ReFuelEU Aviation Regulation.
The RED have progressively established binding renewable energy targets across the EU, including for the transport sector, and have increasingly integrated SAF into the broader energy transition strategy. From RED I (2009), which set initial renewable energy targets, to RED II (2018), which introduced incentives for SAF, and finally RED III (2023), which reinforced sector-specific mandates, these directives have paved the way for SAF regulation.
Complementing this framework, the ReFuelEU Aviation Regulation, adopted in 2023, marks a decisive shift in SAF development by imposing direct obligations on fuel suppliers at EU airports. Unlike the RED directives, this regulation is immediately applicable across the EU and imposes a progressive incorporation of SAF into jet fuel, with binding quotas extending to 2050. Together, these two instruments define the roadmap for SAF deployment, balancing long-term policy incentives with immediate regulatory requirements.
RED Directives
RED served as the cornerstone for establishing the EU’s shift toward greener fuels.
Adopted on April 23, 2009, the RED I Directive introduced ambitious renewable energy targets across EU Member States:
General Targets: Each Member State was assigned a binding target to achieve 20% renewable energy in its final energy consumption by 2020. These targets varied for each country: Some countries were optimistic about their renewable energy potential and set ambitious targets, such as Sweden with 49% by 2020, Denmark with 30%, and France with 23%. Others, however, were more cautious, with the Netherlands setting a target of 14% and Italy aiming for 17%.
Transport Sector: A specific target of 10% renewable energy was set for the transport sector by 2020. This included biofuels and other renewable fuels but did not explicitly address aviation.
Impact on SAF: While RED I did not explicitly include SAF, it established a foundation for their future integration by defining sustainability criteria and promoting advanced biofuels.
Entering into force on December 11, 2018, the RED II Directive strengthened the EU’s renewable energy framework in response to increased climate ambitions:
Revised Targets: The overall binding target for emissions reduction was raised to 32%, with a renewable energy target of 14% for the transport sector.
Promotion of SAF
Advanced Biofuels and RFNBOs: The RED II Directive encouraged the use of advanced biofuels and Renewable Fuels of Non-Biological Origin (RFNBOs), explicitly including SAF. Advanced biofuels refer to biofuels produced from feedstocks that do not compete with food production or contribute to land-use changes that could negatively impact biodiversity. They are typically derived from waste and residues, or non-food crops such as algae and plant fibers. As for RFNBOs, they are fuels produced from renewable electricity rather than biological sources.
Incentive Multipliers
Biofuels derived from feedstocks listed in Annex IX (including advanced biofuels) count twice their energy content towards renewable targets, meaning that for every unit of energy produced from these fuels, it counts as two units towards the target.
Fuels supplied to the aviation sector (including RFNBOs) count as 1.2 times their energy content, meaning that for every unit of energy from these fuels, it counts as 1.2 units toward the target.
Limitations on Food-Based Biofuels: These are capped at 7% to mitigate adverse effects on land use and food production.
Adopted on October 18, 2023, the RED III Directive was a decisive step towards integrating SAF into the EU’s energy framework, by:
Enhanced Targets: The share of renewable energy in the EU’s overall energy consumption must reach 42.5% by 2030, with a binding target of 29% for the transport sector.
Sectoral Sub-Targets: Specific targets were introduced for advanced biofuels and RFNBOs, solidifying SAF’s role as a cornerstone of aviation decarbonization.
Aviation Catalyst: RED III emphasized increased SAF integration into national energy strategies while supporting emerging technologies, such as synthetic fuels.
Directives are legal acts that generally need be transposed into national law by EU member states, meaning that each country must adopt its own legislation to achieve the directive’s objectives. Therefore, the RED directives’ provisions need to be transposed into national law. There is generally an 18-month deadline for member states to do so, with an occasionally shorter deadline for some provisions.
Member States successfully met the RED I targets, despite varying national goals, demonstrating the EU’s commitment to renewable energy. This progress laid the foundation for the more ambitious targets in RED II and RED III, and Member States are on track to achieve these goals. In particular, the push for SAF under these directives is progressing well, with ongoing efforts to scale production and expand infrastructure. While challenges remain, Member States are well- positioned to meet the targets for both renewable energy and SAF by 2030, especially with the introduction of the ReFuelEU Aviation Regulation.
ReFuelEU Aviation regulation
Regulation (EU) 2023/2405 of October 18, 2023 through ensuring a level playing field for sustainable air transport (ReFuelEU Aviation) represents a cornerstone of the EU’s strategy to decarbonize aviation in line with the Green Deal objectives and the Fit-for-55 package. This regulation establishes a comprehensive legal framework to accelerate the adoption of SAF across the EU.
Finalized in 2023, most of its provisions entered into force on 1 January 2024, with Articles 4, 5, 6, 8, and 10 becoming applicable from January 1, 2025. As an EU regulation, ReFuelEU Aviation is directly applicable in all Member States without requiring transposition into national law.
The regulation imposes binding SAF blending obligations on aviation fuel suppliers, requiring them to progressively integrate SAF into the aviation fuel supplied at EU airports. The mandated SAF share begins at 2% in 2025 and will increase incrementally to 70% by 2050, of which a dedicated sub-target for synthetic aviation fuels starts at 0.7% in 2030, reaching 35% by 2050 (see Figure 2). For instance, the goal for 2040 is to achieve a 42% share of SAF in the aviation fuel supplied to EU airports, with 15% of that being synthetic.
To be eligible, SAF must comply with the sustainability and emissions reduction criteria set out in RED I. Acceptable SAF sources include advanced biofuels, synthetic fuels derived from renewable hydrogen, and recycled carbon aviation fuels. Fuel suppliers may also utilize hydrogen for direct aircraft propulsion or synthetic low-carbon fuels.
Within this regulatory framework, synthetic fuels—particularly e-kerosene—are set to play an increasingly prominent role, with a specific mandate ensuring their integration into the fuel mix.
EU airport operators are required to facilitate access to SAF, while aviation fuel suppliers, airports, and aircraft operators must systematically collect and report data to the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and national competent authorities to ensure regulatory compliance.
The regulation further establishes enforcement mechanisms, designating national competent authorities responsible for supervision. Fuel suppliers failing to meet their SAF blending obligations will face financial penalties and must compensate for any shortfall by supplying the missing volume the following year.
By setting clear, long-term SAF quotas through 2050, the ReFuelEU Aviation regulation creates a stable and predictable market framework, reinforcing the EU’s ambition to achieve a more sustainable aviation sector.
Figure 2: SAF Mandate Levels in the ReFuelEU Directive
Incentives for SAF Production and Innovation
The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) and Financial Incentives for SAF
In addition to the ReFuelEU Aviation regulation, the EU’s climate strategy for the aviation sector is reinforced by the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), established under Directive 2003/87/EC. As a “cap-and-trade” mechanism, the EU ETS aims to progressively reduce greenhouse gas emissions by setting a cap on total emissions while allowing market- based trading of emission allowances. Initially, free allowances were allocated to aircraft operators based on the average emission of the sector and their historical performance. In 2023, approximately 22.5 million aviation allowances were allocated for free, while about 5.7 million were auctioned.
To accelerate decarbonization, the EU has initiated a phased reduction of free emission allowances for aircraft operators:
In 2024, free allowances were reduced by 25%;
In 2025, they will be further cut by 50%;
By 2026, all free allowances will be phased out, requiring operators to fully cover their emissions through auctioning.
This transition is designed to incentivize the adoption of SAF, as airlines can lower their compliance costs by integrating SAF into their fuel mix. To support this shift, the EU has introduced targeted financial incentives within the EU ETS framework:
A dedicated SAF allowance mechanism provides 20 million allowances (valued at approximately €1.7 billion) until 2030, rewarding aircraft operators based on SAF usage. This mechanism helps bridge the price gap between conventional aviation fuel and SAF. SAF remains significantly more expensive to produce. However, by reducing compliance costs for airlines under the EU ETS, it makes SAF adoption more financially viable, supporting the transition to cleaner aviation fuels while maintaining competitiveness in the sector.
SAF that meets RED sustainability criteria is attributed zero emissions under the EU ETS, reducing the number of allowances airlines must purchase.
Beyond emissions trading, the EU has also introduced monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) measures for non-CO₂ aviation effects, with additional policy proposals expected by 2028.
Financial Support Mechanisms for SAF Development
Recognizing the financial and technological challenges associated with SAF production, the EU has established several funding instruments to support research, innovation, and large-scale deployment:
EU Innovation Fund (EUIF): A €40 billion fund aimed at de-risking SAF production across various technology readiness levels. For example, the Innovation Fund awarded in 2023 a €167 million grant to the Biorefinery Östrand project, which seeks to develop, construct, and operate the world’s first large-scale biorefinery dedicated to producing renewable SAF and naphtha, in Östrand, Sweden.
Horizon Europe: The EU’s flagship €95.5 billion research and innovation program, which funds SAF-related projects.
InvestEU: A €26.2 billion initiative supporting sustainable infrastructure investments, including SAF production facilities. One of the most notable projects funded by InvestEU is the INERATEC synthetic fuel production facility in Frankfurt. Backed by a €70 million investment, this initiative is supported by a €40 million venture loan from the European Investment Bank (EIB) and a €30 million non-repayable grant from Breakthrough Energy Catalyst. The funding will help develop Europe’s largest carbon-neutral synthetic fuel plant, set to open in 2025.
Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking: A €1.7 billion public-private partnership between the European Commission and the aeronautics industry to accelerate the development of new aviation technologies.
Projections and Insight
While the ReFuelEU Aviation regulation establishes a robust framework and clear mandates for SAF adoption, several policy areas will require further clarification and potential amendments. The regulation’s overall timeline is generally aligned with industry expectations, but additional interventions may be necessary to ensure a smooth and effective implementation:
Penalty enforcement and cost volatility: The current penalty mechanism for suppliers failing to meet SAF quotas is directly tied to SAF costs, which remain highly volatile due to potential supply shortages. If SAF prices surge, penalties could become unsustainable, adding financial pressure on suppliers while delaying compliance. Additionally, without a price cap mechanism, rising SAF costs could impact air travel affordability, potentially triggering public and industry backlash.
Exploring a tradable SAF system: Under Article 15 of ReFuelEU, the European Commission is mandated to assess additional measures to enhance SAF market liquidity and ensure supply stability. One key consideration is the creation of a book-and-claim system, which would enable fuel suppliers and aircraft operators to purchase SAF credits and allocate them flexibly across EU airports. As of January 2025, the Commission’s report on these measures remains pending.
Beyond regulatory refinements, the political landscape in the EU is evolving, with recent electoral shifts favoring parties historically opposed to Green Deal policies. As EU policymakers shift their focus toward an Industrial Deal, maintaining strong momentum for SAF adoption will be critical. Ensuring a stable regulatory environment and continued financial support will be essential to securing the long-term success of SAF integration within the aviation sector.
The effectiveness of SAF regulations in the EU stems from the fact that they are binding, compelling operators to take immediate action and enhance their performance.
Despite its relatively high cost, airlines and operators are eager to contribute and even exceed their obligated SAF targets as early as possible. They understand that this is the only way to assert themselves in the market and to ensure the long- term sustainability and viability of the industry, which must adapt to greener practices to secure its future.
United States of America
The U.S. SAF Landscape
Current Status and Future Developments
Aviation represents roughly 3.3% of total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions and jet fuel consumption is forecasted to increase by 2-3% annually through to 2050. This obviously presents significant opportunities for SAF investment, and the market has responded: projects have been announced in recent years that are projected to meet over 10% of U.S. jet fuel demand. Nonetheless, the biggest challenge SAF faces in the U.S. is that it is not cost-competitive with fossil jet fuel. According to the U.S. Department of Energy, SAF currently costs two to ten times more than fossil jet fuel. Consequently, the federal and state incentives discussed in this section are playing and will continue to play a critical role in the growth of SAF in the U.S.
Federal Support for SAF
The U.S. government supports SAF development in several ways: annual renewable fuel regulatory mandates; tax policy; and grants. Several of these incentives are in flux, however, given the shift in the balance of political power in the U.S. Congress and the White House.
Regulatory Mandates:
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency issues annual regulations under the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program that require the national pool of transportation fuel to contain a certain percentage of alternative fuels such as SAF. Production and use of biofuels under these mandates is tracked using a system of tradeable credits (Renewable Identification Numbers or RINs). Among other requirements, eligible SAF must have lifecycle GHG emissions that are at least 50% below a 2005 fossil fuel baseline.
Although compliance with the program’s mandates falls on fossil fuel producers and importers, RINs implicitly subsidize biofuels such as SAF. Depending upon the feedstock and production process, SAF can generate RINs that may be used to meet the biomass-based diesel, advanced biofuel or cellulosic biofuel mandates and value of the RIN varies by type. RINs generated by producing SAF can be “stacked” with federal tax credits for SAF, such as those provided by the 2022 IRA, as well as state credits relevant to SAF.
Tax Policy:
The Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA) has a significant impact on the SAF market in the U.S. by offering comprehensive support to encourage the production and adoption of this fuel. Instead of setting mandates, the IRA offers SAF credits for qualified neat fuels and provides grants for SAF production and distribution.
The IRA supports SAF through two credits. First, IRA created a new SAF blender’s tax credit under Internal Revenue Code section 40B, available through to the end of 2024. Then, from January 1, 2025 through to December 31, 2027, the IRA made available a new technology neutral production credit for clean fuels including SAF, the section 45Z Clean Fuel Production Credit.
The section 45Z credit provides a tax credit for the production of clean fuels that are “suitable for use in a highway vehicle or aircraft” and meet a specified threshold for emissions reductions. The credit is worth up to $1.00 per gallon for transportation fuels and $1.75 or more per gallon for SAF, provided that prevailing wage and apprenticeship requirements are met. The 45Z credit is claimed by the producers of SAF, rather than the blenders, but can be transferred or sold to third parties as a means of monetizing the credit.
Since August 2022, significant work has been done by a multi-disciplinary task force including the U.S. Treasury, the IRS, the Energy Department, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the White House to implement the section 45Z credit and publish tax guidance. Most recently, on January 10, 2025, the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service released Notice 2025-10 and Notice 2025-11, establishing an intent to propose regulations and clarifying annual emissions rates for the credit. At the same time, the 119th Congress is currently reviewing tax legislation that may include revisions to several clean energy tax credits established by the IRA, including section 45Z. As a result, airlines, SAF producers, and conventional energy companies are queuing up to talk to Congress and Trump tax officials about the future of federal tax support for clean fuels, since the current production credit is set to expire at the end of 2027.
Grants:
IRA Section 40007 establishes a grant program for eligible U.S. entities involved in SAF production, transportation, blending, or storage, administered by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) through the Fueling Aviation’s Sustainable Transition (FAST) grants program.
Section 324 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for 2023 allows the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) to pilot SAF usage, with a plan to be implemented by FY2028, while permitting waivers under certain conditions.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act for 2023 and 2024 authorize discretionary grants for airport infrastructure that supports SAF’s distribution and storage, provided they meet the 50% lifecycle GHG reduction requirement.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Rural Energy for America program also provides grants and loan guarantees to rural businesses and agricultural producers for renewable energy projects, including SAF production facilities.
State Incentives for SAF Production and Innovation
State-level policies further support SAF production and consumption by allowing producers to generate and sell credits to fossil jet fuel suppliers. In 2009, California established the California Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) to reduce transportation sector GHG emissions in the state and develop a range of low- carbon and renewable alternatives to reduce petroleum dependency. This market-based program sets an annual average carbon intensity (CI) benchmark for all fuels – fossil and renewable – produced or imported into the state. Fuels with a CI below the benchmark (such as eligible SAF) generate credits that producers can sell to other fuel producers in the state as a revenue stream. Oregon, Washington, and New Mexico have adopted similar fuel programs.
In other states – Illinois, Minnesota, and Nebraska – per-gallon SAF production tax credits promote SAF alignment with national objectives.
Projections and Insight
By 2030, domestic SAF production is expected to reach 3 billion gallons annually – a 130-fold increase from 2030 consumption. By 2050, production could rise to 35 billion gallons per year, reflecting a 12-fold increase from the 2030 target.
The shift towards SAF represents a long-term transition in the aviation industry. Given the international nature of air travel, SAF is a clean fuel whose market drivers are largely insulated from the political swings of the US; and American airlines and airports will need to access this fuel to comply with global emissions standards. Driven by discretionary grants from the FAA, significant investments in airport infrastructure for SAF distribution and storage are anticipated. This could lead to an improved supply chain and logistics, facilitating broader SAF availability at major airports by 2025. Increased funding through grants and tax credits may accelerate research and development of new SAF feedstocks and production technologies, enhancing efficiency and reducing costs. This could also lead to advancements in alternative feedstocks, potentially doubling production efficiency by 2030. As government initiatives and incentives ramp up, it is likely that the market share of SAF in total jet fuel consumption will increase significantly from the current less than 0.1%. Projections estimate reaching 5 -10% market share by 2030, depending on regulatory support and industry adoption.
The incentives enacted under the IRA constitute a good beginning in establishing the support necessary for overcoming barriers to SAF adoption. With investors comparing the short three-year timeline of the IRA’s section 45Z clean fuel production credit to ten-year timelines for other clean energy technologies, producers and airlines are making a long-term legislative extension of the credit a top priority for 2025. State level initiatives, like the California LCFS program, look to play a critical role in driving SAF adoption. Other states may follow suit, creating a patchwork of supportive policies that could incentivize producers while also fostering competition among states for SAF leadership.
Conclusion: Comparative Analysis of SAF
Regulatory Frameworks in the UK, EU, and US
The regulatory approaches adopted by the UK, EU, and US to promote SAF reflect distinct policy priorities, economic
structures, and aviation market dynamics. Whilst all three jurisdictions recognize the need to scale SAF production to achieve net-zero aviation emissions, their methods for incentivization, mandate enforcement, and industry engagement exhibit some notable divergences.
Key Similarities
Despite differences in policy mechanisms, several overarching themes emerge across all three jurisdictions:
Mandatory Blending Requirements: The UK, EU, and US each employ a mix of blending mandates and incentives to encourage SAF adoption. The UK’s SAF Mandate (starting at 2% in 2025 and increasing to 22% by 2040) aligns with the EU’s ReFuelEU Aviation Regulation, which also begins at 2% in 2025 but escalates to 70% by 2050. Although the US lacks a direct federal blending mandate, the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) and state-level Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) programs create market-driven demand for SAF.
Financial Incentives: Each jurisdiction incorporates financial incentives to lower SAF’s production costs and bridge the price gap with fossil-based jet fuel. The UK’s proposed Revenue Support Mechanism, the EU’s SAF Allowance Mechanism under the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), and the US’s Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) tax credits all aim to de-risk SAF investment. Notably, the US offers the most aggressive tax-based support via the Section 45Z Clean Fuel Production Credit, which directly rewards SAF producers.
Technology-Specific Targets: Recognizing the need for diversification in SAF production pathways, the UK and EU establish dedicated quotas for Power-to-Liquid (PtL) fuels and synthetic fuels, whereas the US allows greater flexibility in feedstocks, as seen in its Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) and LCFS programs. The UK’s PtL obligation has similar aims to the EU’s sub-target for synthetic fuels, indicating a shared commitment to emerging technologies.
Market-Based Compliance Mechanisms: Each jurisdiction incorporates a credit trading system to enhance compliance flexibility. The UK’s Renewable Transport Fuel Certificates (RTFCs), the EU’s ETS allowances and (if to be applied) book-and-claim system, and the US’s RIN (Renewable Identification Number) market under the RFS facilitate compliance while stimulating a secondary market for SAF credits.
Key Differences
Despite these similarities, the jurisdictions differ in several key respects:
Direct v Market-Based Approach:
The EU and UK impose direct mandates on fuel suppliers, ensuring binding obligations for SAF blending. The UK’s buy-out mechanism acts as a penalty for non-compliance, while the EU enforces fines and requires compensation for missed SAF quotas.
The US primarily relies on market-driven incentives, with no direct SAF blending mandate at the federal level. Instead, state-based programs such as California’s LCFS and financial incentives like the IRA credits encourage voluntary SAF adoption.
Policy Longevity and Stability:
The EU offers the longest regulatory certainty, with ReFuelEU Aviation’s SAF mandates extending to 2050. The UK’s SAF Mandate provides clarity through 2040 but leaves open questions regarding future expansion.
The US approach is, potentially, more politically vulnerable. The IRA’s Section 45Z tax credit is set to expire by the end of 2027, raising questions about long-term investor confidence. This contrasts with the EU’s more predictable long-term regulatory trajectory.
Scope of SAF Eligibility and Feedstock Restrictions
The UK and EU impose stricter sustainability criteria, progressively limiting HEFA (Hydroprocessed Esters and Fatty Acids) (or similar) feedstock eligibility. The UK caps HEFA at 92% by 2027, declining to 35% by 2040, while the EU limits food-based biofuels to prevent indirect land-use impacts.
The US allows broader feedstock eligibility, including corn ethanol-derived alcohol-to-jet SAF, which the EU explicitly excludes. This reflects the political influence of the US agricultural sector, leading to a pragmatic approach to scaling SAF production with available resources.
Enforcement Mechanisms and Market Oversight
The EU employs oversight through the European Union Aviation Safety Agency and national regulatory bodies, ensuring strict compliance through direct penalties. The UK SAF Mandate will be administered by the UK’s Department for Transport and will be responsible for enforcing the scheme with power to revoke certificates or issue civil penalties.
The US relies on tax compliance mechanisms and voluntary participation in state-based LCFS (or similar) markets, which, as an incentive-driven approach results inleading to comparatively less stringent enforcement as can be expected in the EU and UK.
Comparative Insights and Future Implications
Each jurisdiction’s SAF strategy reflects its unique regulatory philosophy and economic priorities. The EU’s highly structured, mandate-driven approach aims to achieve rapid SAF integration but places cost burdens on fuel suppliers and buyers. The UK’s hybrid model, combining mandates with revenue support mechanisms, seeks to balance regulatory certainty with investment incentives. Meanwhile, the US favors a market-driven, incentive-based model, fostering innovation but opening up potential regulatory uncertainty due to shifting political landscapes.
This evolving landscape reflects a multi-faceted approach, balancing stringent emissions reduction targets with mechanisms that incentivise investment and production. The UK has introduced ambitious mandates within its Jet Zero strategy, while the EU’s Fit-to-55 package integrates SAF quotas through the ReFuelEU Aviation initiative.
Meanwhile, the USA leverages tax credits and grant programs under initiatives like the Inflation Reduction Act to stimulate domestic SAF production. These diverse regulatory tools aim to address the significant challenges of scaling SAF, including high production costs, limited feedstock availability, and infrastructure constraints.
Looking ahead, international policy harmonization will be critical to ensuring the global scalability of SAF. The International Civil Aviation Organization and industry stakeholders may push for greater alignment between EU- style mandates and US-style incentives, potentially influencing future SAF policies. Additionally, ongoing bilateral agreements between the UK, EU, and US on carbon accounting, emissions reporting, and SAF certification will play a crucial role in fostering a globally integrated SAF market.
Despite their differences, the UK, EU, and US share the common goal of scaling SAF production to enable a net zero aviation future. While their paths to achieving this differ, their collective efforts will be instrumental in driving the technological and economic transformation needed for sustainable aviation. As regulatory frameworks evolve, continued cross-border collaboration and policy adjustments will be essential to maximizing SAF’s impact on global decarbonization goals.
Additional Authors: Parker A. Lee, Brittany M. Pemberton, and Timothy J. Urban.
AI in Job Postings: What Employers in Canada Need to Know
Artificial intelligence (AI) is rapidly changing the hiring landscape. Whether scanning resumes with machine learning tools or ranking candidates based on predictive models, employers in Canada may now want to ensure transparency when using AI during recruitment. This is no longer just a best practice—it is increasingly being reflected in legislative requirements.
Quick Hits
In Ontario, if AI is used to screen, assess, or select applicants, a disclosure may be required directly in the job posting.
Employers with fewer than twenty-five employees are exempt from Ontario’s requirement.
In Quebec, if a decision is made exclusively through automated processing (such as AI), employers need to inform the individual and offer a mechanism for human review.
Across Canada, privacy laws (Quebec, Alberta, British Columbia, and federally under PIPEDA) suggest that individuals be informed about the purposes for collecting their personal data and openness requirements, which suggests disclosing AI use.
In Quebec, individuals also have the right to know what personal data was used, the key factors behind an automated decision, and to request corrections.
With the coming into force of Ontario’s Working for Workers Four Act, 2024 (Bill 149) and the coming into force of Quebec’s Act to Modernize Legislative Provisions as Regards the Protection of Personal Information (Law 25), which began in 2022, alongside longstanding privacy obligations in Alberta, British Columbia, and under federal law, the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5 (PIPEDA), employers may want to carefully review how AI is used in job postings and the broader hiring process.
Quebec—Regulatory Context
Quebec’s Act Respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector, CQLR c. P-39.1, was significantly amended and is now in force. These provisions apply to all private sector organizations collecting, using, or disclosing personal information in Quebec. This includes employers hiring employees located in Quebec, regardless of where the employer is based, as long as they are considered to be doing business in Quebec.
Section 12.1 provides that any individual whose personal information is the subject of a decision made exclusively through automated processing may be informed of the decision, the main factors and parameters that led to it, and of their right to have the decision reviewed by a person. As such, employers may want to ensure that systems that are used for any automated decision-making in Quebec are explainable so that if they receive a request on the factors and parameters that led to the decision they are able to provide this information.
Although the law is not specific about how such a request must be made, we assume that the section on access rights will apply. This means that employers would need to respond to a written request for information within thirty days.
While the statute does not define “automated decision-making technology,” the language of the law may be interpreted broadly and may apply to a wide range of systems, including algorithmic and AI tools used in hiring. Based on the approach of the data protection regulatory authority in Quebec, the Commission d’accès à l’information (CAI), we can expect a broad interpretation of this concept as the CAI has recently taken the position that privacy laws in Quebec are quasi-constitutional in nature. (For a discussion of Quebec’s restrictive approach to data privacy, see our article, “Québec’s Restrictive Approach to Biometric Data Poses Challenges for Businesses Working on Security Projects.”)
The CAI has broad investigative and enforcement powers. These powers include conducting audits, issuing binding orders, and imposing administrative monetary penalties. Employers may want to monitor guidance from the CAI as the authority’s enforcement evolves.
Ontario—Regulatory Context
On March 21, 2024, the Working for Workers Four Act, 2024 (Bill 149) received Royal Assent in Ontario. Among other amendments, the act introduced a new provision under the Employment Standards Act, 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 41 (ESA) regarding employer disclosure of artificial intelligence use in hiring when a job is publicly advertised.
The implementing regulation, O. Reg. 476/24: Job Posting Requirements, defines artificial intelligence as:
“A machine-based system that, for explicit or implicit objectives, infers from the input it receives in order to generate outputs such as predictions, content, recommendations or decisions that can influence physical or virtual environments.”
The same regulation defines a “publicly advertised job posting” as:
“An external job posting that an employer or a person acting on behalf of an employer advertises to the general public in any manner.”
This requirement is set to take effect on January 1, 2026. It will not apply to general recruitment campaigns, internal hiring efforts, or employers with fewer than twenty-five employees at the time of the posting.
Employers may find it useful to assess what tools qualify as “artificial intelligence” or what constitutes “screening,” “assessing,” or “selecting” a candidate. The broad definition may include simple keyword filters or more complex machine learning systems, raising the potential for over- or under-disclosure.
Considerations for Employers: Human Rights and AI Bias
Employers in Canada may also want to consider their use of AI tools in conjunction with human rights legislation to ensure that their recruitment practices comply with legal standards. These laws prohibit discrimination based on grounds such as race, gender, age, disability, and other protected characteristics.
When implementing AI in hiring, employers may want to assess whether any of the tools used unintentionally promote bias or perpetuate discriminatory outcomes. AI systems, if not properly designed or monitored, can inadvertently reinforce bias by relying on historical data that may reflect past inequalities. For example, predictive models may favor certain demographic groups over others, which could lead to unintentional bias in hiring decisions.
Employers can play a key role in minimizing these risks by considering the following:
being involved in discussions about how AI tools work, ensuring transparency about the data being used, and the potential for bias in decision-making;
choosing AI tools that are explainable—meaning the algorithms and their decision-making processes are understandable to humans. This can help employers detect and correct biases before they impact hiring decisions.
regularly auditing AI tools to identify and addressing any unintentional bias, ensuring that these tools comply with both privacy and human rights obligations; and
for employers subject to PIPEDA or provincial privacy laws, providing clear, accessible notices explaining how personal information is collected, why it is collected, and who to contact with questions.
AI is increasingly common in recruitment, and with this advancement comes increased scrutiny. The new laws are intended to support transparency, fairness, and human oversight. By using explainable AI, having strong internal mechanisms, and communicating across departments, employers may not only reduce legal risks but also foster trust in the hiring process, ensuring that all candidates are treated fairly and equitably.
Next Steps
Tips and considerations for responsible AI use include the following:
understanding the AI technology, verifying that it complies with the requirements of transparency under data privacy law, and understanding what the tool is doing to determine if it is necessary to indicate this information in a job posting;
communicating across the organization by having company-wide discussions about the implementation of AI tools to avoid the risk of a tool being used without being advertised in a job posting or privacy notice;
revising job posting templates to include AI-use disclosures where applicable
creating plain-language descriptions of AI tools used in hiring, especially those that may lead to automated decisions;
implementing procedures that enable human review of AI decisions, as reflected under Quebec’s Law 25;
maintaining up-to-date privacy policies that explain AI usage, list contact information for privacy inquiries, and detail individual rights;
training hiring personnel on how AI tools function and how to respond to applicant questions related to privacy and automation;
limiting data collection to what is necessary and reasonable for recruitment purposes, in line with privacy obligations under applicable laws; and
verifying the applicability of exemptions. For example, Ontario’s AI disclosure requirement may not apply to employers with fewer than twenty-five employees, though privacy obligations may still be relevant.
AI is transforming the hiring process—and the legal landscape is evolving just as fast. Employers across Canada may want to proactively review their recruitment practices through the lens of employment standards, privacy laws, and human rights obligations. Embracing transparency doesn’t just reduce legal risk—it can build trust with candidates and unlock the full potential of AI while respecting individual rights.
EU Pay Transparency Directive: Updates on Implementation Across Member States
The European Union’s pay transparency directive (Directive (EU) 2023/970), adopted in June 2023, is landmark legislation aimed at addressing pay discrimination and closing the gender pay gap across the European Union. With a deadline of June 2026 for transposition, member states are currently transposing the directive into national law.
Quick Hits
Under the EU pay transparency directive (Directive (EU) 2023/970), employers are subject to requirements, such as upholding the principle of “work of equal value,” reporting on gender pay gap statistics, and making pay information available to job applicants during recruitment and employees upon request.
Each EU member state can choose to implement compliance requirements beyond the directive’s existing requirements.
Belgium, Sweden, Poland, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Finland have so far led the way, and other EU countries are expected to publish draft proposals during 2025.
As detailed in our previous article, “Preparing for the EU’s Pay Transparency Directive,” the directive calls for a review of current employer practices to ensure ongoing compliance.
Key Updates From Member States
Belgium
Belgium became the first EU member state to transpose the directive into national law. The Fédération Wallonie-Bruxelles, which is mainly applicable to public sector employers in the French Community of Belgium, was signed into law on 12 September 2024 and has been effective since 1 January 2025. The decree does not apply universally to all Belgian employers, and the directive will continue to be transposed across Belgium, although the timeframe for implementation is still unknown.
Key provisions go beyond the directive’s minimum requirements:
Pay information or salary ranges at the recruitment stage must be presented in a format that is accessible for individuals with disabilities.
Job titles used in recruitment must be nondiscriminatory.
Gender pay gap reporting must include a fair assessment of pay progression for employees who take family-related leave.
Sweden
The Swedish government shared an investigation for the transposition of the directive on 29 May 2024, which is currently under review. The directive introduces stricter pay transparency and gender pay gap reporting requirements for employers than the existing Swedish Discrimination Act, including:
Providing pay information to job applicants. Employers would be required to disclose the relevant provisions of their collective agreements as well as the salary range to candidates before interviews.
Ensuring pay information, such as salary and pay progression, is easily accessible. Employees would also be entitled to request pay information through employee representatives or gender equality bodies rather than directly from the employer. Under Swedish law, all companies with twenty-five or more employees in Sweden have employee representatives on their board of directors, which would enable this provision to operate effectively.
Including specific content requirements for gender pay reports. This includes how pay has been determined; this requirement has already been implied in the directive, but the Swedish proposal specifically addresses this requirement.
Gender pay gap reporting would have to include a comparison of pay progression for employees who take parental leave compared with employees who do work of equal value but do not take parental leave.
Sweden would maintain current pay reporting requirements under the Swedish Discrimination Act for employers with ten or more employees.
Poland
Poland’s progress on transposing the directive is at the draft legislation stage. Originally initiated by members of Parliament on 5 December 2024, a new version of the draft was presented by a parliamentary committee on 1 April 2025. On 9 May 2025, the Polish parliament (Sejm) passed a draft amending the Labour Code. The draft largely aligns with the directive but currently does not state provisions for gender pay gap reporting obligations and is limited to the recruitment stage. The draft will now progress to the Senate for further review, and, after the legislative process is completed, the act will take effect within six months from the date of promulgation.
In its current form, the draft includes the following obligations:
Providing applicants with information on the starting salary or its range (based on objective and neutral criteria) and, where applicable, the relevant provisions of collective agreements or remuneration regulations throughout the recruitment process, including in the job advertisement.
Using gender-neutral language in job advertisements and gender-neutral job titles, as well as conducting the recruitment processes in a non-discriminatory manner.
A prohibition on asking questions regarding salary history.
Ireland
Ireland published the General Scheme of the Equality (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill 2024 on 15 January 2025. Like Poland, Ireland did not include any details that address the pay reporting requirement under the directive. However, unlike Poland, Ireland already has gender pay reporting in place under the Gender Pay Gap Information Act 2021, which requires employers with a headcount of 150 or more employees (reducing to 50 or more employees from 1 June 2025) to publish information on their gender pay gap annually.
The current draft specifies:
Job advertisements must include the pay rate or range for the job role. This is more stringent than the directive, which allows employer flexibility in providing the information to the applicant in advance of the interview rather than requiring its inclusion in the job posting.
Employers are prohibited from requesting information from job applicants regarding their pay history.
The Netherlands
In March 2025, the Netherlands published its draft proposal, which closely follows the text of the directive. This draft was subject to public consultation; the outcome of which is currently undergoing further review in the Dutch Parliament.
Finland
On 16 May 2025, the Finnish government published its draft proposal, which largely aligns with the directive by specifying the inclusion of pay rates during the recruitment stage, the right of employees to request pay information, and the prohibition on employers from requesting information from job applicants regarding their pay history.
However, the draft goes beyond Finland’s current pay survey reporting obligations and does contain specific nuances on reporting by company size. Under the proposal, gender pay gap reporting would be required for companies with 100 or more employees. This would follow a phased approach with companies with 150 to 249 employees reporting by 2027, and those with 100 to 149 employees by 2031. Fines for noncompliance are proposed to range from €5,000 to €80,000.
EU Adopts 17th Sanctions Package Against the Russian Federation: Further Targets the “Shadow Fleet” and Expands Export Controls
On 20 May 2025, the European Council announced its 17th sanctions package against the Russian Federation. The latest measures reinforce the EU’s strategic objective of undermining Russia’s capacity to finance and sustain its war efforts in Ukraine.
The latest sanctions package further intensifies pressure on the Russian economy through a comprehensive expansion of restrictions on maritime transport, military and dual-use exports, as well as circumvention tactics. Notably, it includes the largest-ever coordinated action against the so-called “shadow fleet,” targeting vessels used to circumvent the oil price cap regime.
Anti-circumvention Measures
The package designates an unprecedented 189 additional vessels as part of Russia’s “shadow fleet”, bringing the total number of designated vessels up to 342. These ships, many of which covertly support Russia’s energy export operations, are now barred from EU ports and prohibited from receiving maritime services.
This marks the largest coordinated G7 action against Russia’s covert oil export infrastructure to date. According to the Oil Price Cap Coalition, previous designations had caused shipments of Russian crude to fall by 76%.
The new package imposes restrictive measures on 75 new targets implicated in undermining Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, including 17 individuals and 58 entities. New listings primarily concern entities in the Russian military and defense sectors, including firms involved in operating or enabling the shadow fleet, defense supply chains and involved in looting cultural and heritage items from the disputed territories; among them is the Volga Shipping Company, a key Russian maritime operator, now sanctioned for its role in generating revenue in support of Russia’s war efforts.
Furthermore, among the new targets are 31 new companies, which have been added to the sanctions list for directly or indirectly supporting Russia’s military-industrial base, or facilitating sanctions evasion. These include:
18 firms based in Russia
13 companies from third-party nations including: six Turkish, three Vietnamese, two Emirati, one Serbian and one Uzbek company
Trade Measures
Export restrictions have been further strengthened, with new prohibitions on:
Chemical precursors linked to missile propellants (e.g. sodium chlorate, aluminum powder and magnesium powder)
Spare parts for high-precision Computer Numerical Control (CNC) machinery, including ball screws and encoders, critical for maintaining Russia’s military production capabilities
These measures are accompanied by enhanced anticircumvention safeguards, including tighter controls on transit routes and stricter due diligence obligations for traders and operators in high-risk sectors.
Energy Measures and the Sakhalin Exemption
The package extends the existing oil price cap exemption for the Sakhalin-2 project, permitting crude oil shipments by sea to Japan until 28 June 2026. The extension reflects ongoing Japanese energy security concerns and coordination within the G7 framework.
Private Market Talks: Destination Europe with Pemberton’s Co-Founder Symon Drake-Brockman [Podcast]
As America turns inwards, investors are turning east, towards Europe. It’s a seismic shift not seen since the end of WWII. In this episode, we talk with Symon Drake-Brockman, co-founder and Managing Partner of Pemberton Asset Management, one of Europe’s largest private credit platforms, about the implications of this shift. Prior to starting Pemberton, Symon navigated critical world events on behalf of major financial institutions, including the impact of Russia seizing Crimea, the Asian financial crisis, the Global Financial Crisis, and COVID. During our conversation, Symon helps to put current events into perspective and offers insights as to why today’s capital allocators are rediscovering Europe.
Gradual Implementation of the National Code of Civil and Family Procedure in Mexico City: Key Dates and Broader Impact
Although the National Code of Civil and Family Procedure (CNPCyF) was enacted on June 8, 2023, its implementation will be gradual. At both the federal and state levels, its entry into force depends on each judicial branch requesting the corresponding declaration of enforceability from the federal or local congress. The deadline for this to happen is April 1, 2027. At the federal level, this declaration has not yet been issued.
In Mexico City, the declaration has already been published, which resulted in the abrogation of the local Code of Civil Procedure. However, the CNPCyF will be applied gradually, with a distinction between civil and family matters. In civil matters, the key effective dates are:
December 1, 2024: applicable to oral special mortgage and oral residential lease proceedings.
June 1, 2025: applicable to voluntary jurisdiction, interim relief, and oral executive proceedings.
November 15, 2025: applicable to ordinary oral civil proceedings, enforcement proceedings, and all other cases not previously mentioned. This date will also mark the start of its supplementary application to other laws.
Additionally, on November 29, 2024, a decree was published amending various legal provisions in Mexico City to harmonize them with the CNPCyF. This reform is significant, as it lays the groundwork for the Code to be applied on a supplementary basis in administrative proceedings, including at the federal level. However, its concrete implementation in this area remains pending and will require close monitoring.
U.S.-China Lower Reciprocal Tariffs During 90-Day Negotiation Period
On May 12, 2025, the Administration agreed to lower reciprocal tariffs imposed on products of China under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) for 90 days to allow for further negotiations between the two countries on a formal trade deal.
The 90-day suspension reduces the 125% reciprocal tariffs imposed on April 10, 2025, on goods imported from China down to 10%. With this reduction, the baseline reciprocal tariff on goods imported from China will now be at the same reciprocal tariff rate applicable to essentially all other countries.
This 90-day pause became effective on May 14, 2025, and is anticipated to last until August 12, 2025. Following the end of the 90-day period, assuming the U.S. and China do not reach an agreement, the reciprocal tariffs are expected to increase from 10% to 34%.
It is important to note that this pause does not affect the other tariffs that are currently imposed against Chinese imports, including the 20% IEEPA-Fentanyl tariffs imposed on products of China in February and March 2025, as well as any applicable Section 301 tariffs imposed during the first Trump Administration, antidumping/countervailing duties, and general duty rates. For example, an item from China subject to 25% Section 301 tariffs would now be subject to a 55% rate taking into account the additional IEEPA-Fentanyl (20%) and reciprocal (10%) tariffs, plus any general duty rate. However, for Chinese imports subject to Sec. 232 duties for steel and aluminum products and their derivatives and automobiles and their parts, importers should carefully review Executive Order 14289’s “unstacking” provisions.
Additional Tariffs On the Runway? Commerce Seeks Public Comments on Potential Commercial Aircraft, Engines, and Parts Tariffs
While many in the aviation industry are busy trying to navigate the existing U.S. tariff regime, they should also consider the potential impact of a new investigation that could lead to additional tariffs (e.g., 25 percent, based on recent similar investigations). On May 1, 2025, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) initiated a Section 232 investigation to determine the effects on the national security of imports of commercial aircraft and jet engines, and parts thereof (collectively, “aircraft and aircraft parts”). The current unpublished Federal Register notice of investigation can be found here.
This investigation is just the latest Section 232 investigation on imported merchandise, following closely on the heels of recently initiated investigations on lumber, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, critical minerals and copper, just to name a few. Moreover, the U.S. has already imposed tariffs pursuant to Section 232 on autos and auto parts and on steel and aluminum articles.
During this investigation, BIS will allow for interested parties to submit written comments to inform the agency’s decision on whether to take action, including by imposing tariffs or quotas on imports. BIS is most interested in receiving comments on the:
current and projected demand in the U.S. for aircraft and aircraft parts;
extent to which domestic production of aircraft and aircraft parts can meet domestic demand;
role of foreign supply chains in meeting U.S. demand for aircraft and aircraft parts;
concentration of U.S. imports of aircraft and aircraft parts from a small number of suppliers and related risks;
impact of foreign government subsidies and predatory trade practices on the competitiveness of the aircraft and aircraft parts industry in the U.S.;
economic impact of artificially suppressed prices of aircraft and aircraft parts due to foreign unfair trade practices and state-sponsored overproduction;
potential for export restrictions by foreign nations, including the ability of foreign nations to weaponize their control over supplies of aircraft and aircraft parts;
feasibility of increasing domestic capacity for aircraft and aircraft parts to reduce reliance on imports;
impact of current trade policies on domestic production of aircraft and aircraft parts and whether tariffs or quotas are necessary to protect national security.
If the Section 232 tariffs on autos and steel/aluminum are any indication of the likely outcome, BIS’s investigation may result in imposition of a 25 percent duty on aircraft and aircraft parts. It remains to be seen whether any Section 232 tariffs on aircraft and aircraft parts, if imposed, may allow for import adjustment offsets if assembly occurs in the U.S. (similar to the Section 232 auto import adjustment) or if exemptions will be granted for certain countries (e.g., in the U.S.-U.K. trade deal).
BIS will allow for interested parties to submit written comments on this investigation during the comment period of within 21 days of official publication in the Federal Register, which we anticipate will be on May 13, 2025, making the comment period deadline June 3, 2025. Parties that may be impacted by tariffs or quotas on imports of aircraft and aircraft parts should strongly consider whether to submit comments or to begin strategic planning to deal with the added costs for aircraft and aircraft parts.
New Procedural Rules for Trade Secrets in Germany
On April 1, 2025, the Act to Strengthen Germany as a Location for Justice—formally titled Justizstandort-Stärkungsgesetz of October 7, 2024 (Federal Law Gazette 2024 I No. 302)—entered into force. This legislation aims to enhance Germany’s attractiveness as a venue for international commercial litigation by, among other things, establishing commercial courts and permitting the use of English in civil proceedings.
To strengthen the protection of trade secrets, the new law amends both the German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) and the Introductory Act to the Code of Civil Procedure (EGZPO). These changes respond to a growing practical need for stronger procedural safeguards for trade secrets across a broader range of legal disputes.
Procedural protection for trade secrets is primarily governed by Sections 16–20 of the Trade Secrets Act (Geschäftsgeheimnisgesetz, or GeschGehG). However, these provisions only apply directly to proceedings involving claims brought under the Trade Secrets Act itself. They do not extend to other civil cases where trade secrets could be relevant—such as disputes over confidentiality obligations in employment or service contracts, or in copyright matters.
This limited scope was confirmed by the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf in a decision dated January 11, 2021 (Case No. 20 W 68/20, GRUR-RS 2021, 7875, paras. 12–13), where the court held that Sections 16 ff. GeschGehG could not be applied analogously to copyright disputes.
While certain provisions of the German Courts Constitution Act (GVG)—namely Sections 172 no. 2, 173(2), and 174(3)—do allow for some restriction of public access in civil proceedings, they offer only limited protection. For one, parties do not have a legal entitlement to a non-public hearing. More importantly, these provisions only take effect from the oral hearing onward and do not protect sensitive information disclosed in earlier stages, such as in the statement of claim. As a result, litigants may be forced to choose between withholding crucial information—thereby risking procedural disadvantages—or disclosing trade secrets and compromising confidentiality.
Furthermore, under the current legal framework, the confidentiality obligation in Section 174(3) sentence 1 GVG does not restrict the use of information acquired through the proceedings. This means an opposing party may legally use trade secret information for their own benefit outside the courtroom (see Bundestag printed matter 20/8649 of October 6, 2023, p. 32).
To address this gap, the newly introduced Section 273a ZPO now provides a comprehensive framework for the procedural protection of trade secrets in all civil proceedings governed by the ZPO—not just in commercial court matters. Upon request by a party, the court may designate certain disputed information as confidential, in whole or in part, if it qualifies as a trade secret under Section 2 no. 1 GeschGehG. Notably, it is sufficient for the information to potentially be a trade secret.
Once such a designation is made, the procedural protections of Sections 16–20 GeschGehG apply accordingly. This includes, for example, the obligation to treat the information confidentially under Section 16(2) GeschGehG, and the prohibition on using or disclosing it outside the proceedings—unless the information was already known to the parties independently of the litigation.
According to the transitional provision in Section 37b EGZPO, the new Section 273a ZPO applies immediately upon the Act’s entry into force, including to cases that were already pending at the time. Parties and practitioners must therefore be aware that the new rule is applicable to ongoing proceedings.
Why This Matters
The new Section 273a ZPO marks a significant shift in the procedural protection of trade secrets in German civil litigation. Whether you’re navigating ongoing proceedings or planning future litigation strategy, it’s crucial to understand how these changes affect your rights and obligations.