Pennsylvania Launches Centralized Consumer Complaint System, Expands State Enforcement Under Dodd-Frank
On May 1, Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro announced a new centralized consumer protection hotline, website, and email address, providing residents with streamlined access to state agencies for reporting scams, financial misconduct, and insurance-related disputes. The rollout is part of a broader push by Pennsylvania to expand state-level enforcement amid a shift in federal priorities.
According to Governor Josh Shapiro, Pennsylvania is also expanding its use of enforcement authority under the Dodd-Frank Act, which permits states to enforce federal consumer financial laws when federal regulators decline to act. This includes coordination across agencies and stepped-up investigations into predatory lending, deceptive practices, and insurance misconduct.
The initiative builds on Pennsylvania’s existing consumer protection framework and is designed to connect residents with the appropriate agency, such as the Department of Banking and Securities or the Pennsylvania Insurance Department, regardless of the nature of the complaint. Governor Shapiro emphasized that the program follows a “no wrong door” model, ensuring that consumers can access support across lending, insurance, student loan servicing, and other financial service issues.
Pennsylvanians can now submit complaints by calling 1-866-PACCOMPLAINT, visiting pa.gov/consumer, or emailing [email protected].
Putting It Into Practice: Governor Shapiro’s launch of a centralized complaint platform highlights Pennsylvania’s intention to fill the enforcement void left recently by federal regulators (previously discussed here and here). As the CFPB continues to scale back enforcement and supervision, states like Pennsylvania are asserting authority to investigate and prosecute violations of both state and federal law, including UDAAP violations. Financial service companies should expect to see other states follow suit as they ramp up their enforcement and supervision priorities to compensate for the federal pullback.
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Autonomy On Hold: Nevada Senate Bill SB395 Seeks to Hit the Brakes on Fully Driverless Vehicles
Nevada has long been at the forefront of autonomous vehicle (AV) technology, with the state boldly moving toward fully driverless cars as a normal part of its infrastructure. However, as AV technology continues to advance and increase the number of vehicles on its roads, public policy, regulatory, and safety concerns have come into play. Senate Bill 395 (SB395), introduced in the 2025 legislative session, seeks to correct these issues by modifying major provisions for the operation of autonomous vehicles in Nevada.
SB395 will change the operation of autonomous vehicles from state to state. At present, completely autonomous vehicles may be driven without a human driver present, provided certain conditions are satisfied. SB395 would, however, regulate these autonomous cars by placing further operating restrictions on them and altering the need for human presence to drive them. This is primarily due to the growing concern about AV safety and preparedness to support advanced real-world driving conditions.
Key Provisions of SB395:
Human Operator Requirements – The most significant alteration in SB395 is the need for a human operator to be on board in fully autonomous vehicles—at least in the short run—until the technology is proven to be completely safe and reliable. This requirement is intended to provide an immediate human intervention in the event of unforeseen circumstances or system failure.
Increased Safety Standards – The legislation demands increased safety standards in autonomous vehicles, such as the creation of new testing procedures to assess the actions of cars in challenging driving circumstances, and enhanced manufacturer standards to prove their vehicles can navigate all kinds of road conditions in a safe and secure manner.
Insurance and Liability Adjustments – SB395 would also mandate car manufacturers to maintain certain types of insurance to protect against the risk of damages caused by AV-related accidents. This could include greater liability coverage because self-driving cars bring about new risks.
Data and Reporting Mandates – The bill would demand more data gathering and reporting requirements on autonomous car manufacturers. This would allow regulators in the state to track the performance and safety record of AVs, ensuring that the technology is responsibly developed.
Potential Benefits of SB395:
Enhanced Safety: By requiring the presence of human drivers and imposing stricter safety regulations, SB395 could also end accidents caused by technical malfunctions or unforeseen incidents. The bill addresses the problems caused by accidents in which AVs have not functioned as they ought to during emergency situations where a safety device is most needed to protect the public.
Public Trust in Autonomous Vehicles: While driverless vehicles are said to revolutionize transportation, most of the public is suspicious of their safety. By establishing SB395 into law, the Nevada legislature believes it will build trust with AV technology through the implementation of human oversight and other safeguards.
Long-term Industry Growth: Through the enactment of legislation that allows for the phased introduction of fully autonomous vehicles, SB395 provides a pathway for the AV industry to grow in a sustainable and managed manner. The bill ensures that autonomous vehicles can be tested and deployed safely while also encouraging innovation within the industry.
Challenges and Potential Drawbacks:
Impact on Industry – Nevada has led the way in regulating autonomous vehicle testing, and some argue that imposing further limitations would weaken the state’s proactive stance. Further human oversight and rigorous regulation could stifle the growth of autonomous vehicles, making them slower.
Economic and Operating Costs – Deployment of SB395 would also bring added costs for operators and manufacturers, who would be forced to pay more for additional tests, insurance, and meeting new regulations. These charges can be levied on the masses, thus slowing down the universal deployment of autonomous cars.
Looking Ahead: The Future of Autonomous Vehicles in Nevada
As autonomous vehicle technology continues to develop, Nevada’s role as a testing ground for AVs remains significant. SB395 is a major move toward balancing the potential of innovation with the need for public safety and regulatory oversight. While it may slow the roll-out of fully autonomous vehicles, it sets the stage for an era where autonomous vehicles can integrate into society more safely and responsibly.
As autonomous vehicle laws continue to evolve, working with a knowledgeable car accident lawyer can help individuals understand how new regulations like SB395 might impact accident liability and insurance issues.
The result of SB395 will have implications far beyond Nevada, establishing a precedent for other states contemplating similar legislation for self-driving cars. It will also affect manufacturers’ strategy regarding safety, insurance, and the introduction of fully autonomous technology in the next few years.
Endnotes:
Nevada Legislature. Senate Bill 395 – 83rd Session (2025). Retrieved from: leg.state.nv.us ↩
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. “Automated Vehicles for Safety.” Accessed 2024. ↩
Insurance Information Institute. “The Future of Insurance in Autonomous Vehicles.” 2023. ↩
American Automobile Association (AAA). “Public Opinion on Autonomous Vehicles.” 2023. ↩
U.S. Department of Transportation. “Automated Vehicle Policy.” FMCSA, 2023. ↩
Autonomous Vehicle Industry Association. “Current Safety Protocols for Autonomous Vehicle Testing.” 2022. ↩
Florida Regulatory Action Highlights Need for Insurers to Use Licensed TPAs
Key Takeaways:
A Florida-based Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) was fined for contracting with a Third-Party Administrator (TPA) that was not licensed in Florida, violating its statutory obligation to ensure competent administration under Florida law.
The HMO entered into a Consent Order with the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation (OIR), was fined $10,000 and agreed that any future violations would be considered willful and could lead to more severe regulatory action.
This case underscores the importance of insurers and HMOs verifying the licensure status of all TPAs before entering into business arrangements.
A licensed HMO domiciled in Florida recently entered into a Consent Order with the OIR for doing business with an unlicensed Insurance Administrator in Florida.
On September 12, 2023, a Delaware incorporated TPA submitted its application to become licensed as an Insurance Administrator to the OIR. As a part of the application process, the TPA submitted an in-force Master Software Service Agreement between itself and the HMO, which disclosed the TPA had been administering business for the HMO in Florida for several years prior to the TPA’s submission of its Insurance Administrator application to the OIR.
The OIR found that the HMO was receiving administrative services for Florida residents from the TPA prior to the TPA becoming licensed as an Insurance Administrator in Florida. Based on this information, the OIR determined the HMO violated Section 626.8817(2), Florida Statutes, which provides that it is the sole responsibility of an HMO to provide for competent administration of its programs. Pursuant to the Consent Order the HMO entered into with the OIR, the OIR assessed the HMO with a $10,000 fine, pursuant to Section 641.25. Florida Statutes and the HMO agreed that any future violations of Section 626.8817(2) would be considered a willful violation and subject to action by the OIR pursuant to all administrative remedies provided by the Florida Insurance Code.
The Continued Proliferation of AI Exclusions
Risk professionals and insurers alike continue to monitor the rapid evolution and deployment of artificial intelligence (AI). With increased understanding comes increased efforts to manage and limit exposure. Exclusions to coverage offer insurers potentially broad protection against evolving AI risk. Most recently, one insurer, Berkley, has introduced the first so-called “Absolute” AI exclusion in several specialty lines of liability coverage, signaling an even broader effort to compartmentalize AI risk.
The good news for policyholders is that AI exclusions have led to introduction of new AI-specific coverages to fill potential gaps. As discussed in a recent blog post, start-up insurer Armilla, in partnership with Lloyd’s, introduced an affirmative AI insurance product that offers dedicated protections for certain AI exposures. Other insurers, like Munich Re, have likewise introduced focused AI insurance products. Dedicated AI coverages may soon become the norm, especially if other insurers follow Berkley’s lead to broadly exclude AI risk from existing or “legacy” lines of coverage.
Berkley’s “Absolute” AI Exclusion
Berkley’s new exclusion, intended for use in the company’s D&O, E&O, and Fiduciary Liability insurance products, purports to broadly exclude coverage for “any actual or alleged use, deployment, or development of Artificial Intelligence.” The full endorsement states:
The Insurer shall not be liable to make payment under this Coverage Part for Loss on account of any Claim made against any Insured based upon, arising out of, or attributable to:
(1) any actual or alleged use, deployment, or development of Artificial Intelligence by any person or entity, including but not limited to:
(a) the generation, creation, or dissemination of any content or communications using Artificial Intelligence;
(b) any Insured’s actual or alleged failure to identify or detect content or communications created through a third party’s use of Artificial Intelligence;
(c) any Insured’s inadequate or deficient policies, practices, procedures, or training relating to Artificial Intelligence or failure to develop or implement any such policies, practices, procedures, or training;
(d) any Insured’s actual or alleged breach of any duty or legal obligation with respect to the creation, use, development, deployment, detection, identification, or containment of Artificial Intelligence;
(e) any product or service sold, distributed, performed, or utilized by an Insured incorporating Artificial Intelligence; or
(f) any alleged representations, warranties, promises, or agreements actually or allegedly made by a chatbot or virtual customer service agent;
(2) any Insured’s actual or alleged statements, disclosures, or representations concerning or relating to Artificial Intelligence, including but not limited to:
(a) the use, deployment, development, or integration of Artificial Intelligence in the Company’s business or operations;
(b) any assessment or evaluation of threats, risks, or vulnerabilities to the Company’s business or operations arising from Artificial Intelligence, whether from customers, suppliers, competitors, regulators, or any other source; or
(c) the Company’s current or anticipated business plans, capabilities, or opportunities involving Artificial Intelligence;
(3) any actual or alleged violation of any federal, state, provincial, local, foreign, or international law, statute, regulations, or rule regulating the use or development of Artificial Intelligence or disclosures relating to Artificial Intelligence; or
(4) any demand, request, or order by any person or entity or any statutory or regulatory requirement that the Company investigate, study, assess, monitor, address, contain, or respond to the risks, effects, or impacts of Artificial Intelligence.
The potential breadth of this exclusion cannot be overstated. And, the exclusion’s title suggests that Berkley intends to apply the exclusion to virtually any claim with a connection to AI.
Given the current landscape of AI-related liabilities giving rise to insurance claims, likely first-deployment might be in the context of shareholder litigation alleging AI-related misrepresentations. Those securities claims, which have come to be known as “AI Washing” lawsuits, may be targeted for “actual or alleged statements, disclosures, or representations concerning or relating to Artificial Intelligence.” While the target wrongful acts (“statements, disclosures, or representations”) seem straight-forward, one over arching question remains: what exactly constitutes “Artificial Intelligence?”
What is “Artificial Intelligence”: A Definitional Dilemma
The exclusion applies to claims concerning or relating to “Artificial Intelligence.” But what exactly does that include (or not include)? On its face, one might argue that the exclusion does indeed afford “absolute” protection against AI-related risk. An insurer in practice may seek to simplify the analysis to simply—does the claim reference AI? If so, no coverage.
But as with most insurance language, the devil is in the details, and the exclusion’s purported reach is far less certain. Much of the exclusion’s effect lies in its definition of “Artificial Intelligence.” That definition, read closely, is subject to a myriad of interpretations and perhaps incapable of comprehension for all but the most sophisticated AI engineers. The supplied definition states:
“Artificial Intelligence” means any machine-based system that, for explicit or implicit objectives, infers, from the input it receives, how to generate outputs such as predictions, content, recommendations, or decisions that can influence physical or virtual environments, including, without limitation, any system that can emulate the structure and characteristics of input data in order to generate derived synthetic content, including images, videos, audio, text, and other digital content.
Insurance policies are sold by insurance brokers; they’re bought by risk managers; claims are handled by claim handlers and disputes are typically decided by judges. Nowhere in that list of professionals do we find AI engineers, computer programmers, mathematicians, or other technical professional capable of understanding what actually occurs within the “black box” of a particular AI system. That lack of front-line understanding will invariably lead to differing interpretations and coverage disputes.
Takeaways
Berkley’s introduction of a so-called “Absolute” AI exclusion marks an important development in how the insurance industry is navigating the complexities associated with AI. However, the purported breadth of the exclusion highlights the imprecision that stands to frustrate the insurance industry’s ability to manage AI-related risks.
For now, policyholders must remain vigilant about the addition of any AI-related provisions into their existing, new, or renewing policies. Policyholders likewise should be on the lookout for questions in insurance applications concerning how the company may be using AI. Answers to these questions, like all other application questions, must be carefully considered, especially given the rapid evolution and deployment of AI, which stands to make even the most diligent responses obsolete before the next policy renewal.
Umbrella Insurer’s “Business Decision” to Pick Up an Insured’s Defense Leads to a Multi-Million Dollar Fraudulent Concealment Claim
A primary insurer (Truck Insurance Exchange) and an umbrella insurer (Federal Insurance Company) have been involved in a series of lawsuits dating back to 2007. The California Court of Appeal recently ruled that their litigation is not done yet. Truck Ins. Exch. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. B332397, 2025 WL 1367172, ___ Cal. Rptr. 3d ___ (2025).
Truck and Federal insured a company named Moldex-Metric, Inc., which was named as a defendant in several civil lawsuits. Initially, Moldex was defended and indemnified by various primary insurers.
In 2003, when the primary insurers’ limits were purportedly exhausted, Federal – which had issued a commercial umbrella policy to Moldex – began to indemnify Moldex and pay for its defense. However, in late 2004, Moldex discovered it was an additional insured under a primary liability policy issued by Truck. This ultimately led to three different lawsuits between Federal and Truck.
Lawsuit #1: Federal first sued Truck seeking contribution for indemnity and defense costs that Federal had paid on Moldex’s behalf. Federal argued, among other things, that as an umbrella/excess insurer, Federal had no duty to indemnify or defend Moldex until all primary policies were exhausted – including Truck’s. The trial court ruled in Federal’s favor. While the case was on appeal, Truck reached a settlement with Federal as part of which Truck agreed to pay more than $4.8 million in defense and indemnity costs.
Lawsuit #2: Truck later sued Federal (and other defendants) seeking reimbursement or contribution for defense and indemnity costs that Truck paid after its policy limits were exhausted. In response, Federal argued Truck could not seek reimbursement from Federal for defense costs because Federal had no duty to defend Moldex; rather, Federal claimed that it “made a business decision” to exercise its right to associate in Moldex’s defense. Specifically, Federal relied on a provision in its umbrella policy that stated it “shall not be called upon to assume” the defense of any suits brought against Moldex, but that Federal “shall have the right and be given the opportunity to be associated in the defense,” which if it chose to do would be at Federal’s “own expense.” Federal ultimately prevailed in that second lawsuit, in part, based on that argument.
Lawsuit #3: Truck then filed a fraud action against Federal that alleged, among other things, that Federal had misrepresented to Truck that Federal had a duty to defend Moldex or, alternatively, that Federal concealed that it had voluntarily made defense payments as a “business decision.” Truck argued that had it known that Federal’s payments were voluntary, Truck never would have entered into the $4.8 million settlement because Federal would not have had a basis to seek contribution from Truck for defense costs that Federal voluntarily assumed.
That fraud action went to a bench trial. After considering extensive evidence, the trial court issued a tentative statement of decision in Federal’s favor finding that Federal had no duty to disclose to Truck that Federal did not have a duty under its umbrella policy to defend Moldex. The court also concluded that even if the evidence supported that Federal had committed fraud, that fraud was intrinsic to Lawsuit #1 and therefore protected by the litigation privilege. Truck objected to the trial court’s tentative, including because it did not address Truck’s alternative concealment claim. The trial court disagreed and entered judgment in Federal’s favor, which Truck appealed.
The California Court of Appeal reversed. First, the court held that the trial court failed to address Truck’s concealment claim – which was not that Federal concealed it had no duty to defend under its policy, but that Federal concealed that it made a “business decision” to voluntarily assume that duty. In doing so, the court rejected Federal’s argument that it was not acting as a “volunteer” simply because it was motivated to avoid potential bad faith liability to Moldex. The court also recognized that “California law does not require one insurer to contribute to or reimburse another insurer who makes a voluntary payment.”
Second, the court held that Truck’s concealment claim was not barred by the litigation privilege. The court concluded that during Lawsuit #1, Truck did not unreasonably neglect to explore whether Federal had voluntarily assumed the defense of Moldex. Of note, the court pointed to how Federal had alleged in its complaint in that lawsuit that Truck was “obligated” to reimburse Federal for defense costs, which was inconsistent with Federal voluntarily assuming a defense obligation. Moreover, Federal never disclosed during discovery anything that indicated that it had made a voluntary “business decision” to defend Moldex. Therefore, the court agreed with Truck that Federal’s alleged concealment would amount to extrinsic fraud, which does not fall under the litigation privilege.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to hold a new trial on Truck’s concealment claim.
There are lessons to be learned on both sides of this dispute. For primary insurers, when faced with a contribution claim from an excess insurer, it’s important to closely review the excess insurance policy to assess the nature of the excess insurer’s obligations to the insured – e.g., whether it does or does not have a duty to defend. That could impact the excess insurer’s right to seek contribution from a primary insurer, in particular, if the excess insurer’s payments could be considered voluntary.
As for excess insurers, be aware that voluntarily assuming an obligation not owed under the terms of the policy could impact your right to seek recovery from other insurers.
Maryland Delays Start of Paid Family and Medical Leave Program
Hold your horses—Maryland just added a few more furlongs to its race toward a paid family leave.
On May 6, 2025, Governor Wes Moore signed House Bill 102 (“the Amendment”), which again pushes back the start date for Maryland’s Family and Medical Leave Insurance Program (FAMLI). This latest delay came as no surprise, given Maryland Department of Labor’s (MDOL) proposal earlier this year to extend the FAMLI implementation dates, because of the “high degree of instability and uncertainty for Maryland employers and workers” created by recent federal actions.
Dates to Begin Contributions and Use Leave Benefits
As we previously discussed, FAMLI will be funded through contributions from employees and employers with 15 or more employees. Although the Amendment does not alter FAMLI’s funding model, the required payroll deductions, previously scheduled to start on July 1, 2025, will now begin on January 1, 2027. The Maryland Secretary of Labor also now has until March 1, 2026, to set the contribution rates for 2027, and then until November 1st to designate the contribution rate for each subsequent calendar.
Notably, the Amendment does not establish an exact date on which employees can use paid family leave benefits. Instead, the Amendment only directs the Secretary of Labor to announce when the benefits will be available, provided the announcement is not later than January 3, 2028. Previously, benefits were supposed to begin January 1, 2026.
Finally, the minimum and maximum weekly benefit amounts remain unchanged for 2027 and 2028 at $50 and $1,000 respectively. Starting in 2029, however, FAMLI’s maximum weekly benefit amount will be tied to the Consumer Price Index to account for inflation.
Addition of the “Anchor Date”
The Amendment also added the term “Anchor Date,” which is defined as the earlier of the date on which a covered individual completes their FAMLI benefit application or the date the leave began. The state will use the Anchor Date as the new reference point for calculating (i) when an employee is eligible for paid family leave benefits; (ii) the covered employee’s average weekly wage, which is used to calculate the amount in benefits they receive; and (iii) their eligibility for increases in weekly benefits under the Program.
To qualify as a “covered employee” under the amended law, an individual must have worked at least 680 hours over the four completed calendar quarters immediately prior to the Anchor Date. Previously, employees needed only to work at least 680 hours in the four most recently completed calendar quarters before the date the leave began. Additionally, a covered employee’s average weekly wage will be calculated based on the total wages the employee received in the highest of the four completed calendar quarters that immediately precede the Anchor Date.
Finally, any increases to FAMLI’s weekly benefit amount will only apply to paid family leave applications with an Anchor Date that occurs on or after the date the increase becomes effective, except in certain cases where paid family leave benefits are paid intermittently.
Looking Ahead
The Maryland Department of Labor is in the process of developing regulations to help implement FAMLI and has already updated its website to reflect the new dates discussed here. We will continue to keep you updated as circumstances evolve.
Ticking Financial Time Bomb: Eleventh Circuit Reaffirms Insurer’s Duty to Initiate Settlement in Florida Bad Faith Case
In April 2025, the Eleventh Circuit reversed a judgment against a Florida lodge and held that a jury should determine whether the failure of the lodge’s insurer to initiate settlement proceedings before a claim was filed constituted bad faith. In reversing the district court, the Eleventh Circuit reinforced the key duty imposed on insurers under Florida law to diligently and carefully investigate claims and act with an appropriate degree of care to protect their insureds or face consequences such as bad faith liability.
Background
In 2015, the Pride of St. Lucie Lodge 1189, Inc. hosted a weekend social event while operating as a club and bar. In the early hours, an altercation erupted between two groups inside the Lodge. They were removed from the premises, but the conflict continued outside, culminating in an attendee sustaining a fatal gunshot wound.
The Lodge had a primary general liability insurance policy issued by Kinsale Insurance Company with a $1,000,000 limit and a $50,000 sublimit for assault and battery claims.
Approximately eight months after the altercation, the Lodge received a letter of representation from the estate of the patron who was shot. The Lodge notified Kinsale of the incident and potential claim. Kinsale’s investigation revealed several concerning practices at the Lodge. These included the use of volunteer security guards who had previously been criticized for inaction during fights and the Lodge’s practice of simultaneously escorting two conflicting groups out of the premises, which was contrary to best practices. Additionally, one of the security guards knew a participant and had previously heard her brag that she was “liable to shoot.”
Nevertheless, Kinsale did not initiate settlement proceedings. In August 2016, the patron’s estate filed a negligent security claim against the Lodge. After three years of litigation, the negligent security claim went to trial, and the jury reached a verdict of more than $3 million against the Lodge.
Thereafter, Kinsale filed a declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida seeking a declaration that the Lodge’s $50,000 sublimit for assault and battery applied. The Lodge counterclaimed for bad faith based on Kinsale’s failure to initiate settlement proceedings and make an offer within policy limits before the suit was filed.
Kinsale eventually moved for summary judgment on the Lodge’s bad faith claim and the district court granted its motion, concluding that no “reasonable” jury could find this a “clear liability” case.
The Eleventh Circuit Decision
The Lodge appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit, in Kinsale Ins. Co. v. Pride of St. Lucie Lodge 1189, Inc., No. 22-12675, 2025 WL 1142094 (11th Cir. Apr. 18, 2025), reversed the district court and held that Kinsale’s bad faith was an issue for a jury to determine.
The Eleventh Circuit’s analysis began by reiterating that Florida law imposes on insurers “a duty to use the same degree of care and diligence as a person of ordinary care and prudence should exercise in the management of his [or her] own business.” Id. In the context of investigating and evaluating a claim, the court explained that insurers have a duty to use diligence and care.
The court described circumstances where “liability is clear, and injuries so serious that a judgment in excess of the policy limits is likely,” and stated that an insurer in these circumstances “has an affirmative duty to initiate settlement negotiations.” Id. (citing Powell v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 584 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (per curiam)). The court explained that the heightened duty is a result of the financial exposure to insureds constituting a “ticking financial time bomb” in these circumstances as any delay in making an offer could be viewed as bad faith.
Applying this legal framework to the facts, the court determined that a jury could reasonably conclude that the Lodge’s liability was clear even before the negligent security claim was filed. Key facts included the Lodge’s volunteer security allowing two hostile groups into an unmonitored and dark parking lot, a second fight erupting almost immediately, and the fatal shooting occurring within ten to fifteen minutes of their removal from the Lodge. The court also noted that part of the assessment involves comparing the anticipated damages to any applicable sublimit.
Discussion
The Pride of St. Lucie Lodge decision reinforces the crucial duty imposed under Florida law on insurers to diligently and carefully investigate and evaluate claims. Insurers must act with the same degree of care that they would use in managing their own business or face consequences such as bad faith, particularly in situations like here, where the Lodge was facing clear liability and damages in excess of the policy’s sublimit.
6 Signs You Should Contact a Personal Injury Lawyer Immediately
An unexpected injury can leave you with a lot of questions, especially if it occurred due to someone else’s negligence. Whether it was a car accident, a fall, or something else, knowing when to contact a personal injury lawyer can be unclear.
In Michigan, your rights are protected, but timing matters. Below are six signs it might be time to speak with a lawyer and why reaching out sooner can make all the difference.
1. You’re Facing Expensive Medical Bills
Even with insurance, medical care can be costly. If your injuries require emergency care, follow-ups, physical therapy, or long-term treatment, those expenses can pile up fast. A lawyer can help you seek compensation for current and future medical costs.
2. You Missed Work Because of the Injury
Lost wages can have a serious impact on your financial stability. Whether you were out for a few days or you’re unable to return to your job at all, you may be entitled to recover those losses. A personal injury attorney can help you calculate and claim that income.
3. The Insurance Company Is Delaying or Denying Your Claim
If your claim is being ignored, undervalued, or denied outright by an insurance company, it’s a strong sign you need legal backup. A lawyer knows how to deal with adjusters and can help ensure you’re treated fairly.
4. You’re Unsure Who Was at Fault
If liability is unclear or if multiple parties are involved, things can quickly become complicated. A personal injury lawyer can investigate what happened, gather evidence, and identify who’s legally responsible.
5. You’re Being Blamed for the Accident
If the other party or their insurance company is accusing you of causing the incident, you should have someone in your corner. Comparative fault laws vary by state, and being wrongly blamed can significantly reduce or eliminate your compensation.
6. Your Injuries Are Serious or Life-Altering
When an injury leads to long-term disability, chronic pain, or permanent damage, the stakes are much higher. These cases often involve complex legal and medical issues, and having an experienced attorney on your side can make a big difference in the outcome.
Final Thoughts
Navigating the aftermath of an injury can be overwhelming. In Michigan, it’s important to act promptly, as the statute of limitations for most personal injury claims is three years from the date of the injury. Delaying action could jeopardize your ability to seek compensation.
IRS Roundup May 2 – May 13, 2025
Check out our summary of significant Internal Revenue Service (IRS) guidance and relevant tax matters for May 2, 2025 – May 13, 2025.
IRS GUIDANCE
May 2, 2025: The IRS issued Revenue Procedure 2025-20, providing guidance on the domestic asset/liability percentages and domestic investment yields used by foreign life insurance companies and foreign property and liability insurance companies to compute their minimum effectively connected net investment income under Section 842(b) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2023.
May 5, 2025: The IRS released Internal Revenue Bulletin 2025-19, which includes Revenue Ruling 2025-10 and Revenue Procedure 2025-18.
Revenue Ruling 2025-10 provides various prescribed rates for federal income tax purposes for May 2025, including:
The short-, mid-, and long-term applicable federal rates for purposes of Code Section 1274(d).
The short-, mid-, and long-term adjusted applicable federal rates for purposes of Code Section 1288(b).
The adjusted federal long-term rate and the long-term tax-exempt rate from Code Section 382(f).
The appropriate percentages for determining the low-income housing credit from Code Section 42(b)(1) (but only for buildings placed in service during May 2025).
The federal rate for determining the present value of an annuity, an interest for life or for a term of years, or a remainder or a reversionary interest for purposes of Code Section 752.
Revenue Procedure 2025-18 provides issuers of qualified mortgage bonds (defined in Code Section 143(a)) and mortgage credit certificates (defined in Code Section 25(c)) with guidance related to nationwide purchase prices for residences, as well as the average area purchase price for residences located in statistical areas in each US state, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, and Guam.
May 6, 2025: The IRS issued Revenue Procedure 2025-21, modifying Section 12 of Revenue Procedure 2024-32.
Executive Order 14219, issued through the Department of Government Efficiency’s deregulatory initiative, directed agencies to initiate a review process for identification and removal of certain regulations and guidance. Pursuant to Executive Order 14219, the US Department of the Treasury and the IRS identified Section 12 of Revenue Procedure 2024-32 as a regulation needing modification.
Revenue Procedure 2024-32 specifies the procedure by which the sponsor of a defined benefit plan, which is subject to the funding requirements of Code Section 430, may request approval from the IRS for the use of plan-specific substitute mortality tables. Section 12.02 of Revenue Procedure 2024-32 specifies that if a plan sponsor wishes to use plan-specific mortality tables, it must develop and request approval for the use of new plan-specific mortality tables for plan years beginning on or after January 1, 2026. Revenue Procedure 2025-21 provides immediate relief for some of those plan sponsors by narrowing the category of plan sponsors that must request approval of new plan-specific substitute mortality tables.
May 12, 2025: The IRS issued Revenue Ruling 2025-11, determining the interest rates on overpayments and underpayments of tax under Code Section 6621. For corporations, an overpayment rate of 6% and an underpayment rate of 7% is established for the calendar quarter beginning July 1, 2025. Where a portion of a corporate overpayment exceeds $10,000 during the calendar quarter beginning July 1, 2025, the overpayment rate is 4.5%. For large corporate underpayments, the underpayment rate for the calendar quarter beginning July 1, 2025, is 9%.
May 12, 2025: The IRS released Internal Revenue Bulletin 2025-20, which includes Notice 2025-25 and Notice 2025-26.
Notice 2025-25 publishes the inflation adjustment factor for credits under Code Section 45Q on carbon oxide sequestration, which is used to determine the amount of the credit allowable under Section 45Q for taxpayers that make an election under Code Section 45Q(b)(3) to have the dollar amounts applicable under Code Section 45Q(a)(1) or (2) apply.
Notice 2025-26 publishes the reference price under Code Section 45K(d)(2)(C) for calendar year 2024. The reference price applies in determining the amount of the enhanced oil recovery credit under Code Section 43, the marginal well production credit for qualified crude oil production under Code Section 45I, and the applicable percentage under Code Section 613A used in determining the percentage of depletion in the case of oil and natural gas produced from marginal properties.
The IRS also released its weekly list of written determinations (e.g., Private Letter Rulings, Technical Advice Memorandums, and Chief Counsel Advice).
THE “BIG, BEAUTIFUL BILL”
A recent tax bill, which some practitioners are calling the “Big, Beautiful Bill,” is currently being deliberated in Congress. As of the publication date of this edition of the IRS Roundup, a few of the notable provisions in the Big, Beautiful Bill include:
A proposed disallowance of “substitute payments” related to state and local taxes.
The proposal of a 23% pass-through business deduction, up from the current deduction of 20%.
The renewal of a research and development expensing provision through 2029, including a 100% bonus depreciation.
A phaseout of certain clean electricity credits, marking a notable change to the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022.
The reinstatement of a partial charitable contribution deduction for nonitemizers.
The proposed disallowance of certain amortization deductions for sports franchises.
An extension of various provisions expected to sunset in 2026.
Maryland Further Delays Implementation of FAMLI Program
On April 8, Maryland enacted House Bill 102, further postponing the implementation of the state’s Family and Medical Leave Insurance (FAMLI) program. This latest delay, recommended by the Maryland Department of Labor, is intended to provide employers and employees with additional time to prepare for the program’s requirements.
House Bill 102 marks the third consecutive year that the launch of Maryland’s FAMLI program has been delayed. In addition to the new timeline, the legislation revises several key aspects of the program, including definitions, contribution rates, reporting requirements, and introduces new provisions for self-employed individuals.
Overview of Maryland’s FAMLI Program
The FAMLI program is designed to provide eligible employees with paid leave benefits for a variety of family and medical reasons, including:
To welcome a child into their home, including through adoption and foster care.
To care for themselves if they have a serious health condition.
To care for a family member’s serious health condition.
To make arrangements for a family member’s military deployment.
Eligible employees may receive up to 12 weeks of paid leave per year, with job protection and weekly benefits of up to $1,000 for qualifying reasons. If the employee experiences both their own serious health condition and welcomes a child in the same year, they could be eligible for up to 12 weeks per event for a total of up to 24 weeks. The program requires employers to both pay and withhold contributions from employee wages, with these requirements now set to begin on January 1, 2027. Employees may begin submitting benefit claims between January 1, 2027, and January 3, 2028, although these dates may be adjusted by the Secretary of Labor.
Key Program Details
Contribution Rates: The total contribution rate is capped at 1.2% of an employee’s wages, split evenly between employers and employees (each responsible for 50%). Employers may choose to cover all or part of the employee’s share.
Self-Employed Individuals: By July 1, 2028, the Department of Labor must establish regulations for an optional enrollment program for self-employed individuals, including details on contributions and benefits.
Annual Rate Announcement: The Department of Labor will announce the total contribution rate for each upcoming year by November 1.
Benefit Amounts: Weekly benefits are based on the employee’s average weekly wage and the state average. The minimum weekly benefit is $50, and the maximum is $1,000 through December 31, 2028. Beginning in 2029, the maximum benefit will be adjusted annually based on the Consumer Price Index.
Employer Coverage and Exemptions
All employers with at least one employee in Maryland are covered by the FAMLI program. However, employers that offer their own family and medical leave insurance benefits that are at least equivalent to those provided under the state program may apply for an exemption. To qualify, employer plans must be insured by a carrier holding a certificate of authority from the Maryland Insurance Commissioner.
Next Steps for Employers
Maryland employers should update their compliance timelines to reflect the new contribution and benefit claim dates. It is important to monitor forthcoming regulations and guidance from the Department of Labor, particularly regarding program implementation and requirements for self-employed individuals. Employers should also review their current leave policies to determine whether they may qualify for an exemption from the state program.
Georgia’s Tort Reform Legislation: Key Procedural Changes
Georgia’s tort reform legislation comes at an opportune time, as jury verdicts in recent years have been the stuff of records. Georgia was rated the #1 Judicial Hellhole in 2022 and 2023, and #4 in 2024. The new statutes, signed into law on April 21, 2025, aim to promote fairness in civil litigation procedure in the Georgia state courts, reality in consideration of damages, and commonsense fairness in trials and in liability standards for property owners, managers, and security personnel when crimes occur at their property. Key procedural changes are detailed below.
Motions to Dismiss
If a defendant files a motion to dismiss, then it shall no longer be required to file an answer until 15 days after the court either denies the motion or announces it will postpone deciding the motion until trial. Discovery will be stayed until the court rules on the motion, and the court is required to rule on the motion within 90 days after the conclusion of briefing on the motion. (Amendment to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12).
Voluntary Dismissals
Plaintiffs are no longer permitted to voluntarily dismiss the complaint at any time before the first witness is sworn at trial. Now, unless all parties stipulate to the voluntary dismissal, a plaintiff must first obtain a court order to dismiss the complaint more than 60 days after the opposing party filed an answer. (Amendment to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41).
Damages Model
The special damages model in Georgia personal injury cases is amended to remove the collateral source rule. Thus,
Truth in special damages. Special damages shall be limited to the reasonable value of medically necessary care. Juries can now consider amounts paid by health insurance or workers’ compensation. Letters of protection are relevant and discoverable. (New O.C.G.A. § 51-12-1.1).
The general damages (e.g., pain and suffering) available to a plaintiff are subject to these new regulations:
General damages guidelines:
Plaintiffs may not argue or suggest a specific amount of general damages until closing argument.
If the plaintiff elects to open and close the closing arguments, then he/she must make his/her specific amount known during the opening phase of his/her closing argument.
The argument for general damages must be rationally related to the evidence and shall not refer to values having no rational connection to the facts of the case. (Amendment to O.C.G.A. § 9-10-184).
Other Provisions
The playing field at trial is leveled to provide the following:
Seatbelt evidence is admissible.In cases involving motor vehicle accidents, evidence that the plaintiff was not wearing his/her seatbelt is admissible and relevant to the issues of negligence, comparative negligence, proximate causation, assumption of the risk, and apportionment of fault. (Amendment to O.C.G.A. § 40-8-76.1).
Trial bifurcation/trifurcation available upon request.In any personal injury or wrongful death case, any party may elect to have trial bifurcated or trifurcated into separate phases: fault – damages – punitive damages/attorney’s fees.o Exceptions may be made to the right to bifurcation/trifurcation upon motion for cases involving alleged sexual offenses and those involving less than $150,000 in dispute. (New O.C.G.A. § 51-12-15).
Finally,
A new series of statutes provides governance and guidance for negligent security cases.
The new laws provide stricter standards for imposing liability in negligent security cases and clarify the expectations on premises owners in the state.
Now, in order for a premises owner/occupier to be held liable by an injured invitee for negligent security, the plaintiff must prove:
(a) The third person’s wrongful conduct was reasonably foreseeable;
a. “Reasonably foreseeable” may be established by showing that the owner/occupier:
i. Had particularized warning of imminent wrongful conduct by a third person; or
ii. Reasonably should have known that a third person was reasonably likely to engage in such wrongful conduct on the premises based on one of the following:
Substantially similar prior incidents on the premises of which the owner/occupier had actual knowledge;
Substantially similar prior incidents on adjoining premises or otherwise occurring within 500 yards of the premises of which the owner/occupier had actual knowledge; or
Substantially similar prior incidents by the same third person that the owner/occupier had actual knowledge about and the owner/occupier knew or should have known that the third person would be on the premises.
(b) The injury sustained was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the third person’s wrongful conduct;
(c) The third person’s wrongful conduct was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the third person exploiting a specific physical condition of the premises known to the owner/occupier, which created a reasonably foreseeable risk of wrongful conduct on the premises that was substantially greater than the general risk of wrongful conduct in the vicinity of the premises;
(d) The owner/occupier failed to exercise ordinary care to remedy or mitigate the specific and known physical conduction and to otherwise keep the premises safe from the third person’s wrongful conduct; and
(e) The owner/occupier’s failure to exercise ordinary care was a proximate cause of the injury sustained.
For a premises owner/occupier to be held liable to an injured licensee (e.g., a tenant’s social guest) for negligent security, the plaintiff must prove:
(a) The third person’s wrongful conduct was reasonably foreseeable because the owner/occupier had particularized warning of imminent wrongful conduct by a third person;
(b) The injury sustained was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the third person’s wrongful conduct;
(c) The third person’s wrongful conduct was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the third person exploiting a specific physical condition of the premises known to the owner/occupier, which created a reasonably foreseeable risk of wrongful conduct on the premises that was substantially greater than the general risk of wrongful conduct in the vicinity of the premises;
(d) The owner/occupier willfully and wantonly failed to exercise any care to remedy or mitigate the specific and known physical condition and to otherwise keep the premises safe from the third person’s wrongful conduct; and
(e) The owner/occupier’s failure to exercise any care was a proximate cause of the injury sustained.
Moving forward, in no case will a premises owner/occupier be held liable for negligent security where:
The injured party was a trespasser
The injury was sustained on premises not owned/occupied by the owner/occupier
The wrongful conduct complained of did not occur on the premises and in a place from which the owner/occupier had the authority to exclude the third person
The third-party wrongdoer was either a tenant under eviction or the guest of a tenant under eviction
The injured person came to the premises for the purpose of, or was engaged in committing a felony or theft
The injury occurred at a single-family residence or
The owner/occupier made any reasonable effort to provide information to law enforcement about a particularized warning of imminent wrongful conduct by a third person.
In order to assess whether the owner/occupier breached a duty to exercise ordinary care to keep persons on or around their premises safe from a third party’s wrongful conduct, courts and juries shall consider any relevant circumstances, including but not limited to:
The security measures employed at the premises at the time the injury occurred
The need for any additional or other security measures
The practicality of additional or other security measures
Whether additional or other security measures would have prevented the injuries
The respective responsibilities of owners/occupiers with respect to the premises and government with respect to law enforcement and public safety.
Moreover, juries are now required to apportion fault among all parties, including the criminal wrongdoer. If a jury assigns more fault to the property owner than to the criminal wrongdoer, then the court is required to order a new trial. There shall be a rebuttable presumption that an apportionment of fault is unreasonable if the percentage of fault assigned to the criminal wrongdoer(s) is less than the total percentage of fault assigned to all property owners, occupiers, managers, and security contractors. (New O.C.G.A. §§ 51-3-50 – 51-3-57).
Practical Implications of the Negligent Security Legislation
Given the new guidelines, it is critical that property owners and managers ensure that regular inspections are taking place. If there are fences, the fences should be checked and documented monthly. The same goes for gates, warning/no trespassing signs, locks, cameras, lighting, or other physical conditions or installments on the property.
Property owners and managers should consider current security measures and whether additional or different measures might be appropriate. If multiple reports of similar crimes are received, then property owners and/or managers should consider asking a security consultant to perform a premises security assessment and to make any recommendations for additional or different security measures at the premises.
The process for tenants to communicate with the property manager about any security concerns or reports should be seamless and explained to all current and new tenants. The tenants should be encouraged to provide as much detail as possible, including about the specific location of the property where the crime or other security issue occurred. All such reports should be maintained for at least three years, and a line of communication should be started with local police about tenant security complaints.
Staff should be trained to recognize when a tenant reports concerns about an immediate threat to the tenant by another person and to notify the police immediately by calling 9-1-1. The staff should record such reports to the police and maintain the records for no less than three years.
When Do These Changes Apply?
Thankfully, the majority of changes apply immediately and take effect even in existing cases. There are two exceptions for cases accruing on or after April 21 2025:
New code section O.C.G.A. § 51-12-1.1, limiting recoverable special damages to the reasonable value of medically necessary care, allowing juries to consider the actual costs paid, and making letters of protection relevant and discoverable
The negligent security legislation.
“Accruing” means that the underlying incident giving rise to the claim occurred on or after the effective date.
Seventh Circuit Certifies Question Regarding the Impact of Regulatory Permits on CGL Pollution Exclusions to the Illinois Supreme Court
In the recent case Sterigenics U.S., LLC v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, No. 24-1223 (7th Cir. 2025), the Seventh Circuit court has asked the Illinois Supreme Court to clarify a key issue of state law regarding pollution exclusions in commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policies. The question presented before the court is whether industrial emissions of toxic chemicals authorized by a regulatory permit constitute traditional environmental pollution excluded from coverage or whether the permit alters the analysis. This answer could have significant implications for insurers and insureds facing liability for bodily injuries caused by environmental contamination.
Background
This case involves Sterigenics U.S. and Griffith Foods International, two companies that operated a medical supply sterilization plant in Willowbrook, Illinois, from 1984 to 2019. The plant used ethylene oxide (EtO), an allegedly carcinogenic gas, to sterilize medical equipment and devices. The companies emitted EtO into the air pursuant to a permit issued by the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) in 1984 – a permit that failed to limit the amount of emissions. In 2018, a federal report suggested that Willowbrook residents were experiencing “staggering and disproportionate” rates of cancer, allegedly due to exposure to EtO. Over 800 people filed lawsuits against Sterigenics and Griffith, claiming that they suffered various illnesses, including cancer, as a result of inhaling EtO emitted by the plant.
Sterigenics and Griffith sought insurance coverage for the lawsuits under their CGL policies issued by National Union Fire Insurance Company. The policies covered bodily injuries caused by an occurrence during the policy period but excluded injuries arising from the discharge of pollutants into the atmosphere, unless the discharge was sudden and accidental.
National Union denied coverage and refused to defend the companies, arguing that the policies’ pollution exclusions applied. In 2021, Sterigenics and Griffith sued National Union in federal court in Chicago, seeking a declaration that the insurer had a duty to defend them against the underlying claims.
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ruled in favor of Sterigenics and Griffith, finding that the pollution exclusion did not apply because the companies emitted EtO pursuant to a permit issued by the IEPA. The court relied on a 2011 Illinois Appellate Court decision, Erie Insurance Exchange v. Imperial Marble Corp., which held that ambiguity existed within that policy’s language as to whether emissions authorized by a regulatory permit constituted traditional environmental pollution and were excluded by a standard pollution exclusion in a CGL policy.
The Decision
National Union appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which decided to certify the question to the Illinois Supreme Court, the definitive authority on Illinois law. The Seventh Circuit noted that the Illinois Supreme Court, in its 1997 decision in American States Insurance Co. v. Koloms, 687 N.E.2d 72 (Ill. 1997), interpreted the pollution exclusion in CGL policies to apply only to injuries caused by traditional environmental pollution, and not routine emissions such as carbon monoxide from a furnace. However, the Court in Koloms did not address the relevance of a permit or regulation authorizing emissions. The Seventh Circuit also observed that its decision in Scottsdale Indemnity Co. v. Village of Crestwood, 673 F.3d 715, 716 (7th Cir. 2012), which held that permitted emissions were not exempt from exclusion, conflicted with the Imperial Marble decision, and that the question was important and likely to recur in future cases.
Implications of the Case
The Illinois Supreme Court’s answer to the certified question could have far-reaching consequences for insurance coverage of environmental claims in Illinois and beyond. If the court agrees with the district court and the Imperial Marble decision and finds that a permit or regulation authorizing emissions makes the pollution exclusion inapplicable, then insurers could face increased exposure for bodily injuries caused by industrial emissions that comply with permits but may nonetheless violate environmental standards, which could create liability for the emitter. This also could incentivize insureds to obtain permits or comply with regulations to avoid the pollution exclusion, regardless of the actual environmental impact of their emissions.
On the other hand, if the court agrees with National Union and the Scottsdale decisions and finds that a permit or regulation authorizing emissions does not affect the pollution exclusion, then insurers could avoid coverage for bodily injuries caused by a wide range of industrial emissions allegedly harming third parties, even those permitted by regulatory authorities. For example, this decision will likely significantly impact coverage for PFAS liability.
The pollution exclusion is a common and controversial provision in CGL policies, and courts across the country have reached different and sometimes conflicting results on its meaning and scope. The Illinois Supreme Court’s answer could provide clarity and guidance for future cases involving environmental contamination and insurance coverage nationwide.