Indiana’s Amended Physician Non-Compete Statute Bars Physician-Hospital Agreements Starting July 1
Takeaways
Indiana’s 2025 amendment to its Physician Non-Compete Statute invalidates non-compete agreements between physicians of all types and hospitals (or specific hospital-related entities) entered into after 06.30.25.
Although the 2025 amendment defines key terms such as “noncompete agreement,” it does not affect the statute’s original or 2023 restrictions or requirements or employers’ existing agreements.
Employers should immediately assess their practices and procedures for protecting against unfair competition by physicians.
Related links
Senate Enrolled Act No. 475
Indiana’s New Restrictions on Physician Non-Compete Agreements
Indiana Bans Physician Non-Competes for Primary Care Physicians, Adds Restrictions for Others
Article
Following a nationwide trend for physician mobility, Indiana’s legislature has passed another amendment to the state’s 2020 Physician Non-Compete Statute (Ind. Code § 25-22.5-5.5), which limits the enforceability of non-compete restrictions on physicians, to include all physicians employed by hospitals or certain hospital-related entities. Governor Mike Braun signed Senate Enrolled Act No. 475 into law on May 6, 2025, and it takes effect beginning July 1, 2025.
2020 Physician Non-Compete Statute
Prior to 2020, physician non-compete agreements in Indiana were subject to the same legal analysis as agreements with other occupations. Enforceable non-compete restrictions must be reasonable in scope. Overly broad restrictive covenants in Indiana, including non-compete restrictions, are unenforceable as a matter of public policy as unfair restraints on trade.
The Physician Non-Compete Statute sets forth a laundry list of specific provisions required for any enforceable physician non-compete agreement signed on or after July 1, 2020. The required provisions include specific language on contact with patients about the physician, access to patient medical records, and a purchase option for the physician in exchange for a release from the non-compete restriction.
2023 Amendment
The 2023 amendment implemented an outright ban for physician non-compete agreements entered into on or after July 1, 2023, with primary care physicians. It makes non-compete restrictions with all other types of physicians void and unenforceable if the employer terminates the physician’s employment without cause, if the physician terminates employment for cause, or if the physician’s employment contract expires and both parties have fulfilled their respective contractual obligations.
2025 Amendment
Under the 2025 amendment, any non-compete agreements originally entered into on or after July 1, 2025, between physicians and a hospital, the parent company of a hospital, an affiliated manager of a hospital, or a hospital system are void and unenforceable outright. This is without regard to the physician’s practice. Critically, this new limitation does not supplant the 2020 and 2023 schemes for assessing the enforceability of physician non-compete restrictions. Instead, it adds an additional framework.
The 2025 amendment also defines several key terms. However, these definitions explicitly apply only to the sections of the statute added by the 2025 amendment. These definitions include “hospital,” “hospital system,” and “originally entered into.”
Importantly, the 2025 amendment defines the term “noncompete agreement.” The intended meaning of that term has been a lingering question since 2020 (and remains a question with respect to agreements falling under the 2020 and 2023 frameworks). A “noncompete agreement” under the 2025 amendment is:
a contract, or any part of a contract, to which a physician is a party that has the purpose or effect of restricting or penalizing a physician’s ability to engage in the practice of medicine in any geographic area, for any period of time, after the physician’s employment relationship with a hospital, a parent company of a hospital, an affiliated manager of a hospital, or a hospital system has ended.
The definition continues with specific examples, stating that the term includes provisions that do the following:
Prohibits the physician from engaging in the practice of medicine with a new employer.
Imposes financial penalties or repayment obligations, or requires reimbursement of bonuses, training expenses, or similar payments if: (1) the physician has been employed by a hospital, parent company of a hospital, affiliated manager of a hospital, or a hospital system for at least three years; and (2) these penalties, obligations, or reimbursements are based primarily on the physician’s decision to continue engaging in the practice of medicine with a new employer.
Requires the physician to obtain the employer’s consent or submit to equitable relief in order to practice medicine with a new employer, regardless of geographic area or specialty.
A “noncompete agreement” does not include the following:
Nondisclosure agreements protecting confidential business information or trade secrets.
Non-solicitation agreements prohibiting the solicitation of current employees for a period not exceeding one year after the end of the physician’s employment, provided that the non-solicitation agreement does not restrict patient interactions, patient referrals, clinical collaboration, or the physician’s professional relationships.
Agreements made in connection with the bona fide sale of a business entity if the physician owns more than 50 percent of the business entity at the time of sale.
Moving Forward
The 2025 amendment to the Physician Non-Compete Statute creates a fourth separate framework for determining whether a physician non-compete agreement is enforceable in Indiana. Portions of the four frameworks overlap, and Indiana courts could borrow or find persuasive the 2025 amendment’s defined terms when assessing the original portions of the statute or the 2023 amendment.
Employers with physician non-compete agreements must refer to the agreement’s original execution date, the physician’s practice, and whether the employer is a hospital or hospital-related entity to determine which framework controls.
Hospitals and hospital-related entities employing physicians in Indiana should immediately assess how the new amendment affects their protections against unfair competition and develop a plan for employment contracts and employee retention.
Canada Implements Temporary Employment Insurance Measures Responsive to Economic Impacts of Trade War
Quick Hits
The Canadian government has amended the Employment Insurance Act to temporarily suspend certain repayment rules for severance payments due to job separations occurring between March 30, 2025, and October 11, 2025.
Employees who receive both severance pay and employment insurance benefits during the specified period will not have to repay their employment insurance benefits.
Repayment obligations for employment insurance can still apply to terminations before March 30, 2025, even if severance payments are made after that date.
Of particular interest to employers and employees, the temporary measures suspend certain rules relating to monies paid because of a temporary or permanent separation from employment. These temporary rules will apply to any monies paid as a result of a separation of employment that occurs between March 30, 2025, and October 11, 2025.
The temporary measures outline that severance payments made because of a separation between these dates will no longer trigger repayment obligations where an individual receives both severance pay and employment insurance benefits. Previously, an employee who had received employment insurance payments and later received severance payments would have a repayment obligation. A similar suspension of repayment obligations was implemented in response to the deleterious effects of COVID-19.
Employment insurance repayment obligations can still apply to any termination of employment that occurred before March 30, 2025, even if payments are made after that date.
These changes will certainly be relevant in assessing severance packages and termination settlements, but for the time period outlined above, it appears that employees will be able to keep both employment insurance benefits and termination pay.
The Founders Sound the Alarm on the President’s Unchecked Power to Terminate Appointees at Will
“[I]f this unlimited power of removal does exist, it may be made, in the hands of a bold and designing man, of high ambition, and feeble principles, an instrument of the worst oppression, and most vindictive vengeance.”
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution (1833)
President Trump has clearly communicated his administration’s belief in presidential supremacy, emphasizing his authority to fire any federal appointee or employee, even those for whom Congress has required “good cause” for discharge. Regarding federal employee whistleblowers, the assertion of these powers wreaked havoc on the laws designed to protect employees who lawfully report waste, fraud, and abuse. President Trump fired both the Special Counsel and a Member of the Merit Systems Protection Board, both of whose jobs were protected under the federal laws that created the positions. More recently, President Trump has threatened to fire the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, another appointee whose position is protected under law.
By testing the unitary executive theory in the courts, the debate over the limits of the President’s authority to remove executive officers will soon be decided. The final decisions regarding the President’s removal authority will have a lasting impact on all federal employee whistleblowers, as the legal framework designed to protect these whistleblowers was all premised on the independence of the officials making final determinations in retaliation cases. If these officials are not independent (i.e., are not free from the threat of discharge by a sitting President), one of the most important safeguards included in the whistleblower laws covering federal employees will be compromised.
As the debate over Presidential powers moves through the halls of Congress, the Courts, and ultimately by the voters of the United States, the concerns raised by the Founders of the United States need to be carefully considered. The policy issues they identified years ago continue to resonate today.
The first Founder to comment on the President’s authority to remove officials was Alexander Hamilton. While the States were debating whether to approve the Constitution, Alexander Hamilton directly addressed this issue in Federalist No. 77. Hamilton explained that “the consent of [the Senate] would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint.” Hamilton recognized that the U.S. Constitution required a check and balance on the President’s authority to remove all non-judicial appointees who were confirmed by the Senate.
In other words, the issue was not whether or not the President had the constitutional power to fire appointees, but rather whether the Constitution required Senate approval for any such termination. Hamilton understood that, not only was the President’s power to terminate limited, but he went further and stated that any such termination had to be approved by the body that had originally approved the appointment (i.e., the Senate).
In 1803, a pivotal constitutional law issue arose in the landmark case Marbury v. Madison. The decision was authored by the most respected Supreme Court Justice in history, Chief Justice John Marshall. Justice Marshall explained that the President’s power of removal was controlled by Congress. Congress established the terms of the law establishing the office in question. This reasoning was not just accepted; it was a cornerstone of the unanimous decision, grounded in Congress’s authority to create inferior offices and define the rules governing them. The Constitution explicitly designates these powers not to the President, but to Congress.
In discussing the President’s removal authority, Chief Justice Marshall explained: “Where an officer is removable at the will of the executive, the circumstance which completes his appointment is of no concern…but when the officer is not removable at the will of the executive, the appointment is not revocable, and cannot be annulled.” Thus, if Congress creates a position for which the occupant cannot be fired “at will,” and termination from that position must follow the restrictions placed on it by Congress.
Justice Marshall further explained that a President is barred from simply removing officers at his pleasure if Congress did not grant the President such powers: “[Mr. Marbury] was appointed; and [since] the law creating the office gave the officer a right to hold for five years, [he was] independent of the executive, [and] the appointment was not revocable.”
The most authoritative discussion of the policies underlying the power of a President to remove inferior officers was carefully explained by Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story’s widely respected 1833 Commentaries on the Constitution. In his text, he provides a thorough explication of the history and background of the removal authority and its significance within U.S. Constitutional law. Justice Story explained the polices that strongly weighed against expanding Presidential powers to include a unilateral right to fire federal appointees or employees, if Congress set limits on such removals.
In the Commentaries, Justice Story warned of the catastrophic impact of unrestrained presidential removal powers:
“[I]f this unlimited power of removal does exist, it may be made, in the hands of a bold and designing man, of high ambition, and feeble principles, an instrument of the worst oppression, and most vindictive vengeance.
***
“Even in monarchies, while the councils of state are subject to perpetual fluctuations and changes, the ordinary officers of the government are permitted to remain in the silent possession of their offices, undisturbed by the policy or the passions of the favorites of the court. But in a republic, where freedom of opinion and action are guaranteed by the very first principles of the government, if a successful party may first elevate their candidate to office, and then make him the instrument of their resentments, or their mercenary bargains; if men may be made spies upon the actions of their neighbors, to displace them from office; or if fawning sycophants upon the popular leader of the day may gain his patronage, to the exclusion of worthier and abler men, it is most manifest, that elections will be corrupted at their very source; and those, who seek office will have every motive to delude and deceive the people.
***
[S]uch a prerogative in the executive was in its own nature monarchical and arbitrary; and eminently dangerous to the best interests, as well as the liberties, of the country. It would convert all the officers of the country into the mere tools and creatures of the president. A dependence so servile on one individual would deter men of high and honorable minds from engaging in the public service. And if, contrary to expectation, such men should be brought into office, they would be reduced to the necessity of sacrificing every principle of independence to the will of the chief magistrate, or of exposing themselves to the disgrace of being removed from office, and that, too, at a time when it might no longer be in their power to engage in other pursuits.’
Six years later, in ex parte Hennen (1839), the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously upheld the principle that Congress had the authority to limit the removal authority of the President “by law,” for all appointments that were not “fixed by the Constitution.” Crucially, Hennen held that “the execution of the power [of removal] depends upon the authority of law, and not upon the agent who is to administer it.”
Hennen has never been overturned by the Supreme Court.
The 1903 case Shurtleff v. United States followed Hennen. The Court held that Congress had the authority to limit the removal authority of the President whenever it used “clear and explicit language” to impose such a limitation. Shurtleff has not been overruled by the Supreme Court.
That brings us to the landmark case primarily relied upon by those supporting the imperial powers of the President: Myers v. United States. This case has been mischaracterized as promoting a unitary executive. Far from it. The Court’s 6-3 holding –with distinguished justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. and Louis Brandeis among the dissenters– did not diminish or overturn the precedents established by Hennen or Shurtleff.
The issue at hand was not whether Congress could limit the removal authority of the President. Rather, the case decided a radically different issue: Whether the President needed to obtain the approval of the Senate any time he sought to terminate any official who was confirmed by the Senate. The case concerned an older established doctrine that, because a Senate vote was necessary to confirm certain appointments, a Senate vote should also be needed to remove that official.
The limited scope of the case was clarified by James M. Beck, the Solicitor General of the United States, who argued the case on behalf of the President. His statement to the court was clear: “[I]t is not necessary to decide” the issue of a President’s general removal authority. Further in his argument, after being questioned about the scope of the President’s removal authority, Beck explained that “it is not necessary for me to press the argument [against removal restrictions] that far (i.e., beyond the issue of Senate approval of removal decisions).” In essence, the case of Myers centered on an old argument about Senate interference with executive duties. This issue is fundamentally distinct from the debate today, which focuses on legislative regulations on the President’s ability to fire executive officers.
Justice Brandeis, in his dissent, further elaborated the very narrow nature of the issue decided in Meyers: “We need not determine whether the President, acting alone, may remove high political officers.” Brandeis’ dissent, along with those of Justices Holmes and James Clark McReynolds need to be understood in the context of the Founders’ views on executive power as expressed by Alexander Hamilton (Federalist No. 77), Chief Justice Marshall (Marbury v. Madison), and Justice Story (Commentaries on the Constitution). Justice Brandeis’ explanation of past precedent needs to be given its just weight in the debates that are unfolding today: “In no case has this Court determined that the President’s power of removal is beyond control, limitation, or regulation by Congress.”
Supporters of unrestrained presidential power to fire executive officers often reference the congressional debates on the establishment of the Department of Foreign Affairs in 1789 as their primary justification. However, this reliance again overlooks the historical context of the discussions regarding the president’s authority over foreign affairs.
The congressional vote regarding the removal of an executive officer did not address the constitutional question of whether Congress had the authority to impose restrictions on the president’s ability to terminate such officers. Instead, the issue being decided concerned an opposite proposition. The debate was over an amendment that would have stripped the President of the unilateral authority to remove the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The amendment sought to strip the President of the power to fire the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The specific clause the amendment sought to strike from the bill was the ability for the secretary “to be removed from the office of the president of the United States.”
The amendment was introduced by Virginia Congressman Alexander White, who had in the prior year participated in the Virginia convention that voted to approve the Constitution. Congressman White was very clear that the purpose of his amendment was not to decide whether or not Congress had the authority to set restrictions on a President’s removal authority. The issue was whether the Constitution prevented the President from having any such authority. Congressman White was simply raising the issue discussed in Federalist No. 77, i.e., whether the authority of the Senate to approve an appointment implied a requirement that the Senate concur in any removal. The issue was not whether the President had imperial powers, but instead was whether the President’s authority to terminate officers should be severely restricted.
Congressman White explained the meaning of his amendment as follows: “As I conceive, the powers of appointing and dismissing to be united in their natures, and a principle that never was called in question in any government, I am adverse to that part of the clause which subjects the secretary of foreign affairs to be removed at the will of the President”.
Although his amendment was not approved, Congressman White’s perspective—that the power of removal should be radically restricted—was supported by many members of the First Congress. But in defeating White’s amendment, the First Congress did not enact any law that would restrict Congress from placing limits on the removal powers of a president. That issue was simply not before the First Congress.
Regardless of the various arguments now being raised concerning the President’s removal authority, the warnings articulated by Justice Story have never been refuted. If the Supreme Court were to conclude that Congress lacked the authority to limit the President’s power to fire, at-will, any and all executive officers, the fear articulated by Justice Story would become the law of the land, and as he warned, would be “eminently dangerous to the best interests, as well as the liberties, of the country”.
Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, § 1533 (1st ed. 1833).
Compl. Dellinger v. Bessent, No. 1:25-cv-00385 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 2025) ECF 1, Attachment A.
Tom Jackman, Federal Judge Rules Trump’s Firing of Merit Board chair was illegal, Wash. Post (Mar. 4, 2025), https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2025/03/04/trump-firing-cathy-harris-mspb-illegal/.
Colby Smith & Tony Romm, Trump Lashes Out at Fed Chair for Not Cutting Rates, New York Times, (Apr. 17, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/17/business/economy/trump-jerome-powell-fed.html.
The Federalist, No. 77 (Alexander Hamilton).
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
See McAllister v. United States, 141 U.S. 174 at 189). (reaffirming the holding of Marbury v. Madison in regard to Presidential Powers 141 U.S. 1704).
U.S. Const, art. 1, § 8 (“To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”); art 2 § 2 (“. . .the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone . . .”)(emphasis added).
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 162 (1803).
Id. at 161
Story, supra n 1, § 1533.
Story, supra n. 1, at § 1533.
Story, supra n. 1, at § 1533.
Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. 230, 259 (1839).
Id at 260
Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 315 (1903).
Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 23 S. Ct. 535 (1903).
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
Id at 63.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 310.
Id. at 314.
Elliot’s Debates, Vol. 4 , p. 350 (June 16, 1789).
Id.
Spring 2025 Brings Changes to Minnesota Contractors’ State Affirmative Action Requirements
The Minnesota Department of Human Rights (MDHR) recently updated several documents on its website for Minnesota government contractors, including the workforce certificate application, affirmative action program template (now “Compliance Plan”), annual compliance report (ACR), ACR instructions, and nondiscrimination poster. These changes were presumably made to minimize conflict with President Donald Trump’s executive orders concerning affirmative action and diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) programs.
Quick Hits
MDHR has revised multiple compliance-related documents for Minnesota government contractors.
Key changes include new terminology, workforce certificate application form signature requirements, and more structured reporting periods for annual compliance reports.
An annual compliance report must be submitted to MDHR each year, even if the Minnesota contractor does not currently hold a state government contract.
Background
Companies contracting with Minnesota state departments and agencies, certain metropolitan agencies, and the University of Minnesota must obtain a workforce certificate of compliance from MDHR if they have a Minnesota government contract that exceeds $100,000 and they have at least forty full-time employees in Minnesota or in the state of their primary place of business. Contracts with Minnesota cities, counties, townships, and other political subdivisions must exceed $250,000. Workforce certificates are required whether the company’s primary place of business is inside or outside Minnesota.
To obtain a workforce certificate, a Minnesota contractor must complete the workforce certificate application form, submit a Minnesota-compliant compliance plan, including a workforce and utilization analysis (WUA) and availability and underutilization analysis (AUUA), and pay a $250 application fee. Once received, the workforce certificate is good for four years and is tied to the contractor, not to a particular contract. Therefore, Minnesota contractors are not required to obtain a new certificate for each state contract exceeding $100,000 or local government contract exceeding $250,000. Contractors receiving a workforce certificate must post MDHR’s nondiscrimination poster at all establishments covered by the workforce certificate.
Each year during the four-year certification period, contractors must submit an annual compliance report, which is due to MDHR on the certificate’s anniversary date. Failure to submit an acceptable ACR may result in revocation of the workforce certificate and the inability to enter into state government contracts until an acceptable ACR is submitted and certificate reinstatement is requested and granted by MDHR’s commissioner. State government contractors are also subject to compliance reviews by MDHR.
Changes to MDHR’s Workforce Certificate Application Form
MDHR’s workforce certificate application form was updated in March 2025 and no longer references the Office of Equity and Inclusion for Minnesota Businesses. It also deleted language that Minnesota contractors must work to ensure that Minnesota’s workforce reflects the state’s demographics and replaced it with a statement that companies must maintain a workforce free of discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA).
The application checklist notes that the previously entitled “Affirmative Action Plan” is now known as the “Compliance Plan.” Further, it is no longer necessary that the workforce certificate application form be signed by the contractor’s president, chief executive officer, or board chair.
The application now includes new and comprehensive “Good Faith Efforts Agreements,” including an agreement to take prompt corrective action concerning violations of state human rights laws. Finally, the data privacy notice clarifies what information submitted with the application is and is not made available to the public.
Changes to the Affirmative Action Plan Template
In April 2025, MDHR changed the name of its AAP template from “Affirmative Action Programs for People of Color, Women and Individuals with Disabilities” to “Compliance Plan.” Differences between the old and new templates include:
The compliance plan no longer includes the definitions of the terms used in the plan.
The following sections were eliminated: “Internal and External Dissemination of Affirmative Action Policy and Plan,” “Action-Oriented Programs,” and “Goals & Timetables.”
The compliance plan includes a new section entitled “Anti-Discrimination Policy.”
The “Assignment of Responsibility for Affirmative Action Program” was reworked and retitled, “Equal Employment Opportunity Official and Role.”
The compliance plan no longer includes references to affirmative action or affirmative action goals. These have been replaced with equal employment opportunity (EEO) objectives.
The compliance plan no longer includes references to the utilization of businesses owned by women, people of color, and individuals with disabilities. Nor are there any references to full employment of women, people of color, and individuals with disabilities.
Contractors may wish to consider the following tips for preparing the compliance plan:
adopting MDHR’s most recent template and limiting revisions to MDHR’s suggested language;
ensuring the EEO official included in the EEO policy statement matches the EEO official listed in the workforce certificate application and in the compliance plan narrative;
ensuring the EEO policy statement is signed by the president, CEO, or board chair for the legal entity seeking the workforce certificate; and
ensuring the WUA and AUUA include all employees of the legal entity seeking the workforce certificate, including the top official of the legal entity (CEO or president), or at a minimum, all employees in Minnesota and at the company’s headquarters, including the company’s top official (CEO or president).
Changes to the MDHR Poster
The name of the new poster issued in 2025 is “Our Commitment to a Workplace Free from Discrimination.” It includes a new protected category for local human rights commission activity. It no longer includes any reference to affirmative action or AAPs.
Changes to the Annual Compliance Report
An annual compliance report (ACR) must be submitted to MDHR each year, even if the Minnesota contractor holds no current state government contracts.
Although the ACR packet includes a revision date of March 2025, the reports included therein appear to be unchanged, and interestingly still permit contractors to report on nonbinary employees.
What did change are the instructions for the ACR, both those included in the “Instructions & Requirements” tab of the ACR packet and on MDHR’s website. Contractors are now required to use 2018 (instead of 2010) census data to complete the “Availability and Underutilization Analysis” (AUUA) report. The instructions for the ACR used to read, “To make sure the Report is submitted on time, you can use a reporting period timeframe that is not more than 2 months prior to your certification date.” Under this old version of the instructions, contractors with a certification date of February 6 could pick any date between December 6 and February 6 to end their twelve-month ACR reporting period.
The revised instructions clarify MDHR’s previously unpublished rule change and now state, “To allow you enough time to compile the required data, your report can either start one or two months before the date your report is due. Each report must have the same start and end dates. For example, if your Workforce Certificate was approved 6.15.2024, your first ACR is due 6.15.2025.” Your reporting period can only be: 5.15.2024 to 5.14.2025, or 4.15.2024 to 4.14.2025.
MDHR’s unannounced rule change caused problems for many Minnesota contractors that had already submitted one or more ACRs using a reporting period that was not an exact date match to their workforce certificate. As a result, many contractors were required to revise and resubmit previously filed ACRs for the new date match reporting period.
Contractors may wish to consider the following tips for filing ACRs:
checking the MDHR website to ensure the most recent ACR form and instructions are being used;
confirming that the “Total Employees – Beginning of Reporting” period matches “The Total Current Employees” from the prior year’s ACR—unless this is the first ACR under a new workforce certificate; and
confirming the ACR “balances” before submitting it to MDHR; i.e., Total Employees Beginning of Reporting Period + Total Hires – Employees Transferred Out + Employees Transferred In – Employees Terminated must = Total Current Employees.
If the ACR does not “balance,” it will be rejected.
Contractors may also want to consider the following:
using “Total Current Employees” to prepare the AUUA;
using the whole person test to determine underutilization of women and minorities in the AUUA;
confirming the completion of Section F of the AUUA listing the recruitment area and census/standard occupational classification (SOC) codes used for each job group; and
when preparing the narrative report of the company’s steps to increase the utilization of females and/or minorities for any job groups where they are underutilized per the AUUA, making sure to include additional or different steps from the prior year ACR narrative for continuing areas of underutilization.
The letter template is optional.
Conclusion
Minnesota takes its affirmative action requirements for state government contractors seriously, and MDHR’s compliance officers are sticklers for their rules. It is rare for a workforce certificate application and/or ACR to be approved without a request for revisions.
Cleveland Will Prohibit Salary Inquiries and Require Salary Ranges in Job Postings
On April 28, 2025, the Cleveland City Council unanimously passed Ordinance No. 104-2025 (the “salary ordinance”), which will ban any employer that employs fifteen or more employees in the City of Cleveland, as well as any employment agency operating on the employer’s behalf, from asking about or considering a job applicant’s salary history. The salary ordinance also requires job postings to provide the salary range or scale of the position. The ordinance will take effect on October 27, 2025.
Effective October 27, 2025, employers with fifteen or more employees in Cleveland, Ohio, will be prohibited from asking about or considering a job applicant’s salary history under a new ordinance passed by the city council. The ordinance also applies to employment agencies operating on behalf of covered employers.
Quick Hits
The Cleveland City Council passed an ordinance that prohibits Cleveland businesses with fifteen or more employees within the city limits from inquiring about salaries and requires such businesses to provide salary information in job postings.
The ordinance allows employers to cure violations without receiving a civil monetary penalty but provides for civil penalties up to $5,000 for refusal to comply and multiple violations.
The ordinance is effective October 27, 2025.
Ordinance No. 104-2025, which the city council approved on April 28, 2025, also requires job postings to provide the salary range or scale of the position.
The city council noted in the ordinance that Cincinnati, Columbus, and Toledo have similar pay equity laws.
The ordinance makes it an unlawful discriminatory practice to: (1) inquire about a job applicant’s salary history; (2) screen applicants based on their current or prior salary history; (3) rely solely on an applicant’s salary history in deciding whether to offer the applicant employment; or (4) refuse to hire or otherwise retaliate against an applicant who refuses to disclose his or her salary history. The ordinance also requires Cleveland employers to include the salary range or scale of the position in the notification, advertisement, or other formal posting that offers the opportunity to apply. The ordinance does not, however, prohibit an employer from inquiring about a job applicant’s salary expectations.
The ordinance only applies to positions that will be performed within Cleveland’s geographic boundaries, and “whose application, in whole or in part, will be solicited, received, processed, or considered in the City of Cleveland, regardless of whether the person is interviewed.”
Cleveland’s Fair Employment Wage Board (FEWB) is tasked with enforcing the ordinance. Any person may allege violations of the ordinance by filing a written complaint with the FEWB within 180 days of the alleged violation. The ordinance provides for a resolution process and, if the FEWB finds by a preponderance of evidence that a violation has occurred, the employer may resolve and correct the deficiency within ninety days without receiving a penalty. If the deficiency is not cured within ninety days, the FEWB may issue a civil penalty, which starts at $1,000 per violation and increases with each violation up to a maximum of $5,000. The monetary penalties will adjust annually based on the U.S. Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers (CPI-U).
Employers covered under the ordinance may want to review their hiring practices and job postings to ensure compliance with the new ordinance when it takes effect.
Arkansas Law Takes Unprecedented Step to Prohibit PBM Ownership of Pharmacies
On April 16, 2025, Arkansas Governor Sarah Huckabee Sanders signed into law House Bill 1150, now Act 624 (the Act), making Arkansas the first state in the nation to prohibit pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) from acquiring or holding a direct or indirect interest in a pharmacy. The Act—which broadly prohibits PBM ownership in retail and mail-order pharmacies—moves forward a policy initiative that has stagnated at the federal level following the introduction of the Patients Before Monopolies (PBM) Act, and could provide a blueprint for other states to pass similar legislation.
Overview of the Act
Under the Act, as of January 1, 2026, the Arkansas State Board of Pharmacy (Board) must either revoke or not renew pharmacy permits where the permit holder is a PBM or its subsidiary, is an entity managed by a PBM, or is an entity that has a direct or indirect ownership interest in a PBM. The Act’s only exemption allows pharmacy employers and pharmacies to maintain a direct or indirect interest in a PBM if: (1) the pharmacy employer is the sole Arkansas client of such PBM; and (2) the pharmacy exclusively services the employees and dependents of the pharmacy employer while using the PBM in Arkansas.
Limited Use Permits. Until September 1, 2027, the Board may convert the pharmacy permit of a pharmacy owned by a PBM into a limited use permit, allowing such pharmacy to sell certain rare, orphan, or limited distribution drugs that otherwise would be unavailable in the market for a minimum of 90 days. Before January 1, 2026, the Board will issue a written policy outlining (i) how patients, pharmacies, or healthcare providers may notify the Board of a drug’s unavailability in the market; (ii) how pharmacies may request a limited use permit from the Board, (iii) timing for Board decisions; and (iv) a process for making emergency determinations due to patient needs.
Extensions or Renewals Pending Sale of Pharmacy to Eligible Buyer. For pharmacies subject to the Act, the Board has the discretion to extend the use, or issue a renewal, of a permit for a pharmacy that offers same-day patient access for pharmacist services, a prescription for a controlled substance, mental health services, or other critical patient healthcare services, provided that there is a pending sale of the pharmacy to an eligible buyer.
Critical Dates. Ninety days before January 1, 2026, the Board must provide written notice to any pharmacy permit holder that it believes is in violation of the Act. Pharmacies in receipt of such notice will not have long to react; any pharmacy in receipt of notice from the Board must provide written notice to each patient and each patient’s prescribing healthcare provider that has used the pharmacy within the previous year that, beginning in the new year, the pharmacy will no longer be able to dispense retail drugs to the patient. Such notice will only be deemed sufficient if it (1) is delivered 60 days prior to January 1, 2026; (2) is transmitted via mail, email or through the patient portal; (3) contains the Board’s phone number and email address; and (4) contains a list of Arkansas pharmacies holding an active pharmacy permit that are not in violation of the Act. Any pharmacy in violation of the Act that fails to meet the compliance requirements by January 1, 2026, will have its pharmacy permit revoked or not renewed.
Impact of the Act
Passage of the Act has already had immediate industry effects, with some of the nation’s largest PBMs either announcing plans to shutter their Arkansas pharmacy operations or publicly cautioning about potential disruptions to hundreds of thousands of Arkansians’ prescriptions. PBMs and other industry stakeholders have also criticized the Act’s potential to limit patients’ access to drugs, increase prescription drug spending in the state, cost jobs, and hurt local revenues. Despite these criticisms, other states—including Indiana, New York and Vermont—are considering passage of similar state initiatives to bolster independent pharmacies and combat what they perceive as anticompetitive operations.
At the federal level, the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG), on behalf of a bipartisan coalition of 39 state and territory attorneys general, sent a letter to Speaker Mike Johnson, Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries, and Senators John Thune and Chuck Schumer on April 14, 2025 urging Congress to pass legislation prohibiting PBMs from owning or operating pharmacies. Although not specifically mentioned in the NAAG’s letter, the Patients Before Monopolies (PBM) Act, introduced in December 2024 by Senators Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) and Josh Hawley (R-MO), would meet the NAAG’s requests by (i) prohibiting a parent company of a PBM or a health insurer from owning a pharmacy business, and (ii) requiring that a parent company in violation of the PBM Act divest its pharmacy business within three years.
The passage of a federal-level initiative or proliferation of state-level initiatives similar to Act 624 may destabilize the PBM and pharmacy markets and result in a variety of unintended consequences, particularly with respect to patient access.
BREAKING: Todd Snyder to Pay Six Figure Fine for Consumer Privacy Violations
The California Privacy Protection Agency (CPPA) has taken decisive enforcement action against national clothing retailer Todd Snyder, Inc., highlighting the increasing scrutiny businesses face under the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA). In a release published May 6, 2025, the CPPA announced that the retailer will pay a $345,178 fine and make significant changes to its privacy practices following findings of non-compliance with state privacy laws.
According to the CPPA, Todd Snyder failed to properly configure its privacy portal, resulting in a 40-day window during which consumers’ requests to opt out of the sale or sharing of personal information were not processed. This technical lapse was compounded by procedural missteps: consumers were required to submit more information than was necessary to fulfill privacy requests, including needing to verify their identity before opting out.
In addition to the monetary penalty, Todd Snyder has agreed to reconfigure its opt-out mechanism to ensure effective functioning. The company will also provide CCPA compliance training for its employees.
The CPPA emphasized that businesses are responsible for ensuring their privacy management solutions comply with the law and function as intended. Using a consent management platform does not absolve a business from compliance obligations.
“Businesses should scrutinize their privacy management solutions to ensure they comply with the law and work as intended, because the buck stops with the businesses that use them,” said Michael Macko, head of the CPPA’s Enforcement Division.
This action is part of a broader wave of privacy enforcement. The CPPA recently imposed a $632,500 penalty on American Honda Motor Co. for similar violations and launched the bipartisan Consortium of Privacy Regulators to collaborate with states across the country to implement and enforce privacy laws nationwide.
You can read the CPPA’s press release here: CPPA Announcement
The 7 Most Common Types of Personal Injury Cases
Getting injured unexpectedly can turn your life upside down instantly, especially when it wasn’t your fault. If you are feeling overwhelmed dealing with medical bills, time off work, or long-term effects from an accident, you might be wondering whether you have legal options. From car accidents to medical mistakes, personal injury law holds individuals and organizations accountable when their negligence causes harm. Below is a breakdown of the seven most common types of personal injury cases:
1. Car Accidents
This is by far the most common type of personal injury case. Whether it is a fender-bender or a more serious crash, if someone was driving carelessly and caused injuries, you might have a case. Insurance typically comes into play, but getting fair compensation is not always a simple process.
2. Slip and Fall Accidents
These cases fall under premises liability. If someone slips on a wet floor in a store, trips over uneven pavement, or falls because a property was not maintained properly, the owner may be held responsible. It depends on whether they knew, or should have known, about the danger.
3. Medical Malpractice
Unfortunately, sometimes mistakes can occur when we receive medical care. Medical malpractice cases can involve misdiagnosis, surgical errors, medication mistakes, or neglect. These cases are complex and often require expert testimony.
4. Dog Bites
In many states, dog owners are legally responsible if their dog bites someone, especially if the dog has a history of aggression. Even if it’s the first time the dog has bitten anyone, the owner may still be liable, depending on local laws.
5. Workplace Accidents
If you get injured on the job, you generally turn to workers’ compensation rather than filing a lawsuit. But there are exceptions, especially if a third party caused the injury. For instance, a delivery driver injured in a car crash while working may have a claim against the at-fault driver and workers’ comp.
6. Product Liability
If a defective product injures you, like a faulty airbag, a dangerous toy, or even contaminated food, the manufacturer, distributor, or retailer could be held responsible. These cases often require a thorough investigation to prove the product was defective and caused the injury.
7. Wrongful Death
When someone dies because of another person’s negligence, such as in a car accident, medical procedure, or other situation, the family may be able to file a wrongful death claim. These cases seek compensation for things including lost income, funeral expenses, and emotional suffering.
Final Thoughts
Facing an injury is difficult enough without the added stress of wondering what to do next. Understanding the most common types of personal injury cases can give you a clearer picture of your rights and whether you might be entitled to compensation. Remember, every case is unique, and even minor injuries can have lasting consequences. If you suspect someone else’s actions contributed to your injury, speaking with a skilled personal injury attorney can help you get clarity about your next steps.
CMS Proposes Medicare Payment Policies for Hospital Inpatient Services for Federal Fiscal Year 2026
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) recently published the fiscal year (“FY”) 2026 proposed rule for Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems (IPPS) (the “Proposed Rule”). Comments to the Proposed Rule must be submitted by 5 p.m. EDT on June 10, 2025.
The Proposed Rule reflects a number of broader policy changes announced by the Trump Administration through its Executive Orders and other agency actions, including an effort to de-regulate and to limit the use of notice and comment rulemaking unless it is otherwise required by statute; and removing hospital quality measures related to health equity, social drivers of health, and COVID-19 vaccination coverage among health care personnel. The Proposed Rule does not include anticipated changes to the Medicare Conditions of Participation for hospitals related to gender affirming care; those may still be forthcoming in the Medicare payment proposed rules for hospital outpatient services and physician and other health care professionals’ services that will be published in early July.
Other policy proposals of significant interest to academic medical centers and other hospitals include:
Continued implementation of the Transforming Episode Accountability Model (TEAM) with mandatory participation for hospitals in certain geographic areas, starting in January 1, 2026 — CMS is moving forward with the five-year mandatory episode-based payment model for selected acute care hospitals, with several proposed new policies to implement the model. Proposals include a limited deferment period for new hospitals and policies to account for risk adjustment and coding changes, among other things.
Codification of long-standing CMS policies for counting resident full-time equivalent (FTE) positions for purposes of calculating the enhanced Medicare payments to teaching hospitals for direct graduate medical education (DGME) and indirect medical education (IME) costs — CMS is not proposing any changes to its long-established FTE counting policy. Under existing policies, Medicare makes payments to teaching hospitals for DGME and IME, both of which are based on the number of residents (measured by FTEs) that the hospital trains during the year.
Revision to the accepted cost accounting methodology for nursing and allied health programs (which Medicare reimburses on a reasonable-cost basis) — Following a decision from the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in favor of hospital plaintiffs disputing the current CMS methodology, CMS proposes to clarify its regulations to explain how the net costs for approved educational activities are calculated. CMS claims that the adjusted methodology will be “more accurate, albeit less” that what the providers claimed in the lawsuit.
Discontinuation of a low-wage index hospital policy adopted during the first Trump Administration and that was declared invalid by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in 2024 — In light of the court’s ruling that CMS lacked statutory authority to adopt the low-wage index hospital policy and related budget neutrality adjustment, CMS now proposes to discontinue the policy beginning in FY 2026. CMS also proposes a budget-neutral transitional exception for significantly impacted hospitals.
Continuation of long-standing CMS policies related to add-on payments for new technologies (representing approximately $234 million in payments during FY 2026) — CMS proposes to continue making new technology add-on payments for 26 products that continue to meet the newness criterion. CMS also discusses 43 additional product applications, 29 of which applied under alternative pathways for breakthrough devices and qualified infectious disease products.
Payment Update
The Proposed Rule includes a projected 2.4% increase in IPPS payment rates for eligible general acute care hospitals, which will increase Medicare hospital payments nationwide by $4 billion. Notable components of the projected expenditures include a $1.5 billion projected increase in Medicare uncompensated care payments to disproportionate share hospitals in FY 2026, as well as $234 million in additional payments for inpatient cases involving new medical technologies in FY 2026, primarily driven by continuing new technology add-on payments (NTAP) for several technologies.
Request for Information on Deregulation
Pursuant to President Trump’s January 31, 2025 Executive Order 14191, Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation, CMS specifically requests public input on approaches and opportunities to streamline regulations and reduce administrative burdens on providers, suppliers, beneficiaries, Medicare Advantage and Part D plans, and other interested parties participating in the Medicare program. Among other things, CMS requests information about existing regulatory requirements and policy statements that could be waived or modified without compromising patient safety or the integrity of the Medicare program, changes to simplify reporting and documentation requirements without affecting program integrity, and requirements or processes that are duplicative either within the Medicare program itself or across other health care programs (including Medicaid, private insurance, and state or local requirements).
Like other agencies, CMS requests all comments related to the deregulation RFI be submitted through a program-specific weblink.
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Holds That CBD Products Can Be Reimbursable Medical Expenses Under Workers’ Compensation
In a unanimous and long-awaited decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that when a treating physician recommends an item—such as CBD oil—as part of a treatment plan for a work-related injury, that item qualifies as a reimbursable medical expense under Section 306(f.1)(1)(i) of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act (the “Act”). The ruling is a major development not just for injured workers, but for the broader cannabis and hemp industries in Pennsylvania.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court broadly interpreted “medicines and supplies” under the Act to cover anything that a physician, exercising professional judgment, includes in a treatment plan, not just FDA approved categories. That includes non-prescription and over-the-counter products like CBD oil.
This ruling is especially significant due to the Court’s express acknowledgment of Pennsylvania’s legal definition of hemp. In reaffirming the General Assembly’s statutory language, the Court emphasized that “hemp is legal if it has a Delta-9 THC concentration of not more than 0.3 percent on a dry weight basis.” That definition necessarily includes CBD products, removing any ambiguity that might have previously surrounded their legal status under Pennsylvania law.
The claimant in this case was an attorney who purchased CBD oil from a local health store after his doctor recommended it for treatment of a back injury. When the law firm’s insurance carrier refused to reimburse him, the plaintiff challenged the denial. The Workers’ Compensation Judge and Commonwealth Court sided with him.
Importantly, the Court also held that the reimbursement obligation applies even when the claimant purchases the item directly. If the product is medically justified and included in the treatment plan—whether through a prescription or a physician’s report—insurers are on the hook for the cost. These items are not subject to the cost containment provisions of the Act unless purchased from a provider.
This ruling opens the door for increased access to hemp-derived wellness products in medical treatment plans, including CBD oils, salves, and other cannabinoid-based therapeutics. For hemp industry stakeholders, it offers a clear signal: when hemp-derived CBD products are properly sourced and documented, they are not only lawful—they may be reimbursable medical costs.
Going forward, treating physicians should take care to document any CBD-related recommendations clearly in the treatment plan. Likewise, claimants should retain receipts and provide evidence that the item was medically directed.
This ruling reaffirms the acceptance of hemp-derived products in Pennsylvania.
IRS Announces 2026 Limits for Health Savings Accounts, High-Deductible Health Plans, and Excepted Benefit HRAs
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) recently announced (see Revenue Procedure 2025-19) cost-of-living adjustments to the applicable dollar limits for health savings accounts (HSAs), high-deductible health plans (HDHPs), and excepted benefit health reimbursement arrangements (HRAs) for 2026. All of the dollar limits currently in effect for 2025 will change for 2026, with the exception of one limit. The HSA catch-up contribution for individuals ages 55 and older will not change as it is not subject to cost-of-living adjustments.
In Depth
The table below compares the applicable dollar limits for HSAs, HDHPs, and excepted benefit HRAs for 2025 and 2026.
HEALTH AND WELFARE PLAN LIMITS
2025
Δ
2026
HDHP – Maximum annual out-of-pocket limit (excluding premiums)
Self-only coverage
$8,300
↑
$8,500
Family coverage
$16,600
↑
$17,000
HDHP – Minimum annual deductible
Self-only coverage
$1,650
↑
$1,700
Family coverage
$3,300
↑
$3,400
HSA – Annual contribution limit
Self-only coverage
$4,300
↑
$4,400
Family coverage
$8,550
↑
$8,750
Catch-up contributions (ages 55 and older)
$1,000
=
$1,000
Excepted Benefit HRA
Annual contribution limit
$2,150
↑
$2,200
Next Steps
Plan sponsors should update payroll and plan administration systems for the 2026 cost-of-living adjustments and incorporate the new limits in relevant participant communications, such as open enrollment and communication materials, plan documents, and summary plan descriptions.
An Update on the DEI Certification Provision of Executive Order 14173
On May 2, 2025, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction in National Urban League et al. v. Trump, et al., 25-471, a case that seeks to halt enforcement of President Trump’s executive orders (“EOs”) related to diversity, equity, and inclusion (“DEI”), EO 14151 and EO 14173, as well as EO 14168, regarding so-called “Gender Ideology.” At this point two tribunals have ruled that the DEI-related EOs should not be enjoined pending legal challenges. (The other tribunal to take this position is the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit which stayed a nationwide preliminary injunction of the DEI-related EOs issued by the District Court of Maryland.)
Government contractors are particularly interested in the DEI Certification provision in Section 3(b)(iv)(A) and (B) of EO 14173, which requires each agency of the government to include two terms in every contract or grant award: one requiring the counterparty “to certify that it does not operate any programs promoting DEI that violate any applicable Federal antidiscrimination laws,” and another requiring it to agree that compliance with those laws “is material to the government’s payment decisions for purposes of” the False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4). (We have previously done a deep dive on FCA liability premised on DEI programs.)
District Court: The DEI Certification Is Not Unconstitutionally Vague, Does Not Chill Protected Speech
The Court addressed Plaintiffs’ fear that the Trump administration will take a novel and overly broad view of “illegal discrimination” that will expose them to liability for DEI initiatives that are lawful under current judicial precedent but which the government might nevertheless target under existing antidiscrimination law. The Court said that this is “a concern with the interpretation of underlying antidiscrimination law—which Plaintiffs do not challenge—rather than the Certification Provision.” The Court said that an entity whose DEI program the government targets can, at that time, “contest whether their DEI programs fall within the scope” of applicable antidiscrimination laws.
The Court also stated that the DEI Certification provision does not chill protected speech because it only targets DEI programs that violate federal antidiscrimination law, and there is no First Amendment right to “operate such programs.” Thus, the Court aligned with the Fourth Circuit, which also noted that EO 14173 does not purport to establish the illegality of all efforts to advance DEI, only illegal efforts to advance DEI. In response to the argument that no one knows what illegal DEI means, the judge stated that the First Amendment does not require the government to preemptively identify programs or provide hypothetical examples of action that violates antidiscrimination law. In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated that it “respectfully disagrees” with the Northern District of Illinois which, in Chicago Women in Trades v. Trump et al., 1:25-cv-02005, partially granted a preliminary injunction and in so doing “faulted” EO 14173’s DEI Certification requirement for not clarifying “what might make any given DEI program violate Federal antidiscrimination laws.”
As for what it means to “promote” illegal DEI, the District Court for the District of Columbia simply looked to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, which clarifies that “[t]o ‘promote’ something is to contribute to its growth or prosperity.”
District Court: Good Faith Compliance with Antidiscrimination Law Diminishes FCA Risk
Given the potential for treble damages and civil penalties under the FCA, contractors and grantees are particularly concerned about the concession of materiality required by the DEI Certification. Plaintiffs argued that signing the DEI Certification could expose them to significant FCA liability for minor or technical violations, especially given that the government appears poised to adopt an aggressive and broad view of what counts as illegal discrimination.
The judge viewed this risk with skepticism. He pointed to the FCA’s scienter requirement, under which liability only attaches if a defendant submitting a false claim acted with knowledge, deliberate ignorance, or reckless disregard of the falsity of the claim. The Court specifically stated: “The False Claims Act…does not create liability for good-faith but mistaken beliefs that DEI programs comply with Federal law.” (Notably, this is the result we reached in our earlier analysis of this issue: “Where contractors are required already to comply with federal anti-discrimination laws, it seems likely that they hold a good faith belief that their DEI programs are consistent with, and not contrary, to those laws. We expect that the government will face significant hurdles in proving that contractors ‘knowingly’ engaged in ‘illegal’ DEI programs.”)
Key Takeaways for Federal Contractors
Expect to See the DEI Certification:
At the moment, only the Department of Labor is enjoined from asking its contractors and grantees to sign the DEI Certification requirement.
Confer with Counsel:
It is a good idea to confer with counsel about how to respond to the DEI Certification, particularly given that the certification language is not standard and can be customized by Contracting Officers.
DEI Programs Are Not Per Se Illegal:
Even in decisions denying relief to plaintiffs, courts are making clear that not all DEI programs and not all efforts to promote diversity are illegal. Signing the DEI Certification does not compel an entity to end all DEI activities—the certification only targets DEI efforts that are already illegal under existing, applicable antidiscrimination law.
Good Faith:
Contractors and grantees that act in good faith and have a good faith belief that their DEI programs comply with applicable antidiscrimination law may avoid liability under the FCA.
Conduct a Privileged Review of All Existing DEI Programs:
The DEI Certification covers all DEI programs that an entity operates, even those outside of an entity’s federally funded programs. Therefore, now is a good time for a comprehensive, privileged review of DEI programs to ensure they comport with current anti-discrimination laws. Evaluating these programs through the more critical lens of the current administration can identify any aspects that should be amended to mitigate misunderstanding and risk. This review can also help establish good faith belief in the truthfulness of the DEI certification.