Location Data as Health Data? Precedent-Setting Lawsuit Brought Against Retailer Under Washington My Health My Data Act
An online retailer was recently hit with the first class action under Washington’s consumer health data privacy law alleging that it used advertising software attached to certain third-party mobile phone apps to unlawfully harvest the locations and online marketing identifiers of tens of millions of users. This case highlights how seemingly innocuous location data can become sensitive health information through inference and aggregation, potentially setting the stage for a flood of similar copycat lawsuits.
Quick Hits
An online retailer was hit with the first class action under Washington State’s My Health My Data Act (MHMDA), claiming that the retailer unlawfully harvested sensitive location data from users through advertising software integrated into third-party mobile apps.
The lawsuit alleges that the retailer did not obtain proper consent or provide adequate disclosure regarding the collection and sharing of consumer health data; a term that is defined incredibly broadly as personal information that is or could be linked to a specific individual and that can reveal details about an individual’s past, present, or future health status.
This case marks the first significant test of the MHMDA and could provide a roadmap for litigants in Washington and other states.
On February 10, 2025, Washington resident Cassaundra Maxwell filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington alleging violations of Washington’s MHMDA. The suit alleged that the retailer’s advertising software, known as a “software development kit,” or SDK, is licensed to and “runs in the background of thousands of mobile apps” and “covertly withdraws sensitive location data” that cannot be completely anonymized.
“Mobile users may agree to share their location while using certain apps, such as a weather app, where location data provides the user with the prompt and accurate information they’re seeking,” the suit alleges. “But that user has no idea that [the online retailer] will have equal access to sensitive geolocation data that it can then exfiltrate and monetize.”
The suit brings claims under federal wiretap laws, federal and state consumer protection laws, and violations of the MHMDA, making it a likely test case for consumer privacy claims under the MHMDA. This case evokes parallels to the surge over the past several years of claims under the California Invasion of Privacy Act (CIPA), a criminal wiretap statute. Both involve allegations of unauthorized data collection and sharing facilitated by digital tracking technologies. These technologies, including cookies, pixels, and beacons, are often embedded in websites, apps, or marketing emails, operating in ways that consumers may not fully understand or consent to.
As we previously covered, hundreds if not thousands of lawsuits relating to similar technologies were brought pursuant to CIPA after a California district court denied a motion to dismiss such claims in Greenley v. Kochava, Inc. Given the parallels and the onslaught of litigation that CIPA entailed, the MHMDA case may set important precedents for how consumer health data privacy is interpreted and enforced in the digital age, similar to the impact CIPA litigation has had on broader privacy practices. Like CIPA, the MHMDA also allows for the recovery of attorneys’ fees, but unlike CIPA (which provides for statutory damages even without proof of actual harm), a plaintiff must prove an “injury” to his or her business or property to establish an MHMDA claim.
Consumer Health Data
As many companies working in the retail space likely know, the MHMDA imposes a host of new requirements for companies doing business in Washington or targeting Washington consumers with respect to the collection of “consumer health data.” The law broadly defines “consumer health data” as any personal information that can be linked or reasonably associated with an individual’s past, present, or future physical or mental health status. The MHMDA enumerates an entire list of data points that could constitute “health status,” including information that would not traditionally be thought of as indicative of health, such as:
biometric data;
precise location information that could suggest health-related activities (such as an attempt to obtain health services or supplies);
information about bodily functions, vital signs, and symptoms; and
mere measurements related to any one of the thirteen enumerated data points.
Critically, even inferences can become health status information in the eyes of the MHMDA, including inferences derived from nonhealth data if they can be associated with or used to identify a consumer’s health data.
For instance, Maxwell’s suit alleges the retailer collected her biometric data and precise location information that could reasonably indicate an attempt to acquire or receive health services or supplies. However, the complaint is light on factual support, alleging only that the data harvesting conducted via the retailer’s SDK couldreveal (presumably via inference in most cases) “intimate aspects of an individual’s health,” including:
visits to cancer clinics;
“health behaviors” like visiting the gym or fast food habits;
“social detriments of health,” such as where an individual lives or works; and
“social networks that may influence health, such as close contact during the COVID 19 pandemic.”
Notice and Consent
The suit further alleges that the retailer failed to provide appropriate notice of the collection and use of the putative class members’ consumer health data and did not obtain consent before collecting and sharing the data. These allegations serve as a timely reminder of the breadth and depth of the MHMDA’s notice and consent requirements.
Unlike most other state-level privacy laws, which allow different state-mandated disclosures to be combined in a single notice, the Washington attorney general has indicated in (nonbinding) guidance that the MHMDA “Consumer Health Privacy Policy must be a separate and distinct link on the regulated entity’s homepage and may not contain additional information not required under the My Health My Data Act.” Said differently, businesses in Washington cannot rely upon their standard privacy policies, or even their typical geolocation consent pop-up flows with respect to consumer health data.
Additionally, at a high-level, the MHMDA contains unusually stringent consent requirements, demanding the business obtain “freely given, specific, informed, opt-in, voluntary, and unambiguous” consent before consumer health data is collected or shared for any purpose other than the provision of the specific product or service the consumer has requested from the business, or collected, used, or shared for any purpose not identified in the business’s Consumer Health Privacy Policy.
Next Steps
The Maxwell lawsuit is significant as it is the first to be filed under Washington’s MHMDA, a law that has already spawned a copycat law in Nevada, a lookalike amendment to the Connecticut Data Privacy Act, and a whole host of similar bills in state legislatures across the country—most recently in New York, which has its own version of the MHMDA awaiting presentation to the governor for signature. The suit appears to take an expansive interpretation that could treat nearly all or essentially all location data as consumer health data, inasmuch as conclusions about an individual’s health that can be drawn from the data. And, while the MHMDA does use expansive language, the suit appears likely to answer still lingering questions about the extent of what should be considered “consumer health data” subject to the rigorous requirements of the MHMDA.
As this suit progresses, companies targeting Washington consumers or otherwise doing any business in Washington may want to review their use of SDKs or similar technologies, geolocation collection, and any other collection or usage of consumer data with an eye toward the possibility that the data could be treated as consumer health data. Also, their processors may wish to do the same (remember, the Washington attorney general has made it clear that out-of-state entities acting as processors for entities subject to MHMDA must also comply). Depending on what they find, those companies may wish to reevaluate the notice-and-consent processes applicable to the location data they collect, as well as their handling of consumer rights applicable to the same.
It Is More Than Conceivable That The Court Of Chancery Would Correct Statutory Law
The most distinguishing feature of Delaware law is that it is interpreted and applied by a court of equity. A recent post by Professor Stephen Bainbridge illustrates this point:
The Delaware Supreme Court held in Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., that “inequitable action does not become permissible simply because it is legally possible.” This means that even if a corporate action complies with the literal terms of a statute, Delaware courts can intervene if the action is deemed unfair or inequitable. Schnell thus demonstrates that Delaware courts will not allow statutory formalism to justify unfair corporate behavior. Equity acts as a safeguard against directors exploiting statutory provisions to the detriment of shareholders. The decision remains a cornerstone of Delaware’s approach to corporate governance, ensuring that statutory compliance is always subject to equitable scrutiny. It’s at least conceivable that an activist judge could invoke Schnell to impose liability in a particular case even though the technical requirements of SB 21 were satisfied. (See, e.g., the discussion above of Fliegler [v. Lawrence. 361 A.2d 218 (Del.1976)].)
This understanding of equity versus law goes all the way back to none other than Aristotle. See Nicomachean Ethics Book V, Section 10. Thus, the risk that the Court of Chancery would “correct” statutory law is more than conceivable. It is entirely plausible given the Court’s role as a court of equity.
DOL’s Power to Set Salary Minimum for Overtime Exemption Ripe for SCOTUS Review
On February 14, 2025, the Fifth Circuit denied the appellants’ petition for rehearing en banc in Mayfield v. United States Dep’t of Labor—a September 2024 decision holding that the U.S. Department of Labor’s authority to “define” and “delimit” the terms of the Fair Labor Standards Act’s executive, administrative, and professional (EAP) exemptions includes the power to set a minimum salary for exemption.
The dispute in Mayfield dates back to 2019, when the DOL issued a final rule raising the minimum salary required to qualify for most EAP exemptions from $455 per week to $684 per week. Mayfield, a small business owner, challenged the rule, arguing that the DOL lacks, and has always lacked, the authority to define the EAP exemptions in terms of salary level (as opposed to by job duties)—an argument that has been embraced repeatedly by the Texas federal district courts (see here and here). The district court granted the DOL’s motion for summary judgment, and Mayfield appealed to the Fifth Circuit.
The Court of Appeals held that the DOL was empowered to set a minimum salary for exemption—albeit with some meaningful limitations. Last week’s decision denying en banc review tees the issue up for a certiorari petition to the U.S. Supreme Court, which has not exactly been a big fan of regulatory activism as of late.
In related news, we’re expecting the DOL to drop its pre-Inauguration Day appeal of the November 2024 decision invalidating the 2024 overtime rule. We just can’t see this White House having any interest in continuing to appeal a decision curbing agency rulemaking power and saving American businesses untold billions in new overtime expenses.
DOL Appeal of Decision Invalidating 2024 Overtime Rule Likely on Last Legs
On November 15, 2024, in State of Texas v. United States Dep’t of Labor, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas ruled that the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) exceeded its rulemaking authority by issuing a rule in April 2024 raising the minimum salary for exemption as an executive, administrative, or professional (EAP) employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Under the DOL’s rule, the minimum salary for exemption as an EAP employee, with limited exceptions, increased from $684 per week ($35,568 annualized) to $844 per week ($43,888 annualized) effective July 1, 2024. A second increase would have raised the salary threshold to $1,128 per week ($58,656 annualized) effective January 1, 2025. The rule also increased the minimum total annual compensation level for exemption as a “highly compensated employee” (HCE) and provided for automatic triennial increases in the minimum compensation levels for exemption beginning on July 1, 2027. The November 2024 decision declared the DOL’s rule an “unlawful exercise of agency power” and vacated it nationally.
The DOL—represented by the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division—filed an appeal of the decision with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, notwithstanding that the incoming Trump administration was all but guaranteed to have no interest in appealing a decision curbing agency rulemaking power and saving American businesses untold billions in new overtime expenses. Lo and behold, within 48 hours after Inauguration Day, the government requests a 30-day extension of time, through March 7, 2025, to file its opening brief on appeal “because of the press of other business.” We wouldn’t hold our breath for the Trump Justice Department filing anything more in this case other than a stipulation withdrawing the appeal.
So is the DOL done rulemaking with respect to the minimum salary for exemption? It may be for the next four years, but likely not forever. The Fifth Circuit’s September 2024 decision in Mayfield v. United States Dep’t of Labor held that the DOL’s authority to “define” and “delimit” the terms of the EAP exemptions includes the power to set a minimum salary for exemption—albeit with some meaningful limitations. On February 14, 2025, the Fifth Circuit denied Mayfield’s petition for rehearing en banc. We’ll see if Mayfield tries to take the issue to the U.S. Supreme Court.
CTA UPDATE: US District Court Reinstates Reporting Requirement; FinCEN Grants 30-Day Filing Extension
Go-To Guide:
On Feb. 18, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted the government’s motion to stay relief in Smith v. U.S. Department of the Treasury, thereby lifting the injunction against the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA) that had been in place in that case.
As a result, FinCEN confirmed that beneficial ownership information (BOI) reporting requirements under the CTA are once again back in effect, subject to a 30-day filing extension.
Most entities will have a reporting deadline of March 21, 2025 (except for reporting companies with later reporting deadlines under existing guidelines).
The CTA’s status has shifted multiple times1 since Dec. 3, 2024, when a Texas district court in Texas Top Cop Shop, Inc. v. McHenry (formerly Texas Top Cop Shop, Inc. v. Garland) preliminarily enjoined the CTA and its BOI reporting rule (Reporting Rule) on a nationwide basis.
On Jan. 7, 2025, a second federal judge of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas (the District Court) ordered preliminary relief barring CTA enforcement in Smith v. U.S. Department of the Treasury.2 Then, notwithstanding the SCOTUS Order staying the injunction in Texas Top Cop Shop, on Jan. 24, 2025, FinCEN confirmed that reporting companies were not required to file BOI Reports with FinCEN due to the separate nationwide relief entered in Smith (and while the order in Smith remained in effect). On Feb. 5, 2025, the government appealed the ruling in Smith to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (the Fifth Circuit) and asked the District Court to stay relief pending that appeal.
CTA Reporting Requirements Back in Effect
On Feb. 18, 2025, the District Court in Smith granted a stay of its preliminary injunction pending appeal, thereby reinstating BOI reporting requirements once again. On Feb. 19, 2025, FinCEN issued guidance on its website to reflect this update and to announce that companies have 30 days to submit BOI reports:
With the February 18, 2025, decision by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas in Smith, et al. v. U.S. Department of the Treasury, et al., 6:24-cv-00336 (E.D. Tex.), beneficial ownership information (BOI) reporting requirements under the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA) are once again back in effect. However, because the Department of the Treasury recognizes that reporting companies may need additional time to comply with their BOI reporting obligations, FinCEN is generally extending the deadline 30 calendar days from February 19, 2025, for most companies.
New Filing Deadlines
Most reporting companies will be required to file BOI reports no later than March 21, 2025, as follows:
The new deadline to file an initial, updated, and/or corrected BOI report is generally now March 21, 2025.
Companies that were previously given a reporting deadline later than the March 21, 2025, deadline must file their initial BOI report by that later deadline (i.e., companies that qualify for certain disaster relief extensions and companies formed on or after Feb. 20, 2025).
Looking Ahead
In its guidance, FinCEN indicates that it will assess its options to further modify deadlines and initiate a process this year to revise the Reporting Rule to reduce burden for lower-risk entities, including many U.S. small businesses. How this will impact BOI reporting requirements remains to be seen.
Expedited oral arguments for the Fifth Circuit appeal in Texas Top Cop Shop are set for March 25, 2025. Unless the courts or Congress3 provide further relief, reporting companies should prepare to comply with the deadlines outlined above. Additionally, reporting companies should stay updated on FinCEN announcements, as further adjustments to reporting deadlines could be issued within the next 30 days.
1 On Dec. 3, 2024, the CTA and its BOI reporting rule were preliminary enjoined on a nationwide basis, approximately four weeks ahead of a key Jan. 1, 2025, deadline. FinCEN appealed that ruling, and on Dec. 23, 2024, a motions panel of the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit stayed the injunction, allowing the CTA to go back into effect. Three days later, on Dec. 26, 2024, a merits panel of the Fifth Circuit vacated the motion panel’s stay, effectively reinstating the nationwide preliminary injunction against the CTA and the Reporting Rule. On Dec. 31, 2024, the government filed an emergency application with the U.S. Supreme Court to stay that preliminary injunction. On Jan. 23, 2025, the Supreme Court granted that application (the SCOTUS Order), staying the nationwide preliminary injunction in Texas Top Cop Shop, Inc. v. McHenry. McHenry v. Texas Top Cop Shop, Inc., No. 24A653, 2025 WL 272062 (U.S. Jan. 23, 2025).
2 See Smith v. United States Dep’t of the Treasury, No. 6:24-CV-336-JDK, 2025 WL 41924 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2025).
3 On Feb. 10, 2025, the House of Representatives unanimously passed the Protect Small Businesses from Excessive Paperwork Act (H.R. 736, 119th Cong. (2025)). The bill has moved to the Senate for consideration. If enacted, the bill will extend the reporting deadline for entities that qualify as “a small business concern” to Jan. 1, 2026.
New York’s Highest Court Declares Ethics Commission Valid
On Feb. 18, 2025, the New York State Court of Appeals issued a 4-3 decision upholding the constitutionality of the Commission on Ethics and Lobbying in Government (COELIG).1 As was previously detailed in GT Alerts from May 2024 and September 2023, both the Appellate Division, Third Department and the Albany County Supreme Court criticized COELIG’s structure, ultimately concluding that its establishment and scope of authority violated the separation of powers doctrine. The Court of Appeals, however, disagreed, finding that COELIG’s structure and the manner in which its commissioners are appointed is constitutionally permissible. As a result, COELIG may continue its work consistent with statutory provisions enacted in 2022.
In challenging the Commission’s authority following its attempt to enforce a monetary penalty for violating certain rules prohibiting the use of state resources for private purposes, former-Gov. Andrew Cuomo argued that COELIG, as an ethics enforcement body, exercises executive power and, for that reason, the executive must have sufficient authority to appoint and remove commissioners. Gov. Cuomo argued that the Ethics Commission Reform Act of 2022:
1.
“violates constitutional principles of separation of powers because the Commission exercises investigatory and enforcement powers constitutionally entrusted to the Executive, without sufficient oversight by the Governor”;
2.
“violates Article V of the State Constitution because, although the Commission is formally within the Department of State, it functions as a separate department without a head appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate”; and
3.
“unconstitutionally displaces the . . . impeachment process, by permitting the Commission to sanction the Governor for putative violations of the Public Officers Law.”
The lower courts embraced these arguments, with the Albany County Supreme Court concluding that COELIG was unsalvageable due to it being “a body that exercises executive authority where the Governor’s role is confined only to nominating a minority of that body,” where the body’s vetting and appointment was being conducted by “private operators (like a bunch of deans).”2 After the Appellate Division, Third Department upheld the lower court, the state again appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals focused on three factors to ultimately reverse the lower courts and conclude that the 2022 statutory changes creating COELIG are constitutional: (1) the separation of powers doctrine’s flexibility, (2) COELIG’s appointment and removal powers, and (3) the need to promote the public’s trust in government. The majority of the court stated that the separation of powers doctrine does not need to be applied in a rigid fashion; there may be overlap in duties so long as “core duties and responsibilities are retained” with the executive. The court’s majority similarly stated that the constitution is clear that “powers of appointment and removal . . . generally are divided between the Legislature and the Governor.” The governor is not afforded “indefeasible powers to appoint or remove non-constitutional state officers,” and thus that type of exclusive authority for COELIG does not need to rest with the governor.
Finally, the court reasoned that the legislative justification for the Ethics Commission Reform Act of 2022 was to maintain public confidence in government and that this “implicates fundamental constitutional values.” “Given the danger of self-regulation . . . there is an urgent need for the robust, impartial enforcement of the State’s ethics and lobbying laws.” For these reasons, the court concluded that the Act and the commission’s existence “neither unconstitutionally encroaches upon the Executive nor otherwise deviates from constitutional requirements.”
Promptly after the decision’s release, the Commission’s chair and executive director touted the result, stressing that COELIG has and continues to “administer and enforce the state’s ethics and lobbying laws, deliberately, fairly, and with zeal, pursuing its mission to restore New Yorkers’ faith in state government.” To that end, all regulated parties – including lobbyists, clients of lobbyists, and state government officials — should expect COELIG to proceed with business as usual.
1 Cuomo v. COELIG (2025).
2 Cuomo v. COELIG, (Alb. Sup. Ct. 2023).
The Return of the CTA: FinCEN Confirms that Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirements are Back in Effect with a New Deadline of March 21, 2025
On February 19, 2025, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) announced that beneficial ownership information reporting requirements under the Corporate Transparency Act (“CTA”) are back in effect with a new deadline of March 21, 2025 for most reporting companies. This announcement came in response to the decision made on February 17, 2025 by the U.S. District for the Eastern District of Texas in Smith v. U.S. Department of the Treasury, No. 6:24-cv-336-JDK, 2025 WL 41924 (E.D. Tex.) to stay (lift) the preliminary injunction on enforcement of the CTA.
In addition to the deadline extension of 30 calendar days from February 19, 2025, FinCEN notably stated that “in keeping with Treasury’s commitment to reducing regulatory burden on businesses, during this 30-day period FinCEN will assess its options to further modify deadlines, while prioritizing reporting for those entities that pose the most significant national security risks. FinCEN also intends to initiate a process this year to revise the BOI reporting rule to reduce burden for lower-risk entities, including many U.S. small businesses.”
FinCEN did not provide any further details regarding how or when the BOI reporting rule would be revised. However, FinCEN did note that it would provide an update before the March 21, 2025 deadline “of any further modification of this deadline, recognizing that reporting companies may need additional time to comply with their BOI reporting obligations once this update is provided.” The full notice from FinCEN can be read here: FinCEN Notice, FIN-2025-CTA1, 2/18/2025.
Meanwhile, in Congress, several bills have been proposed that, if signed into law, would push the reporting deadline out still further. On February 10, 2025, the Protect Small Business from Excessive Paperwork Act of 2025, H.R. 736, co-lead by U.S. Representatives Zachary Nunn (R-IA), Sharice Davids (D-KS), Tom Emmer (R-MN) and Don Davis (D-NC), unanimously passed by the House. This bill, if passed into law, would modify the deadline for filing of initial BOI reports by reporting companies that existed before January 1, 2024 to not later than Jan. 1, 2026. On February 12, 2025, the Protect Small Business Excessive Paperwork Act of 2025 – companion legislation in the Senate that would likewise extend the filing deadline until January 1, 2026 – was introduced by U.S. Senators Katie Britt (R-AL) and Tim Scott (R-SC) and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs.
Additionally, on January 15, 2025, another bill – the Repealing Big Brother Overreach Act – was introduced by U.S. Senator Tommy Tuberville (R-AL) in the Senate and re-introduced by U.S. Representative Warren Davidson (R-OH) in the House. This bill, if passed into law, would repeal the CTA entirely.
As noted above and in previous posts, the CTA landscape remains volatile. The Sheppard Mullin CTA Task Force will continue to monitor the various court cases, both in Texas and in other jurisdictions around the country, as well as the legislative bills that are making their way through the House and Senate, and will continue to provide updates as they become available. In the meantime, reporting companies are advised to comply with the law as it currently stands and, barring any further updates from FinCEN, should being filing BOI reports again if they have not already done so.
For background information about the CTA and its reporting requirements (including answers to several frequently asked questions), please refer to our previous blog post, dated November 5, 2024. For more information about the history of the CTA litigation mentioned above, please refer to our blog post, dated January 3, 2025.
Additional information about the CTA requirements can be found at the following FinCEN websites:
FinCEN’s website regarding beneficial ownership information
FinCEN’s Small Entity Compliance Guide
FinCEN’s BOIR Frequently Asked Questions (https://www.fincen.gov/boi-faqs)
Procedural Foot Faults are a Trap for the Unwary
Whether filing a tax return, a protest, or an appeal, there are countless procedural requirements that must be met in order to avoid penalties or worse. While those requirements are oftentimes tedious, they are a necessary evil to avoid future headaches.
The recent decision of the Supreme Court of Nevada highlighted one such procedural misstep. In Hohl Motorsports, Inc. v. Nevada Department of Taxation, the company filed a petition for judicial review of a deficiency determination. Hohl, No. 87189, (Nev. Feb. 10, 2025). Under Nevada law, prior to filing a petition, the company was required to either (1) pay the amount of the determination or (2) enter into a written agreement with the Department of Taxation (“Department”) to pay later. The Hohl decision centered around what constituted a “written agreement.”
In that case, the company emailed a lawyer representative of the Department prior to filing its petition. The Department’s response to the company stated that the company would have an additional 90 days to pay the determination and should timely file its petition. The company filed its petition and paid the determination a few weeks later.
Despite its email, the Department moved to dismiss the appeal for failure of the company to comply with the procedural requirements. Specifically, the Department claimed that the company did not have a written agreement with the Department to pay the determination at a later date. Upon review, the Court held that the email from the Department constituted a written agreement, which satisfied the procedural requirements.
Significantly, the Court noted that “[t]axpayers should be able to rely on the advice that they receive from the Department.” The Court stated that this is even more true when the taxpayer discusses a particular issue with the Department. The Court admonished the Department for filing the motion to dismiss and asserted that the Department “violated basic notions of justice and fair play.” In today’s world, where courts often chide taxpayers for not seeking guidance from the Department on filing positions, while also alleging that taxpayers cannot rely on information received from the Department, it is a breath of fresh air for the Supreme Court of Nevada to be a voice of reason.
While this case was an important victory for the taxpayer on the procedural requirements in Nevada, the best place to be in is to never have potentially faulted at all. Be sure to dot those i’s and cross those t’s!
LLC’s Splitting into Six Companies Not Subject to Pennsylvania Realty Transfer Tax
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held that the statutory division of a limited liability company (“LLC”) which resulted in the original LLC and five new companies—with each of the new companies owning a portion of the real estate of the original LLC—was not subject to state and local realty transfer tax as there was no transfer of real estate as contemplated by the statute. Kunj Harrisburg LLC, et. al. v. Commonwealth, No. 390 F.R. 2020 (Pa. Cmwlth. Jan. 10, 2025).
The Facts: Kunj Harrisburg LLC (“Kunj”) owned a Condominium Association consisting of seven condominium units in Adams County, Pennsylvania. Pursuant to the Entity Transactions Law (“ETL”), it subsequently filed with the Department of State a Statement of Division and an accompanying Plan of Division which divided Kunj into six companies consisting of Kunj and five new companies. Kunj remained the owner of two condominium units and each of the five new companies became the owner of one condominium unit. The six companies recorded deeds in Adams County reflecting the Plan of Division and claimed exemption from the realty transfer tax.
The Department of Revenue issued Notices of Assessment to the five new companies asserting that the deeds did not qualify for exemption and assessing tax. The companies were unsuccessful in their appeals to the Board of Appeals and the Board of Finance and Revenue.
The Decision: The Commonwealth Court first reviewed the realty transfer tax which imposes tax for the recording of any document and which defines a “document” to include any deed which conveys title to real estate in the Commonwealth. It then looked to the ETL which permits an entity to divide into one or more new associations and which states that the property allocated to a new association vests “without reversion or impairment, and the division shall not constitute a transfer, directly or indirectly, of any of that property.” 15 Pa.C.S. § 367(a)(3)(ii).
Relying on the “unambiguous language” in the ETL that an association created through a statutory division is a successor to the dividing association and does not acquire its property through the transfer of the property’s beneficial interest, the Court concluded that each deed at issue did not convey title to real estate, that each deed was therefore not a “document” as contemplated by the realty transfer tax law, and that no tax was due.
This case demonstrates that when there is unambiguous statutory support for a position, while it may take a couple of levels of appeal, a taxpayer should be victorious despite a taxing agency’s position.
New York ALJ Upholds Convenience of Employer Rule Despite Employee Working Remotely Out-Of-State During COVID Lockdowns
In yet another challenge to New York’s so-called “convenience of the employer” rule, a New York Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) upheld the application of the rule against a Pennsylvania resident who worked remotely for a New York-based employer during the COVID-19 pandemic. In the Matter of the Petition of Myers and Langan, DTA No. 850197 (Jan. 8, 2025).
The Facts: Richard Myers, a resident of Pennsylvania, worked in New York for the Bank of Montreal (“BMO”) which provides a broad range of personal and commercial banking, wealth management, global markets, and investment banking products and services. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, BMO temporarily closed its New York City office on March 16, 2020 and required employees to find alternative working arrangements. Mr. Myers worked from a BMO disaster recovery site in New Jersey on March 16 and March 17 and worked exclusively from his home in Pennsylvania for the remainder of the year. On his New York State nonresident income tax return, Mr. Myers claimed a refund of $104,182, which the New York Division of Taxation partially disallowed, leading to an audit and subsequent recalculation of his income allocation.
The Decision: The ALJ determined that Mr. Myers’ wages were correctly allocated to New York under the convenience of the employer rule. The rule provides that any allowance claimed for days worked outside New York for a New York-based employer must be based on the necessity of the employer, not the convenience of the employee. While there was an executive order in place requiring businesses to employ work from home policies to the maximum extent possible (the “Executive Order”), the order did not apply to essential businesses, including banks and related financial institutions, such as BMO. The ALJ found that BMO, as an essential business, was not legally mandated to close its New York office, and therefore, Mr. Myers’ remote work from out-of-state was deemed to be for his convenience rather than a necessity imposed by his employer. The ALJ noted that BMO’s decision to close its office did not qualify Mr. Myers’ remote work as a necessity for the company, and there was no evidence or explanation in the record as to why BMO closed its offices.
The Takeaway: The decision underscores the consistent application of the convenience of the employer rule by New York State Tax Appeals Tribunal ALJs, even during the unprecedented circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic. The decision highlights the challenges nonresident employees face in proving that their remote work is a necessity for their employer. Unless there is clear evidence that the employer required the employee to work from a location outside New York, the convenience of the employer rule will apply, resulting in the allocation of income to New York. Employers need to be aware of the convenience rule, as well, as they may be required to withhold taxes in the state where the employer’s office is located, even if an employee works remotely out-of-state.
The decision suggests that if BMO were not exempt from the Executive Order as a bank or financial institution, the convenience of the employer rule would not apply, and Mr. Myers would be entitled to a refund. But, as discussed in a prior article I authored regarding application of the convenience rule, even in cases where the employer was not a bank or financial institution and was not exempt from the Executive Order, ALJs have still found that the convenience rule applies.
It remains to be seen whether appellate courts will step in to overrule ALJ decisions and find that when New York offices were closed during an unprecedented world-wide pandemic, employees were not working from their homes merely for their own convenience.
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Affirms Published Patent Applications Become Prior Art on Their Filing Date
Lynk Labs, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. concerns an appeal of a decision from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) that upheld the refusal of claims in a patent application filed by Lynk Labs, Inc. (the ’400 patent) in view of another application (the Martin application) that was filed before the ’400 patent’s filing date, but was published after the ’400 patent application’s filing date.
Those familiar with the patent application process will recognize that prior art can render a claim, or even an entire application, unpatentable. For those new to patenting, if the USPTO finds that an invention is public or if public information makes the new invention obvious, the patent claim will not be allowed. The Board had ruled that the Martin application, though published after the ’400 patent’s filing date and later abandoned, had an effective prior art date of its filing date. Lynk Labs argued that documents become prior art when they are published, and so the Martin application’s effective prior art date was its publication date, because it was not publicly accessible prior to that point.
The DecisionThe Lynk Labs court agreed with the Board, noting that while typical documents, such as journal articles and the like, become prior art on their publication date, patent applications operate under a separate rule when determining prior art. Where printed publications such as journal articles are governed by section 102(a) and (b), patent applications are governed by section 102(e)(1), which notes that the patent application would serve as prior art if it were filed before the claimed invention. Accordingly, even if it were published and publicly accessible only after the filing of the claimed invention, it could still serve as prior art and be used to deny claims.
The Lynk Labs decision has marked consequences for clients with business before the USPTO. First, it underscores the importance of securing an early filing date, as even the most robust patentability search may not be able to find unpublished applications that may serve as prior art if there is delay. Second, the Lynx Labs decision opens opportunities for clients looking to secure and defend their intellectual property rights against potential infringers and competitors by affirming the wider scope of a patent application in being able to prevent others from claiming rights to the same invention. Ultimately, however, it makes clear that there is no safe harbor from others’ patent applications, and so entities are advised to secure early filing dates to protect their intellectual property.
Recent Developments: Nationwide CTA Injunction Lifted, New March 21, 2025, Reporting Deadline Set, and Reporting Rule May Be Modified
Key Takeaways:
The Corporate Transparency Act (CTA) reporting requirements are back in effect following a Texas district court decision entered on February 18.
According to the Financial Crime Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the new general deadline for most reporting companies filing initial, updated, and corrected BOI reports is March 21and the deadline for a reporting company with a previously given later deadline is the later deadline.
In the interim, FinCEN “will assess its options to further modify deadlines, while prioritizing reporting for those entities that pose the most significant national security risks.”
FinCEN also “intends to initiate a process this year to revise the BOI reporting rule to reduce burden for lower-risk entities, including many U.S. small businesses.”
Background:
On January 23, 2025, the United States Supreme Court (SCOTUS) reversed the U.S. district court’s preliminary injunction staying the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA) and the implementing Reporting Rule in Texas Top Cop Shop v McHenry (f/k/a Texas Top Cop Shop v Garland), Case No. 4:24-cv-00478 (E.D. Tex. 2024). For background, see our previous alerts describing the Texas Top Cop Shop district court’s December 3, 2024, opinion and order, and the Fifth Circuit’s decisions lifting and later reinstating the district court’s nationwide stay.[1]
A separate nationwide stay of the CTA Reporting Rule issued on January 7, 2025, by another Texas district court in Smith v U.S. Department of Treasury, Case No. 6:24-cv-00336 (E.D. Tex. Jan 7, 2025) was not affected by the SCOTUS order in Texas Top Cop Shop and remained in effect.[2]
On January 24, 2025, FinCEN published an updated alert acknowledging that, in light of the continuing effect of the nationwide stay in Smith, reporting companies were at that time not required to report beneficial ownership information but could do so voluntarily.[3]
On February 5, 2025, the Department of Justice (DOJ) appealed the Smith nationwide stay to the Fifth Circuit and filed a motion with the Smith district court asking it to lift that stay in view of the SCOTUS order in Texas Top Cop Shop. DOJ stated that, if lifted, FinCEN intended to extend reporting deadlines for 30 days and, during that period, evaluate whether to revise reporting requirements on “low-risk” entities and prioritize enforcement on the “most significant national security risks.”
On February 6, 2025, FinCEN published a new alert acknowledging the DOJ’s pending appeal in Smith and motion requesting the district court to lift the stay in Smith. FinCEN also confirmed its intention, if the stay was lifted, to extend the reporting deadline by 30 days and to assess options to modify further reporting deadlines for “lower-risk” entities during the 30-day period.
Smith District Court Lifts Stay of CTA Reporting Rule:
On February 18, 2025, the Smith district court stayed the preliminary relief granted in its January 5, 2025, order, including the nationwide stay of the CTA Reporting Rule, pending disposition of the Smith appeal to the Fifth Circuit.[4]
CTA Reporting Requirements Back in Effect:
On February 19, 2025, FinCEN published an updated alert stating that, in view of the Smith district court’s decision, “beneficial ownership information (BOI) reporting requirements under the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA) are once again back in effect.” FinCEN generally extended the deadline for most reporting companies filing initial, updated and corrected BOI reports to March 21, 2025 (30 calendar days from February 19, 2025). FinCEN also stated that “during this 30-day period, FinCEN will assess its options to further modify deadlines, while prioritizing reporting for those entities that pose the most significant national security risks” and that “FinCEN also intends to initiate a process this year to revise the BOI reporting rule to reduce burden for lower-risk entities, including many U.S. small businesses.” At the same time, FinCEN also updated two other alerts with respect to Texas Top Cop Shop and National Small Business United v Yellen.[5]
FinCEN Updated CTA Reporting Deadlines:
The updated deadlines, as set forth in the FinCEN updated alert, follow:
For the “vast majority” of reporting companies, the new deadline to file an initial, updated, and/or corrected BOI report is March 21, 2025. FinCEN also stated that it will provide an update before that deadline of any further deadline modifications, recognizing that more time may be needed to meet BOI reporting obligations.
For reporting companies that were previously given a reporting deadline later than the March 21, 2025, the applicable deadline is that later deadline. FinCEN included as an example, “if a company’s reporting deadline is in April 2025 because it qualifies for certain disaster relief extensions, it should follow the April deadline, not the March deadline.”
FinCEN also noted that the plaintiffs in National Small Business United v. Yellen are not currently required to report their beneficial ownership information to FinCEN. See FinCEN alert “Notice Regarding National Small Business United v. Yellen, No. 5:22-cv-01448 (N.D. Ala.)”.
For additional information, see the FinCEN February 19, 2025, updated Alert, Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting | FinCEN.gov], and FinCEN Notice, FIN-2025-CTA1, FinCEN Extends Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Deadline by 30 Days; Announces Intention to Revise Reporting Rule (February 18, 2025).
If you have questions about your CTA-related engagement with the firm, please contact your Miller Canfield lawyer for further guidance.
[1] Corporate Transparency Act: Miller Canfield
[2] See the Smith district court’s opinion and order here: [Smith et al v. United States Department of The Treasury et al, No. 6:2024cv00336 – Document 30 (E.D. Tex. 2025).]
[3] The current FinCEN Alerts can be found here [Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting | FinCEN.gov.]
[4] gov.uscourts.txed.232897.39.0.pdf
[5] [Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting | FinCEN.gov]