Supreme Court Narrows Scope of Injunctions in Birthright Citizenship Case: Employer Considerations
On June 27, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision in Garland v. CASA de Maryland that narrows federal courts’ authority to issue nationwide injunctions. The ruling comes in the context of legal challenges to Executive Order 14160, which seeks to limit birthright citizenship for children born in the United States to undocumented immigrants and nonimmigrant visa holders.
Although the Court did not decide whether the executive order is constitutional, it held that lower courts may only provide injunctive relief to the actual parties involved in litigation. This change restricts the use of nationwide blocks on federal policy and has practical implications for U.S. employers whose workforce includes foreign nationals or mixed-status families.
Background: Executive Order 14160
President Trump issued Executive Order 14160 on Jan. 20, 2025. It directs federal agencies to deny U.S. citizenship to children born in the United States unless at least one parent is a U.S. citizen, lawful permanent resident, or active-duty member of the U.S. Armed Forces. The order prompted multiple lawsuits challenging its constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment.
While several federal district courts issued preliminary injunctions blocking the order’s enforcement, the Supreme Court has now clarified that such injunctions cannot extend beyond the named plaintiffs or organizational members specifically covered in each case.
To avoid immediate disruption, the Court granted a 30-day pause before the order may be enforced in jurisdictions not protected by an active lawsuit.
Where Is the Executive Order Currently Blocked?
Active injunctions cover the following 22 states, plus the District of Columbia and the city of San Francisco, based on their participation in multi-state litigation. Individuals born in these jurisdictions remain protected from the executive order for now:
Covered States:
Arizona
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Hawaii
Illinois
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Nevada
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
Oregon
Rhode Island
Vermont
Washington
Wisconsin
Covered Municipalities:
District of Columbia
City of San Francisco
These jurisdictions joined one of four key lawsuits filed in federal courts in Massachusetts, Maryland, Washington, and New Hampshire. Those cases remain active and are expected to proceed to full hearings on the merits of the executive order’s constitutionality.
States Not Covered by Active Legal Challenges
In contrast, the following 28 states did not join any of the pending lawsuits and are not currently protected by court-ordered injunctions. Barring further legal action, the executive order may be enforced in these states after the 30-day delay expires:
Uncovered States:
Alabama
Alaska
Arkansas
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Virginia
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
While Wisconsin joined earlier litigation, its standing under the narrowed injunction framework may be subject to review depending on how lower courts interpret organizational and class membership post-ruling.
Are More Lawsuits Expected?
Given the Court’s limitation on nationwide relief, additional lawsuits may be filed in states not currently covered. Civil rights organizations, advocacy groups, and affected individuals may bring new legal challenges to extend protections on a state-by-state or plaintiff-by-plaintiff basis.
Employers should be aware that the legal landscape may shift rapidly, especially as courts clarify who qualifies for relief under existing injunctions and whether new cases will result in further geographic coverage.
Key Considerations for Employers
While the executive order does not impose direct compliance obligations on employers, its implementation may impact a future generation of U.S.-born children whose eligibility for citizenship—and later work authorization—may be called into question.
Avoid Unlawful Inquiries: Employers may not inquire into an employee’s or applicant’s immigration or parental status in ways that could violate anti-discrimination provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act or Title VII.
Stay Informed on State-Level Variations: Multistate employers should track litigation in the states where they operate. Birthright citizenship—and the documentation associated with it—might vary across jurisdictions.
Plan for HR and Benefits Questions: Employees may seek guidance regarding their children’s eligibility for health insurance, dependent care, or other benefits. HR teams should refer legal or immigration-related questions to counsel.
Support Affected Employees: Where lawful and appropriate, employers may wish to provide access to legal resources or employee assistance programs to help affected families understand their rights.
Coordinate with Legal Counsel: Companies with operations in uncovered states may wish to assess risk exposure and prepare for possible requests for documentation, public benefits eligibility verification, or identity validation linked to the order.
Takeaways
The Supreme Court’s decision redefines how federal policy can be challenged—and where. While it does not determine the fate of birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment, it limits the reach of lower court rulings, shifting the burden of protection to individual states and plaintiffs.
Nonsolicitation Agreement Forfeiture Clause Falls Outside Massachusetts Noncompetition Act
In a June 2025 opinion, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) clarified that the Massachusetts Noncompetition Agreement Act’s scope does not extend to a forfeiture clause tied to the breach of a nonsolicitation agreement.
Case Overview: Miele v. Foundation Medicine, Inc.
An employee was bound by an agreement not to solicit employees of Foundation Medicine. The employee later affirmed her nonsolicitation obligations in a separation agreement, which provided that the employee’s severance benefits would be forfeited in the event she breached her contractual obligations.
Foundation Medicine subsequently ceased paying severance benefits based on its claim that the employee had violated her nonsolicitation agreement. The employee filed suit and alleged that the forfeiture provision ran afoul of the Massachusetts Noncompetition Act, which places strict limitations on the use of noncompetition agreements, which, in turn, are defined to include “forfeiture for competition agreements.”
The trial court agreed with the employee’s position that the Massachusetts Noncompetition Act prohibited the forfeiture clause and ruled in favor of the employee on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
SJC Opinion
In Miele, the SJC overturned the lower court’s decision based on a reading of plain statutory language. The Court ruled that under the Noncompetition Act, “(1) noncompetition agreements do not include nonsolicitation agreements, and (2) forfeiture for competition agreements are a subset of noncompetition agreements.” Therefore, according to the SJC, “[i]t follows, by necessary implication, that forfeiture for competition agreements also exclude nonsolicitation agreements. To conclude otherwise would contradict the statute’s express exclusion of non solicitation agreements from the broader category of noncompetition agreements.”
The SJC drew a distinction between the nature of the underlying agreement and the remedy for a violation, noting that pairing a nonsolicitation agreement with a forfeiture clause does not convert it to a noncompetition agreement. “A non solicitation covenant remains just that – regardless of whether the remedy for breach involves forfeiture of benefits. Because the act expressly excludes non solicitation covenants, and the forfeiture at issue is triggered solely by breach of such a covenant, the act does not apply.”
Key Consideration for Massachusetts Employers
The Miele decision clarifies that employers in Massachusetts may utilize nonsolicitation agreements without worrying that a forfeiture remedy may bring the agreement within the Massachusetts Noncompetition Act’s purview.
If The Shoe Doesn’t Fit: Supreme Court Rejects “Minimum Contacts” For Personal Jurisdiction Under FSIA
The Supreme Court recently confirmed in a unanimous decision the requirements for personal jurisdiction over foreign states when parties seek to confirm international arbitration awards, but important questions remain.
In CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd., after nearly fifteen years of litigation, the Supreme Court held that personal jurisdiction exists over a foreign state under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (“FSIA”) when at least one of FSIA’s sovereign immunity exceptions applies and service is proper. In reaching that conclusion, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s earlier determination that, based on International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), personal jurisdiction cannot exist under FSIA absent “minimum contacts” with the United States.
This case, like many others, “began with two companies and a contract.” Antrix Corporation Ltd. (“Antrix”)—a company owned by the Republic of India—and Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. (“Devas”) entered into a satellite-leasing agreement. Under the agreement, Antrix agreed to build a satellite network and lease a portion of it to Devas. After several years, and right before the satellites were scheduled to launch, Antrix terminated the agreement, at the government’s request, invoking the contract’s force majeure clause.
Devas initiated arbitration, and the arbitral panel unanimously concluded Antrix breached the contract and awarded Devas $562.5 million in damages, plus interest. After successfully confirming the arbitration award in France and the United Kingdom, Devas sought to do the same in the Western District of Washington, resulting in a $1.29 billion judgment. On appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit, relying on circuit precedent, concluded the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Antrix because it did not have sufficient “minimum contacts” with the United States under International Shoe.
The Supreme Court reversed. Starting with FSIA’s plain text, the Supreme Court explained that personal jurisdiction “shall exist” if (1) one of the Act’s enumerated exceptions applies and (2) service was proper. By importing the requirements of International Shoe, the Ninth Circuit created a third requirement divorced from the plain text and not otherwise supported by the FSIA’s structure or history.
While the Court’s holding confirms that the FSIA does not itself require minimum contacts, it left open whether such a nexus remains necessary to comport with the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court also declined to decide whether the FSIA’s arbitration exception to foreign sovereign immunity applies only to arbitration agreements that concern commerce within or with the United States; and whether this case, which involves parties located in a foreign country (India) engaged in commerce in a foreign country under the laws of that country, should be dismissed under forum non conveniens. These questions will likely need to be sorted on remand to the District Court.
Texas Supreme Court Holds That Executor Who Is Also The Sole Beneficiary Of The Estate Can Represent The Estate Pro Se
In Suday v. Suday, the executor was also the sole beneficiary of her mother’s estate. No. 24-1009, __ Tex. LEXIS __ (Tex. June 27, 2025) (per curiam). She engaged in substantial litigation seeking to challenge her parents’ divorce decree and property distribution. While her appeal was pending in the court of appeals, the executor’s attorney withdrew. The court of appeals notified her that she could not represent her mother’s estate pro se and extended her briefing deadline to allow her time to secure new counsel. When the executor did not obtain counsel for the estate, the court of appeals dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed. It assumed without deciding the correctness of the general rule, that an estate’s executor may not represent the estate pro se. However, the Court held that that rule would not apply in this case because the executor was also the sole beneficiary. The Court noted that the logic underlying the general prohibition is that an executor serves in a representative capacity, thereby requiring her to represent the rights of third parties. But when there are no other parties with an interest in the estate, the executor represents only her own rights. In this situation, The Court held that the right to self-representation outweighs any competing concerns. Accordingly, the Court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and remanded the case to the court of appeals to address the remaining issues on the merits.
Meta’s AI Copyright Victory: What It Means for the Future of AI Training
On the heels of our post on Anthropic’s mixed ruling in its copyright case, we have witnessed another plot twist in the AI copyrighted-data-usage saga, this time with Meta scoring a significant victory of its own in federal court.
The Battle Lines: Authors vs. Meta’s Llama
Several prominent public figures, including comedian Sarah Silverman and Pulitzer Prize winners Andrew Sean Greer and Junot Díaz, have challenged Meta’s extensive AI plans, arguing that Meta’s Llama AI (whose branding is an amalgam of “Large Language Model”) was trained on their works without authorization.
In discovery, Meta essentially conceded that point. Nonetheless, US District Judge Vince Chhabria just delivered a major victory for Meta, granting summary judgment in its favor. But this decision is different from the Anthropic outcome, with far-reaching implications for both content creators and AI developers.
Why Meta Won (And What the Authors Got Wrong)
A key inquiry in the fair-use analysis is whether the secondary work (here, Llama) is likely to substitute for the original work (the authors’ books) in the marketplace and thereby undermine the incentive to create. The judge’s reasoning centered on a key oversight by the authors: they failed to establish a vital point in this inquiry—market harm. Consider this: if someone takes your work and creates something entirely different, does it impact your book sales? That’s the critical question the authors didn’t address. Judge Chhabria pointed out, Look, you might have a case about AI saturating the market, but you never really made that argument in court.
Meta’s defense? Their AI isn’t trying to be a book. It’s not meant to be read like a novel. Instead, it’s a “quintessentially transformative” product that learns from books to do something entirely different. It’s like saying a chef who learns techniques from cookbooks isn’t competing with those cookbooks—they’re creating meals, not recipes.
A recent study on Llama indicates this isn’t entirely accurate. That study revealed that Llama 3.1 “memorizes certain books, such as Harry Potter and 1984, almost completely.” In the Harry Potter example, the study found that Llama 3.1 memorized 42 percent of the first Harry Potter book (HP and the Philosopher’s Stone) so thoroughly that it can reproduce verbatim excerpts at least half the time.
The Piracy Problem Nobody’s Talking (Enough) About
Here’s the surprising part: evidence suggests that Meta may have knowingly downloaded millions of books from shady “shadow libraries” such as Books3, Library Genesis, and Z-Library. These are piracy networks, and internal emails reportedly revealed that Meta brass approved of using “likely pirated” material.
You might think that Llama has run out of grazing space, right? Surprisingly, the judge didn’t dwell on this revelation as much as you’d expect. This judicial divergence raises broader questions about how courts should weigh the methods by which AI systems acquire their capabilities against their ultimate functions. When AI systems increasingly serve as intermediaries between humans and information, the legitimacy of their training processes may matter beyond traditional copyright analysis, affecting public trust in AI-mediated knowledge and decision-making.
A Tale of Two Rulings: Meta vs. Anthropic
Our earlier discussion of the Anthropic case is highly relevant to this context. While Meta emerged victorious, Anthropic faced a more complex result. Judge Alsup concluded that training AI using copyrighted books is acceptable (describing it as “exceedingly transformative”), but downloading those books from pirated sites is clearly prohibited. Anthropic remains at risk of a damages trial over its methods of collecting training data. As Judge Alsup put it, “You can’t just bless yourself by saying I have a research purpose.”
The comparison is notable: two federal judges, two AI companies, similar copyright claims, yet different emphasis and rulings. Judge Chhabria even questioned some of Judge Alsup’s reasoning, highlighting ongoing debates on how to address AI and copyright issues. These differing approaches suggest courts are still developing frameworks for evaluating AI systems that will increasingly shape how people access and understand information. The question isn’t just whether AI training constitutes fair use, but how the integrity of AI development processes affects their role as knowledge intermediaries.
What This Means for You
If You’re in AI:
The good news? Training AI models with copyrighted material appears to have legal support as “transformative use.” However, you must ensure you’re obtaining that data legally. The era of “download first, ask questions later” is seemingly coming to an end.
If You’re a Creator:
Stay hopeful. The Anthropic ruling protects your work from piracy by proxy from LLMs. This ruling offers a clear guide for upcoming cases. The main focus is on demonstrating market harm. Show how AI-generated content might flood your market and impact your sales negatively. Keep records of everything. Get involved with creator advocacy organizations. And display “NO AI TRAINING” notices on your work.
The Bottom Line
These rulings arrive as AI systems transition from experimental technologies to essential infrastructure for information processing and decision-making. We are witnessing the emergence of new legal frameworks for the AI era. Meta’s victory doesn’t mean AI companies have free rein to use any content they want. It means they need to be smarter about how they acquire data and how they utilize it.
The message is becoming clearer: AI can learn from the world’s creative works, but it must adhere to the rules and establish its authority through legitimate means. Think of it like this — AI needs a library card rather than a pirate’s map. As these systems become more powerful mediators of human knowledge and creativity, the integrity of their development processes becomes as important as their capabilities.
As these technologies transform how we create and consume content, one thing’s certain: the legal battles are far from over. But at least now we’re beginning to see where the boundaries might be.
Stay tuned for more updates on AI copyright law as this fascinating legal landscape continues to develop.
“Llama is not capable of generating enough text from the plaintiffs’ books to matter, and the plaintiffs are not entitled to the market for licensing their works as AI training data.” U.S. District Judge Vince Chhabria
Federal Court Nullifies HHS Rule Granting Extra Protections to Reproductive Health Information
On June 18, 2025, a federal district court struck down a regulation from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that restricted disclosure of reproductive health information in connection with investigations and prosecutions of patients who receive, or people who help them receive, reproductive health care.
Quick Hits
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas recently invalidated an HHS rule that imposed additional limits and conditions on disclosure of a person’s reproductive health information for the purpose of criminal and civil investigations and prosecutions.
The court ruled that health plans and healthcare providers can disclose a person’s reproductive health information to comply with state reporting mandates.
The court left intact part of the regulations that implemented notice of privacy practices requirements for Part 2 substance abuse disorder protections.
On June 18, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas struck down a 2024 HHS rule that bestowed extra privacy protections on reproductive health information that is personally identifiable. The ruling applies nationwide.
As a result, the modifications to the privacy rule under the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) that further limited situations in which health plans and healthcare providers could disclose reproductive health information in the context of criminal or civil prosecutions is no longer in effect.
In Purl v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the court reasoned that the HHS rule is “contrary to law” because it “unlawfully limits” state public health laws. In particular, the court found the HHS rule “impermissibly redefines ‘person’ and ‘public health’ in contravention of federal law and in excess of statutory authority.” Furthermore, the court stated, “HHS regulations cannot preempt a contrary state law with more stringent health-information protection requirements.”
HIPAA states that federal law does not “invalidate or limit the authority, power, or procedures established under any law providing for the reporting of disease or injury, child abuse, birth, or death, public health surveillance, or public health investigation or intervention.”
In this case, a healthcare clinic owner in Texas sued, claiming the HHS rule impaired her ability to fulfill a state-mandated obligation to report child abuse to authorities. Many states mandate that certain professions, such as teachers, social workers, and healthcare providers, report to the police when they have reasonable cause to suspect child abuse or child neglect.
Background on the Rule
The HIPAA Privacy Rule to Support Reproductive Health Care Privacy took effect on June 25, 2024, and covered entities were required to comply by December 23, 2024.
That regulation was published after the Supreme Court of the United States decided in 2022, in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, that states could ban abortions. A few states passed laws to permit criminal charges against women for getting an abortion, or against individuals who helped women travel to obtain an abortion. In response, the Biden administration issued an executive order requiring HHS to find methods to protect and expand access to reproductive healthcare services. HHS issued regulations to restrict the disclosure of reproductive health information for certain purposes.
The final rule specifically added “reproductive health care” to the types of medical information protected by HIPAA, if the medical care was lawful where and when it was provided. This term includes abortion, contraception, emergency contraception, pregnancy-related conditions, miscarriage management, and infertility diagnosis and treatment.
The final rule restricted HIPAA-regulated entities when disclosing reproductive health information for the following purposes:
to conduct a criminal, civil, or administrative investigation;
to impose criminal, civil, or administrative liability on a person for seeking, obtaining, providing, or facilitating reproductive health care; or
to identify any person for the purpose of conducting such an investigation or imposing such a liability.
At least sixteen states challenged the final rule in court. They argued the Biden-era rule exceeded HHS’s statutory authority and unlawfully restricted state-mandated reporting obligations, particularly those related to child abuse. The Trump administration revoked the previous executive order but has issued no further guidance. As of the date of publication, HHS has flagged the court’s vacatur of most of the regulations and the retention of the Part 2 provisions related to the notice of privacy practices, and it has stated that it “will determine next steps after a thorough review of the court’s decision.”
Next Steps
HIPAA-regulated entities may wish to review their policies and practices related to disclosing information about reproductive health care, including abortion. Pursuant to Purl v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, they will not be held liable for revealing a person’s reproductive health information to cooperate with a criminal or civil investigation.
The court decision upheld one part of the 2024 final rule that required HIPAA-regulated entities to communicate Part 2 requirements, when applicable, to obtain written consent before disclosing any information that identifies an individual as having a substance use disorder. Thus, health plans and healthcare providers are still required to amend their notice of privacy practices by February 16, 2026, to comply with the regulation related to Part 2’s substance use disorder information requirements.
Perfume, Proof, and Parallel Imports: How Coty’s Traceability System Won a Trade Mark War
Background
On 16 April 2025, the District Court of The Hague in the Netherlands handed down a decision relating to the complex issue of trade mark exhaustion in the context of parallel trade disputes.
The claimant, Coty Beauty Germany (Coty), is a global cosmetics company and exclusive licensee of several well-known trade marks, including Hugo Boss. Coty operates a selective distribution network for the products in the European Economic Area (EEA). The defendant, Easycosmetic Benelux (Easycosmetic), is an unauthorised wholesaler of perfumes and cosmetics that operates outside of Coty’s selective distribution network.
The dispute concerned a 200ml bottle of “Bottled Night” Hugo Boss perfume, which was being sold by Easycosmetic in the Netherlands. Coty claimed that this specific bottle had originally been shipped to South Africa and therefore had not been placed on the EEA market by Coty or with its consent.
Legal Framework
The case hinged on Article 15(1) of the EU Trade Mark Regulation (2017/1001), which states that a trade mark owner cannot oppose further commercialisation of goods once they have been lawfully placed on the EEA market by or with the trade mark owner’s consent. This principle is referred to as trade mark exhaustion.
However, the District Court of The Hague clarified the position on the burden of proof in trade mark exhaustion cases, which is nuanced. The trade mark holder, here Coty, must initially substantiate the claim of infringement. However, the burden of proving that the trade mark is exhausted—in this case, that the goods were lawfully placed on the EEA market—lies with the defendant, Easycosmetic.
However, the District Court of The Hague clarified the position on the burden of proof in trade mark exhaustion cases, which is nuanced. The trade mark holder, here Coty, must initially substantiate the claim of infringement. However, the burden of proving that the trade mark is exhausted—in this case, that the goods were lawfully placed on the EEA market—lies with the defendant, Easycosmetic.
The claimant operates a selective distribution system;
The goods do not clearly identify the intended market;
The trade mark owner refuses to share information about the disputed product’s intended destination; and
The defendant’s suppliers are not forthcoming about their own sources of supply.
In Coty v Easycosmetic, it was not necessary for the court to rule on whether the burden of proof had shifted, because Easycosmetic ceased to dispute that the perfume bottles were marketed for outside the EEA.
Still, this did not mean that Coty’s product traceability evidence went to waste.
The Role of Traceability in Coty’s Victory
A pivotal element in Coty’s success was its ability to trace the product’s origin and distribution path. Coty presented evidence from its internal product tracking system, which showed that the specific bottle in question had been manufactured for and shipped to a non-EEA market, specifically South Africa.
The traceability system allowed Coty to:
Identify the batch number and match it to a specific shipment;
Demonstrate the intended market for the product; and
Prove the lack of consent for EEAmarketing of the perfume bottle.
Traceability: A Legal Sword and Shield
The Coty v Easycosmetic ruling is a powerful reminder that traceability is not just a logistics tool, it is a legal asset. For companies looking to protect their brands, especially those operating a selective distribution system, investing in an effective product tracking system is essential for protecting brand reputation and trade marks in the EEA.
A traceability system is necessary to comply with certain government regulations, for example cosmetic distributors are already obliged under the EU Cosmetic Regulations (EC) No 1223/2009, which was retained by UK law as the UK’s Cosmetic Regulations, to maintain a traceability system.
A robust traceability system can serve as decisive evidence in legal disputes to thwart unauthorised parallel imports from outside the EEA. As this case proves, there are certain circumstances in which the court will instruct the trade mark owner to provide evidence of non-EEA origin. Therefore, a well-maintained product traceability system ensures that brand owners are able to provide convincing evidence in court.
A solid traceability system acts as a deterrent to unauthorised resellers who want to exploit a non-EEA bargain, and this case serves as a reminder to unauthorised resellers that they may find themselves defenceless and out of pocket in infringement lawsuits.
If products are traceable, the brand owner may be able to operate and enforce its selective distribution system with greater ease, as it allows it to identify sources of supply of unauthorised resellers and ensure such product leaks are appropriately dealt with (for instance, also against EEA partners that breach their selective distribution terms with the brand by selling outside the network).
Traceability can support efficient and compliant product recalls.
Product traceability can assist with verifying commercial warranty/repair claims from consumers, for instance where a commercial warranty from the brand is only available for products purchased from approved sources (permitted in most member states).
Finally, a suitably designed traceability system can also in principle be deployed to meet a brand’s digital product password obligations under legislation such as the EU’s Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation.
Ultimately, a traceability system is a powerful legal and commercial resource for brands. Our team would be happy to assist your brand with establishing and maintaining a compliant and effective traceability system.
Supreme Court Rules Federal District Courts Likely Lack Authority for Universal Injunctions
On June 27, 2025, the Supreme Court of the United States held that federal district courts likely lack the authority to issue universal injunctions blocking presidential actions nationwide, a ruling that is likely to allow the Trump administration to continue enforcing executive orders (EO) or other policies despite legal challenges to their constitutionality.
Quick Hits
The Supreme Court ruled that federal district courts likely lack the authority to issue universal injunctions blocking presidential actions nationwide.
The Court found that the Judiciary Act of 1789 does not provide for universal injunctions, emphasizing that equitable relief must be tailored to the specific plaintiffs involved in a case.
The decision will potentially allow the Trump administration to continue enforcing its executive orders despite ongoing legal challenges, while not commenting on the constitutionality of the specific executive order regarding birthright citizenship.
In the 6–3 decision in Trump v. CASA, Inc., the Supreme Court found that the Trump administration was likely to prove that the U.S. Congress did not provide district courts with equitable authority to issue universal injunctions in the Judiciary Act of 1789. The decision comes in cases alleging President Donald Trump’s EO limiting birthright citizenship is unconstitutional.
Three district courts have issued universal injunctions blocking the enforcement of the EO. Universal injunctions, often referred to as nationwide injunctions, are court orders that apply to a broader group of affected individuals or entities across the country.
“These injunctions … likely exceed the equitable authority that Congress has granted to federal courts,” the Court said.
The Supreme Court granted the administration’s applications to stay the injunctions “to the extent that the injunctions are broader than necessary” and ordered the lower courts to “move expeditiously to ensure that, with respect to each plaintiff, the injunctions comport” with the ruling and the principles of equity.
The ruling has significant implications for the powers of the federal courts and their authority to enjoin government actions beyond how they affect parties in a case. However, the Court expressly did not address whether the EO limiting birthright citizenship is unconstitutional.
Background
The decision stems from three cases brought by a group of individuals, organizations, and states alleging that challenging President Trump’s EO 14160, which asserted that citizenship may only be conferred to children with one or more parents who hold U.S. citizenship or lawful permanent resident (LPR) status (i.e., a “green card”). The plaintiffs alleged the EO violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution’s Citizenship Clause and Section 201 of the Nationality Act of 1940.
Federal district courts in each case ruled the EO is likely unconstitutional, and each court entered a universal injunction barring the enforcement of EO 14160 against anyone, not just the plaintiffs. The Trump administration sought stays of those universal injunctions but was denied by the First, Fourth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals. The Trump administration then filed emergency applications to the Supreme Court seeking partial stays limiting those injunctions.
Equitable Authority
The Supreme Court reasoned that the Judiciary Act of 1789, which authorizes federal courts to issue equitable remedies, does not extend to universal injunctions, as such remedies were not traditionally available in the High Court of Chancery in England at the time of the founding. The Court said the only “analogous” form of relief is the type of relief modern U.S. courts are only authorized to provide in class actions under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Court further emphasized that injunctions should provide “complete relief” to the plaintiffs, but should not extend beyond what is necessary to achieve that relief. The Court said “‘[c]omplete relief’ is not synonymous with ‘universal relief,’” which it said is a “narrower concept” that addresses providing relief between the parties.
“Here, prohibiting enforcement of the Executive Order against the child of an individual pregnant plaintiff will give that plaintiff complete relief: Her child will not be denied citizenship,” the Court said. “Extending the injunction to cover all other similarly situated individuals would not render her relief any more complete.”
The plaintiff had argued that universal injunctions allow courts to protect groups from unlawful government actions. In contrast, the Trump administration had argued that blocking government action forces the government to seek stays and thereby requires federal courts to resolve difficult legal questions on an expedited basis without full briefing. However, the Court declined to address such policy arguments, holding that “well-established precedent” establishes the limits of equitable relief that district courts may provide.
“Nothing like a universal injunction was available at the founding, or for that matter, for more than a century thereafter,” the Court said. “Thus, under the Judiciary Act, federal courts lack authority to issue them.”
Rule of Law Questions
Justice Sonia Sotomayor issued a dissent, which was joined by Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson, arguing that the Court’s holding allows the government to continue to enforce an unconstitutional order against parties unless they file their own suit.
“The majority holds that, absent cumbersome class-action litigation, courts cannot completely enjoin even such plainly unlawful policies unless doing so is necessary to afford the formal parties complete relief,” Justice Sotomayor wrote. “That holding renders constitutional guarantees meaningful in name only for any individuals who are not parties to a lawsuit.”
Separately, Justice Jackson argued that the holding is an “existential threat to the rule of law” and that “courts must have the power to order everyone (including the Executive) to follow the law—full stop.”
Next Steps
The decision in Trump v. CASA, Inc., provides the Trump administration with a key judicial victory that will allow it to continue to enforce part of its EO on birthright citizenship against individuals who do not file suit, and could open the door for similar enforcement of other executive orders or policies that are facing constitutional challenges.
In TCPA Case, SCOTUS Rules District Courts Are Not Bound by Final FCC Orders
Key Takeaways:
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the Hobbs Act does not require district courts in civil enforcement proceedings to follow federal administrative agencies’ legal interpretations of federal statutes.
This ruling is a logical extension of Loper Bright, which, in overturning Chevron deference, expanded the judiciary’s power to review and reject agency interpretations of federal statutes.
Justice Kavanaugh, writing for the 6-3 majority, determined it would be unfair to preclude judicial review by district courts and announced a “default rule” that applies where the statute neither expressly allows nor prohibits judicial review in the context of enforcement proceedings.
Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Jackson and Sotomayor, vigorously dissented, asserting that the ruling effectively rewards parties that “intentionally or negligently forgo [ ]Hobbs Act review.”
In June 2024, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, which, in overturning Chevron deference, expanded the judiciary’s power to review and reject interpretations of statutes adopted by federal administrative agencies. Last week, the Court’s majority articulated a logical extension of Loper Bright, holding, over a vigorous dissent, that the Administrative Orders Review Act — usually referred to as the Hobbs Act, 64 Stat. 1129 — does not require district courts in civil enforcement proceedings to follow an agency’s legal interpretation of a federal statute. Instead, this ruling in McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corp., et al. held that district courts “must determine the meaning of the law under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation, affording appropriate respect to the agency’s interpretation.” 1
McLaughlin involved a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) order interpreting the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) 47 U.S.C.A. § 227, specifically the TCPA’s prohibition on unsolicited advertisements sent by fax to a “telephone facsimile machine.” McLaughlin claimed, on behalf of a class, that McKesson had violated the TCPA by faxing unsolicited advertisements that did not contain an opt-in notice required by the statute. Most class members received those faxes via online fax services; only a few received them via traditional fax machines. The district court did not differentiate and certified a class of all fax recipients.
The Amerifactors Order
But, while the McLaughlin litigation was pending, a third party, wholly uninvolved in the litigation, petitioned the FCC for a declaratory ruling as to whether the TCPA applied to faxes received through online fax services. The FCC answered “no” in In re Amerifactors Financial Group, LLC, interpreting the term “telephone facsimile machine” to exclude online fax services.2 The McLaughlin district court found the FCC’s Amerifactors Order to be binding, in that the court had no authority to “question the validity of FCC final orders,” which are, under the Hobbs Act, “subject to the exclusive review of the court of appeals in pre-enforcement suits.” McLaughlin, 2025 WL 1716136 at *3 (internal quotations omitted). The district court, therefore, granted summary judgment in favor of McKesson on claims involving online faxes and, because there were only twelve people left, decertified the class. Id.
The Ninth Circuit agreed that the district court was “bound by” the Amerifactors order and affirmed. The Supreme Court, however, granted certiorari to “decide whether the Hobbs Act required the District Court to follow the FCC’s legal interpretation of the TCPA.” Id. at 4. Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh, writing for a 6-3 majority, held that the answer is “no.”
A “Default Rule” Allowing Judicial Review When Not Expressly Prohibited
The Hobbs Act provides for pre-enforcement judicial review of FCC orders (and orders from other listed agencies). A party that disagrees with an agency order may file a petition in a federal court of appeals within 60 days of the order. The Hobbs Act provides that “[t]he court of appeals…has exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, or suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of … all final orders of the [FCC].” 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1). The problem, the Supreme Court wrote, is what happens if nobody does this and the 60 days passed? Are all federal courts then required to accept the agency’s interpretation, even if they find it incorrect or even irrational? Unsurprisingly, in the wake of Loper Bright, the Court answered in the negative.
The Court found it unfair that judicial review should be precluded and announced a “default rule” that applies where the statute neither expressly allows nor expressly prohibits judicial review in the context of enforcement proceedings: “In an enforcement proceeding, the district court must independently determine for itself whether an agency’s interpretation of a statute is correct,” including reviewing “whether the rule or order was arbitrary and capricious under the APA or otherwise was unlawful.” Id.,2025 WL 1716136 at *6, n.2. The Court remanded McLaughlin back to the District Court for its independent determination as to whether the FCC’s decision excluding online faxes from the TPCA is correct.
A Cautionary Dissent
But Justice Kagan’s dissent — with Justices Jackson and Sotomayor joining — asked, what about the Hobbs Act’s language to the effect that the courts of appeals have “exclusive jurisdiction” to “determine the validity of” FCC or other agency orders? Id., 2025 WL 1716136 at *17. Doesn’t the plain language of the statute require that aggrieved parties seek review in a court of appeals within 60 days or forever hold their peace? Isn’t the “default rule” just made up? Why should we reward parties that “intentionally or negligently forgo [ ]Hobbs Act review?” Id., 2025 WL 1716136 at *14, n.1. Do we really want, for example, plutonium shippers to scoff at Atomic Energy Commission regulations until (or unless) an enforcement action is brought, and only then challenge the regulation? Justice Kavanaugh spent at least ten pages rebutting arguments made by McKesson, the Government and the dissent. The bottom line is that the majority found that none of these arguments outweighed the unfairness of precluding a party, who may well have been unaware of the agency’s ruling, from challenging its validity when that ruling is actually being applied to it.
After Loper Bright, the result in McLaughlin should have come as no surprise. Parties should consider the doors for challenging many administrative rules and regulations to be wide open.
[1] McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corp., et al., No. 23-1226, 2025 WL 1716136 at *6 (June 20, 2025); https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23-1226_1a72.pdf
[2] In re Amerifactors Financial Group, LLC, 34 FCC Rcd. 11950 (2019); https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-19-1247A1_Rcd.pdf
Royal v. Metcalf Suggests Confusion About Massachusetts Chapter 93A Requirements
In Royal v. Metcalf, the Massachusetts Superior Court entered summary judgment under Chapter 93A for the plaintiff (an alleged debtor) against the defendant (the owner of a company engaged in the business of collecting debts). According to the undisputed facts, the owner, without possessing chain-of-title evidence to prove ownership of the debt, filed a small claims action against the plaintiff and included prejudgment interest in the amounts claimed as unpaid principal. That, according to the court, violated M.G.L. c. 93, § 49, which prohibits unfair and deceptive debt collection practices and, in turn, constituted a per se violation of Chapter 93A, Section 2. That finding makes sense because, according to G.L. c. 93, § 49, a violation of Section 49 “shall constitute an unfair or deceptive act or practice under the provisions of chapter ninety-three A.” Beyond the per se violation, the court also concluded that filing suit to collect on a consumer debt without having—or being able to readily obtain—evidence that the plaintiff owns or has any right to collect on a debt, as the owner did here, is unfair and deceptive, because the small claims filing contained false information.
As to a Section 9 injury, the court stated as follows:
Relief is also available under § 9 where the claimed injury is ‘the invasion of a legally protected interest.’ Id. at 800, quoting Leardi v. Brown, 394 Mass. 151, 159 (1985) (landlord violated c. 93A by having tenants sign residential leases with provision falsely implying they were waiving right to habitable housing). Furthermore, § 9 ‘provides for recovery of actual damages or twenty-five dollars, whichever is greater.’ Leardi, supra, at 160, quoting G.L. c. 93A, § 9(3). ‘Accordingly, under circumstances where there has been an invasion of a legally protected interest, but no harm for which actual damages can be awarded, … the statute provides for the recovery of minimum damages in the amount of $25.’ Id. Royal has established that he has suffered an invasion of a legally protected interest. Plus, most anyone compelled to answer a small claim action will have suffered some amount of emotional distress. Both of these kinds of injury are compensable under G.L. c. 93A, § 9.
The court’s injury analysis, in part, is flawed. A Section 9 injury must be separate and distinct from the underlying Section 2 violation, as the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) held in Tyler v. Michael’s Stores, Inc. In Tyler, the SJC explained as follows:
Nevertheless, our recent decisions generally establish the following. The invasion of a consumer’s legal right (a right, for example, established by statute or regulation), without more, may be a violation of G. L. c. 93A, § 2, and even a per se violation of § 2, but the fact that there is such a violation does not necessarily mean the consumer has suffered an injury or a loss entitling her to at least nominal damages and attorney’s fees; instead, the violation of the legal right that has created the unfair or deceptive act or practice must cause the consumer some kind of separate, identifiable harm arising from the violation itself. See Rhodes v. AIG Dom. Claims, Inc., 461 Mass. 486, 496 n.16 (2012) (Rhodes); Casavant v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 460 Mass. 500, 504-505 (2011) (Casavant); Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 632-633 (2008) (Iannacchino); Hershenow v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Boston, 445 Mass. 790, 801-802 (2006) (Hershenow). To the extent that the quoted passage from Leardi can be read to signify that ‘invasion’ of a consumer plaintiff’s established legal right in a manner that qualifies as an unfair or deceptive act under G. L. c. 93A, § 2, automatically entitles the plaintiff to at least nominal damages (and attorney’s fees), we do not follow the Leardi decision. Rather, as the Rhodes, Casavant, Iannacchino, and Hershenow decisions indicate, a plaintiff bringing an action for damages under c. 93A, § 9, must allege and ultimately prove that she has, as a result, suffered a distinct injury or harm that arises from the claimed unfair or deceptive act itself.
Therefore, since Tyler, it is no longer the law in Massachusetts that the “invasion of a legally protected interest” standing alone constitutes a Section 9 injury. Rather, at most, it can violate Section 2 only. The court in Royal commingled and truncated the violation with the injury. Even so, the court apparently did find that the plaintiff suffered from emotional distress as a result of having to defend against a baseless small claims court filing. Emotional distress may serve as a separate and distinct injury under Section 9 to comply with Tyler. Therefore, if violation of Section 49 is the invasion of the legally protected interest (therefore violating Section 2), and plaintiff suffered measurable emotional distress as a result of having to defend the small claims filing (therefore establishing causation and a separate and distinct injury), then the court properly entered summary judgment—provided the facts concerning causation and emotional distress were not genuinely disputed.
Citing a Massachusetts District Court Appellate Division decision, the court also concluded that a violation of Section 49 remedied the need for the plaintiff to show the act otherwise occurred in “trade or commerce.” That conclusion, however, would seem to be at odds with the express language of Section 2, which requires “trade or commerce” as a separate condition to unfairness or deceptiveness. Indeed, Section 49 only states that failure to comply with Section 49 shall constitute an unfair or deceptive act or practice. It says nothing about “trade or commerce.” It would seem incongruous with the intent of Chapter 93A to extend its protections to actions and conduct not occurring in “trade or commerce” as Section 2 expressly requires. The court’s reliance on the Appellate Division decision is puzzling, given that meeting the trade or commerce requirement would appear to have been easily met according to the facts of the case. Furthermore, owners of businesses engaged in trade or commerce may be exposed to Chapter 93A liability if they engaged themselves in the unfair acts or practices.
The case illustrates the continued confusion among the bench and bar with Chapter 93A’s requirements.
Accidentally Deceased: Can a Consumer Reporting Agency be Liable for a Mistake?
Last week, U.S. District Judge Joshua D. Wolson of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied summary judgment motions filed by both the plaintiff and the defendant Consumer Reporting Agency (“CRA”) in a fair credit dispute under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). The plaintiff filed his complaint after the CRA incorrectly reported him as deceased to a creditor that plaintiff had applied for a credit card with, which resulted in the plaintiff’s application being denied.
The FCRA is a federal law that regulates the collection, use, and sharing of consumer credit information. It aims to ensure accuracy, fairness, and privacy by consumer reporting agencies. The FCRA grants consumers various rights and imposes strict penalties for failures to comply.
In Breitenbach v. SageStream, the plaintiff sought to open a credit card with Synchrony Bank to take advantage of a 0% interest credit card offer. Synchrony Bank provided plaintiff’s basic background information to the CRA. The CRA provides consumer reports and scores to help businesses decide whether to offer credit to customers. An unfortunate typo in the plaintiff’s information led the CRA to pull up the profile of a deceased individual with a nearly identical Social Security number. Synchrony Bank ultimately denied the plaintiff’s application. The CRA argued the mistake was reasonable and even supported by some evidence. The plaintiff, meanwhile, alleged the CRA failed to investigate and properly verify the information prior to reporting to the creditor that the plaintiff was deceased.
The plaintiff then sued the CRA, claiming it was liable for negligent and willful violation of Section 1681e(b) of the FCRA. In cross-motions for summary judgment, the CRA argued it was reasonable to run the personal identifying information provided against the death master file and accurately report when the information provided matches a deceased record. The plaintiff relied on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s 2010 ruling in Cortez v.TransUnion, which held that a credit agency willfully violates the FCRA when it ignores key differences in personal identifying information from a third party and produces an inaccurate credit report.
Judge Wolson denied both motions, concluding plaintiff had produced enough evidence that a jury could infer that the CRA failed to follow reasonable procedures, noting there was evidence in the record that the CRA had information to know that the Social Security number did not belong to the plaintiff.
Banking is a heavily regulated industry, and this litigation is a reminder that even small mistakes can have costly consequences. It is imperative to have an experienced attorney guide you through the best practices and procedures.
Upholding State Exclusion of Planned Parenthood from Medicaid, and Three Other Split Decisions – SCOTUS Today
The U.S. Supreme Court decision yesterday that likely will get the most attention is Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic, in which a 6–3 Court that lined up according to the conservative vs. liberal stereotype, held that “Section 1396a(a)(23)(A) of the Medicaid Act does not clearly and unambiguously confer individual rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C. §1983.”
Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic
The question before the Court was whether individual Medicaid beneficiaries may sue state officials under §1983, the venerable civil rights statute, for failing to comply with the “any qualified provider” provision of the Medicaid law. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic operates two clinics in South Carolina, serving both Medicaid and other patients alike. Among the services it provides is performing abortions. In 2018, South Carolina, citing state law prohibiting public funds for abortion, expelled Planned Parenthood from the state’s Medicaid program. At the same time, the state took steps that it claimed would ensure that other providers would continue offering necessary medical care and family planning services. Planned Parenthood and a patient named Julie Edwards brought a class action suit, claiming that the exclusion of Planned Parenthood violated the any-qualified-provider provision of the statute by depriving her and others of their preferred providers of gynecological care.
Justice Gorsuch, writing for himself and the other five jurisprudential conservatives, noted that §1983 allows private parties to sue state actors that violate their “rights” under the federal “Constitution and laws.” “But federal statutes do not automatically confer §1983-enforceable ‘rights.’ This is especially true of spending-power statutes like Medicaid, where ‘the typical remedy’ for violations is federal funding termination, not private suits.”
While Congress sometimes allows private enforcement through §1983, spending-power legislation cannot predicate a §1983 enforcement suit unless Congress “speaks with a clear voice, and manifests an unambiguous intent to confer individual rights.” The requirement of “unmistakable” notice assures that grantees know that they might be subject “to private suits . . . whenever they fail to comply with a federal funding condition.” Here, citing other recent decisions, the Court concluded that the statute at issue did not clearly and unambiguously confer a “right to support a cause of action under §1983.”
The Court went on to note that this standard is a “demanding” and “significant hurdle” that will be cleared only in the “atypical case.” The Court also noted that, in the past, it had sometimes “taken an expansive view of its power to imply private causes of action to enforce federal laws.” Both Justice Thomas, concurring, and Justice Jackson (along with Justices Sotomayor and Kagan), dissenting, are aware of this history. Thomas cites it, urging that the Court go further in narrowing the application of §1983. Jackson would have the Court return to that lenient application, given the remedial intention of the post-Civil War legislation.
There is little question that the Medina decision will be controversial. Putting aside any discussion of which side of the Court might have the better of the argument, I note that this is another in a series of unrelated cases in which the Court is taking a narrow view of standing. We can expect to see comparable assertions of private rights of action and text-based oppositions to them coming up in areas far afield from reproductive rights, such as cybersecurity and data privacy.
Hewitt v. United States
Hewitt v. United States involves the application of the “First Step Act,” a federal enactment that eliminated a harsh provision of earlier law that required the “stacking” of 25-year periods of incarceration for first-time violators of 18 U.S.C. §924(c), a law that criminalized possessing a firearm while committing other crimes. Congress not only rejected the harsh stacking provision, but also made the statute’s more lenient penalties partially retroactive, providing that the statute applies if a sentence “has not been imposed” upon an eligible §924(c) offender as of the date of the First Step Act’s enactment.
The question presented concerned an “edge case,” asking, “What penalties apply when a §924(c) offender had been sentenced as of the Act’s enactment, but that sentence was subsequently vacated, such that the offender must face a post-resentencing?” The Supreme Court held that, under those circumstances, a sentence “has not been imposed” for purposes of §403(b).
Interestingly, the government agreed with the petitioners, so an amicus was appointed to defend the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which held (as the amicus and the dissent contend) “that §403(b) excludes any defendant who was sentenced prior to the enactment date of the First Step Act—even if his sentence was later vacated.” They argue that, because the statute applies only “if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of ” the First Step Act’s enactment date, and a sentence “has . . . been imposed” upon that defendant as a matter of historical fact,” the statute therefore does not apply.
However, Justice Jackson, writing for a majority that included, as to the key operative sections of the opinion, the Chief Justice and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch, concluded that, based on “the text of §403(b) and the nature of vacatur, . . . a sentence has been imposed for purposes of that provision if, and only if, the sentence is extant—i.e., has not been vacated.”
Justice Alito, joined by Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, accused the majority of manipulating the language of the statute to reach a desired result. The majority, as one would expect, held that theirs was a literal reading of the actual text. An outside observer might suggest that Justice Kagan’s proclamation, several terms ago, that “we’re all textualists now” likely applies. However, that fact doesn’t guarantee that all the Justices will read a text in the same way.
Gutierrez v. Saenz
In contrast to several other cases discussed in this blog post, a somewhat lenient approach both to standing and to redressability under 42 U.S.C. §1983 governed the outcome in Gutierrez v. Saenz. Ruben Gutierrez, a convicted murderer who claimed that potentially favorable DNA evidence had been withheld by the state of Texas, filed suit under §1983 against Luis Saenz, the district attorney who has custody of the untested evidence. Gutierrez argued that Texas’s DNA testing procedures violated his liberty interests. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas agreed with him, “finding it fundamentally unfair that Texas gives prisoners the right to challenge their death sentence through habeas petitions but prevents them from obtaining DNA testing to support those petitions unless they can establish innocence of the underlying crime.” However, the Fifth Circuit disagreed, holding that Gutierrez lacked standing to bring his §1983 suit because his claimed injury was not redressable, since a declaratory judgment in his favor “would be unlikely to cause the prosecutor to ‘reverse course and allow testing.’”
In another split decision, the Supreme Court reversed, with Justice Sotomayor writing for herself, the Chief Justice and Justices Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson, and with Justice Barrett concurring in the judgment, that Gutierrez has standing to bring his §1983 claim challenging Texas’s postconviction DNA testing procedures under the Due Process Clause. State court defendants “have a liberty interest in demonstrating [their] innocence with new evidence under state law. . . . For that reason, a state-created right to postconviction procedures can sometimes create rights to other procedures essential to realizing the state-created right.”
The majority opinion criticizes the dissenting opinions of Justice Thomas and Justice Alito, which Thomas and Gorsuch joined, as faultily addressing redressability by focusing on the declaratory judgment of the district court rather than on what Gutierrez was actually complaining about. Contrary to the lower court’s holding, which was dependent upon its belief that Gutierrez would be unable to demonstrate his innocence, the proper focus of the inquiry was Gutierrez’s complaint.
“First, to the extent the Fifth Circuit based its assessment of redressability on the declaratory judgment the District Court later issued, rather than Gutierrez’s complaint, it turned the Article III standing inquiry on its head. Gutierrez’s standing does not depend on the relief the District Court ultimately granted on the merits.” The proper focus of the standing inquiry should thus have been the complaint, which challenges not only Texas’s limitation to actual innocence claims, but also the other barriers erected to Gutierrez’s DNA testing as well. “Second, and more fundamentally, the Fifth Circuit erred in transforming the redressability inquiry into a guess about whether a favorable court decision will ultimately result in the prosecutor turning over the DNA evidence.” Its decision, therefore, was reversed, and the case remanded.
Riley v. Bondi
Another split decision was delivered in Riley v. Bondi, although the split here was somewhat different from those in some other of the Court’s most recent cases. Instead, a 5–4 Court, in an opinion by Justice Alito, joined in the operative part by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch (who also dissented in part), and Jackson, with Justice Thomas separately concurring, held that an order from the Board of Immigration Appeals denying deferral of removal in a “withholding only” proceeding is not a “final order of removal” under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). In other words, the 30-day filing deadline to challenge a final order of removal is a “claims-processing rule,” not a jurisdictional requirement.
The distinction between the two is important not just to immigration lawyers but to the rest of us as well. The consequences of miscategorizing a rule as jurisdictional can be very consequential with respect to the adjudication of cases in federal courts. Supreme Court precedent thus “shows reluctance to label rules ‘jurisdictional’ unless Congress clearly signals that intent. While Congress need not use ‘magic words’ to indicate that a rule is jurisdictional, . . . the Court’s recent decisions require an exceedingly strong signal for jurisdictional classification. That demanding requirement is not met here.” However, yielding to the government’s argument as to the outcome of the case, the lower court’s order as to jurisdiction was dismissed, and the case was allowed to proceed on remand.
As I’ve suggested previously, the end of the term is often characterized by a flurry of opinions, some significant (such as Medina), in which the Court is divided. In part, that relates to a “secretarial” problem occasioned by the circulation of multiple majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions and attempts by the Justices to harmonize their views, if possible. In any event, while Washington weather and the calendar indicate that summer is here, the Court’s summer hasn’t quite started.