NEW HAMPSHIRE DEEPFAKE SCANDAL TCPA LAWSUIT: Court Refuses To Dismiss Claims Against Platforms That Allegedly Aided In Sending The AI/Deepfake Calls Impersonating President Biden
Hi TCPAWorld! Remember last year when that political consultant from Texas hired the New Orleans magician to sound like Joe Biden in order to make calls using AI technology to New Hampshire voters in an attempt to convince them not to vote?
Well, that saga continues!
So for some background here, Steve Kramer, a political consultant, used AI technology to create a deepfake recording of President Joe Biden’s voice. Days before the New Hampshire primary, nearly 10,000 voters received a call in which the AI voice falsely suggested that voting in the primary would harm Democratic efforts in the general election. To further the deception, Kramer spoofed the caller ID to display the phone number of Kathleen Sullivan, a well-known Democratic leader. Voice Broadcasting Corporation and Life Corporation enabled the call campaign, providing the technology and infrastructure necessary to deliver the calls.
Steve Kramer, Voice Broadcasting Corporation, and Life Corporation in the US District Court of New Hampshire were sued on March 14, 2024, for violations of the TCPA (as well as violations of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and New Hampshire statutes regulating political advertising) by the League of Women Voters of the United States, the League of Women Voters of New Hampshire, and three individuals who received those calls. League of Women Voters of New Hampshire et al v. Steve Kramer et al, No. 24-CV-73-SM-TSM.
Broadcasting Corporation and Life Corporation filed a motion to dismiss arguing 1) they did not “initiate” the at-issue calls and 2) these calls did not violate the TCPA because they were “’political campaign-related calls,’ which are permitted when made to landlines, even without the recipient’s prior consent.”
The court denied their motion on 3/26/25 finding that the plaintiffs adequately alleged a plausible claim for relief under the TCPA. League of Women Voters of New Hampshire et al v. Steve Kramer et al, No. 24-CV-73-SM-TSM, 2025 WL 919897 (D.N.H. Mar. 26, 2025).
The TCPA makes it unlawful “to initiate any telephone call to any residential telephone line using an artificial or prerecorded voice to deliver a message without the prior express consent of the called party.” While the TCPA does not specifically define what it means to “initiate” a call, the FCC has established clear guidance. According to In the Matter of the Joint Petition filed by Dish Network, Federal Communications Commission Declaratory Ruling, 2013 WL 1934349 at para. 26 (May 9, 2013), a party “initiates” a call if it takes the steps necessary to physically place it or is so involved in the process that it should be deemed responsible.
In this case, the court assumed, without deciding, that neither Voice Broadcasting nor Life Corporation physically placed the calls. But that didn’t absolve them. The court turned to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the companies were sufficiently involved to bear liability.
The allegations were that Voice Broadcasting didn’t merely act as a passive service provider. Instead, it actively collaborated with Kramer to refine the message and even suggested adding a false opt-out mechanism that directed recipients to call Kathleen Sullivan’s personal phone number. Life Corporation, in turn, allegedly facilitated the delivery of thousands of the calls using its telecommunications infrastructure. The court found that these facts were more than enough to justify holding the companies accountable under the TCPA.
Quoting the FCC’s guidance, the court explained that companies providing calling platforms cannot simply “blame their customers” for illegal conduct. Liability attaches to those who “knowingly allow” their systems to be used for unlawful purposes. Voice Broadcasting and Life Corporation had the means to prevent the deepfake calls— but they didn’t. As the court explained, “Even if one were to assume that neither Voice Broadcasting nor Life Corp. actually ‘initiated’ the Deepfake Robocalls, they might still be liable for TCPA violations, depending upon their knowledge of, and involvement in, the scheme to make those illegal calls.”
As for the defendants’ second argument, that the calls were political and therefore exempt from the TCPA’s consent requirements, the court acknowledged that political campaign calls using regulated technology, such as the AI-voice technology used in the alleged calls, to landlines are generally permissible, even without prior express consent. However, this exemption is not a free pass. The calls must comply with other key provisions of the TCPA, including the requirement to provide a functional opt-out mechanism.
Here, instead of providing a legitimate way for recipients to opt-out, the alleged calls instructed the recipients to call Kathleen Sullivan’s personal phone number. This sham opt-out mechanism not only failed to meet TCPA standards but also contributed to the deception. The court had no trouble rejecting the claim that this constituted compliance: “Little more need be said other than to note that such an opt-out mechanism plainly fails to comply with the governing regulations and is not, as defendants suggest, ‘adequate.’”
And in case you are all wondering about Mr. Kramer himself, a default was entered against Kramer on 8/29/24.
The entire story behind these calls has been something to watch. This is definitely a case to keep an eye on!
A Final Rule Bites the Dust: Federal Court Rules FDA Lacks Authority to Regulate LDTs
The order is in, and the LDT Final Rule is out.
In May 2024, the U.S. Food & Drug Administration (“FDA” or the “Agency”) published its Final Rule establishing its regulatory framework over laboratory developed tests (“LDTs”) as medical devices and, in effect, announced the end to decades of enforcement discretion by the Agency. The deadline to comply with the first phase of the Final Rule was set for May 6, 2025. On Monday, March 31, however, a federal judge in the U.S. Eastern District of Texas ordered that “FDA’s final rule exceeds its authority and is unlawful” and that “[t]herefore, consistent with controlling circuit precedent, the proper remedy is vacatur of the final rule and remand to FDA for further consideration in light of this opinion.”
Epstein Becker & Green’s Life Sciences Team is continuing to review and digest this order and its impact on the clinical lab industry, and we plan to release a more fulsome analysis in the coming days.
In the meantime, we draw stakeholders’ attention to a few key takeaways from the order—namely, the judge’s statement that (1) “the [federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act]’s relevant text is unambiguous and cannot support FDA’s interpretation” and (2) “FDA’s asserted jurisdiction over laboratory-developed test services as ‘devices’ under the FDCA defies bedrock principles of statutory interpretation, common sense, and longstanding industry practice.”
These findings—along with other elements of the district court’s legal analysis—arguably leave little to no room for FDA to salvage its effort to regulate LDTs, absent either a successful appeal of the court’s order or congressional action.
Georgia Regulates Third Party Litigation Financing in Senate Bill 69
On February 27, 2025, by a vote of 52 to 0, the Georgia Senate passed Senate Bill 69, titled “Georgia Courts Access and Consumer Protection Act.”
If signed into law, the bill would regulate third-party litigation financing (“TPLF”) practices in Georgia where an individual or entity provides financing to a party to a lawsuit in exchange for a right to receive payment contingent on the lawsuit’s outcome. This bill represents another effort by states to restrain the influence of third-party litigation financiers and increase transparency in litigations.
Senate Bill 69 sets forth several key requirements. First, a person or entity engaging in litigation funding in Georgia must register as a litigation financier with the Department of Banking and Finance and provide specified information, including any affiliation with foreign persons or principals. Such filings are public records subject to disclosure.
Second, the bill restricts the influence of a litigation financier in actions or proceedings where the financier provided funding. For example, a litigation financier cannot direct or make decisions regarding legal representation, expert witnesses, litigation strategy, or settlement, which are reserved only for the parties and their counsel. A litigation financier also cannot pay commissions or referral fees in exchange for a referral of a consumer to the financier, or otherwise accept payment for providing goods or services to a consumer.
Third, the bill renders discoverable the existence, terms, and conditions of a litigation financing agreement in the underlying lawsuit. Although mere disclosure of information about a litigation financing agreement does not make such information automatically admissible as evidence at trial, it opens the door to that possibility.
Fourth, the bill delineates specific requirements for the form of a litigation financing agreement and mandates certain disclosures about the consumer’s rights and the financier’s obligations. A financier’s violation of the bill’s provisions voids and renders unenforceable the litigation financing agreement. Willful violations of the bill’s provisions may even lead to a felony conviction, imprisonment, and a fine of up to $10,000.
Fifth, the bill holds a litigation financier “jointly and severally liable for any award or order imposing or assessing costs or monetary sanctions against a consumer arising from or relating to” an action or proceeding funded by the financier.
According to a Senate press release, Senate President Pro Tempore John F. Kennedy, who sponsored the legislation, lauded the Senate’s passage of the bill as enhancing transparency and protection for consumers. He commented that “[Georgia’s] civil justice system should not be treated as a lottery where litigation financiers can bet on the outcome of a case to get a piece of a plaintiff’s award” and that “SB 69 establishes critical safeguards for an industry that continues to expand each year.” He further stressed the need to “level the playing field and ensure that [Georgia’s] legal system serves the people—not powerful financial interests.” Since passing the Senate, the bill has also proceeded through the House First and Second Readers.
Georgia’s proposed legislation is largely in line with recent proposed or enacted TPLF legislation in other states. In October 2024, the New Jersey Senate Commerce Committee advanced Senate Bill 1475, which similarly requires registration by a consumer legal funding company, restricts the actions and influence of a consumer legal funding company, and mandates certain disclosures in a consumer legal funding contract, among other things. Indiana and Louisiana also enacted TPLF legislation codified respectively at Ind. Code §§ 24-12-11-1 to -5 (2024), and La. Stat. Ann. §§ 9:3580.1 to -.7 and 9.3580.11 to .13 (2024). West Virginia expanded its TPLF laws by enacting legislation codified at W. Va. Code §§ 46A-6N-1, -4, -6, -7, and -9 (2024). But different from these legislations, Georgia’s proposed legislation explicitly provides for the possibility of felony consequences for willful violations of its provisions.
TPLF has also reverberated at the federal level. In October 2024, the United States Supreme Court’s Advisory Committee on Civil Rules reportedly proposed to create a subcommittee to examine TPLF. H.R. 9922, the Litigation Transparency Act of 2024, was also introduced in the United States House of Representatives that same month and would require disclosure of TPLF in civil actions.
But while some argue that TPLF regulation would bring greater transparency and reduce frivolous litigation, others protest that such regulation would harm litigants with less resources. Either way, litigants would be well-served to monitor important developments regarding TPLF at both the state and federal levels.
Can An Employer Require Employees To Invest In The Business?
Employee stock bonus, stock purchase, and stock option plans are extremely common. Most employees and prospective employees are undoubtedly happy to receive these types of equity compensation awards, but can an employer require an employee to invest in the employer’s business. The California Labor Code provides:
Investments and the sale of stock or an interest in a business in connection with the securing of a position are illegal as against the public policy of the State and shall not be advertised or held out in any way as a part of the consideration for any employment.
Cal. Lab. Code § 407. This would seem to be a problem.
Fortunately, Section 408(c) of the Corporations Code provides:
Sections 406 and 407 of the Labor Code shall not apply to shares issued by any foreign or domestic corporation to the following persons:
(1) Any employee of the corporation or of any parent or subsidiary thereof, pursuant to a stock purchase plan or agreement or stock option plan or agreement provided for in subdivision (a).
(2) In any transaction in connection with securing employment, to a person who is or is about to become an officer of the corporation or of any parent or subsidiary thereof.
A similar provision was added in 2015 with respect to domestic and foreign limited liability companies. Cal. Corp. Code § 17704.01(e).
This does not mean that corporations and LLCs are out of the woods in every case in which it is alleged that the employee was forced to invest. In Hulse v. Neustar, Inc., 2019 WL 13102321 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2019), the court denied the defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings because the plaintiff alleged that the defendant required the plaintiff to participate in an equity rollover that was separate and apart from the terms of the initial stock option plans pursuant to which the plaintiff acquired his equity.
Another Court Partly Blocks DEI-Related Executive Orders; U.S. Government Continues to Stay Its Course
On Thursday, March 26, 2025, a federal judge for the Northern District of Illinois issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) prohibiting enforcement of portions of Executive Order 14151 (“the J20 EO”) and Executive Order 14173 (“the J21 EO”), two of President Trump’s first directives seeking to eliminate Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI), previously explained here.
This order has implications for federal contractors and grant recipients nationwide, at least for now.
The Case
The case, Chicago Women in Trades v. Trump et. al., was brought by a Chicago-based association, Chicago Women in Trades (CWIT), that advocates for women with careers in construction industry trades. Federal funding has constituted forty percent of CWIT’s budget. After the issuance of the J20 and J21 EOs, CWIT received an email from the U.S. Department of Labor’s (DOL) Women’s Bureau stating that recipients of financial assistance were “directed to cease all activities related to ‘diversity, equity and inclusion’ (DEI) or ‘diversity, equity, inclusion and accessibility’ (DEIA).” Similarly, one of its subcontractors emailed CWIT to immediately pause all activities directly tied to its federally funded work related to DEI or DEIA. CWIT brought the action against President Trump, the DOL, and other agencies alleging, among other things, that its Constitutional rights were violated by various provisions in both EOs. For example, CWIT argued that the J20 EO targeted “DEI,” “DEIA,” “environmental justice,” “equity,” and “equity action plans” without defining any such terms. This lack of definition, according to CWIT, makes it difficult to understand what conduct is permissible and what is not.
Contractor “No DEI” Certifications Blocked
The ruling enjoins the DOL and, by extension, its Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) from enforcing two discrete portions of the Executive Orders: (1) Section 2(b)(i) of the J20 EO (the “Termination Provision”), authorizing the agency to terminate a government contract or grant based on the awardee’s alleged DEI-related activities; and (2) Section 3(b)(iv) of the J21 EO (the “Certification Provision”), requiring federal contractors and grant recipients to certify that they do not operate any program promoting unlawful DEI. A Memorandum Opinion and Order accompanying the TRO emphasizes that its ruling constrains only one agency, at least for now.
The injunction against the Termination Provision is also narrow in that it applies only to the plaintiff, CWIT. Specifically, the TRO blocks the DOL from taking any adverse action related to any contracts with the plaintiff. The TRO further forbids the federal government from initiating any enforcement action under the False Claims Act against the plaintiff. Nevertheless, the TRO does carry nationwide implications, in that it prohibits the DOL from requiring any contractor or grantee to make any certification or other representation pursuant to the terms of the J21 EO’s Certification Provision.
Other Initiatives to Curb DEI Continue
Despite judicial opinions criticizing the EOs, most notably in a case currently under review by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, governmental agencies continue to move forward with actions supportive of the EOs, and enforcement against public and private entities for DEI initiatives or other practices. For example:
On March 19th, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) issued multiple documents explaining the administration’s view of DEI as a form of workplace discrimination.
On March 26th, the DOJ issued a Memorandum to all U.S. law schools regarding race-based preferences in admissions and employment decisions.
On March 27th, two agencies issued press releases announcing investigations: the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services announced action against an unnamed “major medical school in California,” and the DOJ issued a press release stating that it is looking into whether four major universities in California use “DEI discrimination” in their admissions practices. The DOJ announcement concludes that “compliance investigations into these universities are just the beginning of the Department’s work in eradicating illegal DEI and protecting equality under the law.”
On March 28th, the administration made headlines across Europe after two French newspapers published the template of a letter and accompanying form sent by the U.S. Department of State to companies in France, Belgium, Italy, and other European Union nations that do business with the federal government, demanding compliance with the J21 EO and requesting completion of a form to certify “compliance in all respects with all applicable federal anti-discrimination law…” and that the contractor does not “operate any programs promoting Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion that violate any applicable Federal anti-discrimination laws.”
What’s Next?
The court will consider further injunctive relief in the coming weeks, and may convert the TRO into a preliminary injunction after a hearing scheduled for April 10, 2025. At present, at least a dozen lawsuits have been filed challenging the Executive Orders regarding DEI, while Executive Branch agencies continue to pursue enforcement activities aligned with the EOs and administration policy.
United States Court of Appeals Enforces Arbitration Agreement Against Third-Party Non-Signatories
Arbitration agreements often seem straightforward—until they unexpectedly bind parties who never signed them. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s recent decision in Various Insurers v. General Electric International, Inc., ___ F.4th ___ (11th Cir. 2025), underscores the reach of arbitration clauses and the courts’ willingness to enforce them against third parties. This case highlights how third-party beneficiaries—and their insurers—can be required to arbitrate disputes, even though they were not signatories to the contract. The ruling is a good reminder for businesses, insurers, and legal practitioners to carefully consider the third-party implications of arbitration clauses when drafting, reviewing, and enforcing international commercial agreements.
Background: Arbitration Battle Following a Catastrophic Failure
The dispute arose from a catastrophic turbine failure at an Algerian power plant owned by Shariket Kahraba Hadjret En Nouss (SKH). SNC-Lavalin Constructeurs International Inc. (SNC) operated the plant on SKH’s behalf pursuant to an Operations and Management Agreement. In turn, SNC had entered a Services Contract with General Electric International (GE) to supply parts and services for the power plant. The Services Contract between SNC and GE International contained an arbitration clause.
Following the turbine failure, various insurers and reinsurers, acting as subrogees of SKH, sued GE International and other General Electric companies in the U.S. State of Georgia’s state-wide business court. GE International and the other General Electric companies removed the case to federal court and then sought to compel arbitration, arguing that SKH was a third-party beneficiary of the Services Contract and, as such, its insurers and reinsurers were also bound by the arbitration clause.
The Eleventh Circuit’s Analysis: Why the Insurers Were Bound to Arbitrate
The central issue was whether SKH, as the power plant’s owner, was a third-party beneficiary of the Services Contract between SNC and GE International. If so, SKH’s subrogated insurers and reinsurers would also be required to arbitrate.
The court applied federal common law to determine SKH’s third-party beneficiary status, to hold that SNC and GE International intended “to grant SKH the benefit of the performance promised” under the Services Contract, and therefore that SKH was indeed a third-party beneficiary.
The key facts about the Services Contract that led the court to that conclusion included the following:
The Services Contract explicitly referenced SKH’s ownership of the power plant and the Operations and Maintenance Agreement between SNC and SKH, including SNC’s obligations to operate and maintain the power plant for SKH’s benefit.
SKH had decision-making authority over certain changes to the power plant’s operations that would trigger GE International’s contractual obligations.
The Services Contract allowed SKH to act unilaterally in order to limit damages and losses during emergencies.
SKH had rights to access certain reports that the Services Contract required GE International to prepare, further evidencing SKH’s direct interest in the contract’s performance.
Because SKH was deemed a third-party beneficiary, the court ruled that its insurers—via subrogation—were also bound by the arbitration clause in the Services Contract. The court distinguished two other federal decisions declining to compel arbitration against third-party beneficiaries where the arbitration clause covered only disputes between the contracting parties.
Delegation of Arbitrability: The Role of ICC Rules
The court then addressed who should decide whether the insurers’ and reinsurers’ specific claims were subject to arbitration, the courts or the arbitrator. The Services Contract incorporated the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) arbitration rules, which expressly delegate arbitrability decisions to the arbitrator. Citing its own precedent (Terminix Int’l Co., LP v. Palmer Ranch Ltd. P’ship, 432 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2005)), the court found that incorporating the ICC rules was clear evidence that the parties intended to delegate arbitrability decisions to the arbitrator.
This means that the arbitrator, not the court, has to decide which, if any, of the insurers’ and reinsurers’ claims were subject to arbitration.
Key Implications of the Ruling
Contracts should clearly define whether third parties—such as affiliates, subcontractors, and beneficiaries—are bound by arbitration clauses. Manufacturers, suppliers, and distributors should consider whether they are bound by arbitration clauses in vendor contracts they have not signed but for which they could be deemed third-party beneficiaries—or conversely, whether they wish to enforce an arbitration clause against a third party that has not signed it. The same holds true for parties to large-scale construction and engineering contracts involving agreements between multiple stakeholders. Insurers stepping into the shoes of an insured party will normally be bound by the insured’s arbitration obligations, potentially limiting litigation options. And because these issues may depend on which law applies to the arbitration clause, contracts should state that clearly as well.
You can read the court’s full opinion here.
Chapter 15: A More Efficient Path for Recognition of Foreign Judgments as Compared with Adjudicatory Comity
Chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, which adopts the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law’s (“UNCITRAL”) Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, provides a streamlined process for recognition of a foreign insolvency proceeding and enforcement of related orders. In adopting the Model Law, the legislative history makes clear that Chapter 15 was intended to be the “exclusive door to ancillary assistance to foreign proceedings,” with the goal of controlling such cases in a single court. Despite this clear intention, U.S. courts continue to grant recognition to foreign bankruptcy court orders as a matter of comity, without the commencement of a Chapter 15 proceeding.
While it is tempting choice for a bankruptcy estate representative to seek a quick dismissal of U.S. litigation, without the commencement of a Chapter 15 case, it is not always the most efficient path.[1] First, because an ad hoc approach to comity requires a single judge to craft complex remedies from dated federal common law, there is a significant risk that such strategy will fail (and the estate representative will subsequently need Chapter 15 relief), increasing litigation/appellate risk and thus, the foreign debtor’s overall transaction costs in administering the case.[2] Second, the ad hoc informal comity approach is of little use to foreign debtors, who need to subject a large U.S. collective of claims and rights to a foreign collective remedy in the United States because it does not give the foreign representative the specific statutory tools available in Chapter 15—the ability to turn over foreign debtor assets to the debtor’s representative; to enforce foreign restructuring orders, schemes, plans, and arrangements; to generally stay U.S. litigation against a foreign debtor in an efficient, predictable manner; to sell assets in the United States free and clear of claims and liens and anti-assignment provisions in contracts; etc.[3]
Wayne Burt Pte. Ltd. (“Wayne Burt”), a Singaporean company, has battled to recognize a Singaporean liquidation proceeding (the “Singapore Liquidation Proceeding”) (and related judgments) in the United States, highlighting the inherent risks in seeking recognition outside of a Chapter 15 case. The unusually litigious and expensive pathway Wayne Burt followed to enforce certain judgments shows how Chapter 15 provides an effective streamlined process for seeking relief.
First, Wayne Burt sought dismissal, as a matter of comity, of a pending lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for New Jersey (the “District Court”). On appeal, after years of litigation, the Third Circuit concluded that the District Court did not fully apply the appropriate comity test and remanded the case for further analysis. Thereafter, the liquidator sought, and obtained, recognition of Wayne Burt’s insolvency proceeding under Chapter 15 in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey (the “Bankruptcy Court”), including staying District Court litigation that had been in dispute for five years in the United States and ordering the enforcement of a Singaporean turnover order that had been the subject of complex litigation as well within two months of the commencement of the Chapter 15 case.
The Dispute Before the District Court
The Wayne Burt case originated, almost exactly five years ago, as a simple breach of contract claim and evolved into a complex legal battle between Vertiv, Inc., Vertiv Capital, Inc., and Gnaritis, Inc. (together “Vertiv”), Delaware corporations, and Wayne Burt. The litigation began in January 2020, when Vertiv sued Wayne Burt in District Court, seeking to enforce a $29 million consent judgment entered in its favor. At the time the consent judgment was entered, however, Wayne Burt was already in liquidation proceedings in Singapore. Thus, a year after the entry of judgment, the liquidator moved to vacate the judgment on the grounds of comity.
On November 30, 2022, the District Court granted Wayne Burt’s motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.[4] The District Court based its decision on a finding that Singapore shares the United States’ policy of equal distribution of assets and authorizes a stay or dismissal of Vertiv’s civil action against Wayne Burt. Vertiv appealed to the Third Circuit.
The Third Circuit Establishes a New Adjudicatory Comity Test
In February 2024, the Third Circuit, in its opinion, set forth in detail a complex multifactor test for determining when comity will allow a U.S. court to enjoin or dismiss a case, based on a pending foreign insolvency proceeding, without seeking Chapter 15 relief.[5] This form of comity is known as “adjudicatory comity.” “Adjudicatory comity” acts as a type of abstention and requires a determination as to whether a court should “decline to exercise jurisdiction over matters more appropriately adjudged elsewhere.”[6]
As a threshold matter, adjudicatory comity arises only when a matter before a United States court is pending in, or has resulted in a final judgment from, a foreign court—that is, when there is, or was, “parallel” foreign proceeding. In determining whether a proceeding is “parallel,” the Third Circuit found that simply looking to whether the same parties and claims are involved in the foreign proceeding is insufficient. That is because it does not address foreign bankruptcy matters that bear little resemblance to a standard civil action in the United States. Instead, drawing on precedent examining whether a non-core proceeding is related to a U.S. Bankruptcy proceeding, the Third Circuit created a flexible and context specific two-part test. A parallel proceeding exists when (1) a foreign proceeding is ongoing in a duly authorized tribunal while the civil action is before a U.S. Court, and (2) the outcome of the U.S. civil action could affect the debtor’s estate.
Once the court is satisfied that the foreign bankruptcy proceeding is parallel, the party seeking extension of comity must then make a prima facie case by showing that (1) the foreign bankruptcy law shares U.S. policy of equal distribution of assets, and (2) the foreign law mandates the issuance or at least authorizes the request for the stay.
Upon a finding of a prima facie case for comity, the court then must make additional inquiries into fairness to the parties and compatibility with U.S. public policy under the Third Circuit Philadelphia Gear[7] test. This test considers whether (1) the foreign bankruptcy proceeding is taking place in a duly authorized tribunal, (2) the foreign bankruptcy court provides for equal treatment of creditors, (3) extending comity would be in some manner inimical to the country’s policy of equality, and (4) the party opposing comity would be prejudiced.
The first requirement is already satisfied if the proceeding is parallel.[8] The second requirement of equal treatment of creditors is similar to the prima facie requirement regarding equal distribution but goes further into assessing whether any plan of reorganization is fair and equitable as between classes of creditors that hold claims of differing priority or secured status.[9] For the third and fourth part of the four-part inquiry—ensuring that the foreign proceedings’ actions are consistent with the U.S. policy of equality and would not prejudice an opposing party—the court provided eight factors used as indicia of procedural fairness, noting that certain factors were duplicative of considerations already discussed. The court emphasized that foreign bankruptcy proceedings need not function identically to similar proceedings in the United States to be consistent with the policy of equality.
In the Wayne Burt appeal, the Third Circuit vacated the District Court’s order finding that although there was a parallel proceeding, the District Court failed to apply the four-part test to consider the fairness of the parallel proceeding.
The Chapter 15 Case
On remand to the District Court, Wayne Burt’s liquidator renewed his motion to dismiss. Following his renewed motion, protracted discovery ensued, delaying a District Court ruling on comity.
Additionally, during the pendency of the appeal, Wayne Burt’s liquidator commenced an action in Singapore seeking that Vertiv turn over certain stock in Cetex Petrochemicals Ltd. that Wayne Burt pledged as security for a loan from Vertiv (the “Singapore Turnover Litigation”). Wayne Burt’s liquidator contended that the pledge was void against the liquidator. Vertiv did not appear in the Singapore proceedings and the High Court of Singapore entered an order requiring the turnover of the shares (the “Singapore Turnover Order”).
As a result, Wayne Burt’s liquidator shifted his strategy to obtain broader relief than what adjudicatory comity could afford in the pending U.S. litigation—recognition and enforcement of the Singapore Turnover Order. The only way to accomplish both the goal of dismissal of the U.S. litigation and enforcement of the Singapore Turnover Order is through a Chapter 15 proceeding.
On October 8, 2024, Wayne Burt’s liquidator commenced the Chapter 15 case (the “Chapter 15 Case”) by filing a petition along with the Motion for Recognition of Foreign Proceedings and Motion to Compel Turnover of Cetex Shares (the “Motion”). Vertiv opposed the Motion, contending that, under the new test laid out by the Third Circuit, the Singapore Liquidation Proceeding should not be considered the main proceeding because it may harm Vertiv.[10] Vertiv further contended that even if the Singapore Liquidation Proceeding was considered the main proceeding, the Bankruptcy Court should not “blindly” enforce the Singapore Turnover Order and should itself review the transaction to the extent it impacts assets in the United States.[11]
Less than two months after the Chapter 15 Case was commenced, the Bankruptcy Court overruled Vertiv’s objection, finding that recognition and enforcement of a turnover action was appropriate.[12] In so ruling, the Bankruptcy Court applied the new adjudicatory comity requirements set forth by the Third Circuit, in addition to Chapter 15 requirements.
The Bankruptcy Court began its analysis with finding that recognition and enforcement of the Singapore Turnover Order is appropriate under 11 U.S.C. §§ 1521 and 1507. Under Section 1521, upon recognition of a foreign proceeding, a bankruptcy court may grant any additional relief that may be available to a U.S. trustee (with limited exceptions) where necessary to effectuate the purposes of Chapter 15 and to protect the assets of the debtor or the interests of creditors. Courts have exceedingly broad discretion in determining what additional relief may be granted. Here, the Bankruptcy Court found that the Singapore insolvency system was sufficiently similar to the United States bankruptcy process.
Under Section 1507, a court may provide additional assistance in aid of a foreign proceeding as along as the court considers whether such assistance is consistent with principles of comity and will reasonably assure the fair treatment of creditors, protect claim holders in the United States from prejudice in the foreign proceeding, prevent preferential or fraudulent disposition of estate property, and distribution of proceeds occurs substantially in accordance with the order under U.S. bankruptcy law. Here, the Bankruptcy Court found that the Singapore Turnover Litigation was an effort to marshal an asset of the Wayne Burt insolvency estate for the benefit of all of Wayne Burt’s creditors and that enforcement of the Singapore Turnover Order specifically would allow for the equal treatment of all of Wayne Burt’s creditors.
Finally, the Bankruptcy Court found that recognition and enforcement of the Singapore Turnover Order was appropriate under the Third Circuit’s comity analysis. Specifically, the Bankruptcy Court found that the Singapore Turnover Litigation is parallel to the Motion, relying on the facts that: (1) Wayne Burt is a debtor in a foreign insolvency proceeding before a duly authorized tribunal, the Singapore High Court, (2) Vertiv has not challenged the Singapore High Court’s jurisdiction over the Singapore Liquidation Proceeding, and (3) the outcome of the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling would have a direct impact on the estate within the Singapore Liquidation Proceeding as it relates to ownership of the Cetex shares. The Bankruptcy Court concluded that the Singapore Liquidation Proceeding and the Chapter 15 Case are parallel.
The Bankruptcy Court’s analysis primarily focused on the third and fourth factors of the Philadelphia Gear test, determining that it was clear that the first factor was met because the Singapore Liquidation Proceeding is parallel to the Chapter 15 Case and that the second factor did not apply as there was no pending plan. The third inquiry was also satisfied for the same reasons detailed above for the Singapore insolvency laws being substantially similar to U.S. insolvency laws. The fourth inquiry—whether the party opposing comity is prejudiced by being required to participate in the foreign proceeding—was satisfied for the same reasons stated for Section 1507.
In recognizing and enforcing the Singapore Turnover Order, the Bankruptcy Court overruled Vertiv’s opposition finding it rests on an “unacceptable premise” that the Bankruptcy Court should stand in appellate review of a foreign court. Such an act would directly conflict with principles of comity and the objectives of Chapter 15. The Bankruptcy Court noted that this is especially true where the party maintains the capacity to pursue appeals and other necessary relief from the foreign court.
Vertiv appealed the Bankruptcy Court’s decision to the District Court, and the appeal is still pending.
Implications
Adjudicatory comity and Chapter 15 both aim to facilitate cooperation and coordination in cross-border insolvency cases. Indeed, Chapter 15 specifically incorporates comity and international cooperation into a court’s analysis, as Chapter 15 requires that a “court shall cooperate to the maximum extent possible with a foreign court.” In deciding whether to use adjudicatory comity and/or Chapter 15 it is important to consider the ultimate objective and the cost-benefit analysis of each approach. While seeking comity defensively in a U.S. litigation, without Chapter 15 relief, is possible, it can lead to inconsistent and unpredictable outcomes. Additionally, the multiple factors involved in applying adjudicatory comity can led to protracted discovery and, concomitantly, delaying recognition. By contrast, the Bankruptcy Court’s recent analysis demonstrates that the existing Chapter 15 framework, along with the well-established case law interpreting Chapter 15, provides an effective, reliable, and efficient tool for recognition and enforcement of foreign orders. That is particularly true, whereas here, a party seeks multiple forms of relief.
[1] Michael B. Schaedle & Evan J. Zucker, District Court Enforces German Stay, Ignoring Bankruptcy Code’s Chapter 15, 138 The Banking Law Journal 483 (LexisNexis A.S. Pratt 2021).
[2]Id.
[3]Id.
[4]Vertiv, Inc. v. Wayne Burt Pte, Ltd., No. 3:20-CV-00363, 2022 WL 17352457 (D.N.J. Nov. 30, 2022), vacated and remanded, 92 F.4th 169 (3d Cir. 2024).
[5]Vertiv, Inc. v. Wayne Burt PTE, Ltd., 92 F.4th 169 (3d Cir. 2024).
[6]Id. at 176.
[7]Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Philadelphia Gear de Mexico, S.A., 44 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 1994)).
[8]Wayne Burt PTE, Ltd., 92 F.4th at 180.
[9]Id.
[10]See Vertiv’s Brief in Opposition to Motion for Recognition of Foreign Proceedings and Motion to Compel Turnover of Cetex Shares, Case No.: 24-196-MBK, Doc. No. 29, at 10-14 (D.N.J October 29, 2024).
[11]Id. at 13.
[12]In Re: Wayne Burt Pte. Ltd. (In Liquidation), Debtor., No. 24-19956 (MBK), 2024 WL 5003229 (Bankr. D.N.J. Dec. 6, 2024).
The SEC Effectively Ends Climate Disclosure Requirements Under Trump Administration
On Thursday, March 27, 2025, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission announced via letter to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that SEC attorneys would no longer defend its climate change disclosure rules. These disclosure obligations were established by the SEC’s “Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors” Rule, adopted by the Commission on March 6, 2024.
According to the SEC’s current acting chair, Mark Uyeda, the disclosure requirements are “costly and unnecessarily intrusive.”
Disclosure Rule Background
The Disclosure Rule targeted material risks that companies face related to climate change and how those companies are managing that risk. The Disclosure Rule required companies to disclose certain climate-related information in their registration statements and annual reports including:
Climate-related risks that have or may impact business strategy, results of operation, or financial condition;
Actions to mitigate or adapt to material climate-related risks;
Management’s role in assessing and managing material climate-related risks;
Processes used by the company to assess or manage these risks;
Any targets or goals that have materially affected or are likely to affect the company’s business; and
Financial statement effects of severe weather events and other natural conditions, including costs and losses.
Following multiple petitions seeking review of the final Rule, the SEC stayed the Disclosure Rule pending judicial review before the Eight Circuit. In February, Uyeda provided some indication that its position was changing when he directed staff to notify the court not to schedule the case for argument to provide the Commission time to deliberate and determine appropriate next steps. The reason cited for the notice was “changed circumstances.” As such, the March 27 announcement is not all that surprising.
Impact of SEC Announcement
While the SEC has not officially repealed the Disclosure Rule, by no longer defending the Rule, the SEC will allow the stay to continue indefinitely and/or allow the Eighth Circuit to remand the rule to the SEC. This sequence of events indeed creates “changed circumstances,” as it means the SEC will likely take no further action to effectuate a new Rule. As a result, the March 27, 2025, announcement by the SEC effectively terminates the Disclosure Rule.
What Does this Development Mean for You?
While the SEC’s announcement means that public companies operating in the United States are not required to make publicly available disclosures concerning greenhouse gas emissions and climate-change risks and impacts, the impact of this action may be quite limited in reality. Many U.S. companies already report climate-related risks voluntarily in response to investor demand and this action has done nothing to change the requirements imposed by individual states like California or elsewhere around the globe. And, despite this limited reprieve, companies should consider potential changes to SEC rules under future administrations. While the “pendulum” of regulatory focus has swung wide under the Trump administration, there is a strong possibility that there will be a reciprocal swing in the future. As a result, companies should consider maintaining documentation of climate-related risks and management strategies should a similar rule be promulgated.
These events are developing rapidly and will continue to move at a fast pace.
Weekly Bankruptcy Alert March 31, 2025 (For the Week Ending March 30, 2025)
Covering reported business bankruptcy filings in Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island, and Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings in New York and Delaware listing assets of more than $1 million.
Chapter 11
Debtor Name
BusinessType1
BankruptcyCourt
Assets
Liabilities
FilingDate
GO Lab Madison, LLC(Madison, ME)
Miscellaneous Durable Goods Merchant Wholesalers
Wilmington(DE)
$1,000,001to$10 Million
$100,000,001to$500 Million
3/25/25
GO Lab, Inc.(Madison, ME)
Not Disclosed
Wilmington(DE)
$500,001to$1 Million
$10,000,001to$50 Million
3/25/25
BLH TopCo LLC2(Addison, TX)
Restaurants and Other Eating Places
Wilmington(DE)
$1,000,001to$10 Million
$50,000,001to$100 Million
3/26/25
236 West E&P LLC(New York, NY)
Not Disclosed
Manhattan(NY)
$1,000,001to$10 Million
$1,000,001to$10 Million
3/28/25
KTRV LLC(Wilmington, DE)
Coal Mining
Wilmington(DE)
$50,000,001to$100 Million
$50,000,001to$100 Million
3/30/25
Heritage Coal & Natural Resources, LLC(Meyersdale, PA)
Coal Mining
Wilmington(DE)
$100,000,001to$500 Million
$100,000,001to$500 Million
3/30/25
CTN Holdings, Inc.(San Francisco, CA)
Other Financial Investment Activities
Wilmington(DE)
$50,000,001to$100 Million
$100,000,001to$500 Million
3/30/25
Catona Climate Solutions, LLC(San Francisco, CA)
Other Financial Investment Activities
Wilmington(DE)
$10,000,001to$50 Million
$10,000,001to$50 Million
3/30/25
Chapter 7
Debtor Name
BusinessType1
BankruptcyCourt
Assets
Liabilities
FilingDate
59 Indian Lane, LLC(Boston, MA)
Not Disclosed
Boston(MA)
$500,000,001to$1 Billion
$0to$50,000
3/25/25
OG Tile and Flooring Inc.(Everett, MA)
Not Disclosed
Boston(MA)
$0to$50,000
$50,001to$100,000
3/26/25
1Business Type information is taken from Bankruptcy Court filings, which may include incorrect categorization by the debtor or others.
2Additional affiliate filings include: BLH HoldCo LLC, BLH Acquisition Co., LLC, BLH Restaurant Franchises LLC and BLH White Marsh LLC.
Effective Risk Management for Nursing Facilities: Insurance Insights on Retaliation Claims
This is the first in a series of articles addressing critical issues in risk management and insurance for skilled nursing facilities.
Owners and operators of skilled nursing facilities know that a claim or lawsuit against their facility is not a matter of if, but when. Procuring the proper insurance is critical to effectively managing and mitigating these risks. A professional liability insurance policy should provide coverage for the facility and its directors, administrators, and employees from claims of negligent care.
Unfortunately, merely purchasing a professional liability policy without further scrutiny can leave a facility uninsured for certain claims. These policies incorporate exclusions and conditions that insurers could cite to attempt to limit coverage, particularly for claims that allege intentional injury to a patient resident. For example, an injured patient could allege that her injury was not the result of mere negligence, but instead resulted from retaliation by the facility or the facility’s employee in response to a prior complaint. These retaliation claims pose an increased risk to a facility and its insurance coverage, regardless of whether they are alleged as an intentional tort under a state’s common law or as a violation of a state’s anti-retaliation statute.
In states where retaliation is specifically barred by statute, state laws can create additional liability and damages exposure for claims brought by residents who file formal complaints or bring regulatory actions against nursing facilities alleging retaliation. Earlier this year, for example, the Illinois Legislature passed a new anti-retaliation statute for nursing facilities, House Bill 2474, that broadens the scope of anti-retaliation protections. The Illinois bill, which has passed both houses and been sent to the governor’s office for signature, does not require a formal complaint, but can be triggered by a resident taking more informal action, such as making a request to the facility related to the resident’s care. In addition to potential liability for consequential damages, Illinois HB 2474 also makes nursing facilities liable to the plaintiff for attorneys’ fees and additional damages “in an amount equal to the average monthly billing rate for Medicaid recipients in the facility.” The damage provisions of Illinois HB 2474 differentiate it from other broad anti-retaliation statutes. For example, Minnesota expanded its Patients’ Bill of Rights in 2020 to protect nursing facility residents from retaliation for a host of actions, including advocating “for necessary or improved care or services” (M.S.A. § 144.6512). However, Minnesota’s statute does not provide for a private cause of action for residents to sue the facility.
Even if a state’s anti-retaliation statute does not specify additional damages or provide a private cause of action, retaliation claims brought as common law torts can nevertheless pose the risk of enhanced damages based on the facility’s perceived culpability – a risk not found in ordinary negligence actions.
Retaliation claims are a significant and thorny example of circumstances where allegations of negligent and intentional conduct can intertwine. Unless a statute identifies certain acts that constitute retaliation per se, the patient must necessarily prove an intent to retaliate – retaliation cannot be the result of mere negligence. But ordinary negligence and intentional retaliation could manifest in factually identical ways – with intent being the only distinguishing factor. For example, a resident allegedly injured in a fall while being helped out of bed by a facility employee could assert negligence. But if that same resident had complained to management about the quality of their care prior to the fall, the resident could also allege retaliation, asserting that they were allowed to fall in retaliation for the complaint.
Insurers could seize on retaliation allegations to deny coverage under several exclusions, including exclusions for expected and intended conduct and for willful violations of laws or regulations. Depending on the scope of the policy exclusions, insurers could assert that otherwise insured negligence claims are excluded retaliation claims.
To maximize the potential coverage for claims of retaliation or other intentional conduct bolted on to ordinary negligence claims, insureds should understand that the expected and intended exclusion does not exclude claims that an insured acted intentionally; the insurer must also prove that the insured intended to cause the alleged harm. Unfortunately, a retaliation claim arguably alleges that intent to cause harm if the actions can be attributed to the insured entity or individual.
Insureds can take four steps to mitigate anticipated insurer defenses to coverage for retaliation claims:
First, insureds should seek language limiting the intentional conduct exclusion. The best limiting language would require a final adjudication of intentional conduct at trial (and after exhaustion of all appeals). Insurers could not invoke this exclusion in cases settled before trial.
Second, insureds should confirm that any exclusions based on alleged willful statutory violations do not inadvertently encompass statutory retaliation claims.
Third, because insurers may attempt to allocate liability among the negligence and retaliation claims to reduce their obligations for a settlement prior to trial, insureds should insist on favorable allocation provisions that do not leave the allocation to insurers’ discretion but instead require reasonable allocation based on an objective assessment of the claim.
Finally, insureds should insist on policy provisions requiring the insurer to defend (or preferably pay the defense of) all asserted claims – including arguably excluded claims – as long as at least one claim potentially falls within coverage.
These four steps will provide insureds with additional insurance protection against statutory retaliation claims by limiting the defenses that insurers could otherwise assert in response to these claims. And as always, policyholders should scrutinize their professional liability insurance policies during renewal to maximize the coverage available to them. Many coverage enhancements do not impact premium – but they do require insureds’ diligence and awareness of coverage quagmires before binding insurance, as this discussion of retaliation claims shows.
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Trump Administration Launches Comprehensive Review of Clean Water Act Definition for “Waters of the United States” (WOTUS)
On March 24, 2025, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the “Army Corps”) (collectively the “Agencies”) announced a comprehensive stakeholder engagement process to revise the definition of “waters of the United States” (WOTUS), a phrase that defines the geographic scope of regulatory jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act (CWA). In a formal notice published in the Federal Register, the Agencies stated that they intend to use stakeholder feedback from this process to “inform future administrative actions” on the WOTUS definition, including rulemaking.
This initiative follows decades of WOTUS litigation and shifting WOTUS rules promulgated by the Agencies during the Obama, Biden, and Trump administrations, and it responds to ongoing challenges in implementing the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Sackett v. EPA, issued in 2023, which significantly narrowed federal jurisdiction over wetlands.
The Sackett Decision and Ongoing Regulatory Challenges
The Sackett case was a dispute over wetlands, but the Supreme Court’s holding is also relevant to other water bodies:
As to wetlands, Sackett held that CWA jurisdiction covers “only those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies that are [WOTUS] in their own right, so that they are indistinguishable from those waters.” The Court rejected EPA’s position that jurisdiction extended to wetlands that are “separated from [WOTUS] by dry lands.”
As to streams, lakes, and other water bodies, Sackett held that CWA jurisdiction covers only those waters that are “relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing.”
Scope of “Relatively Permanent” Waters: To date, the Supreme Court has not clearly defined “relatively permanent” waters. This category includes certain streams and other water conveyances. In Sackett, the Court held that jurisdiction is not cut off by “temporary interruptions in surface connection” that “may sometimes occur because of phenomena like low tides or dry spells.” Sackett also adopted Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion from Rapanos v. United States, issued in 2006. In that opinion, the plurality confirmed that “intermittent” and “ephemeral” streams do not fall within the scope of CWA jurisdiction. Besides saying CWA jurisdiction could potentially extend to a hypothetical “seasonal river” that flowed continuously for 290 days per year, the plurality declined to spell out “exactly when the drying-up of a streambed is continuous and frequent enough” to cut off jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over Ditches: The Rapanos plurality also analyzed the contentious issue of CWA jurisdiction over ditches. The Agencies have historically treated ditches as a type of jurisdictional “tributary” unless exempted by regulation, but the Rapanos plurality suggested that most ditches are not jurisdictional because the CWA defines ditches as “point sources” rather than “navigable waters” and because ditches typically convey “intermittent” flow. Sackett’s majority opinion did not directly analyze CWA jurisdiction over ditches, but a concurring opinion in Sackett stated that a roadside ditch at issue in that case was not a jurisdictional “tributary”—because the ditch “is not, has never been, and cannot reasonably be made a highway of interstate or foreign commerce.”
The 2023 “Conforming Rule” and Agency Interpretations: In 2023, the Biden administration adopted a rule that attempted to conform the regulatory definition of WOTUS to Sackett (the “2023 Conforming Rule”). In the 2023 Conforming Rule, the Agencies took a minimalistic approach to the task at hand: they removed language that was clearly inconsistent with Sackett, but did not attempt to clarify the meaning of “continuous surface connection” or “relatively permanent” waters.
In part because the 2023 Conforming Rule left room for interpretation by the Agencies, the WOTUS definition remains controversial. In the March 24 notice, the Agencies noted stakeholder concerns that the Conforming Rule does not “adequately comply with the Sackett decision” on its face. The Agencies also noted concerns about how the Agencies have interpreted and applied to 2023 Conforming Rule in particular cases, raising questions such as: which features are “connected to” waters that are “relatively permanent” WOTUS; which waters as “relatively permanent” in the first place; how to implement the “continuous surface connection” requirement; and “which ditches are properly considered to be [WOTUS].”
These concerns have sometimes played out in court, where the Agencies have argued that ditches and channels with “intermittent” flow can still be WOTUS after Sackett. At least one district court has agreed, holding that a channel conveying only “intermittent” flow was jurisdictional because it conveyed flow “continuously during certain times of the year.” As a result of the 2023 Conforming Rule’s ambiguity and the continuing WOTUS litigation, the regulated community continues to face significant uncertainty.
March 12 Announcement and Policy Memo on “Abutting” Wetlands: The March 24 notice follows a March 12 announcement by EPA Administrator Zeldin of the WOTUS stakeholder engagement effort. The March 12 announcement included an unpublished preview of the March 24 notice. As part of the announcement, EPA also issued a new policy memorandum discussing “abutting” wetlands. The memo provides guidance on how to distinguish non-jurisdictional wetlands that are near but separated from jurisdictional waters by a berm, a dike, uplands, or a similar feature, from jurisdictional wetlands (which “directly abut” and have a “continuous surface connection” to jurisdictional waters).
Comprehensive Stakeholder Engagement Strategy
The Agencies will conduct a multi-pronged approach to gather input on the WOTUS definition through listening sessions and written comments, as follows:
Listening sessions: Six targeted listening sessions will be held in April and May 2025. Two sessions will be open to all stakeholders, and one session held for each of the following: industry and agricultural stakeholders; States; environmental and conservation groups; and Tribes. Oral comments will be accepted on a first-come, first-serve basis.
Written comments: Comments are due by April 23, 2025, and can be submitted through the Federal eRulemaking Portal, via email, or by mail or hand delivery.
Specific topics for input: The Agencies are seeking stakeholder input on key WOTUS implementation issues that impact a wide range of private and public stakeholders, including:
The geographic scope of “relatively permanent” waters;
The meaning of “continuous surface connection” and related issues, including the Sackett court’s statement that ‘temporary interruptions in surface connection may sometimes occur because of phenomena like low tides or dry spells’”; and
How to determine the jurisdictional status of ditches and related issues, including whether the Agencies should consider factors such as flow regime (“e.g., relatively permanent status or perennial or intermittent flow regimes”), physical features, “excavation in aquatic resources versus uplands,” “type or use of the ditch (e.g., irrigation and drainage), or “biological indicators like the presence of fish.”
Implications for the Regulated Community
This initiative represents a critical opportunity for stakeholders in the regulated community to influence the future interpretation of WOTUS by the Agencies and the courts. The Trump Administration and the Agencies have emphasized their commitment prioritizing “practical implementation approaches” and seeking to provide durability, stability, and more efficient regulatory processes. This suggests that the Agencies will be especially receptive to comments from the regulated community.
After reviewing the full Federal Register notice, stakeholders impacted by WOTUS issues should consider submitting comments. In the past, many WOTUS commenters have provided detailed descriptions of their own properties, operations, infrastructure, and projects, along with examples of particular local waters. These kinds of comments can help the Agencies better understand how the WOTUS definition impacts different stakeholders “on the ground.” The most effective comments will also include arguments explaining how particular waters fit within the Sackett-Rapanos legal framework discussed above.
Minority Shareholder Protection – What Law Applies?
Many of my clients live in other states but own part of a company based here in New Jersey. That is often a recipe for mistreatment of minority shareholders – out of sight, out of mind. But an owner in such a situation has significant protections afforded to them under the law.
If you own shares in a New Jersey-based company but live out of state, New Jersey law protects you. As I have discussed for over 20 years now in this blog, the court can deem that a minority shareholder is oppressed and order – among other things – a buyout of the minority shareholder’s interest. It makes no difference where you live. But the law or even the jurisdiction that applies might not necessarily be based on where the company is physically located. For example, even if the company is based in one state, the shareholders’ agreement (or operating agreement) might require that any lawsuit be brought in another state. Even if that is the case, you still have the protections of New Jersey law.
Also, the fact that the company is located in New Jersey does not make it a New Jersey company. A company might have been created as a creature of one state but be physically located in another. For example, if your company is a Delaware LLC but operates in a state that has minority shareholder protections (like New Jersey), Delaware law likely still applies, and Delaware does not have a minority oppression statute.
So, when you are creating a company, it is critical where you incorporate and what law applies – especially if you are a minority owner. This is especially true since oppressed minority shareholder protections cannot be waived. In one instance, a client shared that in a new venture, his majority shareholder partner initially asked if he (the 20% minority owner) would waive the protections of the oppression statute when they were drafting a shareholders’ agreement. The client was not aware that those protections could not be waived. He was happy to see that his partner dropped that demand, only to insist that the company be a Delaware company operating in New Jersey. When I advised the client that when he agreed to this, he was agreeing to a set of laws that did not protect him, he believed he had been hoodwinked by his partner.
“That’s why he wanted to make it a Delaware corporation!”
The minority shareholder was still able to sue in New Jersey, under Delaware law, for breach of fiduciary duty, but the protections were nowhere near as broad, and the case was more difficult.
So, pay attention to where the company is being formed, and what that means to you, at the outset of your business relationship. The issue of where the company will operate does not necessarily determine all your rights. If the agreement was created years ago and cannot be changed now, ask an experienced shareholder dispute attorney what – and where – your rights are.