Nondelegation and Environmental Law
Earlier this week, the Supreme Court held oral argument in Federal Communications Commission v. Consumers’ Research.1 The case addresses the Federal Communications Commission’s Universal Service Fund programs aimed at providing funding to connect certain customers with telecommunications services. The challengers contend that Congress ran afoul of the nondelegation doctrine in authorizing the FCC to setup the Universal Service Fund programs and that these programs are therefore unlawful.
Although that issue might appear far removed from issues of environmental law, the case could have significant ramifications and could curtail Congress’s ability to authorize federal administrative agencies to issue binding regulations. That curtailment could reach to congressional enactments that authorize the Environmental Protection Agency to promulgate regulations in a variety of areas, including several major environmental statutes like the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Safe Drinking Water Act, to name a few.
What is the Nondelegation Doctrine and Why is it Important?
The nondelegation doctrine holds that Congress may not delegate lawmaking (i.e., legislative) authority to executive branch agencies. As some observers have put it, however, the nondelegation doctrine had only one good year, in 1935, when the Supreme Court struck down two federal laws authorizing the executive to take certain actions that were considered legislative in nature. The cases were A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. and Panama Refining Co.
Besides those two cases, the Supreme Court has not struck down any other federal laws on nondelegation grounds. This is because, after 1935, the Supreme Court adopted a relatively permissive test of whether a statute runs afoul of the nondelegation doctrine. The test, referred to as the “intelligible-principle” test, looks to whether Congress has provided the administrative agency with some “intelligible principle” to follow in promulgating regulations pursuant to a congressional enactment.
Applying the intelligible-principle test, the Supreme Court has repeatedly, and over approximately eight decades, upheld congressional delegations of rulemaking power to administrative agencies.
However, in 2019, a dissenting opinion written by Justice Gorsuch in Gundy v. United States, called on the Court to abandon the intelligible-principle test and instead move toward a test where the Agency is not able to make policy decisions and instead is left to a role where it only “fills up the details” or makes factual determinations. Notably, the Gundy dissent was joined by Justices Roberts and Thomas, and Justices Alito and Kavanaugh elsewhere expressed support for the Gundy dissent’s approach. Gundy was also decided before Justice Barrett joined the Court. This has Supreme Court watchers asking whether the Supreme Court might inject more stringency in the nondelegation test in an appropriate case.
Enter Consumers Research. This is the first Supreme Court case to squarely raise nondelegation issues since Gundy. The challengers to the Universal Service Fund program argue that Congress gave the FCC unchecked authority to raise funds to be directed toward the goal of providing universal service from telecommunications services providers. The FCC (and intervenors) respond that the program “passes . . . with flying colors” and fits comfortably within past nondelegation cases because of the numerous restrictions that the statute places on the FCC. If the Supreme Court were to shift course by establishing a more stringent nondelegation test, that could significantly constrain Congress’s ability to delegate rulemaking powers to administrative agencies. Importantly, a more stringent test for nondelegation challenges could also impact numerous existing federal laws. We discuss just a sample of environmental laws that could be affected in the following section.
What Could it Mean for Environmental Law, and You?
One of the most obvious areas where a more stringent delegation test could impact environmental law is in the setting of air and water quality standards.
For example, the Clean Air Act directs the EPA to set air quality standards that apply nationwide. The Clean Air Act provides relatively loose guidance on how the EPA should go about that task, directing the EPA to promulgate standards “requisite to protect the public health” while “allowing an adequate margin of safety.” The Supreme Court upheld that delegation in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., but if the Supreme Court were to take a more stringent approach to nondelegation like that in the Gundy dissent, the EPA may not be able to make the decision of what air standard is “requisite to protect the public health” because that could be viewed as a key policy determination and more than “fill[ing] up the details.”
Likewise, in the Clean Water Act, the EPA is also directed to review water quality standards set by individual states, again taking into account a relatively broad instruction from Congress “to protect the public health or welfare, enhance the quality of water and serve the purposes of this chapter” while also considering the waters’ “use and value for public water supplies, propagation of fish and wildlife, recreational purposes, and agricultural, industrial, and other purposes, and . . . their use and value for navigation.” Again, a more stringent nondelegation test could find that these instructions leave the EPA with too much of a policy-making role.
Finally, in the Safe Drinking Water Act, the EPA is directed to set maximum contaminant level goals “at the level at which no known or anticipated adverse effects on the health of persons occur and which allows an adequate margin of safety.” This direction to set a standard is potentially less at risk because it requires more fact finding (i.e., determining “known or anticipated adverse effects on” health), but the requirement to determine an “adequate” safety margin might be deemed to be too close to policymaking.
Although nondelegation challenges to these types of environmental regulations have been raised in the past, they have failed at least in part because of the relaxed intelligible-principle test. The outcome in Consumers’ Research could change that. The Environmental Team at Womble Bond Dickinson are well-suited to evaluate these specific questions of law with you.
Counting Noses in Consumers’ Research
For now, it appears that the current nondelegation test will live to see another day. Only Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch seemed readily willing to make the test more stringent. The Justices appointed by Democratic presidents (Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson) are sure “no” votes. As for the three Justices typically left in the middle, Chief Justice Roberts was unusually quiet during argument, while both Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett pushed back on counsel for Consumers’ Research in numerous instances. Given that the Universal Service Fund program enjoys continuing and broad bipartisan support, this may not be the case where any of the middle three Justices are willing to take on the nondelegation issue, especially after the Court has already issued decisions that reign in administrative agency authority through the major-questions doctrine and by overruling the Chevron deference regime.
Regardless, the Supreme Court’s opinion, which should issue by July 2025, will likely reveal where the Court is headed on nondelegation issues and could signal that a more searching nondelegation test is on the horizon.
1 Brief disclaimer: Michael Miller worked on this case in the earlier stages of litigation before it was brought before the Supreme Court. This update does not share any views on the merits of the case.
PTAB Unveils Updated Practices for Proceedings
The USPTO’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) policy shifts demand and heightens strategic awareness. Clients are reminded that they must continue to align their PTAB and litigation efforts, leveraging timing, venue insights and tailored arguments to maximize their chances of success in this evolved landscape. These recent policy changes by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) have significantly impacted discretionary denials and briefing procedures in PTAB cases.
Rescission of Prior Guidance on Discretionary Denials
On February 28, 2025, the USPTO rescinded the June 21, 2022, memorandum titled “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation.” This action restores the PTAB’s reliance on precedential decisions such as Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc. and Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp. for guidance on discretionary denials.
Updated Guidance from Chief Administrative Patent Judge Boalick
Following the rescission, on March 24, 2025, Chief Administrative Patent Judge Scott R. Boalick issued a memorandum providing further direction:
Application Scope: The rescission applies to cases where the PTAB has not issued an institution decision or where a request for rehearing or Director Review is pending. The PTAB will consider timely requests for additional briefing on the rescission’s application on a case-by-case basis.
Fintiv Analysis Adjustments: The PTAB will continue applying the Fintiv factors, with notable clarifications.
ITC Proceedings: The Board is more likely to deny institution if the International Trade Commission’s (ITC) projected final determination date precedes the PTAB’s deadline for a final written decision. Conversely, if the ITC’s determination date is after the PTAB’s deadline, discretionary denial is less likely.
Sotera Stipulations: A timely filed Sotera stipulation remains highly relevant but is not dispositive in the discretionary denial analysis.
Merits of the Petition: The strength of the inter partes review (IPR) challenge’s merits will be evaluated within the Fintiv analysis but will not be solely determinative.
PTAB’s New Interim Workload Management Processes and Potential Budget Implications
On March 26, 2025, the USPTO introduces short-term strategies for the PTAB to manage backlogs and optimize judicial resources so that the PTAB can continue its work of adjudicated ex parte patent appeals and inter partes review proceedings. These measures that take effect on April 1, are described as “temporary in nature” and will remain in place until at least October 1, 2025. Although the memo does not explicitly mention budget cuts, its emphasis on shifting certain pre-institution tasks to non-Administrative Patent Judge (APJ) staff and prioritizing cases may be reflectively of broader federal efficiency efforts. These changes could be the result of budget reductions for the USPTO resulting from efforts by the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), which has discussed trying to achieve a 10–15% cut to the workforce across all federal agencies.
Key Points:
Resource Reallocation: Pre-institution tasks (like petition reviews) will be handled more often by non APJ staff, reducing APJ involvement at early stages.
Potential Backlog Effects: With roughly 1,500+ annual inter partes and post-grant proceedings, fewer APJs or hiring freezes could exacerbate existing backlogs.
Limits inter partes review: Adds additional non-merits briefing to the inter partes review process that could limit the total number of inter partes review proceeding instituted.
Timeline: This six-month window aligns with the federal fiscal year reset on October 1, hinting that the USPTO might anticipate further changes (either potential relief or deeper cuts) at that time.
New Briefing Procedures for Discretionary Denials
To enhance efficiency and consistency, the USPTO has implemented interim processes for discretionary denial briefing:
Separate Briefing Schedule: Patent owners may file a brief outlining bases for discretionary denial within two months of the PTAB’s Notice of Filing Date Accorded to a petition. Petitioners can file an opposition brief within one month of the patent owner’s brief. Leave to file further briefing may be permitted for good cause.
Word Limits: Consistent with 37 C.F.R. § 42.24, discretionary denial briefs are limited to 14,000 words and reply briefs to 5,600 words.
Recent Guidance on PTAB Hearings
Effective March 14, 2025, PTAB judges conducting virtual hearings will appear from a PTAB hearing room at a USPTO office, absent special circumstances. Parties are encouraged to participate in person when possible but those who have scheduled virtual hearings may continue to appear virtually. The public is also encouraged to observe hearings in person but remote public access for virtual hearings remains available upon request.
Implications for Practice
Parallel Proceedings: Assess the timelines and statuses of parallel district court or ITC proceedings, as these factors significantly influence the PTAB’s discretionary decisions.
Sotera Stipulations: While still influential, Sotera stipulations should be part of a comprehensive strategy rather than a standalone solution to avoid discretionary denial.
Evidence Submission: Provide detailed evidence regarding the expected resolution timelines of parallel proceedings to strengthen arguments against discretionary denial.
Polsinelli will continue monitoring these developments and inform you of any significant changes. Please contact us with questions about how these interim measures may affect your PTAB proceedings.
Sources:
USPTO Rescinds Memorandum Addressing Discretionary Denial Procedures: https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/uspto-rescinds-memorandum-addressing-discretionary-denial-procedures?utm_source=chatgpt.com
Guidance on USPTO’s Recission of “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation”: https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/guidance_memo_on_interim_procedure_recission_20250324.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com
Interim Processes for PTAB Workload Management (March 26, 2025): https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/InterimProcesses-PTABWorkloadMgmt-20250326.pdf?utm_campaign=subscriptioncenter&utm_content=&utm_medium=email&utm_name=&utm_source=govdelivery&utm_term=
Pennsylvania AG Alleges Mortgage Brokers Engaged in Illegal Referral Scheme
On January 17, the Pennsylvania Attorney General filed a civil enforcement action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against a group of mortgage brokers and their manager, alleging that they operated an unlawful referral scheme in violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA), and Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law.
According to the complaint, the defendants offered real estate professionals a mix of financial incentives—such as discounted shares in a joint venture mortgage company, event tickets, and luxury meals—in exchange for directing clients to affiliated mortgage brokerages. These referral arrangements were not disclosed to homebuyers.
The Attorney General alleges that the defendants:
Improperly transferred ownerships interests. Real estate agents were offered discounted, nonvoting shares in affiliated mortgage companies to incentivize referrals, in violation of RESPA and state consumer protection law kickback prohibitions.
Provided high-value entertainment. Agents allegedly received event tickets and luxury dinners in exchange for steering homebuyers, conduct the Attorney General contends violates RESPA and constitutes unfair and deceptive acts under the CFPA.
Disguised payments as legitimate business deals. The scheme was structured to appear as stock sales and profit distributions to conceal kickbacks, allegedly violating RESPA and both federal and state consumer protection statutes.
Failed to meet disclosure requirements. The defendants allegedly did not comply with the legal standards for affiliated business arrangements under RESPA, depriving consumers of material information and transparency.
The lawsuit seeks injunctive relief, restitution, civil penalties, and recovery of attorneys’ fees.
Putting It Into Practice: This state enforcement continues the trend of states ramping up regulation and enforcement of financial services companies (previously discussed here and here). As certain states continue to align themselves with the CFPB’s January recommendations encouraging states to adopt and apply the “abusive” standard under the CFPA (previously discussed here), we expect to see more states ramp up their consumer financial protection efforts.
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SEC Abandons Climate Disclosure Rule
As expected, the SEC under the Trump Administration has abandoned the climate disclosure rule promulgated by the Biden Administration. Specifically, as stated in a court filing today, “the Commission has determined that it wishes to withdraw its defense of the Rules.” Further, the SEC has also informed the court that “Commission counsel is no longer authorized to advance the arguments presented in the Commission’s response brief.”
This decision by the SEC was widely anticipated–and, indeed, had previously been telegraphed by the Republican appointees at the SEC. It is significant nonetheless, as this reversal by the SEC not only provides further evidence of a withdrawal from the climate policies propounded by the Biden Administration but renders the rule less likely to survive legal challenge–and even less likely to be the subject of enforcement action should the courts uphold the rule.
Still, this is not the end of the litigation over the SEC rule. A number of states had intervened in defense of the rule (AZ, CO, CT, DE, DC, HI, IL, MD, MA, MI, MN, NV, NM, NY, OR, RI, VT, WA), and these states can continue to present arguments on behalf of the climate disclosure regulation to the Eighth Circuit. However, the odds that the climate disclosure regulation survives legal challenge when the SEC itself has abandoned it appear quite low.
The SEC will stop defending corporate emissions reporting requirements in court after the agency under President Joe Biden fought for months to save the rules. Securities and Exchange Commission lawyers are “no longer authorized to advance” arguments the agency had made in support of the 2024 regulations that require companies to report their greenhouse gas emissions, the SEC said in a filing with the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on Thursday.
news.bloomberglaw.com/…
A TALE OF TWO REJECTED MOTIONS: Court Denies Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend and Defendant’s Motion to Compel
Hey, TCPAWorld!
Be timely. Don’t skip procedural steps. And always bring receipts.
In SHANAHAN v. MFS SUPPLY LLC, No. 8:23CV475, 2025 WL 885265 (D. Neb. Mar. 21, 2025), both Terrence Shanahan (“Plaintiff”) and MFS Supply LLC, (“Defendant”) filed competing motions. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Modify the First Amended Class Action Complaint and Case Progression Order, aiming to revise the class definition based on new facts uncovered during discovery. Meanwhile, the Defendant filed a Motion to Compel, to Deem Admissions Admitted, and to Enlarge the Number of Interrogatories, requesting the Court to force Plaintiff to respond to discovery requests.
The Court denied both motions.
Background
On October 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed a class action complaint accusing Defendant of sending unsolicited telemarketing texts to consumers on the national Do Not Call Registry (DNC). Plaintiff claims he received two such texts promoting real estate lockboxes and asserts he never gave consent, with his number registered on the DNC since December 17, 2004.
Plaintiff seeks to represent the following class:
“All persons in the United States who: (1) from the last 4 years to present (2) Defendant texted more than once in a 12-month period (3) whose telephone numbers were registered on the Federal Do Not Call registry for more than 30 days at the time the texts were sent.” (Filing No. 1 at p. 4 ). Plaintiff’s Complaint contains one cause of action for violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) by telemarketing to telephone numbers listed on the Federal Government’s National Do Not Call Registry.”
Id. at *2. Plaintiff asserts a single cause of action, alleging that the Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) by making telemarketing calls to phone numbers registered on the National Do Not Call Registry.
Defendant filed an answer broadly denying Plaintiff’s allegations and asserting multiple affirmative defenses, including statutory exclusions and claims that Plaintiff and the putative class consented—either expressly or implicitly—to receiving the messages, among others.
Following the parties’ Rule 26(f) Report, the Court set June 24, 2024, as the deadline for written discovery and July 8, 2024, as the deadline to file a motion to compel. The Case Progression Order required parties to first contact the magistrate judge and receive authorization from the Court before filing a motion to compel.
Discovery
On February 7, 2024, Defendant served discovery requests and later deposed Plaintiff on May 6, revealing new information allegedly not disclosed in prior cases, including that Plaintiff’s phone number was tied to his real estate license and business since 2006. Then on May 8, 2024, Defendant served a second set of discovery requests, which Plaintiff largely objected to as exceeding the interrogatory limit under Rule 33(a), being irrelevant, burdensome, vague, ambiguous, among other objections. After receiving Plaintiff’s responses, the parties engaged in an exchange that would entertain—or agitate—any litigator, and according to the Court, went something like this:
Defense counsel: “These are late.”
Plaintiff’s counsel: “No they’re not.”
Defense counsel: “The admissions were due on the 7th. You are late on the admissions. The remainder of the responses are woefully inadequate…”
Plaintiff’s counsel: “Thank you for your professional courtesy in waiting one day. The requests were all overly broad.”
Defense counsel: No response.
Id. at * 2-3.
Counsel informed the Court of a dispute over whether Plaintiff should be allowed to conduct class discovery, and shortly before the conference, Plaintiff moved to amend the Complaint. During the June 17, 2024, conference, the Court directed Plaintiff to file an amended motion after finding no good cause for missing the amendment deadline under Rule 16(b). Further, the Court declined to grant class discovery or allow a motion to compel, instead directing the parties to resolve the issues through further meet-and-confer efforts.
On June 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed an amended motion to amend the complaint, seeking to revise the class definition and establish standing based on information learned during Defendant’s deposition which revealed that Defendant had sent approximately 34,000 text messages to a nationwide list that included Plaintiff. Plaintiff sought to add the following allegations to his Complaint:
“Defendant obtained Plaintiff’s information when it downloaded a nationwide list of 17,000 (Seventeen Thousand) Berkshire Hathaway Ambassador real estate agents. Plaintiff was unaware and had no knowledge that Defendant obtained Plaintiff’s information. Defendant uploaded the list to Textedly, a text messaging platform, and sent out two text messages soliciting one of its popular products (lockboxes, which are locked boxes for keys that realtors share).
Plaintiff’s phone number ending in 1146 is Plaintiff’s only residential phone number, and Plaintiff does not have a ‘landline.’
Plaintiff’s phone number ending in 1146 is his personal cell phone.
Plaintiff owns a real estate business and maintains four separate phone numbers ending in 6224, 0737, 6430 and 0366 for operational purposes so that people do not call his personal cell phone for matters dealing with routine operation of the business.”
Id. at *3. Plaintiff also sought to amend the class definition as:
“All persons in the United States who: (1) are on the list of Berkshire Hathaway Realtors obtained by MFS Supply LLC; (2) whose telephone numbers were connected to cell phones; (3) registered on the Federal Do Not Call registry; (4) whose owners do not maintain any other residential telephone numbers; and (5) do have separate telephone number(s) for business purposes.”
Id. On July 8, 2024, Defendant filed a Motion to Compel, seeking additional interrogatories and to deem admissions admitted, alleging that Plaintiff’s counsel failed to provide documents, respond to interrogatories, or meet discovery deadlines.
Court’s Analysis of the Competing Motions
The Court starts with analyzing Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend his Complaint.
Under Rule 15(a), courts should freely grant leave to amend when justice requires, but if a scheduling deadline has passed, the party must first show good cause under Rule 16(b). Because Plaintiff filed his motion to amend more than three months after the March 15, 2024 deadline set in the Court’s scheduling order, he must first show good cause.
The primary measure of good cause is the movant’s diligence in trying to meet the deadline. Courts generally do not consider prejudice if the movant was not diligent, and absent newly discovered facts or changed circumstances, delay alone is insufficient to justify amendment. The Court found Plaintiff lacked good cause, finding that the facts were not newly discovered and could have been included earlier with diligence, nor did they alter the legal basis of Plaintiff’s claims which already addressed unsolicited texts sent despite being on the Do Not Call Registry. The Court also stated that granting the amendment after discovery had closed would cause delay, require further discovery, and unfairly prejudice Defendant.
Next, the Court analyzed Defendant’s Motion to Compel.
The Court denied Defendant’s motion for failing to follow procedural requirements, including not requesting a conference with the magistrate judge as required by the Case Progression Order and Civil Case Management Practices. Defendant also failed to show proof of a proper meet and confer, such as the date, time, or attachments any related communications between the parties. Plaintiff, on the other hand, submitted email evidence demonstrating that his counsel requested to meet and confer to resolve discovery issues, however, Defendant ignored the request and instead focused on filing the instant motion.
Moreover, the Court found that even if Defendant’s procedural failures were excused, the motion to compel still lacked the required evidentiary support to challenge Plaintiff’s production or objections, as local rules require supporting evidence for motions relying on facts outside the pleadings.
Specifically, the Court denied Defendant’s request for Plaintiff to respond to its second set of interrogatories, because Defendant exceeded the 25-interrogatory limit under Rule 33(a)(1) and failed to address the merits of Plaintiff’s objections or provide the original set of interrogatories.
Defendant’s request for production was denied as Defendant did not identify which of the 29 requests were deficient or explain why Plaintiff’s objections were invalid.
Finally, the Court denied the requests for admissions. Although Plaintiff’s responses were three days late, the Court, in its discretion, treated them as a request to withdraw deemed admissions and accepted them, finding no prejudice to Defendant and no impact on the merits of the case.
Takeaways
Scheduling Orders are not mere suggestions made by the Court and parties are expected to follow them. While the Court has the discretion to approve untimely requests to amend, the movant must show good cause under Rule 16(b), supported by diligence and not rely on preexisting facts that could have been included earlier.
Further, skipping procedural steps, such as a meet-and-confer, can kill your motion before its merits are weighed.
Finally, if you’re challenging discovery responses, make sure to bring receipts. Courts want precision—not general statements.
Import-Tariffs: Acts of God or just another Thursday?
Many of us are quietly watching and waiting to see how newly imposed tariffs will affect the U.S. and global economy in the coming weeks, months, and potentially – years.[i] Anticipating these changes and protecting your transactions is going to be crucial, but what about deals that have already been negotiated and signed? Which party will bear the greater risks and burdens of tariff-related cost increases? There are several theories that may provide relief.
A widely used contract provision that will bear considerable scrutiny is the ‘Force Majeure Clause,’ which allows a party to avoid liability if it cannot fulfill its obligations due to circumstances beyond their control or unforeseen events.[ii] The motivator behind this provision is to protect parties against defined disasters, calamities, and acts (and wraths) of God.[iii] Numerous courts have considered such clauses, and many have declined to invoke the force majeure clause.
Kyocera Corp. v. Hemlock Semiconductor, LLC:
In 2015, the Michigan First District Court of Appeals considered this question in Kyocera Corp. v. Hemlock Semiconductor, LLC.[iv] This case arose in the midst of upheaval within the solar industry caused by tensions between the United States and China. Chinese companies began engaging in the process known as “large-scale dumping,” in which a foreign producer, perhaps with state support, sells a product at a price that is lower than its cost of production to intentionally manipulate an industry and capture market share. Global solar prices began to decline (including the price of polysilicon, a critical component used in solar panels), causing numerous manufacturers to go out of business. In response, the United States imposed anti-subsidy and anti-dumping import tariffs.[v]
Kyocera, a Japanese solar panel manufacturer, had previously entered into a ten year, take-or-pay supply contract with Hemlock Semiconductor, a Michigan based polysilicon manufacturer, to purchase its polysilicon. The very nature of a take-or-pay contract allocates the risk of a rise in prices to the seller (Hemlock) and a fall in prices to the buyer (Kyocera). Kyocera argued that purchasing polysilicon at this higher price would cause its “solar business to cease to exist.” Kyocera tried and failed to negotiate a satisfactory price change with Hemlock and ultimately provided Hemlock with notice that it was excused from performance under the contract’s force majeure clause.[vi]
The Michigan First District Court of Appeals was unsympathetic, finding that economic hardship and unprofitability alone, including increased costs due to tariffs, are insufficient to invoke force majeure unless explicitly covered by the clause. The risk of falling prices fell squarely on Kyocera under its contract, and Kyocera “opted” not to protect itself.[vii] The court refused to “manufacture a contractual limitation that it may in hindsight desire by broadly interpreting the force majeure clause to say something that it does not.”[viii]
Further, the court addressed the issue of foreseeability. The court rejected Kyocera’s argument that they did not foresee the illegal actions of the Chinese government, simply stating that “markets are volatile” and that the fact that “prices may rise and fall was known to both parties and such risk was precisely allocated by the take-or-pay nature of [a]greement.”[ix]
Kyocera is one of many cases illustrating that unless very carefully drafted to say otherwise, economic hardship and decreasing profits may not be enough for a court to intervene and apply the protections of a force majeure clause. Under these cases, the most that an aggrieved party may receive is more time to comply with its contractual obligations.
So, what type of language would a court consider explicit enough to apply the force majeure clause against tariffs? We will consider this issue in an upcoming post!
[i] See Robert McClelland et al., Tariffs, Trade, China, and the States, Tax Pol’y Ctr, Urb. Inst. & Brookings Inst. (Oct. 17, 2024), https://taxpolicycenter.org/briefs/tariffs-trade-china-and-states.
[ii] See Force Majeure, Legal Info. Inst., Cornell L. Sch., (last visited Mar. 26, 2023) https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/force_majeure#:~:text=Force%20majeure%20is%20a%20provision,or%20both%20parties%20from%20performing.
[iii] See Mark Trowbridge, Acts of God and Other Force Majeure Events, Supply Chain Mgmt. Rev. (May 2, 2022), https://www.scmr.com/article/acts_of_god_and_other_force_majeure_events.
[iv] See Kyocera Corp. v. Hemlock Semiconductor, LLC, 886 N.W.2d 445 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015).
[v] See id. at 449.
[vi] See id. at 447, 450.
[vii] See id. at 453.
[viii] See Kyocera Corp, 886 N.W.2d at 453.
[ix] See id. at 452-53.
The Chapter 93A Hurdle: Mass. Court Rejects ‘Artificial Price Inflation’ Claims in Energy Marketing Lawsuit
In Ortiz v. Eversource Energy, a putative class action, plaintiffs brought suit against Eversource Energy alleging that Eversource knowingly marketed natural gas and related services as clean and safe for residential consumers and the environment despite knowing this was not true. Allegedly, Eversource knowingly issued communications that were purposefully misleading and inconsistent with scientific studies. Plaintiffs further allege that had they known the truth about the health and environmental risks associated with the natural gas, they would not have purchased the gas.
Plaintiffs sought (1) a declaration that defendant’s promotional and advertising of its natural gas contained unlawfully false, misleading, and/or deceptive statements; (2) an order enjoining defendant from promoting and marketing its natural gas using such unlawfully false, misleading, and/or deceptive statements; and (3) an order that defendant be required to make reasonable and regular corrective disclosures to plaintiffs and the putative class members that accurately describe the potential health and safety risks. Plaintiffs also sought monetary damages under Chapter 93A.
Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. Paying for a product whose price was artificially inflated by deceptive advertising is a recognized economic injury cognizable under Chapter 93A; however, a plaintiff may not base the claim on speculative harm or risk of economic damages. Here, plaintiff did not allege that the natural gas they purchased from Eversource was functionally deficient or that they suffered any adverse health effects from the natural gas they purchased. To the contrary, plaintiffs claimed they were harmed when they had been misled regarding the environmental and health risks of the gas. In other words, plaintiffs paid too much for the gas they received. However, the Massachusetts Superior Court noted that pursuant to the current regulatory regime in Massachusetts, the Department of Public Utilities has the exclusive power to regulate operations, service, and rates. Thus, as the rates Eversource charged were not entirely within its control, the connection between the purported false statements and the costs plaintiff incurred was too attenuated to serve as a cognizable injury. Plaintiff was unable to establish that they would have paid a lower price for natural gas had it been honestly advertised.
CFPB Moves to Vacate ECOA Settlement Against Illinois-based Mortgage Lender
On March 26, the CFPB filed a motion to vacate its recent settlement against an Illinois-based mortgage lender accused of engaging in discriminatory marketing practices in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) and the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA). The lawsuit, initially filed in 2020, alleged that the lender’s public radio advertisements and commentary discouraged prospective applicants in majority- and minority- Black neighborhoods from applying for mortgage loans.
In its original complaint, the CFPB claimed the mortgage lender had violated fair lending laws by making repeated on-air statements that allegedly discouraged individuals in certain predominantly minority neighborhoods from seeking credit, and by failing to market its services in a manner that would affirmatively reach those communities. According to the CFPB, this conduct constituted unlawful discouragement under the ECOA and CFPA, even where no formal credit application had been submitted. That decision was challenged on appeal and later upheld by the 7th Circuit which found that ECOA also applies to prospective applicants. After losing on appeal, the lender settled the action for $105,000.
Acting Director Russel Vought explained in a March 26 press release that the CFPB “abused its power, unfairly tagged the lender as racist with “zero evidence”, and spent years persecuting and extorting the lender “all to further the goal of mandating DEI in lending via their regulations by enforcement tactics.”
Putting It Into Practice: The CFPB’s order is the latest example of the Bureau reversing course on enforcement actions initiated under the previous administration (previously discussed here and here). This is the rare instance of a federal regulator ripping up an action that was already settled. Perhaps even more noteworthy, the lawsuit against the mortgage lender was filed under the first Trump administration.
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HUGE WIN FOR LENDING TREE!: Court Holds Tree is Not Responsible for Affiliate Calls in Pay Per Call Program And That’s Huge News
So Tree and I have buried the hatchet and are friends again– in fact, Lending Tree will be speaking at Law Conference of Champions III, how awesome is that!
But the BEST way to get on the Czar’s good side is to deliver huge industry-helping TCPA wins, and that is EXACTLY what Tree just did and I LOVE TO SEE IT.
In Sapan v. LendingTree, 8:23-cv-00071 (C.D. Cal March 18, 2025) the Court just entered judgment in favor of Tree finding it cannot be held responsible for calls made by affiliates in its pay per call program. Absolutely MASSIVE win,
The ruling turned on vicarious liability principles and applied the critical case of Jones v. Royal Administration Services, Inc., 887 F.3d 443 (9th Cir. 2018), which is the primary Ninth Circuit authority on the issue.
Under Jones a party must control the injury-causing conduct to be liable for calls. And where a party is making calls that may be transferred to any number of buyers the party that happens to buy that call simply cannot be held liable for the transfer.
In light of that authority the Sapan found Tree was not liable because it did not directly control the caller and the mere fact it accepted a transfer is not dispositive.
Excellent result– and undoubtedly the correct one!
This is an important ruling for folks to keep in mind. A ton of litigation arises following lead gen third-party transfers and folks buying leads on non-exclusive campaigns should be citing this case!
NetChoice Sues to Halt Louisiana Age Verification and Personalized Ad Law
On March 18, 2025, NetChoice filed a lawsuit seeking to enjoin a Louisiana law, the Secure Online Child Interaction and Age Limitation Act (S.B. 162) (“Act”), from taking effect this July. The Act requires social media companies subject to the law to obtain express consent from parents or guardians for minors under the age of 16 to create social media accounts. The Act also requires social media companies subject to the law to “make commercially reasonable efforts to verify the age of Louisiana account holders” to determine if a user is likely to be a minor. Further, the Act prohibits the use of targeted advertising to children.
In its complaint, NetChoice has raised a First Amendment objection to the age verification requirement, arguing that the obligation “would place multiple restrictions on minors’ and adults’ abilities to access covered websites and, in some cases, block access altogether.” NetChoice has argued that the restriction is content-based, because the law applies to social media platforms and compels speech by requiring social media platforms to verify users’ ages. NetChoice also has argued that the law’s definition of targeted advertising is overly broad and not properly tailored to mitigate the potential impacts to free speech; in other words, NetChoice has argued that Louisiana has not shown that the age verification and advertising restrictions are necessary and narrowly tailored to address the impact of social media use on minors.
We previously blogged about lawsuits NetChoice has filed seeking to block Age Appropriate Design Code laws in California and Maryland.
Can I Sue for for the Michigan Coach Data Breach?
What are My Legal Rights if I Received the FBI Letter or DOJ Letter?
Several student athletes from around the United States received a letter from the FBI about former University of Michigan football coach Matt Weiss. Other victims received an email from the U.S. Department to Justice Victims Notification System to advise them about the computer hack that allowed the coach to access personal photos and videos for the athletes. Coach Weiss was recently arrested and charged with computer crimes. He is out on bond and further criminal proceedings are scheduled for him criminal case.
The big question is “what are my legal rights if I received the FBI letter regarding the Michigan coach data breach?” If you received the letter from the FBI advising you that your personal photos and information were unlawfully accessed, you may have a claim for compensation.
What are my Legal Options to Pursue Compensation?
There are two legal cases arising out of the Matt Weiss data breach and computer hacking incident. First, there is the criminal proceeding for his unlawful conduct.
Criminal matters are being handled by the U.S. Attorney General Office and these charges seek criminal penalties, like incarceration, probation, and fines against the coach himself. He is entitled to a presumption of innocence, and his fate will be decided by a judge or jury.
Victims who received the FBI letter can also pursue a civil lawsuit against Matt Weiss and the University of Michigan. There may be additional defendants who were responsible for preventing computer hacks and unlawful data access from the university computers.
How Does a Hacking Victim File a Claim for Compensation?
If you received the FBI letter or the U.S. Department of Justice email saying that your social media accounts were hacked by Matt Weiss, you can file a civil claim for compensation. A Michigan data breach lawsuit lawyer can help if you were a computer crime victim by Matt Weiss, Michigan’s co-offensive coordinator.
The FBI has so far determined that Matt Weiss used University of Michigan computers to unlawfully access over 3,300 student athletes. Victims of the breach can pursue civil lawsuits for damages and institutions can also be held liable if they fail to protect sensitive data, underscoring the importance of robust legal protections. Invasion of privacy is a basis for civil lawsuits.
What is Invasion of Privacy?
Invasion of privacy involves infringement upon an individual’s right to privacy by several intrusive or unwanted actions. These invasions of privacy can include:’
Physical encroachments on a person’s private property
Taking unauthorized photos and videos of a person
Accessing a person’s private e-mail or text messages
Unauthorized access to a person’s private social media accounts
Access to this information, even if not disclosed to others, has a profound effect on the victims’ mental and emotional state. Private, personal, and intimate photos and information accessed by an unauthorized person causes embarrassment, humiliation, and other emotional harm.
Suing the University of Michigan for Invasion of Privacy
You may be able to sue the University of Michigan for invasion of privacy if your personal accounts were hacked and accessed by Matt Weiss. Much work and investigation must be done to determine if this cybercrime attack was preventable by the school with proper oversight and procedures to protect against its computers being used for criminal purposes.
Victims of digital abuse have several avenues to seek justice and compensation. They can pursue civil claims for damages related to privacy violations, emotional suffering, and even potential medical expenses linked to the breaches. These lawsuits can provide financial relief and hold perpetrators accountable for their actions.
Moreover, institutions that failed to protect sensitive information can also be held liable. Victims can seek financial compensation through civil lawsuits against universities and vendors if it can be demonstrated that these entities neglected their duty to safeguard private data. This dual approach not only addresses immediate harm but also promotes systemic change to prevent future breaches.
How Do I File a U of M Data Breach Lawsuit?
There will likely be a class action lawsuit filed against The University of Michigan and separate lawsuits filed by individuals. With over 3,000 victims, there will be many legal procedural obstacles to navigate to file and qualify for a settlement.
If you received a letter from the FBI or any other entity advising you that Matt Weiss unlawfully accessed your personal data, photos, or video, you should contact our award-winning law firm today. We will protect your legal rights and pursue claims on your behalf.
Is there a Coach Weiss Class Action Lawsuit?
A class action lawsuit has not been filed as of March 25, 2025, for invasion of privacy claims against the University of Michigan for the Coach Matt Weiss computer hacking incidents. A class action case may be filed shortly, and you may be able to join if you were a victim.
High Court Upholds Use of Omnibus Claims in Mass Motor Finance Litigation
A recent High Court decision in claims brought by thousands of claimants against motor finance providers has reaffirmed the validity of using omnibus claim forms in large-scale consumer litigation. The ruling has implications both for the many motor-finance mis-selling claims pending before the courts and also for mass claims in a variety of other contexts.
Background
The case involved eight omnibus claim forms issued on behalf of over 5,800 claimants against eight defendants. While the claims were at an early stage procedurally, the core allegations were that the defendants had paid undisclosed, variable commissions to motor finance brokers (car dealers), creating conflicts of interest which the claimants argued rendered the ensuing credit agreements unfair under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (CCA).
Shortly after the claims were issued, and before filing any defence, the defendants objected to the use of omnibus claim forms and invited the court to sever the claims, such that the claimants’ solicitors would need to issue a separate claim form (and pay a court fee) for each claim.
Initially, a County Court judge ruled that the claims should be severed into individual cases, following Abbott v Ministry of Defence [2023] 1 WLR 4002. This would have required a separate claim form to be issued (and court fee paid) for each case. The claimants appealed, arguing that the claims could and should more appropriately be commenced under omnibus claim forms, as contemplated by CPR 7.3 and CPR 19.1.
Key Legal Considerations
CPR 7.3 allows a single claim form to be used for multiple claims if they can be “conveniently disposed of” in the same proceedings. CPR 19.1 provides that any number of claimants may be joined as parties to a claim.
In Morris v Williams & Co Solicitors [2024] EWCA Civ 376 the Court of Appeal clarified that no gloss should be put on the words of CPR 7.3 and 19.1, which should be given their ordinary meaning. The exclusionary “real progress,” “real significance,” and “must bind” tests proposed in Abbott were factors to consider but should not be viewed as exclusionary tests – the omnibus claim form jurisdiction was not as restrictive as the Group Litigation Order regime in CPR 19.21-28, and should not be treated as “GLO-light”. Abbott was overruled.
Factors Supporting Omnibus Claims
The High Court carried out a detailed analysis of the factors to be taken into account in deciding whether the claims could conveniently be disposed of together per CPR 7.3. Key points cited in favour of allowing omnibus claims to proceed included:
The large number of claimants and small number of defendants.
The claims arose from the same or similar transactions, with broadly common allegations and the same legal causes of action, raising a number of common legal and factual issues.
The likelihood that case managing the cases together by way of lead or test cases would likely facilitate the disposal of many or all of the following cases. Whereas if separate claims were issued it would be random chance which claims were heard first and whether they were appropriate test cases.
Managing the claims together would be more efficient and just, in line with the CPR 1.1 overriding objective. Costs would likely be saved overall, and court time would likely be reduced. The imbalance of financial power between individual claimants and defendants would be mitigated. There were advantages to omnibus claims management in terms of the timing and usefulness of disclosure, and the availability of expert evidence.
Practical Implications
For Defendants facing mass claims this ruling will be a concerning precedent for the use of omnibus claim forms by claimants as a strategy, with obvious advantages for claimant law firms in terms of cost, use of case management applications to gain early disclosure, and selection of common issues and test cases.
For Claimants and their advisers the decision will encourage the use of omnibus claims over the impracticality of litigating individual cases, and the relative restrictiveness of the GLO regime.
For the Courts omnibus claim forms could see large volumes of individual claims taken out of the County Courts and case managed collectively and in a less haphazard fashion than has so far been the case, with potential for many following cases to be settled out of court once lead claims have been determined. This may help with significant delays and backlogs often experienced in the County Courts.
Wider Significance
The significance of this decision in the context of motor finance claims may to some extent be rendered moot by the outcome of the Supreme Court appeal in Johnson v FirstRand and the FCA’s decision on a whether and to what extent to impose a consumer redress scheme. But in reaffirming the broad scope and flexibility of CPR 7.3 and 19.1, the ruling may pave the way for more mass claims in financial services and other contexts.