Indian Music Industry Enters the Global Copyright Debate Over AI
The legal battles surrounding generative AI and copyright continue to escalate with prominent players in the Indian music industry now seeking to join an existing lawsuit against OpenAI, the creator of ChatGPT. On February 13, 2025, industry giants such as Saregama, T-Series, and the Indian Music Industry (IMI) presented their concerns in a New Delhi court, arguing that OpenAI’s methods for training its AI models involve extracting protected song lyrics, music compositions, and recordings without proper licensing or compensation. This development follows a broader trend of copyright holders challenging generative AI companies, as evidenced by similar claims in the U.S. and Europe.
This case was originally filed by Asian News International (ANI), a leading Indian news agency, which alleged that OpenAI had used its copyrighted content without permission to train its AI models. Since then, the lawsuit has drawn interest from music companies, book publishers, and news organizations, all highlighting the alleged economic harm and intellectual property concerns stemming from these practices in India. The proceedings emerge amid a global backlash against the use of copyrighted materials in AI training. In November 2024, GEMA, Germany’s music licensing body, filed a lawsuit against OpenAI, alleging that the company reproduced protected lyrics without authorization. In parallel, lawsuits from authors and publishers in the U.S. have accused OpenAI and other AI platforms of improperly using copyrighted materials as training data.
The unfolding litigation raises critical questions about the boundaries and applicability of ‘fair use’ within the context of AI in the digital age. While OpenAI maintains that its reliance on publicly available data falls within fair use principles, commentators warn that a ruling against the tech giant could set a precedent that reshapes AI training practices not only in India but worldwide—given the global nature of AI development and jurisdiction-specific nuances of copyright law. As courts grapple with these complex issues, both creative industries and the broader tech community are watching closely to understand how emerging precedent and legal frameworks around the world might influence future AI development and deployment.
As legal challenges mount globally, this litigation is another reminder for businesses developing AI models or integrating AI technologies to proactively assess data privacy and sourcing practices, secure appropriate licenses for copyrighted content, and thoroughly review existing agreements and rights to identify any issues or ambiguities regarding the scope of permitted AI use cases. Beyond obtaining necessary licenses, companies should implement targeted risk mitigation strategies, such as maintaining comprehensive records of data sources and corresponding licenses, establishing internal and (where appropriate) external policies that define acceptable AI use and development, and conducting regular audits to ensure compliance. For any company seeking to unlock AI solutions and monetization opportunities while safeguarding its business interests, engaging qualified local legal counsel early in the process is essential for effectively navigating the evolving global patchwork of fair use, intellectual property laws, and other relevant regulations.
District Court Blocks Enforcement of SCOPE Act Requirements
On February 7, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas granted a preliminary injunction further blocking enforcement of Texas’ Securing Children Online through Parental Empowerment Act (“SCOPE Act”). The SCOPE Act, which was enacted in 2023, imposes obligations on digital service providers to protect minors.
In a separate lawsuit regarding the SCOPE Act (Computer & Communications Industry Association v. Paxton), the District Court enjoined certain provisions of the law before it went into effect. In August 2024, plaintiffs, including a student-run civic engagement organization, a “social-good” advertising company, a mental health content creator and an unidentified high school student, sued Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton to block enforcement of the SCOPE Act on the basis that the law is an unconstitutional restriction of free speech.
In Students Engaged in Advancing Texas v. Paxton, the District Court ruled that the law is a content-based statute subject to strict scrutiny. The District Court further held that with respect to certain of the SCOPE Act’s monitoring-and-filtering requirements (§ 509.053 and § 509.056(1)), targeted advertising requirements (§ 509.052(2)(D) and § 509.055), and content monitoring and age-verification requirements (§ 509.057), the plaintiffs had carried their burden in showing that the law’s restrictions on speech fail strict scrutiny and should be facially invalidated. The District Court also ruled that § 509.053 and § 509.055 were unconstitutionally vague. Accordingly, the District Court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining Paxton from enforcing those provisions pending final judgment in the case. The remaining provisions of the law remain in effect.
Greenwashing Lawsuit Against Lululemon Dismissed by Federal Court
On February 18, 2025, Judge Bloom (S.D. Fla.) dismissed a lawsuit against Lululemon, the athleisure company, that centered upon allegations of greenwashing. Specifically, the plaintiffs here had contended “that Lululemon made a number of direct environmental claims about the company’s products and actions that are false, deceptive and/or misleading.” However, the judge found these allegations lacking and dismissed the case for lack of standing due to a failure to plead injury, since “Plaintiffs’ allegations fail to tie any aspect of Lululemon’s statements to the purported price premium that Plaintiffs paid for Lululemon’s products.”
This conclusion by the federal district court is highly significant and will likely impact the growing number of greenwashing actions filed in various courts. In particular, the court’s holding that, in the context of greenwashing, “blanket assertions are insufficient to constitute an economic injury, and therefore Plaintiffs lack Article III standing” may erect a significant barrier to the many greenwashing lawsuits that “fail[] to allege a factual connection between the value of [Company’s]products and [Company’s] representations.” In other words, a greenwashing lawsuit will not succeed based upon generalized allegations that a company is not upholding its environmental commitments or otherwise making improper claims of sustainability but rather will require a specific link between the alleged greenwashing and the economic injury suffered by plaintiffs. This will likely be harder to establish in many, if not most, cases, and so may enable defendants to dispose of greenwashing lawsuits at an early stage in the litigation–e.g., at the motion to dismiss stage, as occurred here.
Lululemon Athletica Inc. has escaped a proposed class action accusing it of misleading the public into thinking the company is environmentally friendly, after a Florida federal judge tossed the suit because the consumers couldn’t make a price-premium connection. [] Judge Beth Bloom granted Lululemon’s motion to dismiss, finding that the buyers lacked standing because they did not adequately link their claims of overhyped environmental statements to any kind of economic injury. The lawsuit “does not allege that there was any deceptive act or unfair practice regarding the products sold to plaintiffs,” Judge Bloom said. “Indeed, the ‘deception’ plaintiffs purportedly relied on amounts to nothing more than goals and promises contained in a press release or on Lululemon’s website. … Plaintiffs’ allegations fail to tie any aspect of Lululemon’s statements to the purported price premium that plaintiffs paid for Lululemon’s products.”
www.law360.com/…
Opioids and Common Law Liability for Indirect Economic Harm
Earlier this month, the Law Court weighed in on a hot-button legal issue—the potential liability of opioid manufacturers for the costs of the drug epidemic. In Eastern Maine Medical Center v. Walgreen Company, the Law Court affirmed a decision granting a motion to dismiss hospitals’ claims for negligence, public nuisance, unjust enrichment, fraud and negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent conspiracy, and civil conspiracy. The Court’s opinion reinforced several important principles circumscribing the scope of potential liability for economic harm under the common law.
The basic theory of the complaint was that various opioid sellers (pharmaceutical manufacturing and sales companies, and retail pharmacies and distributors) had created an epidemic of opioid misuse that required the plaintiff hospitals to incur high costs that were only partially reimbursed.
Before reaching the merits of the complaint, the Law Court first addressed Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which requires a “short and plain statement” of a plaintiff’s claim. The complaint was anything but short—it was 509 pages, with over 1,800 paragraphs. Without resolving the case on this basis, the Law Court noted that the complaint was “decidedly not short or plain,” but was instead unnecessarily filled with “eye-watering detail” and repetition that would justify dismissal of the complaint. The Court’s discussion is an important reminder, in an age where complaints are growing (needlessly) ever longer, that Rule 8’s limitations have real teeth.
On the merits, the Court concluded—in an admirably concise opinion—that the hospitals’ theories of liability were insufficient because the hospitals had not directly suffered the harm allegedly caused by the opioid sellers. Instead, they had suffered only indirect and purely economic harm. Importantly, the Court observed that
[A]n actor has no general duty to avoid the unintentional infliction of economic loss on another.
Among the notable limits to economic liability reaffirmed by the Law Court were the following:
Under principles of duty and proximate causation, a hospital cannot assert an independent negligence claim to recover the costs of treating a victim injured by a negligent act.
A claim for fraud, fraudulent concealment, or negligent misrepresentation cannot be maintained absent a good faith allegation of reliance on the misrepresentation.
A public nuisance claim can be maintained by a private plaintiff only if the nuisance “infringe[d] on a right particular to the plaintiff” and “cause[d] injury different in kind from the injury to the public generally”—requirements that are not satisfied when the claim is based on widespread economic injury broadly affecting the public.
Given the increasing prevalence of negligence, fraud, and public nuisance claims for alleged instances of widespread harm, EMMC will provide an important guidepost for both plaintiffs and defendants in cases involving private causes of action. Time will tell whether it will cause such injuries to be addressed primarily through actions by government officials on behalf of the public.
Eighth Circuit Rules States May Challenge PWFA’s Inclusion of Abortion as a ‘Related Medical Condition’
Seventeen Republican-led states can continue their lawsuit challenging parts of the federal Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA) after the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently ruled the states have standing to sue and remanded the case back to the lower court.
Quick Hits
The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) published a final rule for implementing the PWFA , which took effect on June 18, 2024. Several legal challenges to the rule’s inclusion of abortion as a “related medical condition” have been filed.
The Eighth Circuit recently revived a case that seventeen states brought to challenge provisions in the PWFA regarding accommodations for employees seeking an abortion after the district court found the states lacked standing.
The case will proceed at the district court level.
Changes in federal policy under the new presidential administration may impact the trajectory of the case.
On February 20, 2025, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled that seventeen states—Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and West Virginia—had standing to challenge parts of the PWFA related to reasonable accommodations for employees seeking an abortion.
The PWFA requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations for employees with pregnancy-related health conditions, which include miscarriage, stillbirth, and abortion under the final rule. In the lawsuit, the states argued that the EEOC exceeded its authority in how it defined “pregnancy-related health definitions.” The states claimed the PWFA regulations would hinder their ability to regulate abortions and their interests in maintaining a pro-life message in dealing with state employees. The states also argued the PWFA regulations would subject them to economic harm because of compliance costs.
On June 14, 2024, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas denied the states’ request for a preliminary injunction. It ruled that the states lacked standing because they did not show a likelihood of irreparable harm from the PWFA regulations. The risk of enforcement is speculative because “unlike in situations involving private employers, the EEOC cannot bring enforcement actions against state employers,” the district court stated.
The Eighth Circuit disagreed and found the states are employers under the PWFA and the final rule. They would be required to provide accommodations, change employment practices and policies, and refrain from messaging that would be arguably prohibited under the rule. The court went on to find that the imposition of a regulatory burden action alone causes injury. Therefore, the states had standing.
Next Steps
This case was remanded to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. President Donald Trump recently removed two commissioners from the EEOC, and the agency has signaled a change in enforcement policies, and plans to do so when the Commission has a quorum. The agency could issue new regulations for the PWFA or change how it is approaching this case.
In the meantime, private and public employers may wish to review their policies and practices around reasonable accommodations for pregnancy-related conditions, so they continue to adhere to state and federal laws.
Federal Court Preliminarily Blocks Key Parts of President Trump’s Orders Restricting DEI at Private Employers
A federal judge in Maryland has preliminarily blocked the Trump administration from enforcing key provisions of the recent executive orders (EO) to eliminate “illegal” diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) programs and initiatives from the federal government and federal contractors, finding the provisions are unconstitutionally vague and infringe free speech.
Quick Hits
A federal court in Maryland preliminarily blocked the Trump administration from enforcing executive orders that seek to eliminate DEI programs and initiatives in the federal government and private sector.
The court found the executive orders are likely unconstitutionally vague, lack clear definitions, and potentially discriminate against certain viewpoints in violations of the First Amendment.
The ruling provides some temporary relief for federal contractors and other private employers that have faced concerns they will be a target of federal regulators over programs that may be classified as “illegal” DEI.
On February 21, 2025, U.S. District Judge Adam B. Abelson granted a preliminary injunction, blocking three key provisions of two EOs issued by President Donald Trump in his first days in office: (1) a provision that required federal agencies to terminate “equity-related grants or contracts,” (2) a provision that required federal contractors and subcontractors to certify for purposes of False Claims Act (FCA) liability that they do not operate unlawful DEI programs, and (3) a provision directing the attorney general to enforce civil rights laws against DEI programs in the private sector.
A coalition of DEI advocates—the National Association of Diversity Officers in Higher Education, the American Association of University Professors, Restaurant Opportunities Centers United, and the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore—filed the lawsuit on February 3, 2025, alleging that the Trump EOs restricting DEI or diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility were vague and unconstitutional.
Judge Abelson found that the EOs fail to “define any of the operative terms” such as “equity-related” and “illegal DEI,” leaving companies without clear guidance on what types of programs or policies are being restricted. The judge said the EOs further seek to deter certain principles and speech in clear viewpoint discrimination that is likely to violate the First Amendment.
The ruling in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland is a major win for organizations promoting DEI and diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility (DEIA) and provides some temporary relief for federal contractors and subcontractors and other private employers that have faced concerns they will be targeted by federal regulators over programs that could arguably be classified as “illegal” DEI.
The ruling also comes just days after a two groups of civil rights organizations filed similar challenges U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against the two DEI executive orders and another that rejected gender identity.
Executive Orders
The DEI advocates’ suit targeted EO 14151, “Ending Radical and Wasteful Government DEI Programs and Preferencing,” which was issued on January 20, 2025, President Trump’s first day in office. The order directed federal agencies to “within sixty days of this order … terminate, to the maximum extent allowed by law, all … ‘equity-related’ grants or contracts.”
EO 14173, “Ending Illegal Discrimination and Restoring Merit-Based Opportunity,” issued on January 21, 2025, directed agencies to “include in every contract or grant award: A term requiring the contractual counterparty or grant recipient to agree that its compliance in all respects with all applicable Federal anti-discrimination laws is material to the government’s payment decisions for purposes” of the FCA. The provision has raised concerns for companies doing business with the federal government over potential liability under the FCA, which makes it illegal to defraud the government and allows whistleblowers to bring claims.
Further, EO 14173 directs the attorney general to develop a plan for “enforcing Federal civil-rights laws and taking other appropriate measures to encourage the private sector to end illegal discrimination and preferences, including DEI.” The order states the plan should “identify up to nine potential civil compliance investigations of publicly traded corporations, large non-profit corporations or associations, foundations with assets of 500 million dollars or more, State and local bar and medical associations, and institutions of higher education with endowments over 1 billion dollars.”
Court’s Findings and Injunction
The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims that these provisions were unconstitutionally vague and violated the First Amendment. The court issued a preliminary injunction against the following provisions:
Termination Provision
The court found that the term “equity-related” in EO 14151 is likely vague and could lead to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The court found that the lack of clear definitions leaves federal contractors and grantees uncertain about what activities are prohibited, which could have a chilling effect on speech and activities related to DEI.
Judge Abelson stated that “individuals and organizations have no reasonable way to know what, if anything, they can do to bring their grants into compliance such that they are not considered ‘equity-related.’”
Certification Provision
The court determined that this provision imposed a content-based restriction on speech, requiring contractors and grantees to certify compliance with undefined federal anti-discrimination laws. This provision was found to leverage federal funding to regulate speech outside the scope of the funded programs, violating the First Amendment.
Judge Abelson found that the language of the provision “makes clear that the sole purpose of the provision, regardless of the individualized implementation by executive agencies, is for federal contractors and grantees to confirm under threat of perjury and False Claims Act liability that they do not operate any programs promoting DEI that the government might contend violate federal anti-discrimination laws. This is precisely a ‘condition[] that seek[s] to leverage funding to regulate speech outside the contours of the program itself.’”
Enforcement Threat Provision
The court concluded that it is likely to be found that this provision in EO 14173 is, on its face, an unlawful viewpoint-based restriction on speech. The provision targets DEI programs in private companies without clear definitions and the threat of enforcement is likely to have a chilling effect on speech related to DEI. Judge Abelson stated that it is clear the Trump administration through the EO “that viewpoints and speech considered to be in favor of or supportive of DEI or DEIA are viewpoints the government wishes to punish and, apparently, attempt to extinguish.”
Scope of the Injunction
The preliminary injunction applies not only to the plaintiffs in the case but also to similarly situated federal contractors, grantees, and private sector entities. The court emphasized the need to maintain the status quo while the litigation proceeds and prevent the enforcement of the challenged provisions.
Next Steps
This preliminary injunction represents a significant legal victory for proponents of DEI programs and principles. The court’s decision focused on the lack of clarity of the language used in the EOs and the likelihood that this could chill the free speech of companies and organizations. However, the preliminary injunction ruling will likely be appealed by the Trump administration, and the issues raise important constitutional questions that could land it before the Supreme Court of the United States.
“Claims” Under the FCA, §1983 Claim Denials on Failure-to-Exhaust Grounds, and Limits to FSIA’s Expropriation Exception – SCOTUS Today
The U.S. Supreme Court decided three cases today, with one of particular interest to many readers of this blog. So, let’s start with that one.
Wisconsin Bell v. United States ex rel. Heath is a suit brought by a qui tam relator under the federal False Claims Act (FCA), which imposes civil liability on any person who “knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim” as statutorily defined. 31 U. S. C. §3729(a)(1)(A). The issue presented is a common one in FCA litigation, namely, what is a claim? More precisely, in the context of the case, the question is what level of participation by the government in the actual payment is required to demonstrate an actionable claim by the United States. The answer, which won’t surprise many FCA practitioners, is “not much.”
The case itself concerned the Schools and Libraries (E-Rate) Program of the Universal Service Fund, established under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which subsidizes internet and other telecommunication services for schools and libraries throughout the country. The program is financed by payments by telecommunications carriers into a fund that is administered by a private company, which collects and distributes the money pursuant to regulations set forth by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Those regulations require that carriers apply a kind of most-favored-nations rule, limiting them to charging the “lowest corresponding price” that would be charged by the carriers to “similarly situated” non-residential customers. Under this regime, a school pays the carrier a discounted price, and the carrier can get reimbursement for the remainder of the base price from the fund. The school could also pay the full, non-discounted price to the carrier itself and be reimbursed by the fund.
The relator, an auditor of telecommunications bills, asserted that Wisconsin Bell defrauded the E-Rate program out of millions of dollars by consistently overcharging schools above the “lowest corresponding price.” He argued that these violations led to reimbursement rates higher than the program should have paid. His contention is that a request for E-Rate reimbursement qualified as a “claim,” a classification that requires the government to have provided some portion of the money sought. Wisconsin Bell moved to dismiss, arguing that there could be no “claim” here because the money at issue all came from private carriers and was administered completely by a private corporation.
Affirming the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected Wisconsin Bell’s argument, holding that there was a viable claim because the government provided all the money as part of establishing the fund. Less metaphysically, it also held that the government actually provided some “portion” of E-Rate funding by depositing more than $100 million directly from the U.S. Treasury into the fund.
Justice Kagan delivered the unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court, affirming the Seventh Circuit on the narrower ground that “the E-Rate reimbursement requests at issue are ‘claims’ under the FCA because the Government ‘provided’(at a minimum) a ‘portion’ of the money applied for by transferring more than $100 million from the Treasury into the Fund.” It is important to recognize that this amount was quite separate from the funds involved in the core program at issue. Instead, it constituted delinquent contributions collected by the FCC and the U.S. Department of the Treasury, as well as civil settlements and criminal restitution payments made to the U.S. Department of Justice in response to wrongdoing in the program. This nonpassive role by the government was enough to satisfy the Court that the money was sought through an actionable “claim.”
Rather blithely, Justice Kagan analogizes these government transfers to “most Government spending: Money usually comes to the Government from private parties, and it then usually goes out to the broader community to fund programs and activities. That conclusion is enough to enable Heath’s FCA suit to proceed.”
This conclusion suggests that quibbling about what constitutes a “claim,” where government participation in payment is peripheral, is unlikely to provide an effective avenue for defending FCA lawsuits. But wait! Before closing the discussion, we must turn to the concurring opinion of Justice Thomas, who was joined by Justice Kavanaugh and, in part, by Justice Alito. They note that the Court has left open the questions of whether the government actually provides the money that requires private carriers to contribute to the E-Rate program and whether the program’s administrator is an agent of the United States. Thomas’s suggestion, in attempting to reconcile various Circuit Court opinions as to the fund, is that an FCA claim must be based upon a clear nexus with government involvement. Thomas then goes on to describe a range of cases where, although the arrangements at issue might be prescribed by the government, the absence of government money would be fatal to holding that there was a justiciable FCA claim. In other words, the kind of government payments into the fund that we see in the instant case are the likely minimum that the Court would countenance.
Perhaps a bigger storm warning is the additional concurrence of Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Justice Thomas, in noting that today’s opinion is a narrow one. However, the FCA’s qui tam provisions raise substantial questions under Article II of the Constitution. The Court has never ruled squarely as to Article II, though it has upheld qui tam cases as assignments to private parties of claims owned by the government, something like commercial relationships. Two Justices augured that potential unresolved constitutional challenges to the FCA’s qui tam regime necessarily will mean that any competent counsel will raise the point in any future FCA case not brought by the government alone. But note that Justice Alito did not join Kavanaugh’s opinion, though he did in the Thomas concurrence. Nor did any other conservative Justice. It still takes four to grant cert. But the future is a bit hazier, thanks to Justice Kavanaugh.
Justice Kavanaugh finds himself on the opposite side of Justice Thomas in the case of Williams v. Reed. Writing for himself, the Chief Justice, and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson, Justice Kavanaugh ruled in favor of a group of unemployed workers who contended that the Alabama Department of Labor unlawfully delayed processing their state unemployment benefits claims. They had sued in state court under 42 U. S. C. §1983, raising due process and federal statutory arguments, attempting to get their claims processed more quickly. The Alabama Secretary of Labor argued that these claims should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the claimants had not satisfied the state exhaustion of remedies requirements.
Holding against the Secretary, the Court’s majority opined that where a state court’s application of a state exhaustion requirement effectively immunizes state officials from §1983 claims challenging delays in the administrative process, state courts may not deny those §1983 claims on failure-to-exhaust grounds. Citing several analogous precedents, the majority decided what I submit looks like a garden-variety supremacy case. After all, as Kavanaugh notes, the “Court has long held that ‘a state law that immunizes government conduct otherwise subject to suit under §1983 is preempted, even where the federal civil rights litigation takes place in state court.’” See Felder v. Casey, 487 U. S. 131 (1988).
Justice Thomas and his conservative allies didn’t see it that way at all. Quoting himself in dissent in another case, Justice Thomas asserts that “[o]ur federal system gives States ‘plenary authority to decide whether their local courts will have subject-matter jurisdiction over federal causes of action.’ Haywood v. Drown, 556 U. S. 729, 743 (2009) (THOMAS, J., dissenting).” Well, he didn’t persuade a majority then, and he didn’t do so now in this §1983 case.
Finally, in Republic of Hungary v. Simon, a unanimous Court, per Justice Sotomayor, considered the provision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) that provides foreign states with presumptive immunity from suit in the United States. 28 U. S. C. §1604. That provision has an expropriation exception that permits claims when “rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue” and either the property itself or any property “exchanged for” the expropriated property has a commercial nexus to the United States. 28 U. S. C. §1605(a)(3).
The Simon case involved a suit by Jewish survivors of the Hungarian Holocaust and their heirs against Hungary and its national railway, MÁV-csoport, in federal court, seeking damages for property allegedly seized during World War II. They alleged that the expropriated property was liquidated and the proceeds commingled with other government funds that were used in connection with commercial activities in the United States. The lower courts determined that the “commingling theory” satisfied the commercial nexus requirement in §1605(a)(3) and that requiring the plaintiffs to trace the particular funds from the sale of their specific expropriated property to the United States would make the exception a “nullity.”
The Supreme Court didn’t quite agree, holding that alleging the commingling of funds alone cannot satisfy the commercial nexus requirement of the FSIA’s expropriation exception. “Instead, the exception requires plaintiffs to trace either the specific expropriated property itself or ‘any property exchanged for such property’ to the United States (or to the possession of a foreign state instrumentally engaged in United States commercial activity).”
The three cases decided today bring the total decisions of the term to eight. Stay tuned because a torrent might be on the horizon.
Michigan Overhauls Paid Sick Leave and Minimum Wage Laws
On February 21, 2025, Governor Gretchen Whitmer signed into law two bills amending the state’s Wage Act and Earned Sick Time Act (ESTA).
As we previously explained, absent those amendments, February 21 would have been the effective date for those laws as ordered by the Michigan Supreme Court. Below, we share highlights of the new bills as preliminary guidance.
Changes to the Wage Act
Steeper Minimum Wage Hikes, Faster
Senate Bill 8 (SB 8), the bill that amended the Wage Act, retains the $12.48 per hour minimum wage rate set to take effect February 21. Thereafter, minimum wage will rise again on January 1, 2026 (and on the first of the year annually thereafter) to $13.73, a higher wage rate than the originally scheduled hourly rate of $13.29. The 2027 increase will also be larger than scheduled, jumping to an hourly rate of $15.00.
In short, minimum wage earners will see bigger hikes, sooner, under SB 8. The main takeaway for Michigan employers concerned about compliance as of February 21 is that the statewide minimum wage as of that date is $12.48 per hour.
Smaller Tip Credit Reductions, No Abolishment, Plus Enforcement
SB 8 will not gradually phase out tip credits, which would have occurred under the state Supreme Court Order. Instead, the proportional maximum credit will diminish by 2% annually through 2031, when a tipped worker’s minimum wage would equal 50% of the full minimum wage.
Effective today, employers must ensure that tipped workers receive a minimum rate of $4.74, which is 38% of the full minimum wage. Note that this is meaningfully lower than what the Order required ($6.49 per hour, or 48% of the full minimum wage).
SB 8 also adds a maximum civil fine of $2,500 on employers who fail to comply with the minimum wage scheme for tipped workers.
Changes to ESTA
House Bill 4002 (HB 4002), the bill that amended ESTA, significantly modified the Supreme Court’s Order. The key changes from the Order are as follows:
A revised definition of “small business” from “fewer than 10” to “10 or fewer” employees, along with a delay of mandatory paid earned sick time accrual and usage for small business employees until October 1, 2025.
Excluding the following individuals from paid earned sick time eligibility: trainees or interns and youth employees, as well as employees who schedule their own working hours and are not subject to disciplinary action if they do not schedule a minimum number of working hours.
Clarification that paid earned sick time does not accrue while an employee is taking paid time off, and that employers may cap usage and carryover of accrued paid leave at 72 hours per year, or at 40 hours per year if they are a small business.
Express permission to frontload paid earned sick time, including detailed instructions about how to frontload part-time employees’ leave and waiving requirements to track accruals, carryover unused time or pay out the value of unused time at the end of the year for frontloading employers.
Changes to language regarding an employee’s request for an “unforeseeable” need to use paid earned sick time, including requiring employee to give notice as soon as “practicable” or in accordance with the employer’s policy related to requesting or using sick time or leave (assuming the employer has provided a copy of the policy to the employee and the policy permits the employee to request leave after becoming aware of the need), and permitting employers to take adverse action against employees who do not comply with notice requirements.
Added language permitting an employer to take adverse personnel action against an employee if the employee uses paid earned sick time for a purpose other than a purpose sanctioned by ESTA, or who violates the ESTA’s notice requirements.
Elimination of a private right of action, but expansion of potential civil penalties that the state’s Department of Labor and Economic Opportunity (LEO) may impose through an administrative proceeding, including, but not limited to, a civil penalty up to eight (8) times the employee’s normal hourly wage.
What Should Michigan Employers Do?
Employers must immediately comply with the Wage Act and pay non-exempt workers a general minimum wage of at least $12.48 per hour and tipped workers a rate of at least $4.74 per hour.
As for ESTA, “small employers” can wait until October 2025 to begin providing benefits, but all employers should take steps to comply. Many of the ESTA amendments clarify the initial version of Supreme Court’s Order, so steps employers have likely taken to prepare for the February 21 effective date will be a helpful starting point. Epstein Becker Green soon will publish more detailed insights about ESTA and its relationship to other leave laws.
Second Circuit Upholds Reverse Redlining Verdict Against Mortgage Lender
On February 14, a divided Second Circuit panel upheld a 2016 jury verdict which found that a mortgage lender violated, among other laws, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”) by engaging in “reverse redlining” when it allegedly targeted Black and Latino homeowners with predatory loans.
The majority held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by applying equitable tolling to the plaintiff’s claims, and rejected the mortgage lender’s argument that the statute of limitations began running at loan origination. Instead, the statute of limitations began to run when the plaintiffs discovered that they were the alleged victims of discrimination in connection with their predatory loans.
The majority also rejected the mortgage lender’s challenges to the district court’s jury instructions finding they sufficiently conveyed the requirement for proving disparate impact.
Putting It Into Practice: While we will likely see a pullback in ECOA enforcement under the Trump administration, financial institutions are reminded that many statutes, including ECOA, have an independent right of action. As such, we expect the plaintiffs’ bar to continue to remain busy in bringing lawsuits. Accordingly, lenders should continue to review their own fair lending protocols to ensure they maintain appropriate compliance practices.
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Corporate Transparency Act Enforceable Again
On February 18, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas in Smith, et al. v. U.S. Department of the Treasury, et al., 6:24-cv-00336 (E.D. Tex.), stayed the nationwide injunction on enforcement of the Corporate Transparency Act, thereby requiring all reporting companies to file beneficial ownership information (“BOI”) with FinCEN.
Accordingly, the new deadline to file an initial, updated, or corrected BOI report is now March 21, 2025. However, reporting companies that were previously given a reporting deadline later than the March 21, 2025, deadline must file their initial BOI report by that later deadline. For instance, this exception applies if your reporting company qualifies for certain disaster relief extensions.
In addition, on February 10, 2025, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Protect Small Businesses from Excess Paperwork Act of 2025 (“H.R. 736”), which would extend the Corporate Transparency Act’s original filing deadline of January 1, 2025, to January 1, 2026. Importantly, the U.S. Senate has not passed H.R. 736. If passed by the U.S. Senate and signed by the President, the new filing deadline will be January 1, 2026.
Given the shifting regulatory landscape, businesses should stay informed and ensure compliance to avoid potential penalties. For a detailed breakdown of the reporting requirements under the Corporate Transparency Act, visit this article.
CTA Reporting Restored: FinCEN Extends Filing Deadlines and Signals Revisions to Reporting Requirements After Federal Court Lifts Stay
On February 18, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas in Smith, et al. v. U.S. Department of the Treasury, et al., 6:24-cv-00336 (E.D. Tex), lifted its order staying the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) regulations establishing the Beneficial Ownership Information (BOI) reporting requirements under the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA).
Immediately following this action, FinCEN announced an extension of the deadline for companies to file BOI reports by 30 calendar days. Thus, the new deadline for companies to file an initial, updated, and/or corrected BOI report is Friday, March 21, 2025. The March 21 filing deadline applies to:
existing companies that were originally required to file before January 1, 2025;
companies that were formed in 2024 and originally required to file within 60 days of the formation date; and
companies that were formed on or after January 1, 2025, and before February 20, 2025.
Additionally, the U.S. Department of the Treasury has committed, during this 30-day period, to assess its options to further modify deadlines, prioritize reporting for those entities that pose the most significant national security risks, and initiate a process during this year to revise BOI reporting requirements to reduce the burden for lower-risk entities, such as many U.S. small businesses.
The exceptions to the March 21 reporting deadline include the following:
Those companies that were previously given a reporting deadline later than March 21, 2025—e.g., companies having a later reporting deadline because they qualified for certain disaster relief extensions that were previously granted by FinCEN—may file their BOI report based on that later deadline.
Plaintiffs in the case National Small Business United v. Yellen, 5-22-cv-01488 (N.D. Ala.), are not currently required to report BOI information to FinCEN.
FinCEN announced this change in filing requirements through a notice posted on the BOI Beneficial Ownership Information web page titled “Corporate Transparency Act Reporting Requirements Back in Effect with Extended Reporting Deadline; FinCEN Announces Intention to Revise Reporting Rule.
The CEQ has No Clothes: The End of CEQ’s NEPA Regulations and the Future of NEPA Practice
On February 20, 2025, the White House Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) posted a pre-publication notice on its website of an Interim Final Rule that rescinds its regulations implementing the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which, in one form or another, have guided NEPA practice since 1978. CEQ simultaneously issued new guidance to federal agencies for revising their NEPA implementing procedures consistent with the NEPA statute and President Trump’s Executive Order 14,154 (Unleashing American Energy). The Interim Final Rule was submitted for publication in the Federal Register on February 19, 2025 and will become effective 45 days after it is published. This action represents the final blow to CEQ’s NEPA regulations, coming in the wake of two recent federal court decisions in the past few months that foreshadowed their impending demise. In light of those court decisions, CEQ is unlikely to issue new regulations, even under a future presidential administration, without express congressional authorization.
Background
NEPA generally applies to discretionary actions involving federal agencies, including projects carried out by a federal agency itself or by private parties that receive a permit or financial assistance from a federal agency. When NEPA is triggered, it requires a federal agency to analyze the environmental impacts of the project before making a decision to carry it out or issue an approval that may also include conditions or mitigation requirements. NEPA is a procedural law and does not mandate a specific outcome or require that the project proponent mitigate any identified environmental impacts.
NEPA, which was enacted in 1970, is a rather barebones statute. NEPA practice has long been governed by CEQ’s NEPA regulations, which were first promulgated in 1978 after President Carter issued Executive Order 11,991 (Relating to Protection and Enhancement of Environmental Quality) earlier that year directing CEQ to replace its earlier nonbinding guidance. Many common features of NEPA practice — such as environmental assessments, categorical exclusions, programmatic environmental documents, supplemental environmental documents, lead and cooperating agencies, required analysis of a no-action alternative, and required analysis of mitigation measures — are directly tied to CEQ’s 1978 NEPA regulations (some were eventually codified by Congress’s 2023 amendments to NEPA). Agencies could also develop their own NEPA implementing procedures consistent with CEQ’s regulations. Except for one relatively minor amendment in 1986, CEQ’s NEPA regulations did not change between 1978 and 2020, and a large body of case law resulted as courts evaluated agencies’ compliance with the regulations. CEQ substantially revised its regulations during the first Trump administration (in 2020) and during the Biden administration (in 2021 and 2024). For the past nearly 50 years, federal agencies, courts (including the Supreme Court), and NEPA practitioners have largely accepted CEQ’s authority to issue binding regulations without objection.
Recent Court Decisions
Two recent federal court cases challenged the longstanding assumption of CEQ’s authority. First, as we previously reported, in November 2024 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit found that CEQ lacked authority to issue binding regulations. (Marin Audubon Society v. Federal Aviation Administration, No. 23-1067 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 12, 2024).) On January 31, the full D.C. Circuit denied a petition for rehearing en banc, with a majority of the judges issuing a concurring statement explaining that the earlier decision’s “rejection of the CEQ’s authority to issue binding NEPA regulations was unnecessary to the panel’s disposition” and, impliedly, not part of the court’s holding.
Then, on February 3, in a different case, a federal district court in North Dakota issued a decision expressly holding that CEQ lacked authority to issue binding regulations. (Iowa v. CEQ, No. 1:24-cv-00089 (D.N.D. Feb. 3, 2025).) That case was brought by Iowa and a coalition of 20 other states to challenge CEQ’s regulations issued in May 2024. The court’s decision closely followed the D.C. Circuit’s analysis in Marin Audubon and came to the same conclusion: CEQ does not (and never did) have the authority to issue binding regulations. The court reasoned that CEQ, which was established by NEPA, was authorized by statute only to “make recommendations to the President.” Thus, based on constitutional separation-of-powers principles, President Carter’s 1978 Executive Order could not legally confer regulatory authority on CEQ in the absence of congressional authorization.
Because the court found that CEQ had no regulatory authority, it vacated the challenged 2024 regulations. Notably, although the court’s conclusion about CEQ authority supported vacatur of all CEQ NEPA regulations, it vacated only the 2024 regulations that were challenged in the case before it, leaving “the version of NEPA in place on June 30, 2024, the day before the rule took effect.” The court noted, however, that “it is very likely that if the CEQ has no authority to promulgate the 2024 Rule, it had no authority for the 2020 Rule or the 1978 Rule and the last valid guidelines from CEQ were those set out under President Nixon.”
The court concluded: “The first step to fixing a problem is admitting you have one. The truth is that for the past forty years all three branches of government operated under the erroneous assumption that CEQ had authority. But now everyone knows the state of the emperor’s clothing and it is something we cannot unsee. . . . If Congress wants CEQ to issue regulations, it needs to go through the formal process and grant CEQ the authority to do so.”
CEQ’s Recission of its NEPA Regulations
Meanwhile, CEQ’s NEPA regulations were concurrently under fire from the executive branch. On January 20, President Trump issued Executive Order 14,154 (Unleashing American Energy), which was largely targeted at removing perceived barriers to domestic fossil fuel production and mining, including federal environmental permitting processes. To that end, Section 5 of the Executive Order revoked President Carter’s 1978 Executive Order directing CEQ to issue binding regulations and directed the chairperson of CEQ to, by February 19, (1) propose rescinding all CEQ NEPA regulations and (2) issue new guidance to federal agencies for implementing NEPA. CEQ has now done as directed.
The Interim Final Rule proposes to rescind the entirety of CEQ’s regulations. It will go into effect 45 days after it is published in the Federal Register to give the public an opportunity to submit comments, which CEQ will “consider and respond to” prior to finalizing the rule. In the preamble to the Interim Final Rule, CEQ states it has “concluded that it may lack authority to issue binding rules on agencies in the absence of the now-rescinded E.O. 11191.” While CEQ considers the revocation of the Carter Executive Order to constitute an “independent and sufficient reason” for rescinding the NEPA regulations, it also agrees (contrary to its longstanding and customary practice) that “the plain text of NEPA itself may not directly grant CEQ the power to issue regulations binding upon executive agencies.”
CEQ Guidance to Federal Agencies Regarding NEPA Implementation
At the same time CEQ proposed to rescind its NEPA regulations, it also issued guidance to federal agencies for implementing NEPA going forward and for revising or establishing their own NEPA-implementing procedures, consistent with the NEPA statute and Executive Order 14,154. That guidance recommends agencies “continue to follow their existing practices and procedures for implementing NEPA” while they work on their new procedures and “should not delay pending or ongoing NEPA analyses while undertaking these revisions.” As to these pending or ongoing NEPA reviews, CEQ advises agencies to “apply their current NEPA implementing procedures” and “consider voluntarily relying on” the soon-to-be rescinded regulations.
The guidance also proposes a path forward to agencies to follow in drafting new procedures. It “encourages agencies” to use the 2020 NEPA regulation revisions as a framework and advises that agencies should consider the following:
Prioritize project-sponsor-prepared environmental documents for expeditious review.
Ensure that the statutory timelines established in section 107 of NEPA will be met for completing environmental reviews. (Generally, one year for a completion of an environmental assessment and two years for an environmental impact statement.)
Include an analysis of any adverse environmental effects of not implementing the proposed action in the analysis of a no action alternative to the extent that a no action alternative is feasible.
Analyze the reasonably foreseeable effects of the proposed action consistent with section 102 of NEPA, which does not employ the term “cumulative effects.”
Define agency actions with “no or minimal federal funding” or that involve “loans, loan guarantees, or other forms of financial assistance” where the agency does not exercise sufficient control over the subsequent use of such financial assistance or the effect of the action to not qualify as “major Federal actions.”
Not include an environmental justice analysis, since Executive Order 12,898, which required all federal agencies to “make achieving environmental justice part of its mission” was separately revoked by Executive Order 14,173.
CEQ has set a 12-month timeframe for federal agencies to complete the revision of their NEPA procedures. Agencies must consult with CEQ while revising their implementation procedures and CEQ will hold monthly meetings of the “Federal Agency NEPA Contacts and the NEPA Implementation Working Group” as required by Executive Order 14,154 to coordinate revisions amongst the agencies. Within 30 days of the guidance memorandum, agencies must develop and submit to CEQ a proposed schedule for updating their implementation procedures.
NEPA Practice in the Near Future
Going forward, agencies, project applicants, and NEPA practitioners should rely upon the NEPA statute (as amended by the Fiscal Responsibility Act in 2023) as primary authority. For projects with ongoing or pending NEPA review, applicants should expect federal agencies to continue to apply their existing NEPA practices and rely on the soon-to-be rescinded regulations, except to the extent they are inconsistent with Executive Order 15,154 or the NEPA statute (and in that regard, they will need to be closely evaluated on an individual basis). Case law also will need to be closely analyzed to determine whether courts’ holdings in prior cases were predicated on the statute itself (and therefore, still have binding or persuasive authority, depending on the court) or were based on CEQ’s regulations (in which case they should no longer have any authority). CEQ’s guidance is expressly non-binding, but should also be considered.
In a twist of irony, the rescission of CEQ’s NEPA regulations could lead to greater delays in environmental reviews and permitting (including for fossil fuel production and mining projects favored by Executive Order 14,514), at least in the near term. CEQ’s regulations created uniform procedures that applied to all federal agencies, which was particularly helpful for complex projects that require approvals from multiple federal agencies. Without uniform regulations, each individual agency might now impose its own requirements on the NEPA process. This could result in greater challenges coordinating environmental reviews and permitting among multiple agencies, although CEQ will likely attempt to harmonize implementation procedures as it reviews agencies’ proposals. In addition, permitting delays are expected as agency staff adjust to the new landscape and determine how to comply with NEPA without reliance upon CEQ’s regulations. Staffing shortages resulting from the Trump administration’s efforts to reshape the federal workforce are also likely to additionally exacerbate these problems.
Relatedly, this term, the Supreme Court is considering its first NEPA case since 2004 (Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County) involving the scope of impacts that agencies must consider. Because the case involves the NEPA statute rather than its implementing regulations, the rescission of CEQ’s regulations is unlikely to affect the decision. Oral argument was held in December, and a decision is expected this spring. We will continue to track developments related to this decision.