NetChoice Sues to Halt Louisiana Age Verification and Personalized Ad Law
On March 18, 2025, NetChoice filed a lawsuit seeking to enjoin a Louisiana law, the Secure Online Child Interaction and Age Limitation Act (S.B. 162) (“Act”), from taking effect this July. The Act requires social media companies subject to the law to obtain express consent from parents or guardians for minors under the age of 16 to create social media accounts. The Act also requires social media companies subject to the law to “make commercially reasonable efforts to verify the age of Louisiana account holders” to determine if a user is likely to be a minor. Further, the Act prohibits the use of targeted advertising to children.
In its complaint, NetChoice has raised a First Amendment objection to the age verification requirement, arguing that the obligation “would place multiple restrictions on minors’ and adults’ abilities to access covered websites and, in some cases, block access altogether.” NetChoice has argued that the restriction is content-based, because the law applies to social media platforms and compels speech by requiring social media platforms to verify users’ ages. NetChoice also has argued that the law’s definition of targeted advertising is overly broad and not properly tailored to mitigate the potential impacts to free speech; in other words, NetChoice has argued that Louisiana has not shown that the age verification and advertising restrictions are necessary and narrowly tailored to address the impact of social media use on minors.
We previously blogged about lawsuits NetChoice has filed seeking to block Age Appropriate Design Code laws in California and Maryland.
Can I Sue for for the Michigan Coach Data Breach?
What are My Legal Rights if I Received the FBI Letter or DOJ Letter?
Several student athletes from around the United States received a letter from the FBI about former University of Michigan football coach Matt Weiss. Other victims received an email from the U.S. Department to Justice Victims Notification System to advise them about the computer hack that allowed the coach to access personal photos and videos for the athletes. Coach Weiss was recently arrested and charged with computer crimes. He is out on bond and further criminal proceedings are scheduled for him criminal case.
The big question is “what are my legal rights if I received the FBI letter regarding the Michigan coach data breach?” If you received the letter from the FBI advising you that your personal photos and information were unlawfully accessed, you may have a claim for compensation.
What are my Legal Options to Pursue Compensation?
There are two legal cases arising out of the Matt Weiss data breach and computer hacking incident. First, there is the criminal proceeding for his unlawful conduct.
Criminal matters are being handled by the U.S. Attorney General Office and these charges seek criminal penalties, like incarceration, probation, and fines against the coach himself. He is entitled to a presumption of innocence, and his fate will be decided by a judge or jury.
Victims who received the FBI letter can also pursue a civil lawsuit against Matt Weiss and the University of Michigan. There may be additional defendants who were responsible for preventing computer hacks and unlawful data access from the university computers.
How Does a Hacking Victim File a Claim for Compensation?
If you received the FBI letter or the U.S. Department of Justice email saying that your social media accounts were hacked by Matt Weiss, you can file a civil claim for compensation. A Michigan data breach lawsuit lawyer can help if you were a computer crime victim by Matt Weiss, Michigan’s co-offensive coordinator.
The FBI has so far determined that Matt Weiss used University of Michigan computers to unlawfully access over 3,300 student athletes. Victims of the breach can pursue civil lawsuits for damages and institutions can also be held liable if they fail to protect sensitive data, underscoring the importance of robust legal protections. Invasion of privacy is a basis for civil lawsuits.
What is Invasion of Privacy?
Invasion of privacy involves infringement upon an individual’s right to privacy by several intrusive or unwanted actions. These invasions of privacy can include:’
Physical encroachments on a person’s private property
Taking unauthorized photos and videos of a person
Accessing a person’s private e-mail or text messages
Unauthorized access to a person’s private social media accounts
Access to this information, even if not disclosed to others, has a profound effect on the victims’ mental and emotional state. Private, personal, and intimate photos and information accessed by an unauthorized person causes embarrassment, humiliation, and other emotional harm.
Suing the University of Michigan for Invasion of Privacy
You may be able to sue the University of Michigan for invasion of privacy if your personal accounts were hacked and accessed by Matt Weiss. Much work and investigation must be done to determine if this cybercrime attack was preventable by the school with proper oversight and procedures to protect against its computers being used for criminal purposes.
Victims of digital abuse have several avenues to seek justice and compensation. They can pursue civil claims for damages related to privacy violations, emotional suffering, and even potential medical expenses linked to the breaches. These lawsuits can provide financial relief and hold perpetrators accountable for their actions.
Moreover, institutions that failed to protect sensitive information can also be held liable. Victims can seek financial compensation through civil lawsuits against universities and vendors if it can be demonstrated that these entities neglected their duty to safeguard private data. This dual approach not only addresses immediate harm but also promotes systemic change to prevent future breaches.
How Do I File a U of M Data Breach Lawsuit?
There will likely be a class action lawsuit filed against The University of Michigan and separate lawsuits filed by individuals. With over 3,000 victims, there will be many legal procedural obstacles to navigate to file and qualify for a settlement.
If you received a letter from the FBI or any other entity advising you that Matt Weiss unlawfully accessed your personal data, photos, or video, you should contact our award-winning law firm today. We will protect your legal rights and pursue claims on your behalf.
Is there a Coach Weiss Class Action Lawsuit?
A class action lawsuit has not been filed as of March 25, 2025, for invasion of privacy claims against the University of Michigan for the Coach Matt Weiss computer hacking incidents. A class action case may be filed shortly, and you may be able to join if you were a victim.
High Court Upholds Use of Omnibus Claims in Mass Motor Finance Litigation
A recent High Court decision in claims brought by thousands of claimants against motor finance providers has reaffirmed the validity of using omnibus claim forms in large-scale consumer litigation. The ruling has implications both for the many motor-finance mis-selling claims pending before the courts and also for mass claims in a variety of other contexts.
Background
The case involved eight omnibus claim forms issued on behalf of over 5,800 claimants against eight defendants. While the claims were at an early stage procedurally, the core allegations were that the defendants had paid undisclosed, variable commissions to motor finance brokers (car dealers), creating conflicts of interest which the claimants argued rendered the ensuing credit agreements unfair under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (CCA).
Shortly after the claims were issued, and before filing any defence, the defendants objected to the use of omnibus claim forms and invited the court to sever the claims, such that the claimants’ solicitors would need to issue a separate claim form (and pay a court fee) for each claim.
Initially, a County Court judge ruled that the claims should be severed into individual cases, following Abbott v Ministry of Defence [2023] 1 WLR 4002. This would have required a separate claim form to be issued (and court fee paid) for each case. The claimants appealed, arguing that the claims could and should more appropriately be commenced under omnibus claim forms, as contemplated by CPR 7.3 and CPR 19.1.
Key Legal Considerations
CPR 7.3 allows a single claim form to be used for multiple claims if they can be “conveniently disposed of” in the same proceedings. CPR 19.1 provides that any number of claimants may be joined as parties to a claim.
In Morris v Williams & Co Solicitors [2024] EWCA Civ 376 the Court of Appeal clarified that no gloss should be put on the words of CPR 7.3 and 19.1, which should be given their ordinary meaning. The exclusionary “real progress,” “real significance,” and “must bind” tests proposed in Abbott were factors to consider but should not be viewed as exclusionary tests – the omnibus claim form jurisdiction was not as restrictive as the Group Litigation Order regime in CPR 19.21-28, and should not be treated as “GLO-light”. Abbott was overruled.
Factors Supporting Omnibus Claims
The High Court carried out a detailed analysis of the factors to be taken into account in deciding whether the claims could conveniently be disposed of together per CPR 7.3. Key points cited in favour of allowing omnibus claims to proceed included:
The large number of claimants and small number of defendants.
The claims arose from the same or similar transactions, with broadly common allegations and the same legal causes of action, raising a number of common legal and factual issues.
The likelihood that case managing the cases together by way of lead or test cases would likely facilitate the disposal of many or all of the following cases. Whereas if separate claims were issued it would be random chance which claims were heard first and whether they were appropriate test cases.
Managing the claims together would be more efficient and just, in line with the CPR 1.1 overriding objective. Costs would likely be saved overall, and court time would likely be reduced. The imbalance of financial power between individual claimants and defendants would be mitigated. There were advantages to omnibus claims management in terms of the timing and usefulness of disclosure, and the availability of expert evidence.
Practical Implications
For Defendants facing mass claims this ruling will be a concerning precedent for the use of omnibus claim forms by claimants as a strategy, with obvious advantages for claimant law firms in terms of cost, use of case management applications to gain early disclosure, and selection of common issues and test cases.
For Claimants and their advisers the decision will encourage the use of omnibus claims over the impracticality of litigating individual cases, and the relative restrictiveness of the GLO regime.
For the Courts omnibus claim forms could see large volumes of individual claims taken out of the County Courts and case managed collectively and in a less haphazard fashion than has so far been the case, with potential for many following cases to be settled out of court once lead claims have been determined. This may help with significant delays and backlogs often experienced in the County Courts.
Wider Significance
The significance of this decision in the context of motor finance claims may to some extent be rendered moot by the outcome of the Supreme Court appeal in Johnson v FirstRand and the FCA’s decision on a whether and to what extent to impose a consumer redress scheme. But in reaffirming the broad scope and flexibility of CPR 7.3 and 19.1, the ruling may pave the way for more mass claims in financial services and other contexts.
Court of Appeal Reaffirms Stance on Fiduciary Duties in Half-Secret Commission Cases
Some years it seems like there are no cases of any real importance. 2025 is not one of those years.
Last week a strong Court of Appeal doubled down on a key element of the landmark Johnson v FirstRand decision on secret commissions in motor finance (about to be heard before the Supreme Court). In Expert Tooling and Automation Ltd v Engie Power Ltd [2025] EWCA Civ 292 the Court held that an energy broker owed fiduciary duties not to accept half-secret commissions for broking an energy supply agreement without getting fully informed consent from its client.
Although the client was aware that the broker would be paid a commission, it was not told the amount (which was substantial) or that the commission would be funded by increasing the energy unit rate paid by the client (an arrangement not dissimilar to the discretionary commission agreement in Johnson).
The key findings were:
Fiduciary duty: the broker, as the client’s agent, owed strict fiduciary duties including not profiting from the relationship without fully informed consent. The Court held that the broker breached this duty by failing to disclose material facts about the commission structure.
Informed consent: The Court confirmed that a principal’s informed consent requires full disclosure of all material facts – not mere awareness that a commission would be paid. The fact that the client could have asked for more information did not excuse the lack of disclosure.
Accessory liability: the energy supplier, which was the party paying the commission, could only be liable for procuring the broker’s breach if it acted dishonestly. As the client had not pleaded dishonesty or run that case at trial, the claim failed on that procedural point.
Limitation: The Court held that the cause of action accrued upon payment of the commission, not entry into the underlying contract. The decision of the first instance judge that the claim in respect of the first energy supply contract was time-barred was therefore overturned.
With the Supreme Court about to have its say on the Johnson appeal, this decision underlines the clear line at Court of Appeal level that brokers will commonly owe strict fiduciary obligations requiring clear, proactive disclosure of commission arrangements that may be said to give rise to conflicts of interest. That disclosure needs to be fulsome in order to obtain informed consent.
More hopefully for half-secret commission payers (be they lenders or energy suppliers) the judgment also confirms that accessory liability in equity (where third parties are said to have induced a breach of fiduciary duty) requires proof of dishonesty, consistent with established principles in Brunei and Twinsectra. This issue will inevitably be a key battleground in the Johnson appeal and other cases targeting the payers of half-secret commission instead of the receiving brokers.
The decision may well be subject to further appeal given the pending Supreme Court consideration of Johnson.
Are the Days of OSHA’s Rulemaking and Reliance on Consensus Standards Numbered?
Since Representative Andy Biggs (R-AZ) first introduced the “Nullify the Occupational Safety and Health Administration Act” or “NOSHA Act” (H.R. 86), there has been immense speculation about the future of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). The inauguration of President Donald Trump served to increase scrutiny of the agency, and actions by the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) have caused speculation to run rampant.
The focus on the NOSHA Act, what the administration might do, and how DOGE might impact OSHA may be distractions from a bigger threat facing OSHA and the way it regulates workplace health and safety.
Quick Hits
The introduction of the “Nullify the Occupational Safety and Health Administration Act” bill by Representative Biggs (R-AZ) has sparked significant speculation about the future of OSHA, especially under the Trump administration.
Justice Thomas’s dissent to the denial of certiorari in Allstates Refractory Contractors, LLC hinted at a potential Supreme Court shift regarding the constitutionality of delegations of rulemaking authority.
On March 26, 2025, the Supreme Court heard arguments in consolidated cases challenging the Telecommunications Act of 1996’s delegation of authority to the FCC and USAC that could have broader implications for how administrative agencies such as OSHA operate.
Justice Clarence Thomas’s dissent to the denial of certiorari in Allstates Refractory Contractors, LLC, v. Su at the end of the 2023–2024 term of the Supreme Court of the United States portended a potential change to the manner that the delegation of rulemaking authority might be addressed by the Court. Specifically, Justice Thomas was concerned about whether this broad grant of rulemaking authority violated Article I, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution, which states:
All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.
This term, the Court has taken up a pair of cases relating to the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the Universal Service Fund (USF), and the Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC), which is focused on whether the legislation violates Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was the first substantive revision of the Communications Act of 1934 post–deregulation and modernization of American telecommunications markets and technologies. Local markets were opened to competition, and though there always had been funding for universal services, it developed a new system for funding those universal services. The revisions, per the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), set forth five principles:
“Promote the availability of quality services at just, reasonable and affordable rates for all consumers”
“Increase nationwide access to advanced telecommunications services”
“Advance the availability of such services to all consumers, including those in low income, rural, insular, and high cost areas, at rates that are reasonably comparable to those charged in urban areas”
“Increase access to telecommunications and advanced services in schools, libraries and rural health care facilities”
“Provide equitable and non-discriminatory contributions from all providers of telecommunications services for the fund supporting universal service programs”
In addition, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 directed the FCC to formalize what services must be provided to receive support from the USF, expanded the number of companies required to pay into the fund, and created USAC. USAC is described by the FCC as “an independent, not-for-profit corporation designated as the administrator of the federal Universal Service Fund by the FCC.”
The Supreme Court, on March 26, 2025, heard argument in Federal Communications Commission v. Consumers’ Research, No. 24-354, and Schools, Health & Libraries Broadband Coalition v. Consumers’ Research, No. 24-422. Both cases relate to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ en banc decision in Consumers’ Research v. Federal Communications Commission that “the combination of Congress’s sweeping delegation to FCC and FCC’s unauthorized subdelegation to USAC violates the [Constitution].”
More specifically, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
American telecommunications consumers are subject to a multibillion-dollar tax nobody voted for. The size of that tax is de facto determined by a trade group staffed by industry insiders with no semblance of accountability to the public. And the trade group in turn relies on projections made by its private, for-profit constituent companies, all of which stand to profit from every single tax increase. This combination of delegations, subdelegations, and obfuscations of the USF Tax mechanism offends Article I, § 1 of the Constitution.
While Justice Thomas, in Allstates Refractory, certainly suggested that a majority of the Court was of a like mind with respect to the delegation of rulemaking authority granted to administrative agencies, like OSHA, he did not address the delegation of rulemaking to “nonprofits,” such as the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), and other organizations that publish the consensus standards cited by OSHA in its regulations and when applying the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act’s “General Duty Clause.”
Given his description of the rulemaking authority contained within the OSH Act as being among the broadest to any administrative agency, it is conceivable that a ruling that confirms the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Federal Communications Commission v. Consumers’ Research, would compel Congress to act and actually legislate the workplace health and safety regulations OSHA would enforce. Arguably, reliance on “national standards,” which is built into the OSH Act, would have to be replaced with rules contained within legislation, thereby compelling Congress to have a much more active role with respect to workplace health and safety.
Dismissal by Accident – the Serious Point in a Comedy of Errors (UK)
In 2020, Ms Korpysa was told that because of the COVID lockdown, her workplace would be closing. She thought that meant that she was being dismissed, and asked her employer, Impact Recruitment Services Limited, for details of her contract, accrued holiday pay entitlement and (said Impact) her P45. Impact took that as meaning that she was resigning, and based on that belief it processed steps to take her off the payroll and send her the P45 it said she had requested. She in turn took that as confirmation of her assumed dismissal, even though that was not Impact’s intention, and started unfair dismissal proceedings.
In what must have been one of those is-one-coffee-enough mornings, the Employment Tribunal was therefore faced with deciding the rights and wrongs of a termination of Korpysa’s employment caused by neither party giving notice but each believing that the other had.
Having determined that Korpysa had not in fact asked for her P45, the ET concluded relatively quickly that Impact’s sending it to her did constitute a dismissal effective from that date. The next step in assessing the statutory fairness of that dismissal was then to look at the reason for it. Was it one of the permitted reasons in section 98 Employment Rights Act 1996, because if not, Impact was surely sunk. Korpysa argued that her employer could not possibly rely on any of those statutory reasons because logically you could not claim to have had a reason for something you did not think you were doing.
The ET agreed with that reasoning and upheld Korpysa’s unfair dismissal claim. On Impact’s appeal, however, the EAT was less sure. To construe “reason” as requiring a positive thought-process on the part of the employer went too far, it thought. The proper question was what had led to the termination of the employment, i.e. the factual causation of the dismissal, regardless of whether the employer had had any conscious role in it.
What had caused the employer here to act in a way constituting a dismissal of Korpysa was its genuine belief that she had quit. If she had, its conduct would have been entirely understandable and unobjectionable. Given that she had not, however, two further questions arose under ordinary unfair dismissal principles – first, did that belief fall within one of those permitted reasons in section 98 and second, if it did, had Impact acted reasonably in treating those circumstances as justifying that conduct?
The EAT accepted without too much debate that Impact’s genuine belief could in principle fall within the “some other substantial reason” category in section 98, so that was its first hurdle cleared relatively easily. But the next one was less obvious – had it acted reasonably?
Usually that means some sort of prior process, some warnings or at least a moment’s consultation with the employee, but strictly those are not steps required by black and white statute. They are just the moss or barnacles grown on to the statute by decades of case law and guidance. Even the bare bones of the Acas Code of Practice on disciplinary and grievance procedures are not mandatory. It is only an unreasonable failure to follow them which will generally be fatal to an employer’s defence. In the very rare circumstances where it is reasonable not to follow them (perhaps not least because nothing was further from your mind than a dismissal), then the employer may fight on.
What would an employer’s acting reasonably look like in these particular circumstances? The EAT sent that question back to the ET to look at again, so we cannot yet report here on whether Korpysa’s accidental dismissal was fair. At the same time, it offered the ET some thoughts of its own to chew on. Given that it was not alleged by Impact that Korpysa had said expressly that she was leaving, had it failed to take the steps that any reasonable employer would have taken in those circumstances to verify its understanding of Korpysa’s intentions? Might that have led to its being able to correct her own mistaken view that she had been dismissed at the time of the site closure?
These are obviously very unusual facts – an employee who thought she had been dismissed on the site closure when she hadn’t plus an employer which believed that she had resigned when she hadn’t, together leading to an actual dismissal on the date of issue of the P45 which neither party thought had happened at all. Nonetheless, there is a lesson to be taken by employers out of this mess – before rushing to take your employee off the payroll and issuing P45s etc., do just check. This is exactly the same caution as applies in any case where the employee’s intentions are not crystal clear. That is not just because they don’t make express reference to quitting or exactly what you can do with your job, as here, but also if they do use such terms but in circumstances where that might reasonably be suspected as not their true intention – in temper, under provocation or pressure, or just off their wheels through alcohol or significant mental ill-health. Sayings about gift-horses come very readily to mind, but it is best to resist that temptation. If in any doubt, ask.
SEC Abandons Defense of Brobdingnagian Climate Change Disclosure Rule
Three years ago, the Securities and Exchange Commission issued a nearly 500 page rule proposal that would require registrants to provide certain climate-related information in their registration statements and annual reports. At the time, I argued. albeit to no avail, that the sheer prolixity of the release militated against adoption of the rule. Two years later, the SEC adopted a final rule in a nearly 900 page adopting release.
Expectedly, the rule was challenged in court. National Legal and Policy Center v. Securities and Exchange Commission (8th Cir., Case No. 24-1685). The SEC previously stayed effectiveness of the rules pending completion of that litigation. Yesterday, the SEC through in the towel, announcing that it had voted to no longer defend the rules.
Best Method Challenge Continues to Offer “a Material Advantage” – Zoetis Services LLC v Boehringer Ingelheim Animal Health USA Inc [2024] FCAFC 145
Finding against Zoetis, the Full Federal Court held that Zoetis’ three patent applications relating to pig vaccines were invalid due to the failure to disclose the best method.
The Court’s analysis focused on one of Zoetis’ patent applications (the 535 Application), as the parties agreed that the finding would apply to the other patent applications. The key issue was whether Zoetis’ disclosure of a range of varying antigen concentrations for its investigational vaccine products (IVPs) satisfied the best method requirement. Notably, the antigen concentration disclosed in the specification was provided relative to a reference vaccine, the concentration of which was not disclosed.
The best method arguments centered around the observations in Apotex v Servier that the patentee “has an obligation to include aspects of the method of manufacture that are material to the advantages it is claimed the invention brings“. In addressing this question, the Full Court concluded:
The specific (absolute) antigen concentration was material to the alleged advantages of the claimed invention and therefore had to be disclosed;
Zoetis knew the specific (absolute) antigen concentration that conferred the advantages as it had produced IVPs and conducted trials;
Within the antigen ranges claimed by Zoetis, different experimental compositions demonstrated different levels of efficacy; and
The disclosure of a possible range of concentration of antigens failed the best method requirement as it was not a ‘fair disclosure’ of the best method.
Oregon Court of Appeals Issues Three Different Defense Opinions
Oregon’s Court of Appeals was busy issuing three different defense opinions on March 19, 2025. Circuit court errs by awarding attorneys’ fees based on a contingency fee.The first was Griffith v. Property and Casualty Ins. Co. of Hartford, where a homeowner submitted a fire loss and alleged the insurer did not pay the benefits owed quickly enough. The insureds filed a complaint, the insurer answered, and then a global settlement occurred. The insureds then filed a motion for summary judgment seeking prejudgment interest per ORS 82.010 as well as attorneys’ fees per ORS 742.061(1). They also sought costs as a prevailing party. The circuit court denied interest because no judgment had been entered and costs because there was no prevailing party, but granted $221,179.27 in attorneys’ fees. Both sides appealed. The insureds’ appeal about prejudgment interest was rejected for procedural reasons. The circuit court order on costs was affirmed because there was no prevailing party. Griffith is noteworthy only for its ruling about attorneys’ fees. The insurer did not dispute that ORS 742.061(1) applied or that the insureds were entitled to attorneys’ fees. It disputed only how the circuit court calculated the amount of the award. The circuit court determined that amount was a percentage of the insureds’ recovery. The Court of Appeals held that this was error.
When an award of attorneys’ fees is permitted, ORS 20.075 provides factors to determine the amount to award. Its factors generally align with the lodestar method. Although a percentage of the recovery might be appropriate in some circumstances, Griffith concluded the “lodestar method is the prevailing method for determining the reasonableness of a fee award in cases, such as this, involving a statutory fee-shifting award, even when, as here, the insured has retained counsel on a contingency-fee basis.” Further, the award “must be reasonable; a windfall award of attorney fees is to be avoided.” The Court of Appeals concluded using a percentage of the recovery was inappropriate in this instance. This is because coverage was never disputed, and the claim was immediately accepted. By the time the complaint was filed, the insurer had made several payments and was still adjusting the loss. There was minimal litigation and the delay paying the full claim “was caused by circumstances outside of the parties’ control.” The Court of Appeals ultimately concluded that the insureds had not met their burden to demonstrate the fees they sought were reasonable. The case was remanded to redetermine the fees owed.
No really, the recreational use statute applies to a city park.In Laxer v. City of Portland, the plaintiff entered Mount Tabor Park to “walk its trails” but tripped and fell due to a hole in the pavement. The plaintiff sued the City, but the circuit court granted the City’s motion to dismiss based on Oregon’s recreational use statute, ORS 105.682. The plaintiff appealed. Among other arguments, the plaintiff argued the paved road in the park was like a public sidewalk and thus exempt from ORS 105.682. The Court of Appeals concluded that while there are limits to ORS 105.682, “generally available land connected with recreation” is still typically protected. Since Mount Tabor Park is clearly connected with recreation, the dismissal was affirmed.
Defense verdict affirmed in slip-and-fall case.In Fisk v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., where a customer slipped “on a three-foot by five-foot laminated plastic sign, which had fallen from its stand onto the public walkway.” The sign belonged to the store and was placed there by store employees. The case was tried and produced a defense verdict.
On appeal, the customer conceded there was no evidence to prove the store (1) placed the sign on the ground, (2) knew the sign was on the ground and did not use reasonable diligence to remove it, or (3) the sign had been on the ground for enough time that the store should have discovered it. The customer instead argued the circuit court erred by not giving a res ipsa loquitur instruction. Although Oregon case law has concluded res ipsa loquitur does not apply to slip and falls, the customer argued this was not a slip and fall because an object caused the fall.
Fisk affirmed the circuit court’s refusal to give the res ipsa loquitur instruction. The customer’s attempted legal distinction was meaningless. “We agree with defendant that because plaintiff slipped on an object on the ground, plaintiff’s claim is correctly characterized as a slip-and-fall claim.”
ANCIENT TEXTS: Plaintiff Brings Class Action Against Ancient Cosmetics 3 years 364 Days After Text Was Sent
When people tell you the statute of limitations for a TCPA violation is four years– we really mean it.
Back on March 25, 2021 a company called Ancient Cosmetics allegedly sent a marketing text message to a lady named Patrice Gonzalez.
At that time Tom Brady had just won a Super Bowl over the Chiefs, that big ship Ever Given was still stuck in the Suez canal and the Czar was still working in big law.
Yeah, that was a looooong time ago.
But just this week Ms. Gonzalez filed a TCPA class action lawsuit against Ancient Cosmetics over the ancient text messages–what are the odds of that BTW?–and its a great reminder to folks.
Compare!
What you do today in TCPAWorld has consequences for a loooong time to come.
That means you need to be keeping records of consent–especially if you are buying leads–for that entire time.
And yes people WILL sue you 3 years, 364 days after you allegedly violate the TCPA.
Gross, right?
Let those who have ears to hear, hear.
Zone of Natural Expansion Is a Shield, Not a Sword
The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld a Trademark Trial & Appeal Board decision to partially cancel trademarks, ruling that an opposition challenger could not use the zone of natural expansion doctrine to claim priority because the doctrine is strictly defensive. Dollar Financial Group, Inc. v. Brittex Financial, Inc., Case No. 23-1375 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 19, 2025) (Prost, Taranto, Hughes, JJ.)
Dollar Financial Group (DFG) is a loan financing and check cashing business that has used the mark MONEY MART since the 1980s. In 2012, DFG expanded and started using the mark in connection with pawn brokerage and pawn shop services. DFG registered MONEY MART for these new services in 2014. Brittex petitioned to cancel the registration on several grounds, including that the registrations were improperly issued in violation of the Lanham Act, which bars registration of a mark that “so resembles . . . a mark or trade name previously used in the United States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). Brittex has operated pawn shops under the names Money Mart Pawn and Money Mart Pawn & Jewelry since the 1990s and claimed prior common law rights to the MONEY MART mark for pawn services.
The Board ruled in favor of Brittex, finding that Brittex had priority over DFG for pawn services due to its earlier use of the mark. The Board also determined that DFG could not rely on the zone of natural expansion doctrine to establish priority because this doctrine is purely defensive and does not grant a proactive right to register a mark on an expanded line of goods or services. The Board also concluded that there was a likelihood of confusion between the marks, given their high similarity and the overlapping nature of the services provided by both parties. DFG appealed.
The Federal Circuit agreed that Brittex had established priority because it was the first to use the MONEY MART mark in connection with pawn services. The Court also rejected DFG’s zone of natural expansion argument, reiterating that the doctrine is defensive and cannot be used to establish priority offensively.
The doctrine of natural expansion, as explained in Orange Bang v. Ole Mexican Foods (TTAB 2015), states that:
[T]he first user of a mark in connection with particular goods or services possesses superior rights in the mark as against subsequent users of the same or similar mark for any goods or services which purchasers might reasonably expect to emanate from it in the normal expansion of its business under the mark.
However, the doctrine does not give the senior mark user an offensive or proactive use.
The Federal Circuit also addressed DFG’s argument regarding the doctrine of tacking, which allows trademark holders to make minor modifications to their own mark while retaining the priority position of the older mark. Tacking is generally permitted to allow trademark holders to make minor adjustments to their marks to reflect changing consumer preferences, aesthetics, and marketing styles. However, the Federal Circuit determined that DFG had forfeited this argument by failing to present it during the initial cancellation proceeding before the Board. Consequently, the Court declined to consider the tacking argument on appeal.
What’s the (Re)issue? Patent Term Extensions for Reissue Patents
Addressing the calculation of patent term extensions (PTEs) under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court decision that under the act the issue date of the original patent should be used to calculate the extension, not the reissue date. Merck Sharp & Dohme B.V. v. Aurobindo Pharma USA, Inc., Case No. 23-2254 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 13, 2025) (Dyk, Mayer, Reyna, JJ.)
Merck owns a patent that is directed to a class of 6-mercapto-cyclodextrin derivatives. Four months after the patent issued, Merck applied to the US Food & Drug Administration (FDA) for approval of sugammadex, which it intended to market as Bridion®. During FDA’s review of Merck’s new drug application (NDA), Merck filed a reissue application that included narrower claims. The reissue application issued and included all the original claims and 12 additional claims. FDA regulatory review continued throughout the examination of the reissue application and extended almost two years beyond the date the patent reissued. In all, the FDA regulatory review lasted nearly 12 years.
The Hatch-Waxman Act provides owners of patents related to pharmaceutical products a process to extend the term of their patent rights to compensate for time lost during regulatory review of their NDAs. The act contains a clause providing that “the term of a patent . . . shall be extended by the time equal to the regulatory review period . . . occur[ring] after the date the patent is issued.” Having been unable to market the invention covered by the patent for almost 12 years because of FDA’s regulatory review, Merck filed a PTE application for its reissue patent seeking a five-year extension (the maximum allowed under the act) based on the patent’s original issue date. The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) agreed and granted the five-year extension.
Between the reissue date and the PTO’s grant of the five-year extension, Aurobindo and other generic manufacturers had filed abbreviated new drug applications (ANDAs) seeking to market generic versions of Bridion®. Merck sued for infringement. At trial, Aurobindo argued that the PTO improperly calculated the PTE by using the original issue date instead of the reissue date because only 686 days of FDA’s regulatory review occurred after the reissue date, as opposed to the almost 12 years which had passed since the initial issue date. The district court disagreed, finding that Aurobindo’s proposed construction “would undermine the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act.” Aurobindo appealed.
Aurobindo argued that the act’s reference to “the patent” referred to the reissue patent because that is the patent for which the patentee was seeking term extension. Merck argued that the act’s text, read in light of other patent statutes and the history of patent reissue, required the opposite conclusion (i.e., a PTE based on the original issue date).
The Federal Circuit agreed with Merck, explaining that while the language of the PTE text may be ambiguous, that ambiguity may be resolved by considering the PTE text in light of the history of the Hatch-Waxman Act and its place within the statutory scheme. The purpose of the act is “to compensate pharmaceutical companies for the effective truncation of their patent terms while waiting for regulatory approval of new drug applications,” and “the statute should be liberally interpreted to achieve that end.”
Having found that the Hatch-Waxman Act contemplates PTE for patents claiming drug products for which exclusivity was delayed by FDA review, the Federal Circuit found no reason to deny Merck compensation for the PTE period calculated by the PTO based on the original patent issue date.