High Burden Dooms Intra-District Transfer Request
The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied a mandamus petition requesting transfer from the Marshall division to the Sherman division within the US District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, finding that there was lack of clear error and no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to deny transfer. In re SAP America, Inc., Case No. 25-118 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 10, 2025) (Dyk, Prost, Chen, JJ.) (per curiam).
Valtrus Innovations and Key Patent Innovations (collectively, Valtrus) filed a patent infringement lawsuit against SAP. SAP moved for an intra-district transfer from the Marshall division, where the case was originally filed, to the Sherman division. In support of the motion, SAP cited the presence of SAP offices, relevant witness residences, and two SAP employees, all located in Sherman. Valtrus opposed the transfer, pointing out that co-pending litigation in Marshall involved the same asserted patents.
The district court denied SAP’s motion, even though the co-pending case had been closed. The district court also pointed out that most of SAP’s witnesses were out of state or international, making either Texas division equally inconvenient for those witnesses. SAP appealed.
The Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s ruling under the stringent standards for mandamus relief, which are as follows:
There is no other adequate means to attain the desired relief.
There is a clear and indisputable right to relief.
The writ is appropriate under the circumstances.
Under the Federal Circuit’s 2022 decision in In re Volkswagen, there must be “clear abuses of discretion that produce patently erroneous results.”
Under Volkswagen, a court must consider both private and public factors when deciding whether to transfer venue. The private factors are:
The relative ease of access to sources of proof.
The availability of a compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses.
The cost of attendance for willing witnesses.
All other practical issues that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive.
The public interest factors are:
The administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion.
The local interest in having localized issues decided at home.
The forum’s familiarity with the law that will govern the case.
The avoidance of unnecessary conflict of laws issues or in the application of foreign law.
The Federal Circuit found that the district court erred in assigning weight to the co-pending litigation in Marshall, which had been closed and had all defendants dismissed by the time the motion to transfer was resolved. The Court added that the district court improperly weighed the court congestion factor against transfer based solely on the case’s smooth progression to trial.
Despite these errors, the Federal Circuit concluded that SAP failed to demonstrate that the denial of transfer was erroneous. The district court had plausibly found the convenience of the two divisions comparable for most potential witnesses who resided outside of Texas, and that SAP had not sufficiently shown that its Sherman-based employees had relevant knowledge or would be trial witnesses. The Court therefore denied SAP’s petition, underscoring the high burden faced by petitioners seeking such extraordinary relief.
Opposers Beware: Your Own Mark May Not Be Protectable
The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board’s dismissal of an opposition to the registration of the marks IVOTERS and IVOTERS.COM while also noting that the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) might want to reconsider whether it permits registration of those marks. Heritage Alliance v. Am. Policy Roundtable, Case No. 24-1155 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 9, 2025) (Prost, Taranto, Stark, JJ.)
American Policy Roundtable (APR), a publisher of campaign and political information since June 2010, filed applications to register the marks IVOTERS and IVOTERS.COM for “providing a web site of information on current public policy issues, political campaigns and citizen concerns related to political information” after the PTO approved the marks for publication. Heritage filed an opposition.
Since the 2008 US presidential election season, Heritage has published online voter guides under the names “iVoterGuide” and “iVoterGuide.com” (the iVoters marks). Without a valid registration but having priority of use, Heritage filed an opposition asserting its common law rights in the iVoters marks.
The Board considered Heritage’s opposition but ultimately found that Heritage’s mark was not distinctive. The Board first considered whether the iVoters marks were inherently distinctive and determined they were not just descriptive but “highly descriptive.” The Board next considered whether the iVoters marks had acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning but found that the record evidence Heritage submitted was inadequate to support a finding that the iVoters marks had any source-identifying significance. Heritage appealed.
On appeal, Heritage argued that the Board had erred by finding the iVoters marks to have neither inherent nor acquired distinctiveness and that the Board violated the anti-dissection principle by evaluating the individual components of the marks instead of the marks as a whole. The Federal Circuit disagreed. The Court found the Board’s determination that the iVoters marks were highly descriptive to be supported by substantial evidence because the prefix “i” generally refers to something internet based. Heritage chose not to challenge the Board’s finding that “VoterGuide” and “.com” were not distinctive, a ruling the Court characterized as “facially reasonable.”
The Federal Circuit also disagreed with Heritage’s argument that the Board improperly evaluated the marks’ individual components. The Court found the Board properly considered the marks as a whole through its determination that the iVoters marks “on their face refer to online voter guides” and because no evidence demonstrated that the combination of the individual components conveyed “any distinctive source identifying impression contrary to the descriptiveness of the individual parts.”
Heritage argued that the Board had erred in its determination that notwithstanding over five years of use, the iVoters marks did not have statutory acquired distinctiveness. Under Section 2(f) of the Lanham Act, registration applicants may submit evidence that a mark has acquired distinctiveness because as a consequence of extensive use and promotion of the mark, consumers now directly associate the mark with the applicant as the source of those goods. Heritage argued that the Board should have accepted its five-plus years of continuous use as prima facie evidence of acquired distinctiveness. The Federal Circuit disagreed, explaining that Section 2(f) states that the Board “may accept” proof of substantially exclusive and continuous use of a mark for five years as evidence of distinctiveness. Because the language of the statute is discretionary, the Board was free to reject Heritage’s evidence. Federal Circuit case law “recognizes the Board’s discretion to weigh the evidence, especially for a highly descriptive mark.” The Court found no reason to disturb the Board’s decision to give little weight to the three declarations Heritage submitted as evidence of acquired distinctiveness and affirmed the Board’s determination that Heritage’s marks were highly descriptive and had not acquired distinctiveness.
The Federal Circuit further suggested that in view of the Board’s rulings, the PTO might reconsider its decision to approve APR’s marks for registration. Although registration should generally follow when an opposition fails, “the stated precondition is that the mark at issue be a ‘mark entitled to registration,’…which might allow the PTO, after an opposition fails, to reconsider the examiner’s pre-opposition allowance.” The Court also suggested the possibility that Heritage could now consider cancellation of APR’s marks.
The Missing Piece to Your Business’ Litigation Team: Using A National Coordinating Counsel to Manage Your Mass Tort Litigation
Businesses, large and small, can find themselves overwhelmed by litigation quickly, if and when they find themselves in the crosshairs of a developing litigation. For years, the best example of these crosshairs was those focused mainly on asbestos and those entities that either supplied or manufactured with asbestos. However, over recent years we have seen that focus shift to other types of litigation, including cosmetic and pharmaceutical talc, industrial talc, crystalline silica, benzene, PFAS, pharmaceuticals, and many others. With most of these developing litigations, there are plaintiff firms that specialize in investigating entities involved with the products or activities at issue, and then bringing an onslaught of suits against those entities. Once an alleged tie is found between any mass litigation and an entity, the entity can find themselves named in almost every suit filed across the nation by national plaintiff firms. This often happens before an entity can truly appreciate the magnitude of the impact of these lawsuits.
Many entities attempt to manage this litigation in-house, not knowing that they have options on how best to manage their entity’s litigation issues. However, many times a better alternative is to hire a National Coordinating Counsel (“NCC”) to assist in managing the litigation for the entity. The NCC’s job is to manage every aspect of an entity’s litigation across jurisdictions relating to a specific topic or topics. The use of an NCC allows for streamlined work, implementation of national litigation strategies, and better and more predictable litigation outcomes.
In particular, there are advantages to hiring an NCC at every level of litigation. Below we will outline the basics of why hiring an NCC can benefit your entity at different levels of litigation. We will be publishing a series of follow-up articles on each specific aspect of litigation mentioned below and how hiring an NCC can assist in bringing more value to your entity as compared to attempting to manage the litigation in-house.
Case Management
The NCC’s main role is to manage your entity’s litigation across jurisdictions. This will include tracking all of the relevant deadlines in your cases, including trial dates, expert discovery deadlines, written discovery deadlines, depositions, and motion practice. The NCC tracks this information in real time by having open lines of communication with local counsel in each jurisdiction and creating reports based on that communication so that the information can be presented in a quick and easily digestible manner to your entity. However, this role goes well beyond just tracking relevant events in cases. The NCC is able to report trends involving different plaintiff firms, experts, product identification, and strategies for defenses. The NCC will use these trends and information from across jurisdictions to help develop and implement defense strategies.
For example, Personal Jurisdiction and Forum Non-Conveniens defenses can be suggested based on not only the facts of a case, but also the knowledge of different jurisdictions case specific laws regarding causation, available defenses, damages, as well as others. The NCC is also able to track litigation in each jurisdiction to determine which jurisdictions are more likely to go to trial, jurisdictions with higher settlement values, and jurisdictions that plaintiffs are likely to refile cases against your entity as the sole defendant after a successful Personal Jurisdiction or Forum Non-Conveniens motion. The NCC is able to communicate with local counsels to determine all the facts so your entity can be confronted with only issues and possible solutions rather than having to find those solutions yourselves. This case management also branches out too many other aspects of the case, including discovery, corporate representatives, experts, and trials, as mentioned below.
Discovery
Perhaps one of the biggest roles an NCC can play to ease the burden of litigation on an entity is to manage written discovery. When responding to discovery across cases and across jurisdictions, a national strategy is required. This strategy will ensure that responses are uniform across cases and that your entity is not committing discovery fraud. An NCC can draft all discovery responses across jurisdictions to ensure that all objections and responses are phrased the same way nationwide. However, it is also possible to have local counsel draft your responses and to have the NCC review these responses to ensure similar objections and responses. Either way, the NCC ensures that each inquiry made to your entity is responded to in a uniform way. It avoids contradictions that, when discovered by plaintiff firms, can lead to motion practice and accusations of discovery fraud, which can lead to hefty and punitive penalties.
An NCC ensures that document productions are consistent nationwide to similar requests. When a plaintiff firm is filing cases against your entity in multiple jurisdictions, they are expecting to receive the same documents in response to their requests regardless of the jurisdiction. Without an NCC providing oversight, it is possible that documents can be omitted from disclosure or that documents can be accidentally produced. Either way, this can lead to discovery motions and/or sanctions for discovery fraud. Discovery fraud is a serious risk if your discovery responses and document productions are not managed at a national level, the consequences of which can plague your entity for the rest of its life in the litigation.
Furthermore, an NCC can assist in the drafting and use of confidentiality orders to protect your documents. This needs to be done on a national level, as disclosure in one jurisdiction would require disclosure in all jurisdictions. Tracking your documents and protecting your interests on a national level requires a national strategy that would need to be micromanaged by your entity’s legal department if your entity is not using an NCC.
Beyond written discovery, having an NCC can help ensure that a national strategy is undertaken for gathering discovery in cases. This includes the use of subpoenas for records, the use of private investigators, and the use of other resources. Additionally, having an NCC can assist in gathering discovery across states, as they can link local counsel across jurisdictions for more efficient use of interstate discovery subpoenas or Freedom of Information/Open Public Records Act requests. Overall, they implement a strategy across jurisdictions with the local counsels so that your entity can leave no stone unturned while not having to dedicate resources within your entity to do so.
Corporate Representative Depositions and Trial Testimony
Corporate Representative depositions and trial testimony are another opportunity for an NCC to provide your entity value. First, if your entity is new to the litigation, an NCC can assist in determining the best person or persons to serve as a corporate representative. They can assist in the search by interviewing possible candidates and providing your entity with the pros and cons of each candidate. Once a corporate representative is established, the use of an NCC allows for consistent preparation of your corporate representative for all depositions and trial testimony to ensure that the testimony given on behalf of your entity is consistent. Part of this preparation is the development of a corporate story, for which your corporate representative will be the mouthpiece. This is of the upmost importance, as this will be how your entity is represented to a jury at trial. A compelling corporate story can be the difference between a large plaintiff verdict and a defense verdict.
The preparation of your entity’s corporate story, as well as your corporate representative, can include mock depositions, document reviews, and review of written discovery. This implementation of a consistent strategy across cases and jurisdictions avoids the issues presented when each local counsel is responsible for preparing a corporate representative. This also saves time and resources that would be required if each local counsel had to prepare for each corporate representative deposition by reviewing transcripts and discovery from other jurisdictions. An NCC can constantly be up-to-date without constant review of what has previously happened with a corporate representative. This makes your corporate representative testimony consistent for the witness, the client, and for plaintiff counsel. This leads to positive and predictable outcomes.
Experts
An NCC team allows for efficient management of experts and expert discovery across cases and jurisdictions. An NCC team allows for each expert to have a specific point of contact. This creates a consistent relationship and avoids issues with ensuring the experts are provided with materials and payments consistently. It allows for consistent reports and more involved strategy development across cases. It also allows for a better relationship to develop, which often allows for experts to be more forgiving if issues to arise and reports are needed on an expedited basis. In-house management or management by local counsels of these issues may not result in as favorable outcomes.
Further, as a part of an overall expert strategy, having an NCC allows for a more tactical approach to retaining experts. This includes using multiple experts from the same field across different cases so that that your entity is not reliant on one expert in case there is conflicting trial dates, a conflict with a co-defendant, or an issue with retention in any particular case. Further, this allows for more in-depth management of costs. This also allows for experts to better manage their time while your entity’s entire case load is getting the full attention it deserves. This level of management is possible with an NCC because they are able to dedicate the time and their expertise in a way that local counsel and in-house attorneys cannot.
Further, an NCC team allows for consistent expert depositions, Daubert hearings, and trial testimony from your experts. This is similar to corporate representatives, discussed above. The consistent time spent in preparation for depositions and reviewing reports allows for a direct relationship on behalf of your entity with the expert, as well as a consistent strategy that builds and adapts over time. Further, this facilitates inclusion of cutting edge science and publications within your experts opinions, which substantially supplements your entity’s defenses. This is just another way an NCC team adds value to your entity.
Trial Teams
While no entity wants to find itself at trial, the fact of the matter is that every entity named in a lawsuit must prepare as if a trial is inevitable. This ensures that the entity is prepared in the unlikely event that a matter goes to trial. An NCC team is your entity’s insurance policy that a trial team will be prepared under those circumstances. An NCC team helps create consistent work product for both pre-trial filings and trial itself. This stems from having developed a trial strategy that can be used as a basis for every case. Different elements of this strategy would include development of a corporate story, development of defenses such as expert defenses or state-of-the-art defenses, development of cross-examinations of plaintiff’s experts, and more. An NCC team will constantly be developing and perfecting motions in limine, openings and closings, and cross-examinations that will come together to form a trial handbook. This will allow trial counsel to have a step-by-step plan of how your entity should be defended at trial.
Moreover, this NCC work helps lead to a more consistent and predictable defense, which helps manage outcomes. The NCC team manages trial dates across jurisdictions so that an entity can ensure it is prepared for any trial issues that may come up in any of their cases. This also allows for the entity to have better forecasting of what cases will go to trial, which cases will resolve, and what issues may arise at any time. Due to this, an entity can be better prepared for outcomes and can prepare for what can be expected during any particular time period.
Case Resolution
Resolving cases outside of trial is also the job of your NCC. An NCC can more effectively resolve cases than individual local counsel because they can do so on a larger scale. Further, an NCC can devote more resources and time to forming the relationships with plaintiff firms that allow for these resolutions. Your NCC team can create value when negotiating by creating group settlements across jurisdictions, but your NCC can also create value by producing creative solutions when negotiating with plaintiff firms. They can take advantage of early settlement opportunities or could develop different frameworks depending on your entity’s circumstances.
It is easier for your NCC team to develop creative deals as compared to local counsels or in-house counsel because they will be dedicating more time and resources to building a relationship with the different plaintiffs’ firms on behalf of your entity. Further, they will spend more time on behalf of your client developing relationships with co-defendants on behalf of your entity. This can help develop your defenses, which will impact the overall outcomes of your cases.
Your NCC team will also be tracking different points of data regarding the outcomes in your cases to allow for better projections for future matters. This includes the past history of cases with each plaintiff firm, past history of cases with each product, past history of cases with product use during different time periods, past history in each jurisdiction, as well as many other data points. All of this combines for more information so that your entity can be better prepared to handle the litigation it faces and can navigate a future given its involvement in the litigation.
Overall, an NCC team is the missing piece to your business’ litigation team. An NCC team manages your litigation, but more importantly, they add value to produce better and more predictable outcomes. For your organization to continue to succeed, it should be proactive regarding the possibility of mass litigation. This includes involving an NCC as soon as possible, as it allows your NCC to provide as much value as possible by preparing as much as they can before the cases start rolling in.
Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services: Reverse Discrimination and Background Circumstances
Recent changing perspectives in employment law have brought other topics to the forefront of employment litigation, and reverse discrimination is one of those topics.
Reverse Discrimination
Reverse discrimination refers to the unfair treatment of members of a majority or dominant group, often resulting from policies or actions intended to remedy past discrimination against minority or historically disadvantaged groups. This type of discrimination is frequently associated with affirmative action programs.
Reverse discrimination cases often arise in contexts where affirmative action policies are implemented. Courts examine whether these policies unfairly disadvantage majority-group members while aiming to promote substantive equality.
The concept of reverse discrimination is very controversial. Proponents of affirmative action argue that affirmative action policies are necessary to address systemic inequalities. Critics, however, state that such policies unfairly penalize majority-group members and undermine the principle of non-discrimination.
The Supreme Court has dealt with various reverse discrimination cases, emphasizing the need for policies to balance the promotion of diversity with the protection of all individuals from unfair treatment. The recent decision in Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services attempts to clarify that majority-group plaintiffs do not need to demonstrate “background circumstances” to establish a valid case of discrimination.
The Facts
Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, was employed by the Ohio Department of Youth Services (DYS) since 2004 and was promoted to Administrator of the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) in 2014. In 2017, Ames was assigned a new supervisor, Ginine Trim, who is gay. Ames alleged that after Trim became her supervisor, she faced discrimination based on her sexual orientation and sex. In 2019, Ames applied for the position of Bureau Chief of Quality but was not selected. Shortly after, she was demoted from her PREA Administrator position, resulting in a significant pay cut. The position was then given to Alexander Stojsavljevic, a 25-year-old gay man.
Ames filed a lawsuit under Title VII, claiming that she was discriminated against because of her sexual orientation and sex. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the DYS, stating that Ames lacked evidence of “background circumstances” necessary to establish a prima facie case of discrimination against a majority-group member. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed this decision, emphasizing that Ames did not provide sufficient evidence to prove that the DYS was an unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.
Ames appealed to the Supreme Court, which held oral arguments on February 25, 2025. The main issue before the court is whether or not Ames produced adequate evidence of “background circumstances.”
Background Circumstances
In the context of reverse discrimination, background circumstances refer to specific evidence or appropriate factors that support the suggestion that an employer discriminates against majority-group members. This includes, but is not limited to, past instances where the employer has shown a pattern of discriminating against majority-group members; official policies or statements that indicate a preference for minority-group members over majority-group members; or statistical evidence showing a significant disparity in the treatment of majority-group members compared to minority-group members. The concern with the background circumstances standard is that the burden only applies to so-called majority groups, whereas so-called minority groups do not need to meet that burden. In short, the high court will determine if it is fair to hold people to different standards based on their protected characteristics.
The Circuit Split
To further confound the issue, the circuits are split on the use of background circumstances. This includes the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, while other circuits do not. The split occurred due to the lack of Supreme Court guidance on reverse discrimination cases, leaving the circuits to figure it out on their own.
What to Expect Next
Given the recent ruling by the Supreme Court, which eliminated affirmative action in college admissions, the Trump Administration’s dismantling of DEI programs, and a rule that appears not to apply equally to aggrieved parties, the Court will more than likely to set a precedent by removing the background circumstances from reverse discrimination cases. A formal decision is expected by the summer.
Seventh Circuit Reverses Conviction in Landmark Anti-Kickback Case
In a pivotal decision on April 14, 2025, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the conviction of Mark Sorensen, owner of SyMed Inc. (SyMed), finding insufficient evidence to support a violation of the federal Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS).1 The Court’s ruling delineates the boundaries between lawful marketing practices and illegal kickbacks in the health care industry. It also underscores that compensation arrangements with non-physicians are not categorically prohibited under the AKS so long as they do not compromise the independent judgment of health care providers.
Mark Sorensen, owner and operator of a Chicago-based DME distributor, SyMed, was convicted of conspiracy and multiple counts of offering and paying kickbacks related to marketing orthopedic braces to Medicare beneficiaries and sentenced to 42 months in prison and a nearly $2 million forfeiture judgment. The government alleged that Mr. Sorensen paid illegal kickbacks to two marketing firms based on the number of leads generated, to a DME manufacturer based on the percentage of funds SyMed collected from Medicare and to a billing company with the funds SyMed retained. The business model included marketing firms publishing advertisements for orthopedic braces, and interested patients would respond via electronic forms providing their names, addresses and doctors’ contact information. That information was then sent to a call center where a sales agent would fax a prefilled but unsigned prescription form to the patient’s physician. When a physician signed the prescription, SyMed directed the manufacturer to ship the product and the billing agency billed Medicare for SyMed.
The Seventh Circuit unanimously reversed Sorensen’s criminal AKS conviction concluding Sorensen’s payments did not violate the AKS because there was insufficient evidence that any of the payees leveraged any influence or power over health care decisions or authorized any medical care. Focusing on the fact that 80% of the prescriptions were never signed and instead returned by physicians, the Court concluded that while “physicians and non-physicians alike may exert formal or informal influence on patients’ choice of health care providers” that was not the case in this instance as the physicians clearly retained independent decision-making authority over patient care. While the Court characterized Sorensen’s marketing tactics as “aggressive advertising efforts,” such efforts were not equivalent to unlawful referrals of patients.
The ruling highlights that the AKS is intended to primarily target payments to individuals who can influence patient decisions, such as physicians, underscoring the necessity for prosecutors to demonstrate actual influence over health care decisions when alleging AKS violations.
Key Takeaways:
Under the Court’s ruling: (1) a mere recommendation for health care services is not necessarily an illegal referral, and (2) percentage-based compensation structures or per lead compensation are not per se unlawful.
While this is a very significant decision and opens the door for nuanced arguments under the AKS, other Circuits have not adopted this narrow approach.
As such, health care providers should seek counsel on how they structure compensation arrangements, including those involving marketing and sales, in order to ensure compliance with the AKS and meet safe harbor protections where applicable.
[1] United States v. Sorensen, No. 24-1557, 2025 WL 1099080 (7th Cir. Apr. 14, 2025).
Prosecution Disclaimer Alive and Well, Especially in Closed Claim
The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s noninfringement determination, finding that the presence of a disclaimed compound in the accused product precluded infringement. Azurity Pharm., Inc. v. Alkem Lab’ys Ltd., Case No. 23-1977 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 8, 2025) (Moore, Chen, Murphy, JJ.)
Azurity owns a patent directed to a nonsterile, stable liquid formulation of vancomycin hydrochloride, specifically designed for oral administration to treat Clostridium difficile infections. Following Alkem’s submission of an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), Azurity brought a Hatch-Waxman Act claim against Alkem for infringement of certain claims of the patent. The district court found that Azurity had disclaimed the presence of propylene glycol in the claimed formulation during the prosecution. Since Alkem’s ANDA product contained propylene glycol, the district court held that it did not infringe. Azurity appealed.
The Federal Circuit affirmed, focusing on the patent’s prosecution history and noting that Azurity used the lack of propylene glycol to distinguish its claimed invention from the prior art. The Court noted that this distinction was made during prosecution multiple times in response to the examiner’s rejections, and that Azurity had added negative claim limitations that specifically omitted propylene glycol from the scope of the claims.
The Federal Circuit also noted that Azurity used a “consisting of” transitional phrase to narrow the claims and relied on the closed transition to overcome the prior art. The Court explained that “consisting of” is a closed transition that limits the claim scope to only the recited components. By using this transition and not including propylene glycol as one of the claim components, Azurity effectively disclaimed propylene glycol from the invention. Therefore, the Court found that omission of propylene glycol during patent prosecution was “clean, unambiguous, and complete.”
Azurity argued that a pretrial stipulation between the parties, which stated that “[s]uitable flavoring agents for use in the asserted claims include flavoring agents with or without propylene glycol,” should preclude the application of the disclaimer. The Federal Circuit did not find this argument persuasive, concluding that the stipulation did not alter the clear and unambiguous disclaimer made during prosecution, nor did it affect the noninfringement finding. Since Alkem’s ANDA product contained propylene glycol and Azurity disclaimed inclusion of propylene glycol, there was no infringement.
Not Secret and Not Used: Misappropriation Claim Dismissed
The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld a district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that the plaintiff failed to identify a trade secret and presented no evidence of its use or disclosure. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc. v. Justin Pethick and The Randall Powers Co., Case No. 24-10375 (5th Cir. Apr. 3, 2025) (Smith, Clement, Duncan, JJ.)
In 2018, Justin Pethick was a DeWolff, Boberg & Associates (DBA) employee. That year, DBA’s competitor, The Randall Powers Company (Powers), hired Pethick as regional vice president of sales. After Pethick began working at Powers, some prospective DBA clients hired Powers for consulting services. DBA sued Powers for trade secret misappropriation, asserting that Pethick stole its trade secrets and used them to poach clients. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Powers and Pethick. DBA appealed.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed but on alternative grounds. To prevail on a misappropriation claim under Texas law (where the initial suit was brought), “a plaintiff must show that (1) a trade secret existed, (2) the trade secret was acquired through a breach of a confidential relationship or discovered by improper means, and (3) the defendant used the trade secret without authorization from the plaintiff.”
On appeal, Powers first argued that the information DBA claimed was trade secrets, such as contact information, meeting notes, and “confidential information related to business opportunities,” did not qualify as protectable trade secrets. DBA pointed to “large swathes of database information” without distinguishing what exactly was supposedly a trade secret. The Fifth Circuit found it was unclear as to what materials were trade secrets, noting that it had “no obligation to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary judgment.” The Court held that summary judgment was justified on this basis.
The Fifth Circuit further held that, even assuming the information qualified as trade secrets, summary judgment was still warranted because there was no evidence that Powers and Pethick used the information. Although Pethick had requested a copy of a document that DBA claimed contained trade secrets prior to joining Powers, there was no evidence that he ever possessed it while at Powers. To the contrary, the forensic expert retained by DBA to remove its data from Pethick’s computer did not find the document. The Court concluded that DBA failed to demonstrate any use of an alleged trade secret.
Ill-Gotten Gains: Unjust Enrichment Remedy Not Barred by Limitation of Liability Provision
Examining the issue of trade secret misappropriation when parties have contractually limited their liability from breach, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the case, finding that a plaintiff could still recover damages under a theory of unjust enrichment. Pemco Aircraft Engineering Services Inc. v. The Boeing Company, Case No. 22-13776 (11th Cir. Apr. 4, 2025) (Pryor, Branch, Carnes, JJ.)
Pemco and Boeing, who are usually competitors, entered into an agreement to jointly bid for a government contract. The parties’ contract had three separately executed parts that functioned as one agreement. When the contractual relationship fell apart, Pemco sued Boeing for breach of contract and trade secret misappropriation. Based on Boeing’s contractual breach, a jury awarded Pemco more than $2 million of out-of-pocket damages. The district court dismissed the trade secret misappropriation claim, however, as time-barred under Alabama law. After Pemco appealed, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed and determined that the trade secret misappropriation claim arose under Missouri law, not Alabama law, and that under Missouri law, Pemco’s trade secret claims were not time-barred. On remand, Pemco brought amended trade secret misappropriation claims under Missouri law, which the district court dismissed based on the parties’ contract, which limited liability. Pemco appealed.
The issue on appeal was whether the parties’ contractual limitation of liability provision precluded any damages, even for misappropriation. The contractual provision lists the categories of damages that the parties disclaimed, namely, incidental, punitive, and exemplary, or consequential damages. The Eleventh Circuit explained that two sophisticated parties negotiating at arm’s length are permitted by Missouri public policy considerations to contractually limit future recovery for even intentional torts. By including punitive and exemplary damages, which are available only for tort claims and not contractual ones, the parties clearly intended to include torts related to the contract within its scope. Thus, even though trade secret misappropriation is a tort and not a contractual claim, the Court found that the claim was restricted by this provision and Pemco was therefore limited in its potential recovery.
The Eleventh Circuit next looked to whether the jury award had sufficiently compensated Pemco. The district court found that a Missouri trade secrets claim was barred in this context because of a full recovery under the related contract claim. The Court, however, distinguished the two causes of action. So long as the trade secrets claim provides a separate, non-duplicative remedy, it can stand on its own despite other recoveries under the contract. The Missouri Trade Secrets Act explicitly provides for an unjust enrichment remedy not available for contractual breach and the parties chose not to limit recovery for unjust enrichment. Thus, the Court concluded that this remedy was available as a trade secret claim that was not, and could not have been, available to Pemco under the contract.
Boeing advanced two arguments against the availability of an unjust enrichment remedy. Boing argued that any further award would be duplicative of the previous jury award and that unjust enrichment constitutes a consequential damage and thus is barred under the contract.Relying on the jury instructions and basic damages principles, the Eleventh Circuit explained that the jury verdict compensated Pemco for reliance expenditures while an unjust enrichment award would function to disincentivize corporate espionage and would remove ill-gotten profits from Boeing that it acquired by theft. The Court reasoned that the jury award was compensatory while an unjust enrichment remedy would be restitution. Regarding Boeing’s second argument, the Court differentiated consequential damages from an unjust enrichment remedy, explaining that consequential damages are foreseeable and proximate damages experienced by the plaintiff, while unjust enrichment considers an unfair profit that a defendant has acquired. The Court further explained that unjust enrichment goes beyond making a plaintiff whole and “seeks to deprive the wrongdoer defendant of the gain it obtained from conduct that inflicted the loss on the plaintiff.”
The Eleventh Circuit remanded the case to allow Pemco to prove it is entitled to a further remedy under unjust enrichment.
Munich Court Addresses Implementer’s Obligation To Provide Security in FRAND Negotiations
The Munich Higher Regional Court issued a decision concerning the fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) negotiation process and an implementer’s obligation to provide security if a license offer for standard essential patents (SEPs) is rejected. HMD Global v. VoiceAge, Case No. 6 U 3824/22 Kart, (Judgment of 20 March 2025).
In this case, the Munich Higher Regional Court attempted to fill a gap left by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Huawei v. ZTE regarding an implementer’s obligation to provide adequate security for royalties. This obligation arises when an implementer rejects a SEP holder’s license offer and the SEP holder rejects the implementer’s counteroffer, so there is no agreement on a license.
The Munich Court found that the implementer, HMD Global, provided an inadequate security that was based on HMD Global’s lower counteroffer. The Court explained that it is the SEP holder’s, here VoiceAges, final offer (i.e., the requested royalty) that is determinative for calculating the security amount that an implementer should provide. This is because a willing licensee must accept the SEP holder’s offer if a court declares it to be FRAND and the royalties subject to this offer must be covered by the security. The Court emphasized that an implementer can only establish that it is a willing licensee by making a counteroffer and providing adequate security after rejecting the offer.
However, the Munich Court left open the issue of whether security must be provided if the SEP holder’s final offer is obviously not FRAND, noting that there may be “special cases” where the SEP holder’s final offer may not be determinative of the security without further defining those cases.
The CJEU’s Guidelines to FRAND Negotiations Are Not a Rigid Set of Rules
The Munich Court also took a critical stance in response to the European Commission’s amicus curiae brief and found that the FRAND guidelines set by the CJEU in Huawei v. ZTE are not to be viewed as a rigid set of rules but rather as a “dynamic concept for negotiation.” A court is not limited to assessing the FRAND defense by strictly examining in sequence each step of the CJEU’s guidelines, which includes the following:
The SEP holder must send a notice of infringement to the implementer.
The implementer must declare to be a willing licensee.
The SEP holder must make a FRAND offer.
If the offer is not FRAND, the implementer is allowed to reject it but must make a counteroffer.
The implementer must provide adequate security for royalties if the SEP holder rejects the implementer’s counteroffer.
The European Commission argued that a court must examine each step before moving on to the next one. This means that, for example, once a court has found that the implementer is a willing licensee, the court must leave the implementer’s subsequent (possibly non-FRAND) conduct out of consideration and cannot undermine the implementer’s established willingness to take a license. A court must then assess whether the SEP holder’s offer was FRAND.
Instead, in view of the Munich Court (a view that is also shared by the Unified Patent Court (Local Division Munich, judgment of 18 December 2024, Case No. ACT_459771/2023, UPC_CFI_9/2023)), a court may consider the entirety of the parties’ conduct, including subsequent conduct, during FRAND negotiations. Therefore, a party may not rely on a formal omission by the other party, such as the absence (or inadequacy) of an infringement notice or a declaration to be a willing licensee in the early stages of negotiations, if the omission was remedied by the party’s subsequent conduct and the parties continued to negotiate with the goal of concluding a license. On the other hand, the implementer’s subsequent non-FRAND conduct may undermine its established willingness to take a license.
No Review of the SEP Holder’s Final Offer if the Implementer Fails to Comply With Its FRAND Obligations After Rejecting the Offer
The Munich Court found that it need not review whether the SEP holder’s final offer was FRAND before assessing the implementer’s conduct after rejecting the offer.
The Munich Court explained that in general, whether a SEP holder’s final offer is FRAND is not decisive to the success of a FRAND defense because even if a SEP holder’s offer is not FRAND, the implementer cannot simply walk away from the negotiations. Instead, to comply with its CJEU negotiation obligations, the implementer must take further action, such as making a counteroffer and providing adequate security, to maintain a FRAND defense against a SEP holder’s injunction claim. In other words, the implementer will lose its FRAND defense anyway if it does not comply with its own FRAND obligations. Therefore, a court is only required to perform the time-consuming examination of whether the SEP holder’s final offer is FRAND if the implementer has complied with its own CJEU FRAND obligations.
Practice Notes
This judgment by the Munich Court strengthens the position of SEP holders. Implementers should consider providing security for royalties in the amount of the SEP holder’s final offer even if the relevant royalties seem to slightly exceed what might be considered as FRAND. Otherwise, an implementer risks a finding that it is an unwilling licensee, thus losing its FRAND defense.
It is also noteworthy that the Munich Court expressly allowed an appeal to the German Federal Court of Justice. This is rare in German case law and shows that the Munich Court is aware that its decision touches on a fundamental issue of FRAND law that still needs to be clarified by the German Federal Court of Justice. The appeal has already been filed (Case No. KZR 10/25).
Skating on Thin Ice: The CAS Re-affirms the Field of Play Doctrine in the ‘Kyiv Capitals’ Case
What is the Field of Play Doctrine?
Regardless of the sport or the level of competition, refereeing decisions are inevitably the subject of question and complaint. Players, managers, clubs, fans, commentators, pundits and casual observers may all criticise the merits of officiating decisions – something undoubtedly made all the more prevalent by the multitude of camera angles, slow-motion replays and technology that define modern broadcast sport.
The “Field of Play” doctrine, a concept enshrined in the so-called lex sportiva and consistently applied by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”), is based on the belief that the rules of the game, in the strict sense of the term, are not subject to judicial control. The rationale behind this “qualified immunity”[1] is twofold: (1) to ensure that match officials have the requisite authority and autonomy to make decisions, and (2) that sporting contests will be completed and thus deliver a result.
As per the 2017 CAS case of Japan Triathlon Union v International Triathlon Union[2], for the doctrine to apply, the following two conditions are needed:
“that a decision at stake was made on the playing field by judges, referees, umpires and other officials, who are responsible for applying the rules of a particular game” and
“that the effects of the decision are limited to the field of play.”[3]
Nonetheless, the doctrine is not absolute, meaning that field of play decisions may be disputed in narrow circumstances relating to integrity. These include instances where there is evidence of bad faith, malicious intent, fraud, bias, prejudice, arbitrariness and corruption.[4]
Hockey Club Kyiv Capitals v Ice Hockey Federation of Ukraine[5]
(i) Introduction
In an Award handed down by the CAS on 20 February 2025, the Ice Hockey Federation of Ukraine (the “Federation”) successfully argued that the CAS had no authority to review officiating decisions. The appeal to the CAS had been brought by Hockey Club Kyiv Capitals (the “Club”) in connection with a match during the 2023/2024 Ukrainian Men’s Ice Hockey Championship season.
(ii) Factual Background
The case concerns an incident that occurred on 3 February 2024 during a match between the Club and the Hockey Club of Dnipro (“Dnipro”).
Throughout the match, several incidents occurred which resulted in both teams receiving penalties. The Club received a total of 13 penalties for unsportsmanlike conduct (including kneeing, tripping, elbowing, and roughing) which were committed by several players and their Head Coach, Vadym Shahraichuk. By contrast, Dnipro received three penalties.
With 50 minutes and 48 seconds of the match played, the Club refused to continue and instead left the ice hockey rink, the score being tied a 2-2 at the time. This decision was, according to their Head Coach, due to “unfair and one-sided refereeing.”[6]
(iii) Procedural Background
Following the match, the Club appealed to the Federation Refereeing Quality Assessment Committee (the “RQAC”), citing twelve occasions during the match where the referees failed to impose a sanction. Although the RQAC subsequently ruled that the majority of the refereeing decisions were correct, they did identify several which had been overlooked.[7]
The Disciplinary Committee of the Federation consequently initiated proceedings to determine the application of sanctions against the Club, later opting to impose disciplinary and monetary sanctions on 5 February 2024.[8]
The Club responded by filing an appeal against the Disciplinary Committee’s decision to the Appeals Committee. However, this was unanimously dismissed on 26 February 2024.
Finally, having received confirmation that they could appeal the Appeals Committee ruling to the CAS, the Club consequently filed a Statement of Appeal requesting that the CAS set aside the decision.
Arguments advanced before the CAS
(i) The Club
In seeking relief, the Appellant Club advanced five core arguments:
That the technical defeat should not have been awarded. In supporting this argument, the Club maintained that the game had begun and so the referees had exclusive authority to determine the outcome. The Federation’s competence only extended to matches that did not take place and the referees could therefore not delegate to the Federation. The Club further submitted that the game had been stopped too soon (i.e. after only two minutes rather than 5 minutes) due to an error in the translation of the Official Rule Book on the Federation’s website.
The violation of the principles of publicity and openness, namely that the Club had not been furnished with sufficient information about the proceedings, the receipt of statements from third parties, the hearing (including the time, place and composition of the authority), and the opportunity to renew statements and provide objections.
The violation of the right to an effective remedy, with the Club alleging that the Federation conducted a secret proceeding which deprived the Club of an effective defence.
The violation of ethical norms due to conflicts of interest, with the Club alleging a “direct connection between the Referee and the Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson of the Appeals Committee.”[9]
The violation of the right to a fair trial, namely as a result of the aforementioned arguments.
(ii) The Federation
In response, the Federation advanced nine core arguments:
The inadmissibility of the Appeal. In advancing this argument, the Federation submitted that the CAS lacked authority relating to future issues and that the Club failed to identify the point being appealed along with the exact basis of appeal.
The lack of interest and/or legitimacy of the Appellant. The Federation argued that the Club had neither the direct nor personal interest required to appeal certain aspects of the decisions. As part of this argument, the Federation maintained that the Club’s Head Coach should have appealed the decisions in his personal capacity and that the Club’s final league position was not impacted by the technical defeat awarded.
The binding nature and correct application of the Federation Rules. In invoking the “chain of references”[10] principle, the Federation contended that the Club had, by participating in the championship, consented to and agreed to be bound by the rules of the Federation.
The fair trial objection according to the de novo principle. In invoking the de novo principle[11], the Federation further contended that the Club’s submissions concerning the lack of a fair trial were immaterial and that the CAS would correct “all procedural flaws.”[12]
The field of play doctrine. By relying on the doctrine, the Federation argued that the on-field decisions made by the referees were not reviewable by the CAS.
The absence of any conflict of interest in earlier proceedings. In rebutting the allegation that there was a violation of ethical norms due to conflicts of interest, the Federation asserted that there was no conflict of interest or corruption. They further highlighted that such an argument had only been raised by the Club upon appeal to the CAS and could have been submitted in earlier proceedings.
The respect of the principles of publicity and openness. Far from not being in receipt of information relating to the proceedings, the Federation considered that the Club had been made provided with the first instance decision. They submitted that they were thus “informed of the entire proceeding, including evidence and facts.”[13]
The absence of determination of the outcome of the Match by the Referees. The Federation asserted that the technical defeat finding was a “logical sanction” rather than “an unlawful “determining of outcome””[14] after the Club departed the hockey rink.
The troublesome widespread effect of CAS decision annulling the technical defeat. Finally, and perhaps most persuasively, the Federation highlighted that “annulling the appealed decisions would justify and legalize the abandonment of matches as a means of remedy against field of play decisions and would represent a precedent allowing clubs to abandon games if they are not in their favor.”[15]
Ruling of the CAS
The sole arbitrator, Ms Carine Dupeyron, held that jurisdiction of the CAS had been established in the case and that the Club’s appeal had been filed within the relevant time limits.
Ms Dupeyron further found that the Club’s appeal was both admissible and that the Club had a legal interest in appealing the decisions.
Moreover, Ms Dupeyron concluded that the relevant International Ice Hockey Federation and the Federation rules and regulations applied in the case, with Swiss Law and case law also applying due to the arbitration’s seat in Lausanne, Switzerland.
With regard to the match itself and in applying the Federation Rules, Ms Dupeyron reasoned that the game period had not ended when the Club departed the hockey rink and refused to continue playing. Despite ruling that the referees had applied Rule 73.2 rather than Rule 73.3[16] of the Official Rule Book 2023/24, this did not impact the ability of both the Disciplinary Committee and the Appeals Committee to examine the case.
In considering the disciplinary and financial sanctions imposed on the Club, Ms Dupeyron concluded that the Disciplinary Committee and the Appeals Committee had both the authority to impose such sanctions and to impose a technical defeat on the Club.
Finally, the Club’s submissions regarding the violation of ethical norms due to conflicts of interest did not find favour with Ms Dupeyron. She instead concluded “that the de novo appeal before the CAS cured the potential procedural flaws regarding the appealed decisions”.[17]
Therefore, Ms Dupeyron declined to allow the appeal – thus confirming the decision of the Appeals Committee of the Federation.
Impact of Ruling
The ruling serves as a timely reminder that the Field of Play doctrine will prevent sporting contestants from simply leaving the arena and appealing the decisions of officials, including in situations where appeal boards subsequently find refereeing to have overlooked inappropriate or unfair acts that occurred within matches.
Moving forwards, participants should therefore continue to be mindful of the doctrine and that it will apply save for specific circumstances relating to integrity. If such circumstances are not apparent, then participants are walking on thin ice when choosing to abandon matches prematurely and seeking subsequent judicial relief. As the case demonstrates, the likelihood is that the doctrine will be upheld, certainly before a CAS tribunal, and participants will suffer the regulatory consequences of their abandonment.
The full CAS Award is available here: CAS 2024/A/10449 Hockey Club Kyiv Capitals v. Ice Hockey Federation of Ukraine
[1] CAS OG 02/2007 Korean Olympic Committee v. International Skating Union; 2015/A/4208 Horse Sport Ireland & Cian O’Connor v. FEI.
[2] CAS 2017/A/5373.
[3] Ibid [Paragraph 51].
[4] For example, see the following cases: CAS 2004/A/727 Vanderlei De Lima & Brazilian Olympic Committee (BOC) v. International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF), CAS 2008/A/1641 Netherlands Antilles Olympic Committee (NAOC) v. International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) & United States Olympic Committee (USOC), Aino-Kaisa Saarinen & Finnish Ski Association v. Fédération Internationale de Ski (FIS) CAS 2010/A/2090, CAS 2015/A/4208 Horse Sport Ireland (HSI) & Cian O’Connor v. Fédération Equestre Internationale (FEI).
[5] CAS 2024/A/10449.
[6] [Paragraph 9].
[7] These overlooked instances included “a tripping, a blocking, a player interference, and a hand-checking on behalf of the opponent team” [Paragraph 11].
[8] These included disciplinary and monetary sanctions on the Club; imposing a technical defeat in the match on the Club / awarding a technical victory to Dnipro; warning the Club that repeated refusal to continue upcoming matches will result in automatic exclusion from the Ukrainian Men’s Ice Hockey Championship; imposing two disciplinary sanctions on the Club’s player Pavlo Taran; imposing a disciplinary sanction on the Club’s player Serhii Chernenko; obligating the Club’s Head Coach Vadym Shahraichuk to familiarise himself and the players with the Federation’s golden rules; and warning the Head Coach that he would receive one-match suspensions for each major, disciplinary or game misconduct penalty of the Club’s players.
[9] [Paragraph 85].
[10] [Paragraph 97].
[11]De novo refers to the standard of review employed by an appellate court, with the appellate court reviewing the decision of a lower court as if the lower court had not rendered a decision.
[12] [Paragraph 103].
[13] [Paragraph 112].
[14] [Paragraph 114].
[15] [Paragraph 115].
[16] Rule 73.2 permits the team refusing to play only 15 seconds to resume the match when already on the ice, whereas Rule 73.3 permits 5 minutes for the team to return to the ice.
[17] [Paragraph 179].
Jonathan Mason also contributed to this article.
Ethylene Oxide Case Starts Trial In Georgia
Ethylene Oxide (EtO) is an industrial solvent widely used as a sterilizing agent for medical and other equipment that cannot otherwise be sterilized by heat/steam. EtO may also be used as a component for producing other chemicals, including glycol and polyglycol ethers, emulsifiers, detergents, and solvents. Allegations that exposure to EtO increases the risk of certain cancers has led to governmental regulation as well as private tort actions against companies that operate sterilization facilities that utilize EtO. The most recent example of the latter is a trial that started this week in Georgia.
Ethylene Oxide Trial History
The first ethylene oxide case to go to trial was the Kamuda matter, in which an Illinois jury awarded $263 million in September of 2022 against Sterigenics for ethylene oxide exposure from that company’s Willowbrook facility. A subsequent trial in the same jurisdiction against the same defendant resulted in a defense verdict. Ultimately, Sterigenics resolved its pending claims involving the Willowbrook plant in the amount of $408 million. In December of 2024, a Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas jury found the defendant B. Braun Manufacturing Inc. not liable on all counts. The plaintiff had alleged that her husband developed leukemia as a result of working at the defendant’s sterilization plant in Allentown, Pennsylvania for seven years. Notably, unlike the Illinois trials, the Philadelphia trial involved an employee at the sterilization facility as opposed to the Illinois plaintiffs who did not work at the Willowbrook plant but resided nearby.
Last month, a Colorado jury rendered a verdict in favor of defendant Terumo BCT Inc. (Isaacks et al. v. Terumo BCT Sterilization Services Inc. et al. in the First Judicial District of Colorado (docket number 2022CV031124). This was a bellwether trial that lasted six weeks, and involved four female plaintiffs. The jury determined that the defendant was not negligent in its handling of emissions from its Lakewood plant. The plaintiffs had sought $217 million in damages for their alleged physical impairment and also $7.5 million for past and future medical expenses as well as punitive damages. In light of the fact that the six person jury found the defendant Terumo not negligent, it did not need to consider damages or causation. Notably, there remain hundreds more pending claims against Terumo in Colorado. In fact, plaintiffs’ counsel filed almost 25 more cases while the trial was in progress. All of the plaintiffs alleged that they had developed cancer as a result of ethylene oxide emissions from the Terumo facility. One plaintiff alleged breast cancer as a result of 23 years of exposure from the plant, while another alleged breast cancer after almost 35 years of exposure (these two plaintiffs were neighbors). Another plaintiff alleged multiple myeloma while the fourth plaintiff alleged Hodgkin’s lymphoma.
Georgia Trial Starts
Earlier this week, an EtO trial commenced against CR. Bard in Georgia. At issue is the company’s medical equipment sterilization plant in Covington, Georgia. The plaintiff, who had been a truck driver, alleges that he would make pickups at the plant on a regular basis, and, coupled with the fact that he resided one and half miles from the plant, was exposed to EtO and developed non-Hodgkin lymphoma. The plaintiff alleges that the company failed to take appropriate steps to protect he and the community from EtO. According to plaintiff’s allegations, the Covington facility emitted 9.8 million pounds of EtO from 1970 to 2017, that there were no controls until 1990, and that there were multiple instances of unintended EtO releases. Further, there are claims that Union Carbide, which had suppled EtO to the plant, had warned the company. Until 1990 there was nothing at all interfering with the release of the gas outside the plant, he said, claiming to the jury that any controls the plant put in place were done because the company was “forced” to, and that there were numerous “unintended” release incidents over the years. Even Bard’s EtO supplier, Union Carbide, had warned Bard, Daniel said.
For its part, Bard and Becton Dickinson (Bard’s parent company), maintain that the plant has always been a good corporate citizen and that the plaintiff’s cancer was not caused by EtO but rather by a random DNA mutation. Plaintiff counsel told the jury that the Food and Drug Administration has noted the critical role that EtO plays in the country’s healthcare system and that over 50% of medical products are sterilized with EtO.
Analysis
Recently, we’ve seen increased trial activity with respect to EtO trials. As set out above, there have now been cases taken to verdict in Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Colorado. And now a case has started trial in Georgia. There is also EtO litigation activity in California, though those cases are still in the discovery phase. As noted in previous postings, we expect that plaintiff firms will recruit new clients who allege some type of cancer as a result of residing in the vicinity of an ethylene oxide plant, particularly if the Georgia trial results in a plaintiff verdict. How long will it be until we see television advertisements run by plaintiff firms seeking new plaintiffs? We’ve seen this in asbestos, talc, contaminated water, firefighting foam, defective earplugs, and other types of litigation. It is not out of the realm of possibility to think that we will see this with ethylene oxide litigation at some point in the near future.
Ubisoft Defeats Privacy Lawsuit Over Meta Tracking Pixel: These Are the Key Compliance Takeaways You Need to Know
As privacy litigation over tracking pixels continues to surge, a recent decision out of California offers a clear win for companies that implement strong consent mechanisms.
In Lakes v. Ubisoft, Inc., 2025 WL 1036639 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2025), Plaintiffs Trevor Lakes and Alex Rajjoub filed a class action against Defendant Ubisoft, Inc., a video game company, alleging violations of the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA), California’s Invasion of Privacy Act (CIPA), and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).
According to Plaintiffs, their claims arose when they visited Ubisoft’s website (the “Website”) to download games while logged into their respective Facebook accounts. Plaintiffs alleged that Ubisoft installed a Meta/Facebook tracking pixel on the Website, which disclosed their personally identifiable information to Meta. The allegedly disclosed information included the consumers’ unique and unencrypted Facebook ID, a cookie containing an encrypted Facebook ID, and their Video Request Data.
Plaintiffs sought to represent the following classes:
All PII Users on the Website that had their PII, search terms, and detailed webpage information improperly intercepted by and disclosed to Facebook through the use of the Pixel (the “Class”).
All PII Users, who reside and used the Website in California, that had their PII, search terms, and detailed webpage information improperly intercepted by and disclosed to Facebook through the use of the Pixel (the “California Subclass”).
Ubisoft filed a motion to dismiss and requested judicial notice of its Website and the policies publicly available on the Website, including its Privacy Policy, Cookies Settings, and Website Cookies Banner. Ubisoft contended that these were necessary for the Court to have a complete picture of a user’s journey, what the user consents to, and the policies they are provided and agree to. The request for judicial notice was granted for specific portions of the Ubisoft Website.
On the Website’s landing page, a first-time user is presented with a Cookie Banner notifying them that by clicking “OK” and “continuing to navigate on the site” they “accept the use of cookies by Ubisoft and its partners to offer advertising adapted to [their] interests.” If a user clicks on the “set your cookies” hyperlink in the banner, a pop-up appears with more detailed options to change cookie preferences.
To make any purchases on the Website, a user must first create a Ubisoft account and affirmatively accept Ubisoft’s Terms of Use, Terms of Sale, and Privacy Policy, which are all hyperlinked on the Website. Ubisoft’s Privacy Policy informs users that their information will be shared with third parties and outlines how users can withdraw their consent. After agreeing to the Privacy Policy and consenting to the sharing of data during account creation, a user is once again presented with the Privacy Policy every time they make a purchase on the Website.
In light of the above processes, Ubisoft argued that all of Plaintiffs’ claims fail because Plaintiffs were repeatedly informed of, and consented to, the use of cookies and pixels on the Website. The Court agreed, finding that Ubisoft’s disclosures clearly state that it allows partners to use cookies on the Website, that specific analytics and personalization cookies would be used, and that cookie identifiers and other similar data connected to the use of the site could be collected and shared.
In doing so, the Court rejected Plaintiffs’ assertion that a granular disclosure stating that Meta will collect Plaintiffs’ “video game titles combined with unique Facebook identifiers” was required to obtain actual consent. Here, the Privacy Policy explicitly disclosed that Ubisoft uses technologies such as cookies to collect game, login, and browsing data, and that Ubisoft allows its partners to set and access user cookies. This was found to be sufficient, because “a reasonable user would understand from the Privacy Policy that he or she is consenting to the use of cookies including by third parties.”
“[A] reasonable user would understand from the Privacy Policy that he or she is consenting to the use of cookies including by third parties.”
Therefore, the Court granted Ubisoft’s motion to dismiss the complaint in its entirety, with prejudice. The Court concluded that granting Plaintiffs leave to amend would be futile because they cannot overcome the issue of consent.
The most important takeaway here is the need for businesses to maintain proper consent and disclosure mechanisms – include a cookie disclosure on the website landing page, clearly inform users what data you collect and who you share it with, and allow users to customize non-essential cookies. Although, a Pennsylvania court held that a privacy policy contained in a browsewrap agreement gave users constructive notice of a website’s use of tracking software, affirmative consent obtained via a clickwrap agreement worked in Ubisoft’s favor here. Finally, make sure your privacy policy is accurate and up to date.
Ultimately, this ruling underscores how detailed, user-facing consent flows and transparent data-sharing policies remain critical defenses in privacy litigation.