A Wait Until the Deal Closes: The Antitrust Agencies Send a Strong Message About the Dangers of Gun-Jumping
One of the most common questions clients have after a merger or acquisition has been signed is, “When can we start on combining the operations and doing business?” And one of the most challenging pieces of counseling is to help a client understand the antitrust compliance principle that until a deal closes, the parties must compete as separate and independent entities. While merging companies may plan the integration of their operations, they may not actually integrate their operations or otherwise coordinate their competitive behavior before the transaction has closed without risking a “gun jumping” violation.
Gun-jumping violations can be triggered under two laws: (1) §1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits agreements in restraint of trade (such as price fixing and market allocation); and (2) the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (HSR Act), which requires parties to certain transactions to submit a premerger notification form and observe the necessary waiting period(s) prior to closing their transaction and the transfer of beneficial ownership.
While there have been a number of gun-jumping enforcement actions over the years, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Antitrust Division of Department of Justice (DOJ) (collectively, the “Antitrust Agencies”) made it clear recently that these types of violations will be scrutinized and penalized. The Antitrust Agencies imposed a record $5.6 million civil penalty on three crude oil suppliers for engaging in gun-jumping in violation of the HSR Act.1
According to the complaint, XCL Resources Holdings, LLC (XCL) and Verdun Oil Company II LLC (Verdun) filed an HSR for their $1.4 billion acquisition of EP Energy LLC (EP).2 However, prior to the expiration of the HSR waiting period, XCL and Verdun assumed control of a number of EP’s key operations including but not limited to managing EP’s customers and coordinating pricing strategies. These and other actions effectively transferred beneficial ownership to the buyers before the deal closed, in violation of the HSR Act.
The enforcement action is the largest civil penalty ever imposed for a gun-jumping violation in history. Moreover, the Antitrust Agencies imposed a number of antitrust compliance and monitoring obligations on the buyers.
[1]https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2025/01/oil-companies-pay-record-ftc-gun-jumping-fine-antitrust-law-violation and https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/oil-companies-pay-record-civil-penalty-violating-antitrust-pre-transaction-notification
[2]https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/complaintforcivilpenaltiesandequitablereliefforviolationsofthehartscottrodinoact.pdf
Annual Adjustment of HSR Thresholds Comes at a Time of Uncertainty
There is a lot of uncertainty in the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (HSR) world. The new rules on what must be included in an HSR filing have been issued and are due to take effect on February 10, 2025, but that could be derailed or delayed. Either the new administration could issue a freeze on federal regulations that have not yet gone into effect, or implementation could be delayed by a recently filed lawsuit alleging that the new rules exceed the statutory authority of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).
But one bit of certainty in this uncertain landscape is the new HSR thresholds that are released every year around this time.
The HSR requires that transactions over a certain value be reported at least 30 days prior to closing to the FTC and U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DOJ) (collectively, the “Agencies”). The FTC adjusts the HSR reporting thresholds annually based on the change in gross national product. In 2025, the new threshold to keep in mind for transactions is $126.4 million (which is up from $119.5 million in 2024). There are additional considerations when acquiring or selling voting securities, non-corporate interests in a business (such as interests in an LLC or partnership) or assets valued over $126.4 million.
When determining whether an HSR filing is necessary, the following questions must be considered:
What is the Value of the Transaction and the Size of the Parties?
The HSR rules are complex, and whether the size-of-the-transaction threshold is met depends on a number of details such as the transaction’s structure and whether any HSR exemptions apply. Additionally, one important preliminary question is, if the transaction exceeds the $126.4 million threshold, are the parties large enough to warrant further assessment of HSR filing? If the transaction is valued at or above $124.6 million but less than $505.8 million, then the size of the parties must be considered. If one party to the deal (and all of that party’s parents, affiliates and subsidiaries) has sales or assets over $252.9 million, and if the other party has sales or assets over $25.3 million, then the transaction might be reportable, and the HSR filing analysis should continue. All non-exempt transactions valued over $505.8 million are reportable, regardless of the size of the parties.
Do Any Exemptions Apply?
The HSR rules contain several exemptions that can reduce the transaction value or eliminate the obligation to make a filing altogether. For example, the HSR rules do not apply to certain acquisitions of non-U.S. entities or assets, acquisitions made solely for the purpose of investment or certain real estate acquisitions.
How Much Will it Cost for an HSR Filing?
The HSR filing fees remain relatively unchanged from last year, except for some minor increases for larger transactions:
What Will the FTC or DOJ Do After the Filing is Made?
During the 30-day waiting period, the parties cannot close the transaction, which allows the Agencies to review whether the transaction could adversely impact competition in the market for any particular product or service. One potential change under the new administration is the return of early termination of the waiting period for deals that have no significant antitrust issues. For deals with competitive overlaps, and in light of the Merger Guidelines issued in 2023, if the parties compete in the same market or industry and/or the deal will add to a portfolio of assets in the same market or industry, it is critical that antitrust counsel be engaged early in the process to determine how the transaction might affect competition and the likelihood that the Agencies may oppose or challenge the transaction.
Finally, ignoring the HSR threshold can lead to reputational and financial harm. Failure to submit a required HSR filing can draw penalties of $51,744 for each day of noncompliance.
SBA Final Rule Impacts Small Business Government Contractor Valuations
Go-To Guide:
Small Business Administration Final Rule will impact the valuation of small business government contractors holding Multiple Award Contracts (MACs) and Federal Supply Schedules (FSS). The rule takes effect Jan. 16, 2025.
Under the rule, if a business cannot recertify as small 30 days following a merger or acquisition (i.e., disqualifying recertification), it will no longer be eligible for options or task orders set-aside for small businesses under MACs.
Disqualifying recertifications made before Jan. 17, 2026, will not affect eligibility for small business MAC orders or options. This delayed effect encourages the sale of small business contractors holding MACs in 2025.
The rule eliminates an exception for FSS orders and blanket purchase agreements (BPAs). As of Jan. 16, 2025, a disqualifying recertification makes an FSS vendor ineligible for FSS orders or BPAs set aside for small businesses.
For transactions involving two small business contractors and for single award contracts, the rule does not impact future orders or options eligibility.
Effective Jan. 16, 2025, the United States Small Business Administration (SBA)’s Final Rule will significantly impact mergers & acquisitions involving small business government contractors and investors in the government contracting industry. A September 2024 GT Alert summarizes important aspects of the SBA’s Proposed Rule and discusses key changes that might impact small business government contractors. The Final Rule echoes much of the Proposed Rule’s language and will affect the landscape for small business contractors and investors in the federal government contracting industry.
This GT Alert highlights several aspects of the Final Rule.
Small Business Recertification Applicable to Multiple Award Contracts
Small businesses government contractors must recertify their size and small business program status (i.e., 8(a), HUBZone, women-owned, or service-disabled veteran-owned) within 30 days of a merger, sale, or acquisition. Traditionally, following a recertification, the size of a small business (including its affiliates) was determined at the time the business submitted its initial offer that included price. When the small business received a contract award, the business was generally considered small throughout the life of that contract (including options thereunder). Before the Final Rule, that was generally true even where a large business merged with or acquired the small business.
Single Award vs. Multiple Award Contracts
The Final Rule draws a distinction between single award and MACs. Whether a small business can continue to receive future orders under an underlying contract after a disqualifying recertification depends upon whether the underlying contract or agreement is a single award or MAC. For single award small business contracts (or any unrestricted contract), a business that recertifies as other than small (i.e., “large”) remains eligible to receive orders and options. Conversely, for MACs set-aside for small businesses, a business that recertifies as other than small would be ineligible to receive orders and options.
One-Year Delay
This aspect of the Final Rule delays the effective date to Jan. 17, 2026, and explicitly states that it should not be retroactively applied. In response to industry comment, the Final Rule notes that it makes sense to allow some time to adapt and plan how best to comply with the new recertification provisions. Once in effect, the Final Rule will apply to existing contracts, but the provisions making businesses ineligible for orders or options after disqualifying recertifications will apply only to future disqualifying recertifications (i.e., ones that occur after Jan. 17, 2026). Accordingly, businesses that have made or will continue to make disqualifying recertifications before Jan. 17, 2026, will continue to be eligible to receive orders and options after Jan. 16, 2025.
The Final Rule’s delayed application will increase transaction volume involving small business contractors through Jan. 17, 2026. Until that date, the current regulatory regime will govern transactions involving a small business, meaning small businesses with set-aside MACs will continue to be eligible for set-aside orders even after they are acquired by a large business. If the transaction closes after Jan. 17, 2026, however, small businesses will not be eligible for set-aside orders or new MAC options.
This aspect of the Final Rule takes effect Jan. 17, 2026.
Eliminating the Federal Supply Schedule Exception
General Services Administration (GSA) Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) Multiple Award Schedule (MAS) Contracts
There has been a recognized exception to recertification requirements for set-aside orders or BPAs placed against an FSS contract, meaning that size status would be determined by the underlying FSS contract award date (or the date of its recertification for an option exercise). The Final Rule eliminates this exception and is not subject to the one-year delay. Therefore, as of Jan. 16, 2025, if a small business submits a disqualifying recertification, it will be ineligible for set-aside orders or BPAs under its GSA FSS MAS contract.
This aspect of the Final Rule takes effect Jan. 16, 2025.
Notable Exception: Transactions Between Two Small Businesses
The Final Rule carves out an exception for transactions involving two small businesses. In response to industry comment, the Final Rule amends which businesses will be ineligible for orders and options after a disqualifying certification due to merger, sale, or acquisition.
The Final Rule makes ineligible only those contract holders that have disqualifying recertifications involving a merger, sale, or acquisition with a large business. Where two small businesses individually qualify as small before a transaction, the Final Rule allows the contract holder to remain eligible for orders issued under an underlying set-aside MAC. As a result, small businesses will be poised to engage in transactions with other small businesses.
This aspect of the Final Rule takes effect Jan. 16, 2025.
Application to Outstanding Offers (the “180 Day Rule”)
The Final Rule also clarifies the effect of transactions that occur after a small business submits an offer for a set-aside opportunity and prior to award. Traditionally, if a merger, sale, or acquisition occurred after 180 days from the date in which a small business submitted an offer and the business could not recertify as small following the transaction, the government could still award to the business. This was generally true for single award and MAC set-asides.
Under the Final Rule, if the transaction occurs within 180 days of offer submission and the business submits a disqualifying recertification, the business will be ineligible for award.
But for transactions that occur after 180 days of offer submission, the Final Rule again draws a distinction between single award and MAC set-aside opportunities. If the merger, sale, or acquisition occurs after 180 days of offer submission and the business submits a disqualifying recertification, the business will still be eligible for single award set-asides. But if the transaction occurs after 180 days of offer submission and the business submits a disqualifying recertification, the business will be ineligible for a set-aside MAC or task order thereunder.
This aspect of the Final Rule takes effect Jan. 16, 2025.
Authorization to Protest a Size Recertification
Traditionally, there was no mechanism to allow a size protest or request for a formal size determination from another interested small business who believes that a size recertification is incorrect. For example, if a small business recertified as small following a merger, sale, or acquisition, another MAC contract holder could not challenge that recertification arguing the small business was not eligible for award.
The Final Rule authorizes MAC contract holders to request a formal size determination relating to size recertifications. Because the Final Rule will render a small business ineligible for orders set-aside under a MAC following a disqualifying recertification, the SBA believes that other contact holders should have the ability to question a size recertification.
This aspect of the Final Rule takes effect Jan. 16, 2025.
Conclusion
These changes will impact M&A activity, size protests, and related small business counseling and compliance. Small business regulations are consistently one of the most active areas of regulatory change. With a new administration and Congress, there is potential for further changes to these or other small business regulations.
FTC Secures $5.68M HSR Gun-Jumping Penalty From 2021 Deal
Go-To Guide
FTC announced a $5.68 million penalty against Verdun Oil Company II LLC, XCL Resources Holdings, LLC, and EP Energy LLC for premature control of EP Energy during their 2021 transaction.
FTC took issue with the exercise of certain consent rights and coordination of sales and strategic planning with EP Energy before the deal closed.
The settlement also requires that for the next decade, the companies appoint an antitrust compliance officer, conduct annual antitrust training, and use a “clean team” agreement in future transactions.
The case highlights that maintaining independent operations pre-close is critical, regardless of the merits review of a transaction by the antitrust authorities.
On Jan. 7, 2025, the Federal Trade Commission, in conjunction with the Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DOJ), settled allegations that sister companies Verdun Oil Company II LLC (Verdun) and XCL Resources Holdings, LLC (XCL) exercised unlawful, premature control of EP Energy LLC (EP) while acquiring EP in 2021. This alleged “gun-jumping” HSR Act violation involved Verdun and XCL exercising various consent rights under the merger agreement and coordinating sales and strategic planning with EP during the interim period before closing.
In settling, the parties agreed to pay a total civil penalty of $5.68 million, appoint or retain an antitrust compliance officer, provide annual antitrust trainings, use a “clean team” agreement in future transactions involving a competing product, and be subject to compliance reporting for a decade.
Background
Under the HSR Act,1 an acquiror cannot take beneficial ownership of a target prior to observing a waiting-period, which allows the DOJ and FTC to investigate the transaction’s potential impact on competition in advance of any integration. During the pre-close period, parties to a proposed transaction must remain separate, independent entities and act accordingly. Penalties for HSR Act violations are assessed daily, currently at a rate of $51,744 for each day a party is in violation (amount adjusted annually for inflation).
In July 2021, Verdun and XCL agreed to acquire EP’s oil production operations in Utah and Texas for $1.4 billion. The transaction was subject to the HSR Act’s notification and waiting-period requirements. The transaction closed in March 2022 after an FTC investigation, with a consent decree settlement that required divesting EP’s entire Utah operation (an area where XCL also operated as an oil producer).
The FTC’s current complaint asserts that immediately after signing, Verdun and XCL unlawfully began to assume operational control over significant aspects of EP’s day-to-day business during the HSR Act review period. The complaint alleged Verdun and XCL
required EP to delay certain production activities in return for an early deposit of a portion of the purchase price;
exercised consent rights to discontinue new wells EP was developing;
agreed to assume financial risk of production shortfalls arising from EP’s commitments to customers, and then began coordinating sales and production activity with EP, which included receiving detailed information on EP’s pricing, volume forecasts, and daily operational activity;
required changes to EP’s site design plans and vendor selection;
exercised consent rights for expenditures above $250,000, which the complaint alleged inhibited EP’s ability to conduct ordinary course activities, such as purchasing drilling supplies or extending contracts for drilling rigs; and
exercised consent rights for lower-level hiring decisions, such as for field-level employees and contractors for drilling and production operations.
The complaint also criticized EP for taking “no meaningful steps to resist” XCL and Verdun’s requests for competitively sensitive information and “making no effort” to limit XCL and Verdun employees’ access or use of information, including data room information.
The alleged gun-jumping conduct occurred for 94 days, from July to October 2021, when an amendment to the agreement allowed EP to resume independent operations.
Takeaways
Gun-Jumping Enforcement is a Bright-Line Issue. The FTC’s action against Verdun, XCL, and EP is consistent with the conduct and “bright-line” enforcement approach in past gun-jumping cases—meaning the agencies will bring an action regardless of the magnitude of the impact on commerce. For example, in 2024, the DOJ brought an action against a buyer involving pre-closing bid coordination;2 in 2015, the DOJ brought an action involving the closing of a target’s mill and transferring customers to the buyer pre-close;3 and in 2010, the DOJ brought an action involving the exercise of merger agreement consent rights with respect to three ordinary course input contracts, one of which represented less than 1% of capacity.4
Significant Penalties May Ensue Regardless of Closing. Even though the parties resolved substantive concerns about the merger with a divestiture, they will have to pay a significant penalty for the gun-jumping violation. Though parties settled for an estimated 40% discount off the statutory maximum penalty, the FTC assessed the penalty to both the buy-side and the sell-side, which, since the deal has closed, leaves the buyer with the full obligation. In the past, both sides have also been assessed in abandoned deals and the authorities also have sought disgorgement when there are financial gains because of the violation.5
Consider Covenants that Allow for Ordinary Course Activities. Sellers should ensure they retain the freedom to operate in the ordinary course of business in purchase agreement interim covenants, which in turn maintains the competitive status quo remains while the deal is pending. As illustrated by this case, parties should be concerned with both the conduct that is allowed—e.g., entering into ordinary contracts, maintaining relationships with customers, or making regular hiring or investment decisions—and the dollar thresholds for any consent rights (ensuring they are sufficiently high).
Clean Team Process Needed Pre- and Post-Signing with Overlap. The FTC criticized EP as the seller for failing to impose restraints on the information it provided for diligence and post-close integration planning. The consent decree settlement obligates the parties to use a “clean team” process for future transactions with product or service overlap that antitrust counsel supervises. It also specifies that information shared must be “necessary” for diligence or integration planning, and where competitively sensitive, not be accessible by those with “direct[] responsibil[ity] for the marketing, pricing, or sales” of the competitive product.
Consult Antitrust Counsel Before Exercising Consent Rights. Even where the parties have agreed to certain interim covenants to protect the acquired assets’ value, the facts and circumstances at the time of exercise should be carefully considered for their impact on the seller’s competitive activities. Accordingly, parties are best served to seek the advice of antitrust counsel prior to either seeking consent or responding to a request for consent. A proactive approach may help avoid delays to closing and penalties.
1 15 U.S.C. § 18a.
2 U.S. v. Legends Hospitality Parent Holdings, LLC.
3 U.S. v. Flakeboard America Limited, et al.
4 U.S. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc. and Premium Standard Farms, LLC.
5 See U.S. v. Flakeboard America Limited, et al.
GT Newsletter | Competition Currents | January 2025
United States
A. Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
1. Competitor collaboration guidelines withdrawal.
On Dec. 11, 2024, the FTC and DOJ Antitrust Division withdrew the Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors. The agencies determined the Collaboration Guidelines, issued in April 2000, no longer provide reliable guidance on how enforcers assess the legality of collaborations involving competitors due to the subsequent development of Sherman Act jurisprudence, rapid evolution of technologies and business combinations, and reliance on outdated policy statements and analytical methods. The FTC voted 3-2 to withdraw the guidelines. Commissioners Andrew Ferguson and Melissa Holyoak issued separate dissents highlighting the absence of replacement guidance.
2. Trump names Andrew Ferguson as next FTC chair.
President-elect Donald Trump has named FTC Commissioner Andrew Ferguson as the next FTC chair. Sworn in on April 2, 2024, Commissioner Ferguson was one of two Republican FTC Commissioners President Biden appointed. He previously served as Virginia solicitor general, chief counsel to U.S. Sen. Mitch McConnell, and U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee counsel. Ferguson earned undergraduate and law degrees from the University of Virginia before clerking for the D.C. Circuit and U.S. Supreme Courts. The president-elect also announced his intention to nominate Mark Meador, a partner at law firm Kressin Meador Powers and former antitrust counsel to U.S. Sen. Mike Lee, as an FTC Commissioner to fill current FTC Chair Lina Khan’s seat.
B. U.S. Litigation
1. Borozny v. RTX Corp., Case No. 3:21-CV-01657 (D. Conn.).
On Jan. 3, 2025, the Honorable Judge Sarala V. Nagala initially approved a $34 million settlement for a nationwide “no-poach” class action against several aerospace companies. The proposed $34 million settlement from the principal defendant, RTX, settles claims that RTX entered into agreements with several suppliers and competitors to not hire one another’s aerospace engineers—a highly skilled profession. This civil suit ran parallel to the DOJ’s criminal case, which was dismissed by another court. If approved, the $34 million settlement from RTX would augment the $26.5 million settlement previously negotiated with other alleged conspirators.
2. 2311 Racing LLC, et al. v. National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing, LLC, Case No. 3:24-CV-886 (W.D. N.C.).
On Dec. 20, 2024, defendant National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing, LLC (NASCAR) sought to stay a preliminary injunction that prevents NASCAR from barring various racing teams who initiated an antitrust lawsuit from competing in the 2025 season. Initiated by 2311 Racing, the lawsuit alleges that NASCAR exercises monopoly power over racetracks and requires all NASCAR teams not to participate in competing events. According to 2311, NASCAR then barred its participation in the upcoming 2025 season because, among other things, 2311 would not sign contracts that require the teams to relinquish all rights to bring antitrust claims. The Honorable Judge Kenneth D. Bell granted 2311’s preliminary injunction requiring NASCAR to allow the teams to compete, which NASCAR intends to appeal in the Fourth Circuit.
3. SmartSky Networks, LLC v. Gogo Inc., Case No. 3:24-CV-01087 (W.D. N.C.).
On Dec. 17, 2024, airplane technology company SmartSky Networks, LLC brought a $1 billion lawsuit against competitor Gogo, Inc. and Gogo Business Aviation, LLC (collectively, Gogo). SmartSky alleges Gogo unfairly blocked it from selling its in-flight Wi-Fi services to private aircraft customers. According to the lawsuit, Gogo engaged in a systematic campaign to create “fear, uncertainty and doubt” about SmartSky’s allegedly superior services while falsely promoting a future Gogo alternative that never launched. As a result of this campaign, SmartSky claims it failed after nearly 10 years of trying to enter the market.
Mexico
A. COFECE discovers possible collusion in radiological material sales to the government.
COFECE’s Investigating Authority has issued a Probable Liability Opinion against several companies and individuals accused of rigging public tenders for radiological material, an illegal act under the Federal Economic Competition Law.
In Mexico, public health institutions perform more than 20 million x-rays a year. The Mexican Social Security Institute conducts approximately 19 million of these studies annually, while the Institute of Security and Social Services for State Workers conducts an additional 1.6 million.
In its announcement, COFECE highlighted that when companies agree not to compete in tenders, they not only affect public finances, but also compromise Mexicans’ access to essential medical services. COFECE further emphasized that transparency, equity, and efficiency are fundamental principles that should govern government procurement, especially in the health sector. A trial will follow.
B. COFECE investigates lack of effective competition in live entertainment events.
COFECE’s Investigating Authority (AI) has initiated an investigation into live entertainment markets to determine if there are obstacles that limit competition in these markets, which could negatively impact the millions of live entertainment event consumers.
Between 2023 and 2024, half of adults in Mexico attended live entertainment events, such as concerts, live music or dance performances, plays, and art or history exhibitions. In 2023 alone, Mexicans spent more than MEX 7 billion on online tickets for music events. This positions Mexico as the largest Latin American market for the sale of tickets to musical events and the 16th largest market worldwide.
Through its investigation, the AI seeks to identify and eliminate the barriers that prevent competition in these markets. If the AI identifies barriers to competition or essential inputs, the COFECE Plenary may order eliminating those barriers, issue recommendations and guidelines for their regulation, and/or order divestment to improve efficiency.
The Netherlands
Dutch ACM Statement
Further investigation into KPN joint venture’s acquisition of DELTA needed.
The Dutch Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) has decided that further investigation is required for Glaspoort’s (a joint venture of KPN and APG) acquisition of a portion of Delta Fiber Nederland’s fiber optic network. KPN is the incumbent telecommunications operator in the Netherlands, while Delta is currently KPN’s largest competitor in the fiber optic market.
According to the ACM, the acquisition may significantly reduce competition in the areas where KPN and Delta operate, potentially leading to higher prices for consumers. The ACM also points out that KPN already has a substantial market position, and the acquisition could further strengthen this position, putting smaller providers at a disadvantage. Finally, while each individual small acquisition may have a limited impact, the cumulative effect of KPN’s multiple, small acquisitions could significantly undermine competition in the long term, which may weaken smaller providers’ negotiating positions.
Before the acquisition can be finalized, Glaspoort and Delta must apply for an acquisition license – the equivalent of a Phase II or in-depth investigation in other jurisdictions – after which the ACM will continue its investigation.
Poland
A. The UOKiK President questions consortium agreements and other competitor practices accompanying tenders.
The Polish Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK) has fined 11 geodesy and cartography companies PLN 1.8 million (approximately EUR 422,000 / USD 436,000) for bid-rigging in cartographic services contracts with the Geodesy and Cartography Agency.
The investigation found that these companies engaged in anticompetitive practices through several coordinated actions. The companies formed unnecessarily large consortia, submitted coordinated bids, and divided awarded contracts among themselves. Some participating companies performed no actual work, serving only as nominal consortium members. UOKiK determined that smaller consortia could have completed the projects independently, indicating the larger groups were formed solely to eliminate competition.
In a separate case, UOKiK has initiated antitrust proceedings against seven laundry service providers suspected of bid-rigging in hospital service contracts. The investigation uncovered evidence of potential price-fixing across multiple provinces and coordinated withdrawal of bids. During court-approved searches conducted with police assistance, investigators discovered mobile app communications showing companies exchanging specific price information to influence tender outcomes. The investigation revealed that participants strategically withdrew lower bids to ensure higher-priced bids would win, likely resulting in increased costs for hospitals and patients. This investigation remains ongoing.
Companies found engaging in bid-rigging face severe penalties under Polish law. Organizations can be fined up to 10% of their annual turnover, while individual managers may face personal fines up to PLN 2 million. These regulations apply regardless of company size, as there are no exemptions for companies with small market share. Any anti-competitive provisions in contracts are automatically void under law. Furthermore, affected parties retain the right to seek damages through private antitrust litigation. Notably, bid-rigging stands as the only form of competition-restricting agreement that may result in criminal penalties, including imprisonment.
B. The UOKiK President investigates ENEA Group’s potential abuse of dominant position in renewable energy market.
The Polish Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK) has launched an explanatory investigation into the ENEA Group, a major Polish energy conglomerate responsible for electricity generation, distribution, and trading. The investigation focuses on ENEA Operator, the group’s distribution arm, which holds a natural monopoly in its regional distribution network.
The investigation stems from allegations that ENEA Operator may have provided unfair advantages to renewable energy installation (OZE) applications from its own group companies and select third-party businesses. Following these concerns, UOKiK conducted searches at three ENEA Group facilities. Complaints UOKiK received indicate that ENEA Operator may have shown preferential treatment by issuing connection approvals to certain entities that failed to meet formal requirements or by disregarding the chronological order of application submissions. These practices allegedly resulted in other entities being unfairly denied network connections for their renewable energy installations.
UOKiK suspects that this preferential allocation of connection capacity may have depleted available capacity at crucial balancing nodes, leading to the rejection of other companies’ connection requests due to claimed technical limitations. This issue is particularly significant because network access is fundamental for participation in the electricity trading market.
The investigation is examining whether these actions constitute an abuse of dominant market position, particularly regarding the selective restriction of access to essential infrastructure, discriminatory access conditions, or intentional delays in providing access. Additionally, UOKiK is investigating potential illegal agreements between ENEA Operator and the entities receiving preferential treatment for renewable energy installations.
Should the investigation yield sufficient evidence, UOKiK may initiate formal antitrust proceedings against the involved parties. Under Polish law, companies found to have abused their dominant position face fines of up to 10% of their previous year’s turnover. This penalty may extend to entities exercising decisive influence over the company engaged in such practices. Furthermore, any anti-competitive contractual provisions are automatically void, and affected parties maintain the right to pursue damages through court proceedings.
Italy
Italian Competition Authority (ICA)
1. ICA launches investigation into alleged cartel in copper cable manufacturing industry.
On Dec. 3, 2024, ICA opened an investigation against the Italian main copper cable producers for an alleged restrictive competition agreement aimed at coordinating prices and commercial conditions for producing and selling low-voltage copper cables in violation of Article 101 TFEU.
The proceeding started after a company submitted an application for leniency that disclosed the cartel to benefit from a reduced penalty.
The leniency applicant provided evidence to ICA about price coordination between the different parties. According to the applicant, this coordination started in 2005 when the parties aligned their list prices and initial discounts. Later, in 2008, they created a shared system within their association to adjust prices when copper costs changed. The system included a common way to calculate copper prices. This made the copper component a fixed price that was the same for all producers in the association.
2. Investigation against Booking.com (Italy) closed for allegedly abusing dominant position.
On Dec. 17, 2024, ICA closed its investigation against Booking.com S.r.l. (Italy), Booking.com B.V., and Booking.com International B.V. (Booking) for alleged abuse of dominant position after it accepted Booking’s proposed commitments.
ICA had initiated the proceedings because of Booking’s potentially abusive conduct that allegedly limited Italian hotel facilities’ autonomy to differentiate their rates between Booking.com and other online sales channels by adhering to certain programs Booking promoted, such as the Partner Preferiti and Preferiti Plus programs, which give search result visibility advantages in exchange for higher commissions, and the so-called Booking Sponsored Benefit, which allows Booking to apply – without the hotels’ consent – a discount to align the offer on its platform with the best among those available online.
The group submitted a commitment package that would seek to ensure that prices facilities charge on online sales channels, other than booking.com, would not be taken into account at any stage of its operation and program promotions. In addition, greater transparency around the Preferred Partner, Preferred Plus, and Booking Sponsored Benefit program operations allows facilities to make informed decisions regarding the costs and benefits of participating in them. According to ICA, Booking’s commitments are suitable both for removing competitive concerns and for ensuring the commercial autonomy of Italian hotel facilities.
3. ICA imposed penalties exceeding EUR 2 million on Hera S.p.A. and ComoCalor S.p.A. for excessive and unjustified district heating prices.
Between May and June 2023, ICA initiated three proceedings into the networks of Ferrara (operated by Hera S.p.A.), Como (operated by ComoCalor S.p.A.), and Parma and Piacenza (operated by Iren Energia S.p.A.) to investigate whether and to what extent the three companies had passed on an excessive and unjustified burden to the users of district heating networks between 2021 and 2022, when there had been natural gas price increases.
On Nov. 26, 2024, ICA stated that the conduct that Hera S.p.A. and ComoCalor S.p.A. engaged in from Jan. 1-Dec. 31, 2022, consisting of applying unjustifiably burdensome prices to district heating users, constitutes abusive conduct of their dominant position.
ICA imposed a penalty of EUR 1,984,736 on Hera S.p.A. and EUR 286,600 on ComoCalor S.p.A., arguing that the companies prevented consumers from benefiting from available and affordable renewable sources to produce an essential good (heat), and imposed prices that were unfair in relation to costs (including a fair return on investment).
ICA found no violations related to the Parma and Piacenza networks that Iren Energia S.p.A. operates.
European Union
A. European Commission
1. European Commission fined Pierre Cardin and Ahlers EUR 5.7 million for limiting cross-border clothing sales.
The European Commission fined Pierre Cardin and its licensee Ahlers EUR 5.7 million for violating EU antitrust rules. Pierre Cardin, a French fashion house, licenses its trademark to third parties for producing and distributing clothing branded with its name. Ahlers was Pierre Cardin’s largest licensee of clothing in the EEA during the relevant period. Between 2008 and 2021, both companies participated in anti-competitive agreements and coordinated practices that safeguarded Ahlers from competition within its licensed EEA area. This included preventing other licensees from selling Pierre Cardin clothing outside their territories or to low-price retailers. The Commission calculated the fines based on the severity, geographic scope, and duration of the infringement, with Pierre Cardin receiving a EUR 2,237,000 fine and Ahlers being fined EUR 3,500,000.
2. European Commission approves Nvidia’s acquisition of Run:ai.
The European Commission has unconditionally approved Nvidia’s below-threshold acquisition of Run:ai, concluding that it raises no competition concerns. This decision follows a referral by the Italian Competition Authority under Article 22 of the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR), which allows member states to request deal reviews that fall below national turnover thresholds, following concerns about Nvidia’s potential “super-dominance” in the advanced GPU market.
A recent ruling from the European Court of Justice influenced the European Commission’s review; the case invalidated its previous approach to Article 22 EUMR. In its recent assessment, the European Commission determined that the acquisition would not impair competition, as Nvidia would not have the incentive to make its GPUs less compatible with competitors’ software. The European Commission also found Run:ai’s position in the software market for GPU orchestration to be not significant, with sufficient alternative providers available.
B. ECJ Decision
Preliminary CJEU ruling in ongoing proceedings between Tallinna and KIA Auto.
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) provided a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of Article 101(1) TFEU (the EU’s cartel prohibition provision), following questions from the Administrative Regional Court of the Republic of Latvia. The case involved Tallinna Kaubamaja Grupp AS and KIA Auto AS, which were fined for a vertical agreement that imposed restrictions on car warranties. The national competition authority determined that this agreement hindered access to the Latvian market for independent repairers and restricted independent spare parts manufacturers. The CJEU stated that Article 101(1) TFEU should be interpreted to mean that a national competition authority does not need to demonstrate the existence of concrete and actual competition-restricting effects when investigating an agreement that imposes restrictions on car warranties. It is sufficient to establish the existence of potential competition-restricting effects, provided they are sufficiently appreciable. Now the proceedings shall resume, and the national court will have to evaluate if the Latvian competition authority’s decision demonstrated sufficiently appreciable effects on competition.
Alan W. Hersh, Rebecca Tracy Rotem, Sarah-Michelle Stearns, Miguel Flores Bernés, Hans Urlus, Robert Hardy, Chazz Sutherland, Gillian Sproul, Manish Das, Robert Gago, Filip Drgas, Anna Celejewska-Rajchert, and Ewa Głowacka also contributed to this article.
Bank M&A Outlook for 2025
Overall M&A activity in 2024 continued to be subdued; however, the fourth quarter, especially after the Trump bump, showed signs of a significant pick up. Our M&A outlook for 2025 suggests the potential for a banner year. Numerous variables could hinder deal activity, but improving economic conditions coupled with enhanced net interest margins (NIMs) from lower short term interest rates and possible tax cuts should improve fundamentals. Moreover, a less hostile regulatory regime should eliminate a risk overhang to earnings.[1] The prospect for a more relaxed antitrust enforcement regime or at least less distrust of business combinations could create significant opportunities for strategic growth and investment.
Positive Factors for Dealmaking in 2025
CEO Confidence and Stock Market Performance. CEO confidence continues to go up, which can give C-suites and boards the necessary conviction to pursue M&A. If economic conditions improve, then capital markets should also strengthen. M&A volume frequently tracks stock market performance. In addition, improved economic conditions and higher trading price multiples could narrow valuation gaps between buyers and sellers that were obstacles to some transactions last year.
Antitrust. Not since Grover Cleveland has a President lost a bid for reelection and then ran again successfully. Thus, while a change in Presidential administration and political party leadership ordinarily brings policy uncertainty, we can look to President Trump’s first term for some guidance – but no guarantees – as to how his administration may govern this time around. This is particularly the case with the current regulatory skepticism, if not hostility, toward M&A. In 2023, President Biden adopted an Executive Order ostensibly designed to promote competition. The effect of that admonition was that regulators touching M&A across his administration, whether as part of an independent agency or otherwise, added criteria for M&A while also slowing the pace of review to allow for greater scrutiny. Bank regulators leaned into this Executive Order. Over the next four years, we generally expect regulators to be more open to structural remedies and less likely to block mergers outright. But caution is warranted. We may see bipartisan scrutiny of certain aspects of banking such as Fintech in light of lingering Synapse concerns. There are also populist views in the Trump administration and Congress that may scrutinize major consolidations or mergers, particularly if they will impact US jobs. The current expectation is also that the recently adopted HSR filing requirements for nonbank acquisitions will remain in effect.
Lower Interest Rates. Acquisition financing should become more attractive if the Federal Reserve moderates its rate cutting, so that long-term rates might stabilize. Because acquisition financing tends to be longer term in duration, long term rates are much more important. If Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) is truly effective in cutting spending or at least the pace of increased spending, then long-term rates might actually come down. Private equity financing of corporate debt has taken bank market share. This competition has lead to greater availability of deal funding. An open issue is whether private credit will continue to play as large a role in corporate financing if the cost of traditional bank debt goes down.
For bank buyers, the Federal Reserve may maintain the current Fed Funds rate. As a result, NIMs may continue to widen as the yield curve steepens. Short term deposit rates have declined while the bond market expects long term rates to increase from inflationary tariffs, government spending and tax policy. Wider NIMs lead to higher bank valuations.
Tax Policy. If Congress pursues tax cuts, the resulting savings could generate more cash flow to pursue acquisitions and make exit transactions even more attractive to selling shareholders. Another issue to watch is whether the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), which expires at the end of 2025, is extended and/or modified.
Deregulation. Dealmaking could be impacted if the new administration carries out its goal of deregulation, although it is not clear how quickly that impact might be felt. Deregulation is most likely to open M&A doors not just in banking but for fintech, crypto, and financial services generally. The nominations of Scott Bessent for Treasury, Kevin Hassett for the National Economic Council, and Paul Atkins for the Securities and Exchange Commission all indicate a more hospitable banking environment.
While we expect a significant uptick in M&A activity, we may see particular volume from the following:
Private Equity Exits. It has been widely reported that many private equity funds need to sell their interests in portfolio companies in order to wind-up and return profits to their investors. Exit transactions have been delayed for a variety of reasons, including valuation gaps and a lack of sponsor-to-sponsor M&A activity (largely due to the increased cost of capital associated with leveraged acquisitions caused by higher interest rates).
Strategic Divestments. Banks will continue to explore divesting branches, non-core assets and business lines, especially insurance, to simplify their organizations and footprints and possibly to ward off threats from activist shareholders.
Credit Unions. While we have started to see pushback on credit union and bank tie ups from state regulators, it is likely that the NCUA will continue to permit such combinations. The rise in bank stock valuations may add competition in 2025 that was not available for many deals in 2024. Nonetheless, the lack of credit union taxation or comparable tangible equity requirement and risk-based capital rules should enable credit unions to continue to compete effectively for deals.
Higher Long-term Rates. Certain banks continue to suffer AOCI pressure from the run-up in long-term rates that accompanied recent Federal Reserve rate cuts. Increasingly, national banks with less than 2% tangible capital and all banks with poor NIMs may be pushed by their regulators to sell or at least engage in a dilutive capital raise.
Purchase Accounting/Stock Valuations. For over 40 years, economies of scale have led to vibrant annual results for bank M&A transactions. The punishing accounting marks (AOCI, loan mark-to-market and core deposit intangibles) from M&A have held back such pent up need for growth. Buyers need to use stock consideration to replace the capital from purchase accounting. Higher stock prices are allowing more buyers to do so with less dilution to their shareholders.
Countervailing Factors and Uncertainties
Of course, M&A activity in 2025 may fall short of expectations, particularly if economic conditions deteriorate. Various factors that could adversely impact M&A in 2025 include:
Trade Wars / Tariffs. President Trump has made clear his goal to negotiate trade agreements and expressed his willingness to impose tariffs, which would necessarily impact borrowers in affected industries as well as inbound/outbound investment involving certain countries. As with most government policies, tariffs invariably have winners and losers. To the extent tariffs allow businesses to raise prices, the higher returns could impact creditworthiness, while other businesses will suffer if their supply chain falls apart or they are unable to pass along higher costs to consumers. There may also be bipartisan support for some tariffs, particularly on China.
Politics. Uncertainty over important government policies could hold M&A back. There is the constant specter of disfunction in Washington, D.C., and a thin Republican majority. In addition, proposed cuts in government spending—perhaps led by DOGE—could impact the economy. Staffing or other budget cuts at key governmental agencies (e.g., banking regulators) could also delay the ability to consummate M&A transactions.
Near-Term Transition Issues. Compared to his first term, President Trump is acting more quickly in naming key appointees. Nonetheless, the people who need to run the various important government agencies must obtain Senate approval, where a successful confirmation is not guaranteed and there is a backlogged Senate calendar. Delayed appointments may also stall President Trump’s high-priority items such as border security and tax policy.
Inflationary Pressures. Ongoing inflation will impact markets and economic conditions generally. There are also particular government policies under discussion (e.g., immigration) that could contribute to inflationary pressures. If the Federal Reserve reverses recent accommodation, banks may again suffer shrinking NIMs. This would revive the negative spiral of reduced valuations and impact whether there can be a meeting of the minds on price.
State Attorneys General/State Bank Regulators. A more business-friendly antitrust posture from the federal government could be offset by state attorneys general or state level bank regulators. This could be led by more localized concerns about competition or by state officials who see political upside in challenging transactions.
Geopolitical Risks. Numerous geopolitical risks could escalate in 2025, including the spread of war in the Middle East, Europe or elsewhere, acts of terrorism, sanctions, and the worsening of diplomatic and economic relations with certain countries, any of which could adversely affect markets.
[1] Bank Director survey indicated that almost 75% of bankers viewed regulatory risk as one of the top three risk areas.
Carleton Goss, Michael R. Horne, Lucia Jacangelo, Nathaniel “Nate” Jones, Jay Kestenbaum, Marysia Laskowski, Abigail M. Lyle, Brian R. Marek, Joshua McNulty, Betsy Lee Montague, Alexandra Noetzel, Sumaira Shaikh, Jake Stribling, and Taylor Williams also contributed to this article.
Revitalizing Retail: What Saks Global Means for the Luxury Market and the Future of Department Stores
On December 23, 2024, Hudson’s Bay Company, the parent company of Saks Fifth Avenue, completed its acquisition of Neiman Marcus Group, the parent company of Neiman Marcus and Bergdorf Goodman, for $2.7 billion following years of on-and-off negotiations.
The acquisition combines the luxury retail brands under the newly formed Saks Global, with the goals of creating a US-luxury retail empire and reviving the department store model. Each retailer will continue to serve customers under their individual brands, with consolidation taking place at the executive level under a structure unlike anything else in the industry. The acquisition will impact both customers and vendors of each of the brands, improving the shopping experience and providing a much-needed cash infusion into the Saks brand.
Finally Making Good?
It’s no industry secret that Saks had mounting tensions with its vendors as a result of long delays in making payment and in some cases, no payment at all, to its vendors. Saks Global executives used the announcement of the merger to provide assurances that these vendors will finally be paid. The intent (and hope) is that the financial boost resulting from the merger will stabilize Saks’ cash flow and allow for timely payments to its vendors moving forward. In fact, Saks Global CEO Marc Metrick stated in an interview that the process of working through delayed payments will “begin the first week of January [2025].”
Location, Location, Location?
Under the terms of the merger, Saks Global will operate 38 Saks Fifth Avenue stores, 95 Saks OFF 5TH outlets, 36 Neiman Marcus stores, five Neiman Marcus Last Call stores, and two Bergdorf stores. Although plans for store closures have not been announced, a consolidation of retail space in markets where each brand operated individually pre-merger would not be surprising, as there will be opportunities to optimize store locations and reduce redundancies. As a whole, the fashion industry has witnessed the closure of many brick and mortar retail locations as the department store model has suffered due to high inflation and a shift in consumer shopping habits. Recently in 2023, Saks itself took advantage of certain real estate transactions to better its cash flow and pay back some of its vendors, so it is not out of the question that Saks Global may utilize similar strategies again.
One in the Same?
Industry experts are predicting that, as a result of the merger, Saks Fifth Avenue and Neiman Marcus will restructure their market visibility, relative to one another. With both brands sharing many of the same customers, as well as the same inventory of brands and goods, and with many of their current brick-and-mortar locations being walking distance from each other, there is an expectation that these two primary brands will eventually have to differentiate their positions in the luxury market.
The prediction is that Neiman Marcus will maintain its role as a top tier luxury destination, while Saks will evolve towards a more accessible luxury destination aimed at a younger demographic, which would give Saks Global substantial influence over luxury consumers’ tastes, options, and brand acceptance at various levels of the luxury market, which may lead to a better overall shopping experience for the luxury consumer. But, while consumers may be for the better, the same may not be said for brands that sell to Saks Fifth Avenue, Neiman Marcus, and Bergdorf Goodman, as they may see pressure to reduce their prices on products sold to the now combined brand and provide longer credit terms. As a combined entity, Saks Global’s greater negotiating power could lead to pressure on vendors to meet its supply and demand requirements, especially smaller vendors that rely on wholesaling to Saks and Neiman Marcus. Brands will also now have fewer buyers, as those who formally sold to both Saks and Neiman Marcus individually will now sell to Saks Global.
Conclusion
Now that the merger is complete and Saks Global has been formed, brands that sell to Saks Fifth Avenue and Neiman Marcus may be impacted in several ways depending on the size of the brand and whether it previously sold to both Saks and Neiman Marcus pre-merger. And with Saks Global’s greater negotiating power, brands will need to look at other avenues to protect their interests and bottom lines, such as shop-in-shops, exclusive collaborations, and other strategies to even the playing field. One expected benefit of the merger is that Saks’ vendors can finally expect to be paid, and if what Saks Global executives say comes to fruition, the department store model could be revitalized.
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Significant Increases to 2025 HSR Act Merger Thresholds and Filings Fees
Go-To Guide:
FTC raises merger notification thresholds, with initial reporting starting at $126.4 million, up from $119.5 million.
The updates also adjust the six-tier filing fee system, with fees ranging from $30,000-$2,390,000 based on deal size.
FTC also updates limits on interlocking directorates.
On Jan. 10, 2025, The Federal Trade Commission announced that it will publish revised thresholds and fees for premerger notifications under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (HSR Act). These changes include updated size-of-transaction thresholds for mergers and acquisitions, as well as increased filing fee tiers and fees for larger transactions, as required by the Merger Filing Fee Modernization Act of 2022 (Fee Modernization Act).
Congress first amended the HSR Act in 2000 to require annual adjustments of notification thresholds based on the change in gross national product (GNP). The Fee Modernization Act replaced the prior three-tier filing fee system with corresponding transaction size thresholds with a six-tier filing fee system based on transaction value. The tiers set forth below are also adjusted annually based on GNP change. The fees within each tier increase annually based on the percentage change in the consumer price index, comparing the most recent fiscal year ending in September to the previous fiscal year.
The FTC also published revisions to the thresholds that trigger, under Section 8 of the Clayton Act, a prohibition preventing companies from having interlocking memberships on their corporate boards of directors. These revisions represent the annual adjustment of thresholds based on GNP changes.
Revised HSR Act Thresholds
The initial threshold for a HSR Act notification increases from $119.5 million to $126.4 million. For transactions valued between $126.4 million and $505.8 million (increased from $478 million), the size of the person test continues to apply. That test makes the transaction reportable only where one party has sales or assets of at least $252.9 million (increased from $239 million), and the other party has sales or assets of at least $25.3 million (increased from $23.9 million). All transactions valued more than $505.8 million are reportable without regard to party size.
The new thresholds apply to transactions closing 30 days or more after the official Federal Register publication date. Official publication is expected in the next few business days.
The following is a summary chart of the threshold adjustments:
PRIOR THRESHOLD
REVISED THRESHOLD
Size of the transaction test
more than $119.5 million
more than $126.4 million
Size of the person test
$23.9 million/$239 million
$25.3 million/$252.9 million
Transaction value above which size of the person test is inapplicable
$478 million
$505.8 million
The amendments will adjust all notification thresholds as follows:
NOTIFICATION LEVELS
more than $50 million
more than $126.4 million
$100 million
$252.9 million
$500 million
$1,264 million
25% of total outstanding shares worth
more than $1 billion
25% of total outstanding shares worth
more than $2,529 million
50% of total outstanding shares worth
more than $50 million
50% of total outstanding shares worth
more than $126.4 million
These notification threshold adjustments also adjust upward thresholds applicable to certain exemptions, such as those involving the acquisition of foreign assets or voting securities of foreign issuers.
Revised HSR Filing Fee Thresholds
Below is the new filing fee schedule, which applies to transactions closing 30 days or more after Federal Register publication. Official publication is expected in the next few business days.
NEW FILING FEE LEVELS
Size-of-Transaction*
Fee**
more than $126.4 but less than $179.4 million
$30,000
$179.4 million or greater, but less than $555.5 million
$105,000
$555.5 million or greater, but less than $1.111 billion
$265,000
$1.111 billion or greater, but less than $2.222 billion
$425,000
$2.222 billion or greater, but less than $5.555 billion
$850,000
$5.555 billion or greater
$2,390,000
* Adjusted annually based on GNP.
** Adjusted annually when the CPI increases by more than 1% compared to the baseline CPI from Sept. 30, 2023.
Revised Section 8 Thresholds
The FTC also published revisions to the thresholds that trigger a prohibition preventing companies from having interlocking memberships on their corporate boards of directors under Section 8 of the Clayton Act. These revised thresholds are effective 30 days after official publication in the Federal Register. Official publication is expected in the next few business days.
Section 8 prohibits a “person,” which can include a corporation and its representatives, from serving as a director or officer of two “competing” corporations, unless one of the following exemptions applies:
either corporation has capital, surplus, and undivided profits of less than $51,380,000 (increased from $48,559,000);
the competitive sales of either corporation are less than $5,138,000 (increased from $4,855,900);
the competitive sales of either corporation amount to less than 2% of that corporation’s total sales; or
the competitive sales of each corporation amount to less than 4% of each corporation’s total sales.
“Competitive sales” means “the gross revenues for all products and services sold by one corporation in competition with the other, determined on the basis of annual gross revenues for such products and services in that corporation’s last completed fiscal year.” “Total sales” means “the gross revenues for all products and services sold by one corporation over that corporation’s last completed fiscal year.”
Thresholds for HSR Act Premerger Notifications and Interlocking Directorates Announced
1. Higher Jurisdictional Thresholds For HSR Filings
On January 10, 2025, the Federal Trade Commission announced[1] revised, higher thresholds for premerger filings under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (HSR Act). The jurisdictional thresholds are revised annually, based on the change in Gross National Product (GNP).
The new thresholds will become effective 30 days after publication in the Federal Register. Acquisitions that close on or after the effective date will be subject to the new thresholds. In addition, the new HSR rules are scheduled to become effective on February 10, 2025.[2]
The HSR Act notification requirements apply to transactions that satisfy the specified “size of transaction” and “size of person” thresholds. The key adjusted thresholds are summarized in the following chart:
Size of Transaction Test
Notification is required if– the acquiring person will hold certain assets, voting securities, and/or interests in non-corporate entities valued at more than $126.4 million AND the parties meet the Size of Person test; OR– the acquiring person will hold certain assets, voting securities, and/or interests in non-corporate entities valued at more than $505.8 million – such transactions are not subject to the Size of Person test.
Size of Person Test
Generally, one “person” to the transaction must have at least $252.9 million in total assets or annual net sales, and the other must have at least $25.3 million in total assets or annual net sales.
The above descriptions are general guidelines only. Determining if a transaction meets the thresholds can be complex and applying the thresholds may vary depending on the particular transaction. Parties engaging in transactions that may meet the thresholds or in series of transactions should consult counsel.
The adjusted filing fees will be based on the new thresholds as follows:
Filing fee
Size of Transaction
$30,000
Greater than $126.4M to less than $179.4M
$105,000
$179.4M to less than 555.5M
$265,000
$555.5M to less than $1.111B
$425,000
$1.111B to less than $2.222B
$850,000
$2.222B to less than $5.555B
$2,390,000
Deals valued at $5.555B or more
2. Higher Thresholds For the Prohibition Against Interlocking Directorates
New higher thresholds applicable to the prohibition in Section 8 of the Clayton Act against interlocking directorates will become effective upon publication in the Federal Register. Section 8 prohibits, with certain exceptions, one person from serving as a director or officer of two competing corporations if two thresholds are met. Applying the new thresholds, competitor corporations are covered by Section 8 if each one has capital, surplus and undivided profits aggregating to more than $51,380,000 with the exception that the interlock is not prohibited if the competitive sales of either corporation are less than $5,138,000.
FOOTNOTES
[1] FTC Announces 2025 Jurisdictional Threshold Updates for Interlocking Directorates | Federal Trade Commission
[2] The FTC Adopts New Premerger Notification Rules Implementing the Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) Act | Antitrust Law Blog
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FTC Publishes Annual Merger Notification Jurisdictional Threshold and Filing Fee Adjustments
On January 10, 2025, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) released increased jurisdictional thresholds, filing fee thresholds, and filing fee amounts for merger notifications made pursuant to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (HSR Act).
Merger Notification Threshold Changes
The HSR premerger notification regime requires transacting parties to notify the FTC and US Department of Justice (DOJ) of their intent to consummate a transaction that meets or exceeds certain jurisdictional thresholds, unless an exemption applies. The adjusted thresholds apply to all transactions that close on or after the effective date, which will be 30 days after the notice is published in the Federal Register.
The HSR thresholds are adjusted annually based on gross national product (GNP). The threshold changes are as follows:
The base statutory size-of-transaction threshold, the lowest threshold requiring notification, will increase to $126.4 million.
The upper statutory size-of-transaction test, requiring notification for all transactions that exceed the threshold (regardless of the size-of-person test being satisfied), will increase to $505.8 million.
The statutory size-of-person lower and upper thresholds (which will apply to deals valued above $126.4 million but not above $505.8 million) will increase to $25.3 million and $252.9 million, respectively.
HSR Filing Fee Changes
The FTC is also required to update filing fee thresholds and amounts on an annual basis. Filing fee thresholds are adjusted based on the percentage change in GNP and filing fee amounts are adjusted based on the percentage change in the Consumer Price Index. These changes will also take effect 30 days after publication of the notice in the Federal Register.
The adjusted filing fee thresholds and fee amounts are provided in the table below.
Beating Bump-Up Exclusions: Policyholder Prevails In Coverage for Settlement of M&A Shareholder Lawsuit
A Delaware court recently refused to enforce a directors and officers liability policy’s “bump-up” exclusion to a $28 million class action settlement, finding that the company’s insurers unjustifiably denied coverage. The decision, which is one of several recent bump-up D&O coverage disputes, provides valuable insights for corporate policyholders seeking coverage for M&A-related claims and settlements with shareholders.
Background
In connection with the sale of Harman International in 2017, a class of Harman stockholders filed a securities class action lawsuit alleging that disclosures made in connection with the sale were misleading and violated Section 14(a) and Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Baum action”). The Baum action was settled for $28 million. When Harman’s D&O liability insurers denied coverage under the policies’ so-called “bump-up” exclusion, the company sued for breach of contract and sought a declaratory judgment that the settlement was covered in full by the policies.
Bump-up exclusions are frequently found in D&O insurance policies. While the wording varies among policies, bump-up provisions bar coverage for settlements or judgments in deal-related litigation where the “loss” constitutes an increase (i.e., a bump-up) in the purchase price of the company. While insurers may agree to defend insureds against alleged wrongful acts in negotiating or approving the deal, they will not effectively fund the purchase price of the acquired company.
In the Harman transaction, the insurers rejected the claim by invoking the bump-up exclusion, which barred coverage for all claims alleging that the price “paid for the acquisition . . . of all or substantially all of the ownership interest in or assets of an entity is inadequate” and where the loss “represent[s] the amount by which such price or consideration is effectively increased.” Because the Baum action demanded the difference in price the shareholders received and the true value at the time of the acquisition, the insurers argued the settlement was excluded from coverage.
The Court’s Analysis
In a January 3 opinion, the Delaware Superior Court agreed with Harman and held that the insurers had wrongfully denied coverage for the settlement. In deciding that the bump-up exclusion did not apply, the court focused on three elements of the exclusion: (1) whether the settlement related to an underlying “acquisition”; (2) whether “inadequate deal price” was a viable remedy sought in the underlying litigation; and (3) whether the settlement represented an effective increase in transaction consideration. The insurers carried the burden to show that all elements were satisfied.
The Nature of the Transaction. The parties disagreed on whether the transaction, which was structured as a reverse triangle merger, was an “acquisition” potentially within the bump-up provision.
The court determined that the Harman transaction was an “acquisition” because, among other reasons, the transaction resulted in the buyer owning 100% of Harman, which was in effect an acquisition. Other factors, like Harman’s post-transaction legal status and cancellation of Harman’s shares, also supported Harmon being acquired. Finally, the court pointed to Harman’s own Form 8-K filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, which described the transaction as an “acquisition.” The court found that these factors, taken together, made the transaction an “acquisition” as such term was used in the bump-up exclusion.
The Viability of Alleged Damages. Harman contended that the settlement could not constitute an increase in inadequate deal consideration because a Section 14(a) claim can’t be used to obtain damages for inadequate consideration. The insurers disagreed, contending that the settlement had to represent an increase in deal price because the Baum complaint expressly sought damages equal to the difference between Harman’s true value and the price paid to the shareholders when the transaction closed.
The court acknowledged that the Baum action alleged inadequate consideration, but the court emphasized that damages for an undervalued deal were not a viable remedy under Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Rather, the court said those claims focus on the accuracy of the proxy statement’s disclosures and did not raise any claims authorizing the court to remedy an inadequate deal price.
The Purpose of the Settlement. Lastly, the court examined the settlement and concluded it did not represent an increase in the deal price. The insurers contended that the settlement resulted in an increase in consideration because the settlement amount was based in part on the alleged fair value of Harman stock compared to what Harman shareholders actually received.
Harman argued that the settlement represented only the value of legal expenses that it avoided by not litigating. The court looked no further than the agreement itself, which denied liability and stated the sole purpose of the settlement was to avoid litigation. The $28 million settlement price closely resembled the estimated legal fees and was not in line with the potential increased deal consideration, which the court estimated would be over $279 million. Therefore, the court concluded that the Baum settlement did not constitute an adjustment of the consideration offered to Harman’s stockholders to complete the acquisition.
Discussion
The Harman decision has several takeaways for policyholders.
Deals Driving D&O Disputes. As insurers continue to test the limits of these exclusions, bump-up disputes continue to make headlines and drive high-value, contentious coverage litigation for deal-related D&O claims. The Harman decision is the latest example of judges grappling with enforcement of bump-up language in different scenarios, including other cases in Delaware, which have had varying outcomes for policyholders.
The recent win is significant, especially for policyholders incorporated in Delaware that may be more inclined to pursue coverage litigation in the First State where the Delaware Supreme Court has stated that Delaware law should apply to disputes over D&O policies sold to Delaware companies.
Insurers Have High Burdens. The decision reinforces the difficult burden that insurers should face in proving that a loss fits within a bump-up exclusion, especially in the context of a settlement rather than judicial decision on the merits. The court resolved the dispute through the “norm” that a bump-up exclusion is “construed narrowly” and that any ambiguity must be interpreted in favor of coverage. And a bump-up provision should apply only “if the settlement clearly declares that its purpose is to remedy inadequate consideration given in an acquisition.” While the Harman court felt that this standard was “beyond debate,” not all courts interpreting similar exclusionary provisions have been so clear in holding insurers to this burden, so it will surely be a welcome reminder for policyholders assessing deal-related D&O claims.
Allegations, Even of Inadequate Consideration, Are Not Dispositive. The insurers cited allegations of an “undervalued” acquisition resulting in damages calculated as “the difference between the price Harman shareholders received and Harman’s true value at the time of the Acquisition.” But the court more closely followed the language of the bump-up exclusion. The provision required not just that plaintiffs alleged inadequate consideration in the deal but that the loss “represent” an effective increase in consideration. The court only looked to the complaint to assess whether inadequate consideration was a viable remedy under the theories of liability alleged. Because cured inadequate deal price wasn’t available for Section 14(a) and Section 20(a) securities claims, the plaintiff’s “bare request” for relief for inadequate price was not enough. This will be welcome to policyholders because stockholder-plaintiffs routinely assert a variety of theories and purported damages in M&A litigation which should not necessarily dictate the nature of the settlement.
Consider Insurance Early and Often. The decision provides a roadmap of key issues for policyholders to consider when thinking about potential coverage in deal-related litigation. It starts with the structure of the deal itself, which here was a reverse triangular merger that Harman argued did not fit within the exclusion’s applicability to “acquisitions.” While the court did not accept that position, it pointed to a statement in Harman’s Form 8-K calling the deal an “acquisition” to suggest that the company in some sense understood it to be an acquisition.
More importantly, the court emphasized two aspects of the settlement agreement itself in determining the nature of the settlement: an express denial by the policyholder of any wrongdoing or liability; and statements that the reason for the settlement was “solely” to avoid protracted and expensive litigation and that it would be “beneficial to avoid costs, uncertainty, and risks” inherent in such litigation. This was not necessarily dispositive to the case. Given the lack of evidence from the insurers that might show the settlement was an effective increase in merger consideration, it may not have mattered if the settlement agreement read differently. But when faced with evidence that the settlement represented the estimated litigation costs, the court declined to speculate and rejected the insurers’ bump-up defense.
Conclusion
The Harman decision shows the continued importance of bump-up exclusions and how they can lead to coverage disputes in deal-related litigation. Policyholders need to understand whether their D&O policy has problematic exclusionary language and, if so, whether to address it before pursuing an M&A transaction. The decision also provides guidance for settlement strategies that may maximize coverage.
FTC Imposes Record Fine on Oil Companies for Illegal Pre-Merger Conduct
On January, 7, 2025, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) announced that crude oil producers XCL Resources Holdings, LLC (XCL), Verdun Oil Company II LLC (Verdun) and EP Energy LLC (EP) collectively will pay a $5.68 million civil penalty to resolve allegations they engaged in illegal pre-merger coordination, also known as “gun jumping,” in violation of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (HSR Act). This is the largest fine ever imposed for a gun jumping violation in US history.
The HSR Act requires merging parties to report transactions over certain size thresholds to the FTC and Department of Justice so that those agencies can conduct an antitrust review before closing. The agencies typically have 30 days after a transaction has been reported, which is known as the HSR waiting period, to conduct their initial assessment. The investigating agency can extend that waiting period by issuing a “second request” demand for additional information should they deem the transaction needs more in-depth review. During the HSR waiting period, the acquiror is prohibited from taking ownership or control over the target business. Such gun jumping is punishable by a civil penalty of up to $51,744 per day (the maximum penalty is adjusted annually).
On July 26, 2021, Verdun and XCL entered into a $1.45 billion agreement to acquire EP that triggered the HSR Act’s notification and waiting period requirements. During the initial 30-day HSR review period, the FTC’s investigation identified significant competitive concerns about the transaction, including that it would have eliminated head-to-head competition between two of only four significant energy producers in Utah’s Uinta Basin and would have harmed competition for the sale of Uinta Basin waxy crude oil to Salt Lake City refiners. To resolve those concerns, on March 25, 2022, the FTC entered into a consent agreement with XCL, Verdun and EP that required the divestiture of EP’s entire business and assets in Utah.
According to the FTC’s complaint, instead of observing the waiting period requirement, XCL and Verdun “jumped the gun” and assumed operational and decision-making control over significant aspects of EP’s day-to-day business operations immediately upon signing the purchase agreement. Per the complaint, the parties’ unlawful gun jumping activities during the interim period that were memorialized in the purchase agreement included:
Granting XCL and Verdun approval rights over EP’s ongoing and planned crude oil development and production activities. XCL immediately took advantage of these rights and ordered a stop to EP’s new well-drilling activities, resulting in a crude oil supply shortage for EP when the US market was facing significant supply shortages and multiyear highs in oil prices.
Providing that XCL and Verdun would bear all financial risk and liabilities associated with EP’s anticipated supply shortages, which resulted in XCL and EP working in concert to satisfy EP’s customers supply commitments, and EP employees reporting to their XCL counterparts with details on supply volumes and pricing terms. XCL engaged directly with EP’s customers and held itself out as coordinating EP’s supply and deliveries in the Uinta Basin.
Requiring EP to submit all expenditures above $250,000 to XCL or Verdun for approval. As a result, buyer approval was required before EP could perform a range of ordinary-course activities needed to conduct its business, such as purchasing supplies for its drilling operations and entering or extending contracts for drilling rigs.
Permitting XCL and Verdun to order EP to change certain ordinary-course business operations, including its well-drilling designs and leasing and renewal activities.
Allowing Verdun to review and coordinate with EP regarding prices for EP’s customers in the Eagle Ford region of Texas, with Verdun directing EP to raise prices in the next contracting period.
Providing XCL and Verdun with almost-unfettered access to EP’s competitively sensitive business information, including EP’s site design plans, customer contract and pricing information, and daily production and supply reports.
As stated in the FTC’s complaint, the waiting period obligation for this transaction began on July 26, 2021, the date the parties executed their purchase agreement. On October 27, 2021, during the course of the FTC’s investigation, XCL, Verdun and EP executed an amendment to the purchase agreement that allowed EP to resume operating independently and in the ordinary course of business, without XCL’s or Verdun’s control over its day-to-day operations, thereby ending the illegal gun jumping conduct. Thus, XCL, Verdun and EP were in violation of the HSR Act for 94 days.
This case is noteworthy not only for the magnitude of the penalty imposed on the transaction parties, but also because the violation arose both from provisions in the purchase agreement itself, as well as the parties’ conduct after they executed the purchase agreement. It serves as an important reminder that merging businesses in HSR-reportable transactions must maintain independent operations at least until expiration of the HSR waiting period and in some cases until closing (similar obligations can also apply to M&A transactions involving competitors even in non HSR-reportable deals). This independence must be reflected in both the transaction documents and the actions of the parties. Antitrust counsel can assist with drafting appropriate conduct of business covenants in the purchase agreement and properly navigating integration planning and preclosing coordination during the interim period between sign and close.