SEC Policy Shift and Recent Corp Fin Updates – Part 1
Since the beginning of the year, the US Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Division of Corporation Finance staff (Corp Fin Staff) has issued several important statements and interpretations, including a Staff Legal Bulletin on shareholder proposals and multiple new and revised Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations (C&DIs). Given the pace and importance of these recent changes, it is critical that public companies be aware of the significant policy shift at the Division of Corporation Finance and the substance of the updated statements and interpretations.
This is the first part of an ongoing series that will discuss recent guidance and announcements from the Corp Fin Staff. This alert will review the new and revised C&DIs released by the Corp Fin Staff relating to Regulation 13D-G, proxy rules, and tender offer rules.
Regulation 13D-G
On 11 February 2025, the Corp Fin Staff revised one C&DI and issued a new C&DI with respect to beneficial ownership reporting obligations. Revised Question 103.11 clarifies that determining eligibility for Schedule 13G reporting (as opposed to Schedule 13D reporting) pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 13d-1(b) or 13d-1(c) will be informed by all relevant facts and circumstances and by how “control” is defined in Exchange Act Rule 12b-2. This revised C&DI removed the examples previously given as to when filing on Schedule 13D or Schedule 13G would be appropriate.
New Question 103.12 states that a shareholder’s level of engagement with a public company could be dispositive in determining “control” and disqualifying a shareholder from filing on Schedule 13G. This new C&DI notes that when the engagement goes beyond a shareholder informing management of its views and the shareholder actually applies pressure to implement a policy change or specific measure, the engagement can be seen as “influencing” control over a company. Together, these revised and new C&DIs present a significant change in beneficial ownership considerations with respect to shareholder engagements.
Since the issuance and revision of these two C&DIs, the Corp Fin Staff has further indicated that the publishing of a voting policy or guideline alone would generally not be viewed as influencing control. However, if a shareholder discusses a voting policy or guideline when engaging with a company and the discussion goes into specifics or becomes a negotiation, it could be seen as influencing control. Additionally, the Corp Fin Staff explained that, while statements made by a shareholder during an engagement may indicate that it is not seeking to influence control, a shareholder’s actions may still be considered an attempt to do so.
For companies that actively engage with shareholders that report ownership of the company’s holdings pursuant to a Schedule 13G, the new and revised Regulation 13D-G C&DIs may have the unintended effect of causing additional time and resources to be spent engaging with a broader pool of investors if engagements with larger shareholders are canceled, postponed, or lessened in scope.
Proxy Rules and Schedules 14A/14C
Over the past several proxy seasons, there has been an increase in the number of voluntary Notice of Exempt Solicitation filings by shareholder proponents and other parties in what is often seen as an inexpensive way to express support for a shareholder proposal or to express a shareholder’s views on a particular topic. This can be seen as contrary to the intended purpose of a Notice of Exempt Solicitation filing, which was to make all shareholders aware of a solicitation by a large shareholder to a smaller number of shareholders. Many companies that had these voluntary Notice of Exempt Solicitation filings made in connection with a shareholder proposal have found them to be confusing to shareholders since there was limited information required by these filings and there was uncertainty about how to respond to materially false and misleading statements in them.
On 27 January 2025, the Corp Fin Staff revised two C&DIs and issued three new C&DIs relating to voluntary Notice of Exempt Solicitation filings. The new and revised C&DIs clarify that voluntary submissions are allowed by a soliciting person that does not beneficially own more than US$5 million of the class of subject securities, so long as the cover page to the filing clearly indicates this fact. Additionally, the notice itself cannot be used as a means of solicitation but instead should be a notification to the public that the written material has been provided to shareholders by other means. The Corp Fin Staff also confirmed that the prohibition on materially false or misleading statements contained in Exchange Act Rule 14a-9 applies to all written soliciting materials, including those filed pursuant to a Notice of Exempt Solicitation.
For companies that have had voluntary Notice of Exempt Solicitation filings made to generate publicity for a shareholder proposal or express a view on a particular topic, the new and revised Proxy Rules and Schedules 14A/14C C&DIs are intended to significantly limit the number of or stop these voluntary filings, which are simply made for publicity or to express a viewpoint.
Tender Offer Rules
On 6 March 2025, the Corp Fin Staff added five new C&DIs relating to material changes to tender offers after publication. According to Exchange Act Rule 14d-4(d), when there is a material change in the information that has been published, sent, or given to shareholders, notice of that material change must be promptly disseminated in a manner reasonably designed to inform shareholders of the change. The rule goes on to say that an offer should remain open for five days following a material change when the change deals with anything other than price or share levels.
In new C&DI Question 101.17, the Corp Fin Staff clarified that while the SEC has previously stated that an all-cash tender offer should remain open for a minimum of five business days from the date a material change is first disclosed, it understands this may not always be practicable. The Corp Fin Staff believes that a shorter time period may be acceptable if the disclosure and dissemination of the material change provides sufficient time for shareholders to consider this information and factor it into their decision regarding the shares subject to the tender offer.
New C&DIs 101.18–101.21 address material changes related to the status or source of the financing of a tender offer. In Question 101.18, the Corp Fin Staff indicated that a change in financing of a tender offer from “partially financed” or “unfinanced” to “fully financed” constitutes a material change that requires shareholder notice and time for consideration on whether a shareholder will participate. In Question 101.20, however, the Corp Fin Staff clarifies that the mere substitution of the source of financing is not material. The Corp Fin Staff did note that an offeror should consider whether it needs to amend the tender offer materials to reflect the material terms and the substitution of the funding source. While this may seem contrary to the Corp Fin Staff’s guidance in this C&DI, an immaterial change in the funding source could trigger an obligation to amend the tender offer materials to reflect other changes, such as the material terms of the new source of funding.
In Question 101.19, the Corp Fin Staff indicated that a tender offer with a binding commitment letter from a lender would constitute a fully financed offer, while a “highly confident” letter would not. The answer to Question 101.21 builds on the guidance from the previous three new C&DIs to establish that when an offeror has conditioned its purchase of the tendered securities on the receipt of actual funds from a lender, a material change occurs when the lender does not fulfill its contractual obligation and the offeror waives it without an alternative source of funding.
In light of these new C&DIs, companies planning tender offers should play close attention to the status of any necessary funding, as changes in unfunded, partially funded, or fully funded financing can trigger the need to disclose a material change to stakeholders as well as to amend the tender offer materials.
Conclusion
This publication is the first in a series that seeks to highlight these policy changes and help public companies stay up to date on the Corp Fin Staff’s guidance. Our Capital Markets practice group lawyers are happy to discuss how these policy and guidance changes can impact companies as they consider how to address the new and revised Regulation 13D-G, proxy rules, and tender offer rules C&DIs.
SEC Provides Further Clarity in Rule 506(c) Offerings
On March 12, 2025, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) issued a No-Action Letter that provided guidance regarding the ways issuers can satisfy the accredited investor verification requirements of offerings made pursuant to Rule 506(c) under Regulation D. Specifically, the SEC confirmed that an issuer will satisfy the requirement that it take “reasonable steps” to verify the accredited investor status of an investor if the issuer requires purchasers to agree to certain minimum investment amounts, coupled with such investor’s self-certification of certain representations related to its investment.
Rule 506(c) provides a non-exhaustive list of steps which include collecting bank statements, verification letters, credit reports, or other sensitive documentation, which many issuers find too burdensome. The SEC’s clarification could make it easier for issuers relying on Rule 506(c) to make general solicitations to accredited investors.
Under the guidance provided by the No-Action Letter, an issuer can satisfy the verification requirement if:
The offering requires a minimum investment of at least $200,000 from natural persons or $1 million for legal entities (in either case, including binding commitments to invest at least the minimum amount in one or more installments when called by the issuer); and
The investor provides written representations that (a) the purchaser is an accredited investor; and (b) the purchaser’s minimum investment amount is not financed in whole or in part by any third party for the specific purpose of making the particular investment in the issuer.
Recent Division of Corporation Finance Guidance Relating to Regulation 13D-G Beneficial Ownership Reporting, Proxy Rules, and Tender Offer Rules
Since the beginning of the year, the US Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Division of Corporation Finance staff (Corp Fin Staff) has issued several important statements and interpretations, including a Staff Legal Bulletin on shareholder proposals and multiple new and revised Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations (C&DIs). Given the pace and importance of these recent changes, it is critical that public companies be aware of the significant policy shift at the Division of Corporation Finance and the substance of the updated statements and interpretations.
This is the first part of an ongoing series that will discuss recent guidance and announcements from the Corp Fin Staff. This alert will review the new and revised C&DIs released by the Corp Fin Staff relating to Regulation 13D-G, proxy rules, and tender offer rules.
Regulation 13D-G
On 11 February 2025, the Corp Fin Staff revised one C&DI and issued a new C&DI with respect to beneficial ownership reporting obligations. Revised Question 103.11 clarifies that determining eligibility for Schedule 13G reporting (as opposed to Schedule 13D reporting) pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 13d-1(b) or 13d-1(c) will be informed by all relevant facts and circumstances and by how “control” is defined in Exchange Act Rule 12b-2. This revised C&DI removed the examples previously given as to when filing on Schedule 13D or Schedule 13G would be appropriate.
New Question 103.12 states that a shareholder’s level of engagement with a public company could be dispositive in determining “control” and disqualifying a shareholder from filing on Schedule 13G. This new C&DI notes that when the engagement goes beyond a shareholder informing management of its views and the shareholder actually applies pressure to implement a policy change or specific measure, the engagement can be seen as “influencing” control over a company. Together, these revised and new C&DIs present a significant change in beneficial ownership considerations with respect to shareholder engagements.
Since the issuance and revision of these two C&DIs, the Corp Fin Staff has further indicated that the publishing of a voting policy or guideline alone would generally not be viewed as influencing control. However, if a shareholder discusses a voting policy or guideline when engaging with a company and the discussion goes into specifics or becomes a negotiation, it could be seen as influencing control. Additionally, the Corp Fin Staff explained that, while statements made by a shareholder during an engagement may indicate that it is not seeking to influence control, a shareholder’s actions may still be considered an attempt to do so.
For companies that actively engage with shareholders that report ownership of the company’s holdings pursuant to a Schedule 13G, the new and revised Regulation 13D-G C&DIs may have the unintended effect of causing additional time and resources to be spent engaging with a broader pool of investors if engagements with larger shareholders are canceled, postponed, or lessened in scope.
Proxy Rules and Schedules 14A/14C
Over the past several proxy seasons, there has been an increase in the number of voluntary Notice of Exempt Solicitation filings by shareholder proponents and other parties in what is often seen as an inexpensive way to express support for a shareholder proposal or to express a shareholder’s views on a particular topic. This can be seen as contrary to the intended purpose of a Notice of Exempt Solicitation filing, which was to make all shareholders aware of a solicitation by a large shareholder to a smaller number of shareholders. Many companies that had these voluntary Notice of Exempt Solicitation filings made in connection with a shareholder proposal have found them to be confusing to shareholders since there was limited information required by these filings and there was uncertainty about how to respond to materially false and misleading statements in them.
On 27 January 2025, the Corp Fin Staff revised two C&DIs and issued three new C&DIs relating to voluntary Notice of Exempt Solicitation filings. The new and revised C&DIs clarify that voluntary submissions are allowed by a soliciting person that does not beneficially own more than US$5 million of the class of subject securities, so long as the cover page to the filing clearly indicates this fact. Additionally, the notice itself cannot be used as a means of solicitation but instead should be a notification to the public that the written material has been provided to shareholders by other means. The Corp Fin Staff also confirmed that the prohibition on materially false or misleading statements contained in Exchange Act Rule 14a-9 applies to all written soliciting materials, including those filed pursuant to a Notice of Exempt Solicitation.
For companies that have had voluntary Notice of Exempt Solicitation filings made to generate publicity for a shareholder proposal or express a view on a particular topic, the new and revised Proxy Rules and Schedules 14A/14C C&DIs are intended to significantly limit the number of or stop these voluntary filings, which are simply made for publicity or to express a viewpoint.
Tender Offer Rules
On 6 March 2025, the Corp Fin Staff added five new C&DIs relating to material changes to tender offers after publication. According to Exchange Act Rule 14d-4(d), when there is a material change in the information that has been published, sent, or given to shareholders, notice of that material change must be promptly disseminated in a manner reasonably designed to inform shareholders of the change. The rule goes on to say that an offer should remain open for five days following a material change when the change deals with anything other than price or share levels.
In new C&DI Question 101.17, the Corp Fin Staff clarified that while the SEC has previously stated that an all-cash tender offer should remain open for a minimum of five business days from the date a material change is first disclosed, it understands this may not always be practicable. The Corp Fin Staff believes that a shorter time period may be acceptable if the disclosure and dissemination of the material change provides sufficient time for shareholders to consider this information and factor it into their decision regarding the shares subject to the tender offer.
New C&DIs 101.18–101.21 address material changes related to the status or source of the financing of a tender offer. In Question 101.18, the Corp Fin Staff indicated that a change in financing of a tender offer from “partially financed” or “unfinanced” to “fully financed” constitutes a material change that requires shareholder notice and time for consideration on whether a shareholder will participate. In Question 101.20, however, the Corp Fin Staff clarifies that the mere substitution of the source of financing is not material. The Corp Fin Staff did note that an offeror should consider whether it needs to amend the tender offer materials to reflect the material terms and the substitution of the funding source. While this may seem contrary to the Corp Fin Staff’s guidance in this C&DI, an immaterial change in the funding source could trigger an obligation to amend the tender offer materials to reflect other changes, such as the material terms of the new source of funding.
In Question 101.19, the Corp Fin Staff indicated that a tender offer with a binding commitment letter from a lender would constitute a fully financed offer, while a “highly confident” letter would not. The answer to Question 101.21 builds on the guidance from the previous three new C&DIs to establish that when an offeror has conditioned its purchase of the tendered securities on the receipt of actual funds from a lender, a material change occurs when the lender does not fulfill its contractual obligation and the offeror waives it without an alternative source of funding.
In light of these new C&DIs, companies planning tender offers should play close attention to the status of any necessary funding, as changes in unfunded, partially funded, or fully funded financing can trigger the need to disclose a material change to stakeholders as well as to amend the tender offer materials.
Conclusion
This publication is the first in a series that seeks to highlight these policy changes and help public companies stay up to date on the Corp Fin Staff’s guidance. Our Capital Markets practice group lawyers are happy to discuss how these policy and guidance changes can impact companies as they consider how to address the new and revised Regulation 13D-G, proxy rules, and tender offer rules C&DIs.
SEC Climate Disclosures Rules One Step Closer to the Grave; GHG Emissions Disclosures One Step Closer to Becoming a Multi-State Compliance Issue
The slow death of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) climate disclosure rules continued on March 27, 2025, with the SEC Commissioners voting to discontinue the defense of such rules before the Eighth Circuit, Iowa v. SEC, No. 24-1522 (8th Cir.), which is where the numerous complaints challenging the rules were consolidated.[1] The SEC’s action does not withdraw or terminate the rules, but while they remain in place, the SEC’s previous stay of the rules continues. It will be interesting to see if the Democratic attorneys general from a number of states who joined the litigation in support of the rules will continue to defend the rules without the SEC’s support.
While the SEC has made clear that it will not be pursuing its climate disclosure rules[2], companies may still need to comply with climate disclosure laws of other jurisdictions, including the European Union’s Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive and California’s climate disclosure rules. In addition, legislation similar to California’s “Climate Corporate Data Accountability Act” (CA SB 253)[3] which was later amended by California Senate Bill 219[4] has been introduced in New York[5], Colorado[6], New Jersey[7], and Illinois[8] that would require companies with more than $1 billion in annual revenue and doing business in the particular state to annually report their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, similar to what California will require beginning in 2026.
To add to the list of considerations for companies to keep on their radar, U.S. Senator Bill Hagerty recently introduced federal legislation to “prohibit entities integral to the national interests of the United States from participating in any foreign sustainability due diligence regulation, including the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive of the European Union”.[9] While Senator Hagerty’s bill appears to be symbolic and unlikely to be enacted, it has a private right of action that could prove troublesome if the legislation should be enacted.
[1] See, Press Release 2025-58, Securities and Exchange Commission, “SEC Votes to End Defense of Climate Disclosure Rules” (March 27, 2025), https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2025-58.
[2] Securities and Exchange Commission, Final Rule “The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors,” 17 CFR 210, 229, 230, 232, 239, and 249, adopting release available at https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/final/2024/33-11275.pdf.
[3] Cal. Health & Safety Code § 38532.
[4] Senate Bill 219, Greenhouse gases: climate corporate accountability: climate-related financial risk, Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 38532, 38533, Bill Text available at https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=202320240SB219.
[5] New York Senate Bill S3456, “Climate Corporate Accountability Act,” available at https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2025/S3456.
[6] Colorado House Bill 25-1119, “A Bill for an Act concerning requiring certain entities to disclose information concerning greenhouse gas emissions,” available at https://leg.colorado.gov/bills/HB25-1119.
[7] New Jersey Senate Bill 4117, “Climate Corporate Data Accountability Act,” available at https://legiscan.com/NJ/text/S4117/2024.
[8] Illinois House Bill, “Climate Corporate Accountability Act,” available at https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=3673&GAID=18&DocTypeID=HB&LegId=162463&SessionID=114&GA=104.
[9] Senate Bill 985, 119th Congress (2025-2026), ‘‘Prevent Regulatory Overreach from Turning Essential
Companies into Targets Act of 2025’’ or the ‘‘PROTECT USA Act of 2025,’’ Bill Text available at https://www.hagerty.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/HLA25119.pdf
Can Investors Themselves Be Liable For A Failure To Register The Offer And Sale Of Securities?
Section 12(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 imposes liability on sellers of securities who violate that Act’s registration and prospectus delivery requirements. Because the statute refers to sellers, it seems unlikely that investors themselves might have liability under Section 12(a)(1). Things are not as they seem, however.
Samuels v. Lido Dao, 2024 WL 4815022 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2024), motion to certify appeal denied, 2025 WL 371797 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2025) involved a suit by an investor who bought cryptocurrency tokens on an exchange. The tokens were originally issued by an entity called Lido DAO. After losing money, the investor sued, alleging that the tokens were offered and sold without registration under the Securities Act. The defendants included four large institutional investors in Lido—Paradigm Operations, Andreessen Horowitz, Dragonfly Digital Management, and Robot Ventures. The plaintiff’s theory was that Lido was a partnership and the institutional investors were liable under California law for the activities of the partnership—including for Lido’s failure to register its crypto tokens as securities. U.S. District Judge Vince Chhabria concluded:
It’s true that a partner cannot be directly liable for a violation of Section 12 simply by virtue of their being a partner in an entity that violates that provision (as they could be for a violation of Section 11). But the Act clearly defines “person” to include “a partnership.” 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(2). And under California law, general partners are jointly and severally liable for the obligations of the partnership. Cal. Corp. Code § 16306(a). So even though a partner cannot be directly liable for a partnership’s violation of Section 12, the partnership can still be a co-obligor, under state law, for the partnership’s liability.
He therefore denied all of the defendants’ motions to dismiss, except Robot’s. He granted Robot Venture’s motion because the plaintiff failed to allege that Robot Ventures was a member of the Lido general partnership.
Why Reporting Accounting Fraud Will Lead to Future SEC Whistleblower Awards
A recent CNN documentary about the Enron accounting scandal is a stark reminder of the devastation that results when corporate officers cook the books – thousands of employees lost their jobs, individual investors and pension funds lost billions, and the stock market plummeted as investors lost confidence in the accuracy of public company accounting. Most employees that knew about the fraud failed to speak up due to fear of retaliation and a corporate culture characterized by greed and deception. If Enron employees had been protected against retaliation and incentivized to report accounting fraud to the SEC, the SEC may have learned about the fraudulent practices early enough to combat and remedy those practices.
Under the SEC Whistleblower Program, whistleblowers can submit tips anonymously to the SEC through an attorney and be eligible for an award for exposing any material violation of the federal securities laws. Since 2011, the SEC has issued more than $2.2 billion in awards to whistleblowers. The largest SEC whistleblower awards to date are:
$279 million (May 5, 2023)
$114 million (Oct. 22, 2020)
$110 million (Sept. 15, 2021)
This article discusses: 1) how whistleblowers can earn awards for reporting accounting fraud to the SEC; 2) the pervasiveness of accounting fraud at U.S. publicly traded companies; and 3) the SEC’s focus on accounting fraud which, in turn, will lead to future SEC whistleblower awards.
SEC Whistleblower Program
In response to the 2008 financial crisis, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, which created the SEC Whistleblower Program. Under the program, the SEC is required to issue monetary awards to whistleblowers when they provide original information about violations of the federal securities laws (e.g., accounting fraud) that leads to successful SEC enforcement actions with monetary sanctions in excess of $1 million. Whistleblowers are eligible to receive an award of between 10% and 30% of the total monetary sanctions collected in a successful enforcement action. In certain circumstances, even officers, directors, auditors, and accountants may be eligible for awards under the program.
Since the inception of the SEC Whistleblower Program, whistleblower tips have enabled the SEC to bring successful enforcement actions resulting in more than $6 billion in monetary sanctions. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 alone, the SEC Office of the Whistleblower awarded more than $255 million to whistleblowers, which included a $98 million award. Also in FY 2024, the SEC received nearly 25,000 whistleblower tips, of which 2,609 related to Corporate Disclosures and Financials. As detailed below, recent data suggest that whistleblower tips related to accounting frauds will likely increase in the coming years due to rampant accounting fraud, violations, and errors.
Whistleblowers Needed: Accounting Fraud is Widespread
In October 2023, a paper titled How Pervasive is Corporate Fraud? estimated that “on average 10% of large publicly traded firms are committing securities fraud every year.” According to the paper:
Accounting violations are widespread: in an average year, 41% of companies misrepresent their financial reports, even when we ignore simple clerical errors. Fortunately, securities fraud is less pervasive. In an average year, 10% of all large public corporations commit (alleged) securities fraud, with a 95% confidence interval between 7 and 14%.
The paper’s findings about the pervasiveness of accounting violations were echoed in a December 2024 Financial Times article titled Accounting errors force US companies to pull statements in record numbers. According to the article:
The number of US companies forced to withdraw financial statements because of accounting errors has surged to a nine-year high, raising questions about why mistakes are going unnoticed by auditors.
In the first 10 months of this year, 140 public companies told investors that previous financial statements were unreliable and had to reissue them with corrected figures, according to data from Ideagen Audit Analytics. That is up from 122 in the same period last year and more than double the figure four years ago. So-called reissuance restatements cover the most serious accounting errors, either because of the size of the mistake or because an issue is of particular concern to investors.
Fortunately for investors, officers, directors, auditors, and accountants can be eligible for awards under the SEC Whistleblower Program, and whistleblower tips – especially from individuals with actual knowledge of the fraud – enable the SEC to quickly detect and halt accounting schemes.
Accounting Fraud in SEC Crosshairs
SEC enforcement actions against accounting violations and improper disclosures often lead to significant penalties. Eligible whistleblowers may receive awards of between 10% and 30% of the monetary sanctions collected in successful enforcement actions. Since 2020, some of the SEC’s largest enforcement actions were brought against companies engaged in accounting violations:
In 2020, General Electric agreed to pay a $200 million penalty for misleading investors by understating losses in its power and insurance businesses.
In 2021, The Kraft Heinz Company agreed to a $62 million penalty to settle charges that it engaged in a long-running expense management scheme that resulted in the restatement of several years of financial reporting
In 2021, Luckin Coffee agreed to pay a $180 million penalty for defrauding investors by materially misstating the company’s revenue, expenses, and net operating loss in an effort to falsely appear to achieve rapid growth and increased profitability and to meet the company’s earnings estimates.
In 2022, accounting firm Ernst & Young agreed to pay a $100 million penalty due to some employees cheating on CPA ethics exams and for misleading SEC investigators.
In 2024, UPS agreed to pay a $45 million penalty for misrepresenting its earnings by improperly valuing its UPS Freight business unit.
Whistleblower tips concerning similar accounting violations have led to, and will continue to lead to, significant whistleblower awards. For more information about reporting accounting fraud to the SEC and earning a whistleblower award, see the following articles:
How to Report Accounting Fraud an Earn an SEC Whistleblower Award
5 Things Whistleblowers Should Know About Reporting Accounting Fraud to the SEC
Improper revenue recognition tops SEC fraud cases
Delaware Enacts Sweeping Changes to the Delaware General Corporation Law
On March 25, 2025, the governor of Delaware signed into law Senate Bill 21, over much opposition from the plaintiffs’ bar and some academics. The bill, which amends Sections 144 and Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, 8 Del. C. (the “DGCL”), seeks to provide clarity for transactional planners in conflicted and controller transactions, and seeks to limit the reach of Section 220 books and records demands. These amendments significantly alter the controller transaction and books and records landscape.
Background
Senate Bill 21 comes in the backdrop of heightened anxiety over whether Delaware will retain its dominance in the corporate law franchise. Businesses have cited a seemingly increased litigious environment in Delaware, and when coupled with a handful of high-profile companies redomesticating or considering redomesticating to other jurisdictions (see our blog article about the Tripadvisor redomestication here), other states such as Texas and Nevada making a strong push to accommodate for new incorporations and redomestications, and a series of opinions out of the Delaware Court of Chancery that were unpopular in certain circles, concern was growing of Delaware falling from its position as the leading jurisdiction for corporate law.
This is not the first time the Delaware legislature has acted to re-instill confidence in Delaware corporate law to the market. Senate Bill 21 also comes less than a year after Senate Bill 313 was signed into law. Senate Bill 313, coined the “market practice” amendments, sought to address the decisions in West Palm Beach Firefighters’ Pension Fund v. Moelis & Company, 311 A.3d 809 (Del. Ch. 2024), Sjunde AP-Fonden v. Activision Blizzard, 124 A.3d 1025 (Del. Ch. 2024), and Crispo v. Musk, 304 A.3d 567 (Del. Ch. 2023), which many found surprising. And perhaps most famously, Section 102(b)(7), the director exculpation clause (now the director and officer exculpation clause following an amendment in 2022), was enacted in the wake of the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), which caused shockwaves throughout the corporate law community as well as the director and officer insurance market.
Senate Bill 21 Amendments
Section 144. Section 144 of the DGCL was revamped entirely from being a provision speaking on the voidability of conflicted transactions, into a statutory safe harbor for conflicted and controller transactions. The essence of the new Section 144 is defining what a controlling stockholder is, and providing different safe-harbor frameworks for conflicted transactions, controlling stockholder transactions, and controlling stockholder “go private” transactions for public companies.
Controllers are now statutorily designated as those persons (together with affiliates and associates) that (1) has majority control in voting power, (2) has the right to nominate and elect a majority of the board, or (3) possess the functional equivalent of majority control by having both control of at least one-third in voting power of the outstanding stock entitled to vote generally in the election of directors and the power to exercise managerial authority. The last category will likely be the subject of much litigation in the future, but the defined boundaries will limit a plaintiff’s ability to cast a person as a controller.
Under the new Section 144, controllers (and directors or officers of a controlled company) can shield themselves from a fiduciary claim in a conflicted transaction if (1) a committee of 2 or more disinterested directors that has been empowered to negotiate and reject the transaction, on a fully-informed basis, approve or recommend to approve (by majority approval) the transaction, or (2) it is approved by a fully-informed, uncoerced, affirmative vote of a majority of the votes cast by the disinterested stockholder. And in a “go private” transaction, both (1) and (2) above need to be accomplished. Such actions will grant the transaction “business judgment rule” deference. This is a significant change from recent Delaware Supreme Court precedent under Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014) (“MFW”), and its progeny holding that a controller transaction providing a non-ratable benefit to the controller will be reviewed under the discerning “entire fairness” standard unless the transaction is conditioned “ab initio” (i.e., at the outset) on the approval of a majority of fully-informed disinterested director and fully-informed, disinterested and uncoerced stockholders. The legislature has spoken that the spirit and structure of MFW will only apply to “go private” transactions, whereas in a non-“go private” transaction the controller needs to meet just one of the MFW prongs, and a disinterested director cleansing does not have to be “ab initio.” Note also that Section 144 provides that controllers are not liable for monetary damages for breaches of the duty of care.
New Section 144 also creates a new presumption that directors of public corporations that are deemed independent to the company under exchange rules are disinterested directors under Delaware law (and, if the director meets such independence criteria with respect to a controller, the director is presumed disinterested from such controller). To overcome this presumption, there must be “substantial and particularized facts” of a material interest or a material relationship with a person with a material interest in the act or transaction. Note that NYSE and NASDAQ independence is a somewhat different inquiry from director disinterestedness under Delaware corporate law. To qualify as independent for exchange purposes, directors cannot hold management positions at the company, its parents or subsidiaries, and former executives are not considered independent for three years after their departures. See Nasdaq Rule 5605 and NYSE Listed Company Manual 303A.02. A director also does not qualify as independent if the director or their families received more than $120,000 in compensation from the company in any 12-month period in the prior three years. In contrast, disinterestedness of a director under Delaware law has been historically a much more fact-and-circumstances inquiry, where judges have looked to things like co-owning an airplane, personal friendships and other “soft” factors.
Section 220. Under Section 220, a stockholder is entitled to examine a corporation’s “books and records” in furtherance of a “proper purpose” reasonably related to the person’s status as a stockholder. The use of this potent tool has proliferated through the years, with stockholders of Delaware corporations becoming increasingly savvy, sophisticated and demanding with their books and records demands to investigate potential corporate wrongdoings before filing suit. Delaware courts have encouraged the use of Section 220, in many cases urging stockholders to use the “tools at hand” ahead of filing suit, presumably with the hope of curtailing bad claims clogging up the docket.
The amended Section 220 limits the universe of what a stockholder may demand under Section 220. Prior to the amendments, a stockholder could pursue materials, even if not “formal board materials,” if they make particularized allegations of the existence of such materials and a showing that an investigation of the suspected wrongdoing was “necessary and essential.” The statute, as amended, limits the ability for stockholders to pursue materials such as personal director or officer emails that may have relevant information, which could be allowed under the prior regime. Under the amended Section 220, if what the stockholder seeks is not part of the nine types of “books and records” spelled out in the statute, the stockholder cannot have access to it in a Section 220 books and records demand.
Questions Going Forward
The amendments to Sections 144 and 220 collide with or directly overturn several Delaware caselaw precedents. The landscape has changed, and we will see how Delaware corporations and its constituents respond. From a transactional planning perspective, the safe-harbors of Section 144 provide much-needed guidance, but with limited caselaw overlay interpreting the boundaries of the safe-harbors, the structuring is not without risk.
Turning back to the backdrop of Senate Bill 21: does this fix the “DExit” concern? Perhaps. But these amendments undoubtedly swing the pendulum to the corporation, controller and management. Whether it is swinging back toward the center is up for debate, but what is not debatable is that preserving the Delaware corporate law franchise depends upon balance. Through the legislative process there were some institutional investors that opposed Senate Bill 21. We will see what kinds of moves, if any, investors of Delaware corporations will make going forward.
Finally, is Section 144 an “opt out” provision? The DGCL is a regime of mandatory statutes, enabling statutes, and default statutes one can opt in or out of. Returning to Section 102(b)(7), this exculpation provision is a well-known example of an opt-in, where a corporation has the option to add that exculpation clause to the company’s certificate of incorporation. Section 203, on the other hand, is an “opt out” statute where a corporation can choose not to have certain restrictions on business combinations with interested stockholders. In the legislative process, several prominent corporate law professors sought to have Senate Bill 21 revised such that it would be a charter “opt-in,” meaning that the default is the status quo, and companies (with stockholder approval) can adopt the controller transaction safe-harbor and books and records limitations in the new Sections 144 and 220. This proposal was ultimately not accepted, but there has been some mention that the text of the new Section 144 suggests it is actually an “opt out” statute. If that is the case, and investors do feel strongly about the Senate Bill 21 amendments, we may see stockholder proposals in the coming years for amendments to the corporate charter to opt out of the new Sections 144 and 220. We will watch the SEC Rule 14a-8 proposals in upcoming proxy cycles to see if this is the case.
Updated SEC Marketing Rule FAQ: Clarification Regarding Presentation of Net Extracted Performance
On March 19, 2025, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) staff issued an update to its frequently asked questions (FAQ)[1] guidance with respect to registered investment advisers’ compliance with Rule 206(4)-1 (Marketing Rule) under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act). The FAQ provides new direction for advisers on the presentation of gross and net extracted performance data for a single investment or a group of investments (an “extract”) in marketing materials, as well as guidance as to whether certain portfolio or investment characteristics would constitute “performance” for purposes of the Marketing Rule.
The Marketing Rule originally required the presentation of gross extracted performance to be accompanied by a presentation of net extracted performance. This was made explicitly clear in a prior SEC FAQ published on January 11, 2023.[2] Under the updated FAQ, however, an adviser will now be permitted to present gross extracted performance and refer to certain portfolio or investment characteristics without also presenting corresponding net extracted performance, provided that certain additional requirements are met as described below.
Presentation of Gross and Net Performance of Extracts and Investment Characteristics
Following the release of the Marketing Rule, advisers to private investment funds struggled with the requirement to present net performance data for extracts, as it was unclear from the final rule how fund-level fees and expenses should be applied to specific investments. This led to many advisers taking various diverging approaches in an attempt to comply with the Marketing Rule and a perception among private fund industry participants that such additional disclosures were inherently flawed for resting upon simplistic, if not artificial, assumptions mandated by the Marketing Rule concerning the allocation of fund-level fees and expenses and provided little (if any) practical benefit for investors. Additionally, the Marketing Rule does not define the term “performance”, which led to uncertainty as to whether certain portfolio or investment characteristics (e.g., yield, coupon rate, contribution to return, Sharpe ratio, Sortino ratio and other similar metrics), for which calculating “net” performance may be impossible, misleading or confusing to investors, could actually be included in advisers’ marketing materials.
In the updated FAQ, the SEC staff stated that they would not recommend enforcement action under Rule 206(4)-1(d)(1) of the Advisers Act if an adviser either (i) presents the gross performance of an extract in an advertisement without including the corresponding net performance of the extract or (ii) presents one or more gross characteristics of a portfolio or investment without including the corresponding net characteristics, if each of the following are true:
The extract’s performance or the gross characteristic (as applicable) is clearly identified as being calculated on a gross basis, without the deduction of fees and expenses;
The extract’s performance or the characteristic (as applicable) is accompanied by a presentation of the total portfolio’s gross and net performance, consistent with the requirements of the Marketing Rule;
The total portfolio’s gross and net performance is presented with at least equal prominence to, and in a manner designed to facilitate comparison with, the extract’s or the characteristic’s (as applicable) performance;[3] and
The gross and net performance of the total portfolio is calculated over a period that includes the entire period over which the extract’s or characteristic’s (as applicable) performance is calculated.[4]
While the SEC staff has not provided a definition of “performance” under the Marketing Rule, the staff clarified that total return, time-weighted return, return on investment, internal rate of return, multiple on invested capital and total value to paid-in capital are each considered “performance” and are subject to the full requirements of the Marketing Rule. Additionally, the staff indicated that if a characteristic is not “performance”, then it does need to be shown on a gross basis.
Action Items
The updates to the FAQ represents a marked shift in the SEC’s interpretation and position on extracted performance, and may give advisers additional certainty on how to meet their obligations under the Marketing Rule. Private fund advisers should review their marketing materials that include gross and net performance of extracts or characteristics of a portfolio or investment to ensure the conditions set forth in the FAQ are satisfied.
Please contact your Foley Fund Formation and Investment Management client team for more information and assistance with navigating these Marketing Rule obligations.
[1] Available at: https://www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/staff-guidance/division-investment-management-frequently-asked-questions/marketing-compliance-frequently-asked-questions#_edn6
[2] The prior FAQ from January 11, 2023, which directly contradicts certain aspects of the new FAQ concerning presentation of net extracted performance, has been removed from the SEC’s FAQ webpage.
[3] The SEC clarified that the total portfolio’s gross and net performance do not need to be shown on the same page of an advertisement as the extract or characteristic, but having the total portfolio’s performance precede the extract or characteristic in an advertisement would help to facilitate a comparison between the two.
[4] Because time periods over which extracts and characteristics are calculated may not easily align with the one-, five- and ten-year periods required by Rule 206(4)-1(d)(2) for advertisements to clients other than private funds, the SEC staff further stated that they would not recommend enforcement action if the extract or characteristic is calculated over a single, clearly disclosed period.
CFTC Withdraws Pair of Advisories on Heightened Review Approach to Digital Asset Derivatives [Video]
On March 28, the staff of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) issued two press releases announcing the withdrawal of two previous advisories that reflected the agency’s heightened review approach to digital asset derivatives.
These announcements appear to mark the end of the CFTC’s heightened review of digital asset products. The CFTC rules certainly still apply, but this seems to be a deliberate move by the CFTC to start treating digital asset derivatives like other CFTC-regulated products. It also gives a glimpse of how the CFTC would regulate digital asset spot transactions if Congress gives it the authority to do so.
The first advisory the CFTC withdrew was Staff Advisory No. 18-14, Advisory with Respect to Virtual Currency Derivative Product Listings, which was issued on May 21, 2018. The withdrawal is effective immediately. That advisory provided certain enhancements that CFTC-regulated entities were asked to follow when listing digital asset derivatives. These included enhanced market surveillance, closer coordination with the CFTC, reporting obligations, risk management and outreach to members and market participants. That advisory was withdrawn in its entirety, with the CFTC staff citing its increased experience with digital asset derivatives and that the digital asset industry has increased in market growth and maturity.
The second advisory the CFTC staff withdrew was Staff Advisory No. 23-07, Review of Risks Associated with Expansion of DCO Clearing of Digital Assets, issued on May 30, 2023. It stated that CFTC staff would focus on the heightened risks of digital asset derivatives to system safeguards, fiscal settlement procedures and conflicts of interest.
United States: House Committee on Financial Services Urges the SEC to Withdraw Final and Proposed Rules
On 31 March 2025, the House Committee on Financial Services (Committee), in a letter to Acting Chairman of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Mark Uyeda, identified a series of proposed and adopted rules that the SEC should withdraw or rescind. The letter notes the Committee’s view that the SEC, under the prior Chair, had lost sight of its mission. The identified proposals and rules represent significant rulemaking efforts on the part of the SEC, many of which were controversial and subject to significant industry opposition. The specific proposals identified are the following:
Cybersecurity Risk Management, Strategy, Governance, and Incident Disclosure;
Short Position and Short Activity Reporting by Institutional Investment Managers;
Reporting of Securities Loans;
Pay Versus Performance;
Investment Company Names;
Form N-PORT and Form N-CEN Reporting; Guidance on Open-End Fund Liquidity Risk Management Programs;
Conflicts of Interest Associated with the Use of Predictive Data Analytics by Broker Dealers and Investment Advisers;
Open-End Fund Liquidity Risk Management Programs and Swing Pricing;
Regulation Best Execution;
Order Competition;
Position Reporting of Large Security-Based Swap Positions;
Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity;
Outsourcing by Investment Advisers; and
Enhanced Disclosures by Certain Investment Advisers and Investment Companies about Environmental, Social, and Governance Investment Practices.
While the Committee does not have the authority to compel the SEC to take action on any if these final or proposed rules, the letter is a strong indication of support for an overall deregulatory environment and could provide a blueprint for SEC regulatory policy once Paul Atkins is confirmed.
Confirmation Hearing for SEC Chair Nominee Atkins — Takeaways for Fund Managers
The Senate Banking Committee convened on Thursday to consider the nomination of Paul Atkins, President Trump’s nominee for Chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission, along with the nominees for the Comptroller of the Currency, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and the Department of Transportation.
Atkins, a former SEC Commissioner, shared his views on the current regulatory landscape, contending that today’s environment stifles capital formation and indicating a pivot from the SEC’s recent emphasis on aggressive enforcement. Overall, nothing occurred at the hearing that would change the expectation that Atkins will be confirmed. Currently, the SEC only has three members, meaning the Democratic Commissioner in theory could effectively have veto power over actions requiring a vote of the SEC because she can deny a quorum for any action she strongly opposes; if Atkins is confirmed, the Republican majority would no longer need the Democratic Commissioner, so it will be able to begin with formal rulemaking steps.
Key takeaways for fund managers from Atkins’ testimony are below.
Position on Private Funds
Surprisingly, Atkins faced relatively few questions about private funds. Nonetheless, in responding to questions, he noted that investors in private funds are typically sophisticated and have sufficient resources to hire advisers. In response to a question from a Democratic member of the Committee, he conceded that retail investors in registered funds benefit from additional investor protections, such as diversification rules. Atkins confirmed that the SEC would continue to enforce penalties against firms that mislead investors, but he drew a distinction between accredited investors—who he said have the sophistication and means to fend for themselves—and registered fund investors, possibly indicating a less restrictive or more principles-based regulatory and enforcement framework for the private fund industry.
Focus on Disclosure Practices
Atkins expressed concerns about the inefficient disclosures that investors face, stating, “investors are flooded with disclosures that do the opposite of helping them understand the true risks of an investment.” At the same time, he stated that investors should be protected from incorrect or materially misleading private fund disclosures. While his testimony suggests that the SEC would continue scrutinizing firms’ marketing practices, this could signal a willingness to pare back rules that require voluminous disclosure that most investors do not read.
Digital Assets and Cryptocurrency
In his opening statement, Atkins signaled that digital assets and cryptocurrency will be a prominent focus if he is confirmed. He highlighted his experience developing best practices for the digital asset industry since 2017, pointing to what he views as ambiguous or outdated regulations that have led to market uncertainty and inhibited innovation. Atkins stated that a “firm regulatory foundation” for digital assets would be a top priority, emphasizing a “rational, coherent, and principled approach.” Consistent with the work that already has started under the Crypto Task Force, his comments suggest a more measured and predictable environment for market participants, which could foster greater institutional involvement and spur technological developments in the digital asset space. Consistent with his overarching views on regulation expressed throughout the hearing, Atkins stressed the importance of clear rules that encourage capital formation, which believes are critical as the SEC considers its role in overseeing rapidly evolving cryptocurrency markets.
Creating Efficiencies within the SEC
In response to questions regarding how he might work with the Department of Government Efficiency, Atkins indicated general support for seeking greater efficiency in the SEC’s operations. “If there are people who can help with creating efficiencies in the agency or otherwise, I would definitely work with them.” As has been reported elsewhere, more than 12% of the SEC has already taken a voluntary buyout; any further cuts as a result of involvement by DOGE could result in the SEC prioritizing certain types of investment adviser firms for focus from the Division of Examinations. While the SEC’s future staffing levels are not yet known, its future resource allocation is likely to be influenced by any priority given to protecting less sophisticated and less well-resourced investors.
Winding Back the Clock: CFTC Withdraws Controversial SEF Registration Staff Letter
The Division of Market Oversight (DMO) of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has withdrawn its previous staff advisory letter on swap execution facility (SEF) registration requirements (Letter 21-19).
Published on March 13, CFTC’s staff letter 25-05 (Letter 25-05) withdrew Letter 21-19 due to DMO’s understanding that it “created regulatory uncertainty” regarding whether certain entities operating in the swaps markets were required to register as SEFs. Letter 21-19 was therefore withdrawn with immediate effect.
The withdrawal of Letter 21-19 has removed what was seen by many parts of the swaps industry as a problematic widening of the interpretation of SEF regulatory requirements, which was difficult to apply and raised more questions than it answered.
A Look Back at Letter 21-19 and SEF Registration Requirements
Letter 21-19 was published in September 2021 as a “reminder” for entities of the SEF registration requirements under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA). The entities specifically in scope of the remainder were those: (1) facilitating trading or execution of swaps through one-to-many or bilateral communications; (2) facilitating trading or execution of swaps that are not subject to the trade execution requirement under the CEA; (3) providing non-electronic means for the execution of swaps; or (4) falling within the SEF definition and operated by an entity currently registered with the CFTC in some other capacity, such as a commodity trading advisor (CTA) or an introducing broker.
In relation to the first set of entities (i.e., facilities offering one-to-many or bilateral communications), the CEA defines a SEF as, in relevant part, “a trading system or platform in which multiple participants have the ability to execute or trade swaps by accepting bids and offers made by multiple participants in the facility or system.” Prior to Letter 21-19, the wider swaps industry had interpreted this as multiple-to-multiple trading; in other words, two or more market participants interacting with two or more other market participants to execute swaps. Letter 21-19 drastically increased the scope of such SEF requirement, however, by providing that the multiple-to-multiple trading requirement could be met even if (1) the platform only allows bilateral or one-to-one communications; and (2) multiple participants cannot simultaneously request, make, or accept bids and offers from multiple participants. DMO went on to express its view that a one-to-many system or request for quote (RFQ) system would satisfy the multiple-to-multiple requirement if more than one participant were able to submit an RFQ on the platform.
Letter 21-19 coincided with the CFTC’s settlement of an enforcement action with Symphony Communication Services, LLC (Symphony) for failure to register as a SEF. The CFTC found that Symphony had operated a multiple-to-multiple platform by operating a communications platform that allowed participants to send RFQ messages to multiple other market participants. Subsequently, the CFTC also relied on Letter 21-19 when it issued an order against Asset Risk Management, LLC, a registered CTA, for failing to register as a SEF.
What is the Cross-Border Impact
The potential relaxation of the SEF registration scope in the United States stands in contrast to similar regimes in the EU and the UK. The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) each published guidance in 2023, similar to Letter 21-19, which focused on the registration requirements for multilateral platforms. However, there are no signs that the EU or UK regulatory guidance will be amended. Technology service providers and trading venues may, therefore, wish to reconsider their cross-border service offerings in light of Letter 25-05 and the differing positions in the EU and UK.
Letter 21-19 is available here and Letter 25-05 is available here.