10 Important Insights for Procurement Fraud Whistleblowers in 2025
If you have information about procurement fraud, providing this information to the federal government could lead to the recovery of taxpayer funds and put a stop to any ongoing fraud. It could also entitle you to a financial reward. In addition to providing strong protections to procurement fraud whistleblowers, the False Claims Act entitles whistleblowers to financial compensation when the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action.
Whether you are interested in seeking a financial reward or you are solely focused on ensuring integrity and accountability within the federal procurement process, if you have information about procurement fraud, it will be important to make informed decisions about your next steps. While protections and financial incentives are available, whistleblowers who wish to expose procurement fraud must meet various substantive and procedural requirements, and they must come forward before someone else beats them to it.
“Federal procurement fraud is a pervasive issue, and whistleblowers play a critical role in the government’s fight against fraudulent bidding, contracting, and billing practices. For those who are thinking about serving as procurement fraud whistleblowers, understanding the federal whistleblowing process is critical for making informed decisions about their next steps.” – Dr. Nick Oberheiden, Founding Attorney of Oberheiden P.C.
So, what do you need to know if you are thinking about reporting procurement fraud to the federal government? Here are 10 important insights for whistleblowers in 2025:
1. Suspecting Procurement Fraud and Being Able to Prove Procurement Fraud Are Not the Same
Filing a whistleblower complaint for procurement fraud requires more than just suspicion of wrongdoing. To qualify as a federal whistleblower—and to become eligible for the protections and financial compensation that are available—you must be able to help the federal government prove that a contractor or subcontractor has violated the law, whether through false statements, bid rigging, overbilling, or other fraudulent actions.
As a result, if you just have general concerns about procurement fraud, these concerns—on their own—will generally be insufficient to substantiate a procurement fraud whistleblower complaint. However, if you have inside information about a specific form of procurement fraud, then this is a scenario in which filing a whistleblower complaint may be warranted.
2. You Don’t Need Conclusive Proof to Serve as a Procurement Fraud Whistleblower
To be clear, however, filing a whistleblower complaint does not require conclusive proof of government procurement fraud. Instead, to file a whistleblower complaint under the False Claims Act in federal court, you must be able to make allegations that “have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation.” As a result, you do not need any specific type or volume of evidence to serve as a procurement fraud whistleblower. If you have reason to believe that government contract fraud has been committed (or is in the process of being committed), this is generally all that is required.
With that said, the more evidence you have, the better—and you will want to work closely with an experienced procurement fraud whistleblower lawyer to determine whether you can meet the federal pleading requirements. If you need additional information, your lawyer can advise you regarding the information needed and how to collect it, as discussed in greater detail below.
3. You Must Be the First to Come Forward with Material Non-Public Information
Another requirement for serving as a procurement fraud whistleblower is that you must be privy to non-public information. In most cases, you also need to be the first to share this information with the federal government, though certain exceptions may apply.
With this in mind, while it is important to make an informed decision about whether to file a procurement fraud whistleblower complaint under the False Claims Act, it is also important to act promptly. A lawyer who has experience representing federal whistleblowers should understand that time is of the essence and should be able to assist you with making an informed decision as efficiently as possible.
4. While You Should Protect Any Evidence You Have, You Should Be Cautious About Collecting Additional Evidence
If you have collected or copied any evidence from your employer’s facilities or computer systems, you should protect this evidence to the best of your ability. Keep any hardcopy documents in a secure location and keep any electronic files on a secure storage device (and not in the cloud). This is important for your protection and for helping to ensure that you remain eligible to secure federal whistleblower status.
At the same time, if you are aware of additional evidence that you have not yet collected, you will need to be cautious about collecting this additional evidence. Even when you are taking steps to expose fraud, it is important to avoid violating employment policies or non-disclosure obligations–as doing so could put you at risk. While there are rules on when employers can (and can’t) enforce these types of restrictions to prevent whistleblowing, here too, you need to ensure that you are making informed decisions. An experienced procurement fraud whistleblower lawyer will be able to help.
5. If You Come Forward with Qualifying Information, the Government Will Have a Duty to Investigate Further
A key aspect of the procurement fraud whistleblower process is that the government has a duty to investigate allegations that warrant further inquiry. This is due, in part, to the nature of the qui tam procedures under the False Claims Act. The government isn’t necessarily required to pursue an enforcement action—this decision will be based on the outcome of its investigation—but it is generally required to determine if enforcement action is warranted.
With that said, not all substantiated allegations of government procurement fraud will necessarily warrant a federal investigation. If the amount at issue is small, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) may be justified in deciding not to devote federal resources to a full-blown federal inquiry. A whistleblower lawyer who has significant experience in qui tam cases will be able to assess whether the DOJ is likely to determine that your allegations warrant an investigation.
6. Federal Authorities Will Expect to Be Able to Work With You During Their Procurement Fraud Investigation
If you file a procurement fraud whistleblower complaint and the government decides to open an investigation, you will be expected to work with the government during the investigative process. Whether, and to what extent, you remain involved is up to you–but it is important to understand that federal agents and prosecutors will be expecting you to assist to the extent that you can. Your lawyer can advise you here as well, and can communicate with federal authorities on your behalf if you so desire.
7. Procurement Fraud Whistleblowers Are Entitled to Protection Against Retaliation and May Be Entitled to Financial Rewards
If you qualify as a procurement fraud whistleblower under the False Claims Act, you will be entitled to protection against retaliation in your employment (if you are currently employed by the contractor or subcontractor that you are accusing of fraud). Your employer will be prohibited from taking adverse employment action against you based on your decision to blow the whistle; and, if it retaliates against you illegally, you will be entitled to clear remedies under federal law.
If the information you provide leads to a successful enforcement action, you may also be entitled to a financial reward. Subject to certain stipulations, under the False Claims Act, whistleblowers who help the government recover losses from procurement fraud are entitled to between 10% and 30% of the amount recovered.
8. Hiring an Experienced Whistleblower Lawyer is Important, and You Can Do So at No Out-of-Pocket Cost
While filing a procurement fraud whistleblower complaint is a complex process, you do not have to go through the process on your own. You can—and should—hire an experienced whistleblower lawyer to represent you at no out-of-pocket cost. An experienced lawyer will be able to advise you of your options every step of the way, answer all of your questions, and interface with the federal government on your behalf.
9. There Are Several Reasons to Consider Blowing the Whistle on Procurement Fraud
If you have information about government procurement fraud, there are several reasons to consider coming forward. While the prospect of a financial reward is appealing to many, blowing the whistle is also simply the right thing to do. Contractors that engage in procurement fraud deserve to be held accountable, and helping federal and state governments recover taxpayer funds—while also helping to mitigate the risk of future losses—is beneficial for everyone.
10. It Is Up to You to Decide Whether to Blow the Whistle on Procurement Fraud
Ultimately, however, whether you decide to serve as a procurement fraud whistleblower is up to you. While an experienced whistleblower lawyer will help you make sound decisions, your lawyer should not pressure you into coming forward. It is a big decision to make, and it is one that you need to make based on what you believe is the right thing to do under the circumstances at hand.
As we mentioned above, however, time can be of the essence in this scenario. With this in mind, if you believe that you may have inside information, you should not wait to report fraud to the government. Your first step is to schedule a free and confidential consultation with an experienced procurement fraud whistleblower lawyer—and this is a step that you should take as soon as possible.
Using International Arbitration to Resolve Retaliatory Tariff Disputes in Global Supply Chains
As trade tensions rise, retaliatory tariffs are disrupting global supply chains—particularly in the automotive industry and other manufacturing sectors. These unexpected costs are sparking disputes over who should bear the financial burden under cross-border contracts. International arbitration is increasingly seen as the forum of choice for resolving these conflicts.
Retaliatory Tariffs Disrupting Global Supply Chains
Retaliatory tariffs—duties imposed by one country in response to another’s tariffs—have lately become a harsh reality. These tit-for-tat measures are upending global supply chains, especially in the manufacturing sector. Companies suddenly face higher import costs, squeezed profit margins, and unpredictable regulations as countries strike back with their own duties. The automotive industry is particularly exposed, as tariffs on steel, aluminum, or automotive parts drive up production costs and disrupt just-in-time supply lines. In short, retaliatory duties are injecting uncertainty at every tier of global manufacturing.
This uncertainty is not just an economic nuisance—it’s a legal flashpoint. Contracts that once made financial sense can become unprofitable or impossible to perform when an unexpected tariff hits. Common points of contention include:
Who pays for newly imposed tariffs—supplier or buyer?
Can pricing be adjusted when costs spike?
Is non-performance excused under force majeure or hardship clauses?
We’ve already seen cases of suppliers threatening to halt deliveries or buyers refusing shipments because a new tariff tipped a deal into the red. Such scenarios often trigger formal disputes. Many companies are discovering too late that their agreements didn’t fully account for politically driven tariff shocks. In this turbulent landscape, businesses need a robust way to resolve disputes fairly and efficiently—and so they are increasingly considering international arbitration.
Why International Arbitration Works
International arbitration offers a neutral, enforceable, efficient, confidential, and competence-driven way to resolve these disputes:
Neutrality. Unlike court litigation, where you might end up suing or being sued by a foreign partner in an unfamiliar legal system, arbitration provides a neutral forum agreed upon by both parties. Companies can avoid the “home court” advantage that one side would have in its local courts. In arbitration, the dispute is heard by an independent tribunal, often with arbitrators of neutral nationalities. This level playing field is crucial when a tariff dispute pits businesses from different countries against each other.
Enforceability. Another major advantage is enforceability. An arbitration award (the final decision of the arbitrators) can be enforced almost anywhere in the world, thanks to a treaty called the New York Convention. Over 170 countries—including the U.S., EU nations, China, Mexico, and many others—are signatories to the New York Convention, which obligates their courts to recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards. This means if a manufacturer wins an arbitration against an overseas supplier, the award can be taken to the supplier’s home country and converted into a local court judgment for payment. Such global reach is not guaranteed with a normal court judgment, which might not be enforceable abroad. For businesses facing losses from a tariff dispute, knowing that any resolution will hold up internationally can be a huge relief.
Efficiency: International arbitration is also typically faster and more flexible than litigating through court systems in multiple countries. Procedural rules can be streamlined in arbitration, which can significantly speed things along. There is only a limited right to appeal. Many arbitral institutions have expedited rules, and some allow the parties to resolve their disputes remotely via Teams or Zoom.
Expertise: The fact that parties can select arbitrators with industry experience can also help to resolve disputes more quickly than in court. An arbitrator who understands customs duties, supply chains, manufacturing timelines, the auto industry, and standard international commercial terms will grasp the issues more quickly than most judges and juries. Arbitrators with relevant expertise can expeditiously determine whether a dispute can be resolved with money damages, or whether it instead should be resolved with emergency interim relief such as a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, both of which arbitrators typically have the power to award.
Confidentiality: Unlike litigation in court, arbitration proceedings are private and confidential by default, which helps companies manage sensitive commercial issues outside the spotlight.
Practical Steps for Companies to Protect Themselves
In the short term, you should consider adding an arbitration clause to your agreements or updating the one you already have. Alternatively, if you’re already in the midst of a dispute, and you don’t have an arbitration clause in your supply agreement, you and your counterparty can nevertheless agree to arbitrate your dispute. Ask your lawyer to help you select the arbitration rules and institution—such as the International Chamber of Commerce, International Centre for Dispute Resolution, or Singapore International Arbitration Centre, among others—that best fit your needs.
Select the governing law carefully. The governing law is the national law that will be used to interpret the contract. This is important if, for instance, you want a legal system that recognizes sudden tariffs as a valid reason to adjust obligations, or, conversely, one that enforces contracts strictly.
Select the seat of arbitration (legal place of the arbitration) carefully. The seat determines the procedural framework, and which courts have limited oversight of the arbitration. Choose a seat in a neutral, arbitration-friendly jurisdiction such as New York, London, Singapore, or Geneva.
Retaliatory tariffs are likely to remain a feature of international trade for the foreseeable future, and global manufacturers—especially in industries like automotive, where supply chains cross many borders – will continue to feel the effects. International arbitration has emerged as a critical tool for resolving the disputes that inevitably arise from these trade frictions. It offers a neutral, enforceable, and effective way to get parties back on track when a deal is derailed by retaliatory tariffs. Businesses should see international arbitration not as a last resort, but as a built-in safety valve that can give all sides confidence to continue trading despite an uncertain tariff environment.
Hatch-Waxman Litigation Expenses Are Deductible Under Internal Revenue Code § 162(a)
The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld a US Court of Federal Claims ruling that Hatch-Waxman Act litigation expenses are ordinary and necessary business expenses under § 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, entitling an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) filer to deduct litigation expenses incurred defending against a patent infringement lawsuit. Actavis Labs. FL, Inc. v. United States, Case No. 23-1320 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 21, 2025) (Chen, Cunningham, Stark, JJ.)
Actavis filed ANDAs with the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) seeking approval to market and sell a generic version of a drug already offered for sale in the United States. Per the Hatch-Waxman Act, filing an ANDA is an act of patent infringement where the ANDA holder seeks FDA approval prior to the expiration of the new drug application (NDA) holder’s patent. Following Actavis’s filing, the NDA holder brought a patent infringement lawsuit against Actavis.
Actavis subsequently treated litigation expenses incurred in defending the patent infringement lawsuit as ordinary and necessary expenses. Actavis deducted those litigation expenses on its tax returns for that year. However, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) considered these expenses to be nondeductible capital expenditures since they were incurred “in pursuit of an intangible capital asset: namely, FDA approval to lawfully market a generic drug product in this country.”
Actavis eventually paid its tax liability but then sued the IRS in the Court of Federal Claims to recover what Actavis considered an overpayment of its taxes. The claims court agreed with Actavis, holding that Hatch-Waxman litigation expenses were deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses. The IRS appealed.
The Federal Circuit affirmed. When determining whether Hatch-Waxman litigation expenses are deductible under Code § 162(a), the Federal Circuit uses two tests to settle the issue: the “origin of the claim” test and the “most significant benefit” test. However, as the Court emphasized, regardless of which test applied, Actavis prevailed.
The Federal Circuit first explained that Actavis prevailed under either test because patent infringement (not the FDA approval process) is what triggers incurring litigation expenses. Further evidence that the “origin of the claim rests in the patentholder’s decision to sue, and not in the ANDA filer’s decision to seek drug approval from the FDA, is the fact that infringement litigation cannot provide the ANDA filer what it wants – only the FDA can,” the Court stated.
Relying on the Third Circuit’s 2023 decision in Mylan v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, the Federal Circuit delved into the fairness aspect of allowing Hatch-Waxman litigation expenses to be deductible. Citing Mylan, the Court explained that generic manufacturers defending against patent infringement suits “obtain no rights from a successful outcome. They acquire neither the intangible asset of a patent nor an FDA approval.” The Court also noted that brand-name drug companies in Hatch-Waxman lawsuits may deduct litigation expenses incurred while enforcing their patent rights. “[I]mposing very different tax treatment on the warring sides in an ANDA dispute, as the Commissioner advocates, is at odds with the careful statutory balance [embodied in the Hatch-Waxman Act] of improving access to lower-cost generic drugs while respecting intellectual property rights,” the Court stated.
Lastly, the Federal Circuit discussed the practical issues involved in treating Hatch-Waxman litigation expenses as nondeductible capital expenditures. The Court stated that obviously “[t]he ANDA filer would prefer not to be sued and then to obtain final FDA approval that becomes effective upon the FDA’s completion of its regulatory review, without a 30-month stay and risk of losing the litigation and needing to wait until the expiration of all pertinent patents.” Hence, defending a lawsuit should not be considered a “facilitating step in the FDA regulatory approval process,” which necessarily means that Hatch-Waxman litigation expenses did not “‘facilitate’ Actavis’ pursuit of the intangible asset of effective FDA approval of its ANDA,” the Court explained. As a result, the Court concluded that Hatch-Waxman litigation expenses should not be treated as nondeductible capital expenditures.
Matthew J. Blaney also contributed to this article.
President Trump Announces “Reciprocal” Tariffs Beginning 5 April 2025
On 2 April 2025, President Trump announced a series of “reciprocal” tariffs on US imports from all countries. The tariffs apply at different rates by country, starting at a baseline of 10% and reaching as high as 50%.
The tariffs, which are being implemented under the authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), will go into effect at a rate of 10% on 12:01 am ET on 5 April 2025. For some countries (see the complete list at the end of this alert), the 10% tariff baseline will increase to a higher per-country rate effective 12:01 am ET on 9 April 2025.
The latest tariffs are intended to address the customs duties and related VAT and non-tariff barriers imposed by each covered trading partner on US exports, as summarized in the National Trade Estimate Report issued by the Office of the US Trade Representative on 31 March 2025.
The reciprocal tariffs announced on 2 April 2025 will not apply to:
Certain news publications and other similar media;
Goods that are already subject to c Section 232 tariffs on steel, aluminum, and autos/auto parts;
Certain metals and minerals, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, lumber, electronics, energy, and other products identified in Annex II to the president’s Executive Order;
Imports from countries such as North Korea and Cuba subject to “Column 2” customs duty rates; and
Any goods that later become subject to tariffs pursuant to future Section 232 trade actions.
Additionally, for goods that incorporate US content, the reciprocal tariffs will apply only to the non-US content – provided at least 20% of the value of the good is US content (defined as produced or substantially transformed in the United States). Thus, for example, a good that incorporates 15% US content will be dutiable at its entire value, whereas a good incorporating 25% US content will be dutiable at 75% of its value.
Goods from Canada and Mexico that qualify for tariff-free treatment under USMCA will not face additional tariffs. Any goods from Canada or Mexico that do not qualify for USMCA will continue to be subject to the tariffs of 10% (for certain energy and mineral products) or 25% (all other products) that were announced in February 2025. In the event the President decides to terminate these 10-25% tariffs, goods from Canada or Mexico that do not qualify for USMCA treatment will be subject to a 12% reciprocal tariff.
In addition to the latest reciprocal tariffs, goods from China and Hong Kong will continue to be subject to the 20% tariffs implemented in February and March pursuant to the President’s IEEPA authority as well as (for most products from China) existing Section 301 tariffs of 25%. Further, starting 2 May 2025 at 12:01 a.m. ET, US tariffs will apply to products from China and Hong Kong that are imported through the Section 321 “de minimis” exception for low value shipments to a single US recipient on a single day.
According to President Trump, the United States will consider removing the latest reciprocal tariffs if US trading partners lower their tariff rates on US exports and take other steps to open their markets to US products. Countries that retaliate against the latest US tariffs may face even higher tariff rates.
Companies importing goods from the covered countries should carefully evaluate the list of covered imports and consider appropriate measures to determine their tariff exposure and potentially mitigate risks arising from the tariffs.
Countries Subject to “Reciprocal” Tariffs Higher than 10% (Effective 9 April 2025)
Countries and Territories
Reciprocal Tariff Rate
Algeria
30%
Angola
32%
Bangladesh
37%
Bosnia and Herzegovina
36%
Botswana
38%
Brunei
24%
Cambodia
49%
Cameroon
12%
Chad
13%
China
34%
Côte d`Ivoire
21%
Democratic Republic of the Congo
11%
Equatorial Guinea
13%
European Union
20%
Falkland Islands
42%
Fiji
32%
Guyana
38%
India
27%
Indonesia
32%
Iraq
39%
Israel
17%
Japan
24%
Jordan
20%
Kazakhstan
27%
Laos
48%
Lesotho
50%
Libya
31%
Liechtenstein
37%
Madagascar
47%
Malawi
18%
Malaysia
24%
Mauritius
40%
Moldova
31%
Mozambique
16%
Myanmar (Burma)
45%
Namibia
21%
Nauru
30%
Nicaragua
19%
Nigeria
14%
North Macedonia
33%
Norway
16%
Pakistan
30%
Philippines
18%
Serbia
38%
South Africa
31%
South Korea
26%
Sri Lanka
44%
Switzerland
32%
Syria
41%
Taiwan
32%
Thailand
37%
Tunisia
28%
Vanuatu
23%
Venezuela
15%
Vietnam
46%
Zambia
17%
Zimbabwe
18%
Karla M. Cure, Myeong S. Park, Ted Saint, and Brian J. Hopkins also contributed to this article.
US Treasury Extends Recordkeeping Requirement for Economic Sanctions Compliance to 10 Years
On March 20, 2025, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) published a final rule (Final Rule) extending the recordkeeping requirement for compliance with U.S. economic sanctions regulations from five to 10 years. This change aligns with the April 2024 legislation (Pub. L. 118-50) that increased the statute of limitations for economic sanctions violations under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. § 1705, and the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA), 50 U.S.C. § 4315 to 10 years. The Final Rule took effect March 21, 2025.
10-Year Recordkeeping Requirement for Sanctions Compliance
The April 2024 legislation doubled the statute of limitations for civil and criminal violations of IEEPA and TWEA. Subsequently, OFAC issued an interim final rule (89 Fed. Reg. 74832) in September 2024 to amend its recordkeeping requirements, consistent with the revised statute of limitations. After reviewing public comments, OFAC finalized the rule, officially codifying the 10-year recordkeeping requirement at 31 C.F.R. 501.601 and requiring that:
[E]very person engaging in any transaction subject to [U.S. sanctions regulations] shall keep a full and accurate record of each such transaction engaged in, regardless of whether such transaction is effected pursuant to license or otherwise, and such record shall be available for examination for at least 10 years after the date of such transaction.
Additionally, individuals or entities holding blocked property must keep a full and accurate record of that property for at least 10 years after the date of unblocking.
Implications for Financial Institutions
Financial institutions – including banks, casinos, and money services businesses – subject to the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) must implement risk-based measures to address compliance risks related to money laundering and terrorist financing.
Previously, the BSA’s recordkeeping requirements aligned with OFAC’s five-year retention period. With the Final Rule’s extension, financial institutions must reassess their record retention policies and update internal frameworks to comply with the new 10-year requirement. Regulatory agencies will expect institutions to revise policies, procedures, and controls to reflect this change.
Key Takeaways
The extended recordkeeping requirement applies only to sanctions compliance and does not affect the five-year retention requirements for the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) or the Export Administration Regulations (EAR).
Companies should review their existing recordkeeping and record retention policies to determine updates or adjustments to be made to align with the new 10-year OFAC period, as well as evaluate potential conflicts with other regulatory record retention periods to be reconciled. Companies should also evaluate from an operational standpoint whether their systems, resources, and technologies can support the longer retention period, including assessing potential impacts on data management, storage costs, access controls, and cybersecurity.
Compliance measures should include updating record-retention policies, enhancing automated systems, and conducting organization-wide training to ensure adherence to the new rules.
This change carries significant operational and compliance implications, particularly for financial institutions, which must ensure readiness to meet the extended requirements while maintaining secure and accessible records for regulatory purposes.
Kentucky Legislature Ends Judicial Deference To State Agencies
In a realignment of judicial review standards, the Kentucky General Assembly overrode Governor Andy Beshear’s (D-KY) veto of Senate Bill (SB) 84, effectively abolishing judicial deference to all agency interpretations of statutes and regulations. This development marks a shift in administrative law in the Commonwealth.
A RESPONSE TO CHEVRON AND TO KENTUCKY COURTS
SB 84 invokes the Supreme Court of the United States’ 2024 decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, which overturned the Chevron doctrine and ended judicial deference to federal agency interpretations of statutes. The bill’s preamble provides:
In Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), the United States Supreme Court ruled that the federal judiciary’s deference to the interpretation of statutes by federal agencies as articulated in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and its progeny was unlawful.
However, SB 84 does more than align Kentucky with the new federal standard. It also repudiates the approach taken by Kentucky’s own courts. The bill notes that decisions such as Metzinger v. Kentucky Retirement Systems, 299 S.W.3d 541 (Ky. 2009), and Kentucky Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission v. Estill County Fiscal Court, 503 S.W.3d 924 (Ky. 2016), which embraced Chevron-like deference at the state level, is a practice that the legislature now declares inconsistent with the separation of powers under the Kentucky Constitution.
KEY PROVISIONS: DE NOVO REVIEW MANDATED
The operative language of SB 84 creates two new sections of the Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) and amends an existing provision by establishing a de novo standard of review for agency, including the Kentucky Department of Revenue, interpretations:
An administrative body shall not interpret a statute or administrative regulation with the expectation that the interpretation of the administrative body is entitled to deference from a reviewing court. (New Section of KRS Chapter 13A.)
The interpretation of a statute or administrative regulation by an administrative body shall not be entitled to deference from a reviewing court. (New Section of KRS Chapter 13A.)
A court reviewing an administrative body’s action… shall apply de novo review to the administrative body’s interpretation of statutes, administrative regulations, and other questions of law. (New Section of KRS Chapter 446.)
The court shall apply de novo review of the agency’s final order on questions of law. An agency’s interpretation of a statute or administrative regulation shall not be entitled to deference from a reviewing court. (Amended KRS 13B.150.)
This means Kentucky courts must now independently review all legal interpretations made by agencies, including in tax cases before the Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals, without any presumption of correctness.
A CONSTITUTIONAL FLASHPOINT
Governor Beshear vetoed the bill, arguing in his veto message that it violates the separation of powers by dictating to the judiciary how it should interpret laws. Governor Beshear’s message provides that:
Senate Bill 84 is unconstitutional by telling the judiciary what standard of review it must apply to legal cases…It prohibits courts from deferring to a state agency’s interpretation of any statute, administrative regulation, or order. It also requires courts to resolve ambiguous questions against a finding of increased agency authority. The judicial branch is the only branch with the power and duty to decide these questions.
Republican lawmakers countered that SB 84 strengthens the judiciary’s independence. Senate leadership said in a statement that:
SB 84 aligns Kentucky with a national legal shift that reaffirms the judiciary’s role in interpreting statutes. The bill does not weaken governance—it strengthens separation of powers by removing undue deference to regulatory agencies and restoring courts’ neutrality in legal interpretation.
The governor’s constitutional objections should not apply to cases before the state’s Office of Claims and Appeals (which includes the Board of Tax Appeals), which the legislature itself created.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR TAX PRACTITIONERS
For tax practitioners, SB 84 could reshape tax litigation strategy in Kentucky. Courts reviewing Department of Revenue guidance or interpretations – whether in audits, refund claims, or administrative appeals – are no longer bound by any deference. The Department of Revenue’s legal position is now just that – a position, not a presumption. Whether Kentucky courts fully embrace this legislative mandate or chart their own course remains to be seen.
Either way, this is a welcome development for taxpayers and practitioners who have long argued that state agencies should not have the last word on the meaning of tax statutes. By mandating de novo review, Kentucky reinforces a neutral playing field, one where legal questions are resolved by courts without institutional bias in favor of the agency.
Other states should take note and follow suit. Just last year, Idaho, Indiana, and Nebraska passed similar amendments restoring judicial independence from executive branch interpretations of state laws. SB 84 offers a legislative blueprint for restoring judicial independence and curbing agency overreach in the tax context. As more states grapple with the implications of Loper Bright, Kentucky’s approach provides a model for how legislatures can proactively realign administrative law with core separation of powers principles.
The Supreme Court Finds An Income Tax Statute Unconstitutional – Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co. 158 U.S. 601 (1895)
The 16th Amendment to the United States Constitution, ratified in 1913, provides as follows: “The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States and without regard to any census or enumeration.” Why the reference to “apportionment”? Why the reference to a census? To answer these questions, it is necessary to turn to one of the most forgotten of forgotten Supreme Court cases, Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co. 158 U.S. 601 (1895). The case was forgotten because it was rendered moot by the passage of the 16th Amendment. Few today remember that the Supreme Court invalidated an income tax statute passed by Congress in the 1890s.
Until eclipsed by the Great Depression of the early 1930s, the Panic of 1893 was regarded as the greatest economic downturn in American history. Prompted by bankers, bondholders, and other financial interests, the nation’s currency had been on the gold standard for 20 years. This contributed to deflationary pressures that pushed the prices of farm products below farmers’ costs[1]. A wave of farm bankruptcies and foreclosures was followed by widespread unemployment and wage cuts for urban workers, prompting strikes to protest the wage cuts.
The Panic of 1893, like the Stock Market Crash of 1929, was ushered in by a period in which the nation’s wealth was concentrated in the hands of fewer and fewer people. In a 2017 installment of the PBS series The American Experience, titled “The Gilded Age,” the narration discussed the 1890 Census, which revealed that there were approximately 12 million families in America, of whom 4,000 held as much wealth as the combined wealth of approximately 11.6 million other families.
During the 1890s, as had been the case at almost all previous times in American history, the federal government derived most of its revenue from tariffs and excise taxes. In January 1894, a young Congressman from Nebraska named William Jennings Bryan joined a growing contingent that questioned the wisdom of financing the government with an indirect tax on basic goods.[2] Bryan and others reasoned that most people spent most of their income on necessities and that the sellers of many of these necessities passed on the costs of tariffs imposed on those goods to consumers who bought them. It followed that those who spent all or most of their income on living expenses (most Americans) paid taxes on a larger portion of their income than the wealthy, who spent only a fraction of their income on living expenses and were not subject to any tax on their income. It followed that an income tax would be a fairer way to distribute the cost of supporting the federal government. This idea had great appeal in this era of concentrated wealth. Hence, in 1894, Congress passed the first peacetime income tax.[3] Some monied interests saw this law as the first step on the road to socialism and the confiscation of most of their wealth. Hence, the challenge that brought the Pollock case before the Court.
The Court’s majority found that Congress could not tax income from land or money invested in financial assets. This decision rested on some brief and perhaps confusing language in the Constitution. Article I § 2 ¶ 3 says, “Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union according to their respective numbers.”[4] Article I §8 ¶1 gives Congress the power “To lay and collect taxes duties, imposts, and excises…to be uniform throughout the United States.”
From these provisions came the distinction between direct taxes, which must be apportioned among the States according to the population as determined by the Census, and indirect ones, such as tariffs, which must be uniform throughout the country. Thus, the crucial question for the Court in Pollock was what constitutes a direct tax.
There was no disagreement among the Justices that an income tax did not lend itself to apportionment among the States according to population. A head tax, a “capitation” in which each individual paid the same amount, was the archetype of a direct tax apportioned according to population. Because some States had aggregate incomes that were greater per capita than others, ensuring that an income tax was apportioned equally among the States on a per capita basis presented some obvious problems. From this reality, the majority, as expressed in Chief Justice Melville Fuller’s opinion, drew a very different conclusion from those of four Justices, who wrote separate dissenting opinions. Most notable among the dissents was that of Justice John Marshall Harlan, which was more in tune with the sentiments of Main Street than of Wall Street.[5]
The majority found that a tax on income derived from rents or earnings from securities or other investments was a direct tax that could not be imposed without violating the apportionment mandate of Article I §2 ¶3 and was, therefore, unconstitutional.
In his dissent, Harlan cited precedents going back to George Washington’s day as authority for his view that direct taxes within the meaning of the Constitution were limited to head taxes and taxes on land. He noted the terrible contortions that would be necessary to apportion a tax on the income from land and other invested personal assets among the States according to population.[6] He concluded that the Framers could not have intended to include such taxes as direct ones within the meaning of Article I §2 ¶3. Pollock, Id. at 652.
What is most notable about Harlan’s dissent is that he eloquently expressed the sentiments that led Congress to pass the 1894 income tax legislation in the first place. Although the majority found that all the provisions of the income tax statute were tainted by the unconstitutional tax on the profits of land and invested capital, the opinion theoretically held open the possibility of taxes on salaries.[7] Thus, in his dissent, Harlan protested that “The practical effect of the decision to-day is to give to certain kinds of property a position of favoritism” Id at 685.
“In the large cities or financial centers of the country there are persons deriving enormous incomes from the renting of houses that have been erected not to be occupied by the owner, but for the sole purpose of being rented. Near by are other persons, trusts, combinations, and corporations, possessing vast quantities of personal property, including bonds and stocks of railroad, telegraph, mining, telephone, banking, coal, oil, gas, and sugar-refining corporations, from which millions upon millions of income are regularly derived. In the same neighborhood are others who own neither real estate, nor invested personal property, nor bonds, nor stocks of any kind, and whose entire income arises from the skill and industry displayed by them in particular callings, trades, or professions, or from the labor of their hands, or the use of their brains. And it is now the law, as this day declared, that …congress cannot tax the personal property of the country, nor the income arising either from real estate or from invested personal property…while it may compel the merchant, the artisan, the workman, the artist, the author, the lawyer, the physician, even the minister of the Gospel, no one of whom happens to own real estate, invested personal property, stock, or bonds, to contribute directly from their respective earnings, gains, and profits, and under the rule of uniformity or equality, for the support of the government.” Id at 672-673.
Harlan’s dissent makes nearly the same point made by William Jennings Bryan in a portion of his famous “Cross of Gold” speech at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in 1896.[8] In this portion of the speech, Bryan addressed his remarks to the monied interests who supported the gold standard and opposed bimetallism.
“When you come before us and tell us that we shall disturb your business interests, we reply that you have disturbed our interests by your action….The man who is employed for wages is as much a businessman as his employer. The attorney in a country town is as much a businessman as the corporation counsel in a great metropolis. The merchant at the crossroads store is as much a businessman as the merchant in New York. The farmer who goes forth in the morning and toils all day, begins in spring and toils all summer, and by the application of brain and muscle to the natural resources of this country creates wealth, is as much a businessman as the man who goes upon the Board of Trade and bets on the price of grain. The miners who go 1,000 feet into the earth or climb 2,000 feet upon the cliffs and bring forth from their hiding places the precious metals to be poured in the channels of trade are as much businessmen as the few financial magnates who in a backroom corner the money of the world.” [Commager (ed) Documents Of American History, P. 174]
The Main Street v. Wall Street theme was present in both Harlan’s dissent in Pollock and Bryan’s Cross of Gold speech.
It is undoubtedly a good thing that our Constitution cannot be amended easily. Only overwhelming sentiment in favor can secure the two-thirds majorities in both houses of Congress and ratification by the legislatures of three-fourths of the States necessary for an amendment. It took until 1913, 18 years after the Pollock decision, for the 16th Amendment to be passed. However, public support for financing the federal government with an income tax rather than tariffs was likely already building at the time of the decision.
By 1913, what became known as the Progressive Era was in full swing. Woodrow Wilson, of the Progressive wing of the Democratic Party, was President. Theodore Roosevelt of the Progressive wing of the Republican Party had been president from 1901 to 1908. The 17th Amendment, which provides for the direct election of members of the U.S. Senate, another Progressive reform, was also passed in 1913. The Federal Trade Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Reserve System, and the Clayton Anti-Trust Act were all part of this era of reform. By 1913, Charles Evans Hughes and Oliver Wendell Holmes, two Justices sympathetic to Progressive reforms, were already on the Supreme Court; another Justice with these sympathies, Louis Brandeis, would follow in 1916. With the 16th Amendment in place, Congress passed the Revenue Act of 1913, which simultaneously implemented the income tax and lowered tariffs. [Link & McCormick, Progressivism, James, The Supreme Court In American Life, Chambers, The Tyranny Of Change, and McGerr, A Fierce Discontent].
The Pollock decision was moot, but the sentiments expressed in Harlan’s dissent had prevailed and made a lasting impact on law and public policy.
[1] The underlying cause of the problem was a long-term downward trend in grain prices. This trend was a result of the worldwide expansion of railroads, which opened new land for cultivation, facilitated access to markets, and reduced transportation costs. The decreasing prices they received for their products made the debts American farmers had incurred in earlier years relatively more burdensome. Many farmers viewed the monetization of silver, known as “bimetallism,” as a remedy to the deflationary pressure squeezing them. [Blum, et. al. The National Experience (3rd ed.), PP. 475-476; Parkes, The American Experience, P. 298; Foner, Give Me Liberty, P. 631; Schieber et. al., American Economic History (9th edition), PP. 213-214.; Goodwyn, The Populist Moment, P. 12; Brands, American Colossus, P. 487]
[2] Canellos, The Great Dissenter, P. 108.
[3]. A special emergency income tax existed during the Civil War, which was not continued after the War’s end.
[4] What followed, although not relevant here, was the language embodying the infamous Three-Fifths Compromise.
[5] See generally, Canellos, supra Chapter 14, and Urofsky, Dissent and the Supreme Court at PP. 126-128.
[6] Such as imposing a higher rate on States with lower aggregate incomes from these sources so that the amount paid per capita was equal.
[7] This possibility would require the tax on salaries to be categorized as an indirect tax within the meaning of Article I §8 ¶1, or the contortions needed to apportion it equally among the States according to population would also apply to it.
[8] This speech is considered one of American history’s greatest speeches. Bryan was 36 years old and not one of the leading contenders for the Party’s nomination for President at the time. The speech electrified the Convention. There was pandemonium on the floor and in the galleries. Bryan was carried around the hall on the shoulders of elated delegates for 25 minutes and instantly vaulted over all the other candidates to become the Party’s nominee. The language quoted above was merely part of the build-up to the dramatic final words of the speech, “You shall not press down upon the brow of labor this crown of thorns. You shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold.” [See H.W. Brands, American Colossus, PP. 547-548; Lears, Rebirth of a Nation, PP. 186-187; Cashman, America in the Gilded Age, PP. 332-334, and Wikipedia Article “Cross of Gold Speech” accessed 3/25/25.]
And Just Like That Another Restructuring Plan Is Sanctioned with HMRC Supporting (UK)
The Outside Clinic restructuring plan (RP) was sanctioned last week with HMRC voting in favour of it. In a similar vein to Enzen (see our earlier blog) HMRC initially indicated that it was not inclined to support the plan, but, after negotiating a higher return following the convening hearing, it voted in favour of it. A somewhat different outcome in circumstance where HMRC had (prior to the company proposing a plan) instructed its solicitors to present a winding up petition after attempts to agree a time to pay agreement had failed.
HMRC’s engagement and support is welcome (as it is on any restructuring), but the outcome in both this case, and Enzen, should not be taken as a green light that HMRC’s support is guaranteed – much will depend on the terms of the plan.
Under the terms of the Outside Clinic RP as originally proposed, HMRC would have received a dividend of 5p in the £ in respect of its secondary preferential claims of c£1.45m, compared to nil in the relevant alternative. HMRC would also have been treated the same as other unsecured creditors who also were to receive 5p in the £.
Following the convening hearing, HMRC flagged a number of concerns which the plan company had to address not least
Whether the “no worse off” test could be satisfied – with concern about the recoverability of receivables/book debts which (if the assumptions were wrong) could see a different return in the alternative (an argument we saw in opposition to the plan proposed by the Great Annual Savings company); and
HMRC’s treatment compared to other creditors (as noted above the plan originally proposed to treat HMRC in the same way as unsecured creditors)
HMRC’s improved position seems to have come about partly as a result of the plan company subsequently acknowledging that HMRC is an involuntary creditor and that it has a role to play as collector of taxes.
Perhaps more will come from the judgments on both this case and Enzen, but the key takeaways at the moment are that a plan company must (a) recognise that HMRC is an involuntary creditor and (b) its role in collecting taxes – something that reflects HMRC guidance too.
If HMRC’s status is recognised in a plan perhaps HMRC will support from the outset, especially so given HMRC’s new stated policy is “to participate as fully as possible in plans – which will include, when necessary and desirable, negotiating with plan companies on HMRC’s return under a restructuring plan”.
Hillsborough County, FL Sales Tax Increase June 1, 2025
The Florida Department of Revenue announced today that the temporary sales tax reduction in Hillsborough County, Florida will expire on May 31, 2025.
As outlined in our initial article, the 2024 legislature temporarily suspended the Hillsborough County surtaxes in order to return a portion of previously enacted and later ruled unconstitutional transportation surtax. That legislation resulted in a 1% reduction to the Hillsborough County surtaxes (6.5%).
Starting June 1, 2025, dealers of tangible personal property, admissions, and taxable services should collect a combined rate of 7.5%. For commercial rental periods occurring on or after June 1, 2025, dealers should collect a combined rate of 3.5%.
The TIP is available at the following website:
https://floridarevenue.com/taxes/tips/Documents/TIP_25A01-02.pdf
The length of the suspension is based on several factors, including the balance of the proceeds available for the suspension, which the Department has determined will last through May 31, 2025.
Louisiana Voters Overwhelmingly Reject Governor Landry’s Constitutional Amendments
On March 29, 2025, four constitutional amendments were on the ballot for Louisiana voters’ consideration. Constitutional Amendment No. 2, (CA No. 2) which passed the Louisiana legislature during the November 2024 special fiscal session as House Bill No. 7, included changes to personal income tax rates, governmental spending caps, education funding, and teacher pay raises. Also included were amendments to the Constitution that would allow local taxing authorities to exempt or reduce the assessment rate of parish property taxes on business inventory located in their parishes. However, despite strong support from the Governor and his administration, the voters of Louisiana rejected that amendment by over 60% of the ballots cast.
As CA No. 2 was an important component of the Governor’s modernization of Louisiana’s taxation system and would have provided the legislature with more flexibility in collecting and distributing revenue, it is likely that more work will have to be done during the upcoming regular fiscal session scheduled to begin on April 14 with a conclusion date of June 12.
One important component of CA No. 2 was the ability of local taxing jurisdictions to lower the assessment rate of business inventory or exempt it altogether. Under current law, local taxing jurisdictions do not have the authority to do either, and the legislature retains the sole authority to make those determinations. Because the legislature repealed the credit for property taxes paid on business inventory (the repeal of which was not tied to the passage of CA No. 2), that credit will still sunset with no apparent relief from the current local taxes levied on business inventory.
As noted above, with the upcoming fiscal session beginning soon, legislators have until the close of business on April 4 to file “general subject” bills that do not address fiscal matters. Legislators have until April 23 to file bills with a fiscal impact. It is highly likely that legislation will be proposed to address some of the issues that CA No. 2 would have amended.
As noted above, with the upcoming fiscal session beginning soon, legislators have until the close of business on April 4th to file “general subject” bills that do not address fiscal matters.
What are the Odds that FanDuelDraftKingsBet365 Can Save Tax-Exempt Bonds?
A document leaked earlier this year and attributed to the House Ways and Means Committee included the repeal of tax-exempt bonds[1] as a source of revenue to help defray the cost of extending the provisions of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act that otherwise will expire at the end of 2025. Apoplexy ensued.
This consternation is fueled by the notion that Congress has the untrammeled authority to prevent states, and the political subdivisions thereof, from issuing obligations the interest on which is excluded from gross income for federal income tax purposes. This notion appears to ignore a line of precedent that culminated in making Bet365, DraftKings, FanDuel, et al. indistinguishably omnipresent.
Curious? Read on after the break.
The concern that Congress has the unfettered right to proscribe the issuance of all tax-exempt bonds emanates from the U.S. Supreme Court’s (the “Court”) decision in South Carolina v. Baker.[2] The Court held in that case that Congress violated neither the principles of intergovernmental tax immunity[3] nor the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by enacting a prohibition against the issuance of tax-exempt bearer bonds.
The portion of the Court’s opinion pertaining to the Tenth Amendment cited Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), for the proposition that the political process establishes the limitations under the Tenth Amendment on Congressional authority to regulate the activities of the states and their political subdivisions. Under this formulation of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, the courts do not define spheres of Congressional conduct that pass or fail constitutional muster. The Court concluded that the political process functioned properly in this instance and did not fail to afford adequate protection under the Tenth Amendment to South Carolina.
The Court also rejected the contention that Congress had, in violation of the Tenth Amendment, commandeered the South Carolina legislature by prohibiting the issuance of tax-exempt bearer bonds and questioned whether the concept of anti-commandeering originally contained in FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982), survived the Court’s decision in Garcia.
Aside from the portion that dealt with the Tenth Amendment, Justice Antonin Scalia joined the opinion of the Court, and Chief Justice William Rehnquist concurred in the Court’s judgment but did not join the Court’s opinion. In the view of Justices Rehnquist and Scalia, the Court should have upheld the prohibition against the issuance of tax-exempt bearer bonds because it had a de minimis effect on state and local governments, which would have ended the analysis under the Tenth Amendment. They asserted that the Court’s opinion regarding the Tenth Amendment mischaracterized the holding of Garcia and unnecessarily cast doubt on whether the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from dictating orders to the states and their political subdivisions.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor dissented and stated that “the Tenth Amendment and principles of federalism inherent in the Constitution prohibit Congress from taxing or threatening to tax the interest paid on state and municipal bonds.” In Justice O’Connor’s view, the prohibition against the issuance of tax-exempt bearer bonds intruded on state sovereignty in contravention of the Tenth Amendment and the structure of the Constitution. This incursion would have negative effects on state and local governmental budgets and activities – effects she said that would only metastasize as Congress enacted further restrictions on the issuance of tax-exempt obligations, including, potentially, the elimination of such obligations.[4]
Four years later, when confronted anew with an anti-commandeering question in New York v. United States,[5] the Court demonstrated that it was receptive to the argument that the protection of state prerogatives under the Tenth Amendment is not limited to the political process. The Court held that Congress cannot compel a state government to take title to radioactive waste or, alternatively, assume liability for such waste generated within the state’s borders, because the Tenth Amendment forbids the issuance of orders by the federal government to the various state governments to carry out regulatory schemes adopted by the federal government.
In her opinion for the Court in New York, Justice O’Connor developed the themes articulated in her dissent in Baker. Namely, the Tenth Amendment was ratified to ensure that the federal government adhered to the federalist structure devised by the Constitution, a structure that contrasted starkly with the Articles of Confederation that the Constitution replaced. Under the Articles of Confederation, the federal government had limited, if any, power to govern the citizens of the various states. Instead, the Articles of Confederation constrained the federal government to acting upon the state governments, and state governments were the sole sovereign with respect to their citizens. Under this constraint, the federal government could not tax the citizens; it could only issue requisitions to the state governments to raise funds.
The federal government at that time did not possess the wherewithal to enforce the dictates and requisitions it had imposed upon the states. As a result, the United States was hardly a cohesive whole. The Constitution was ratified to create a more robust federal government and, thus, a truly unified United States. Under the Constitution, the federal government may use the powers conferred upon it to directly govern the citizens. Justice O’Connor observed that the Tenth Amendment guarantees adherence to the Constitutional structure, because it prohibits the federal government from issuing orders, dictates, and requisitions to the state governments, as the federal government could do under the Articles of Confederation.
The Court applied the foregoing rationale to hold in Printz v. United States[6] that the Tenth Amendment precludes the federal government from commandeering state officials to carry out a federal regulatory program. The Court once again followed this rationale when it held in Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association[7] that, where Congress had not prohibited sports gambling throughout the United States, the Tenth Amendment barred Congress from preventing a state legislature from enacting laws that permit sports gambling within the state. As a result of Murphy, 39 states now allow sports gambling, and the FanDuelDraftKingsBet365 Borg has relentlessly endeavored to assimilate us.
This durable line of Tenth Amendment precedent should give one pause before concluding that Congress can completely repeal the ability of state and local governments to issue tax-exempt bonds. As noted above, a complete repeal of tax-exempt bonds is projected to generate $364 billion in revenue to the federal government over a 10-year period. Under New York, Printz, and Murphy, Congress clearly cannot issue a requisition to the states seeking remittance of $364 billion to help finance a federal income tax cut. The elimination of tax-exempt bonds is the economic equivalent of such a requisition by the federal government to the states and their political subdivisions. State and local governments will be required to pay bondholders higher, taxable interest rates on debt obligations that they issue.[8] If the projections noted above are accurate, $364 billion of this increased interest paid by state and local governments will be remitted by the bondholders to the federal government.[9]
Does the Tenth Amendment allow the federal government to impose an indirect requisition on state and local governments that the federal government cannot issue directly? Does the legal incidence of the tax on the bondholders suffice to avoid the anti-commandeering principle developed by New York, Printz, and Murphy? If it does, would the Court distinguish its holding in Baker on the basis that prohibiting the issuance of tax-exempt bearer bonds has a trivial effect on state and local governmental sovereignty, while a full elimination has a much more profound effect? If Congress eliminates tax-exempt bonds, will one or more states invoke the right of original jurisdiction[10] to present these questions directly to the U.S. Supreme Court?
With all this on the table, it might be a bad bet to conclude that Congress can parlay the elimination of tax-exempt bonds into a revenue offset to help pay for a federal tax cut.
[1] The document scored the repeal of tax-exempt bonds as raising $250 billion over 10 years and the repeal of “private activity bonds” as generating $114 billion over the same timeframe. The reference in that document to “private activity bonds” means “qualified bonds” under Section 141(e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. Qualified bonds are private activity bonds that would, absent legislative enactment by Congress, constitute taxable bonds. Some common examples of qualified bonds include qualified 501(c)(3) bonds (which are frequently issued to finance educational, healthcare, and housing facilities owned or operated by 501(c)(3) organizations), exempt facility airport bonds (which are issued to finance improvements to terminals and other airport facilities in which private parties, such as airlines, hold leasehold interests or other special legal entitlements), and exempt facility qualified residential rental project bonds. For ease, references to “tax-exempt bonds” in this post are to both tax-exempt governmental use bonds and tax-exempt qualified bonds.
[2] 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
[3] In so holding, the Court overruled Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895). The Court in Pollock espoused the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity to conclude that the federal government lacks the authority under the U.S. Constitution to tax the interest on obligations issued by state or local governments.
[4] Justice O’Connor was quite prescient.
[5] 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
[6] 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
[7] 584 U.S. 453 (2018).
[8] The Public Finance Network estimates that the repeal of tax-exempt bonds will raise borrowing costs for state and local governments by $823.92 billion between 2026 and 2035, which will result in a state and local tax increase of $6,555 per each American household.
[9] It should be noted that taxing the interest paid on state and local debt does not, as some claim, result in an economic charge imposed on the wealthy. As an initial matter, retirees and others of more modest means hold a significant amount of currently outstanding tax-exempt bonds, because they want to allocate a portion of their savings to a secure investment. Assuming arguendo that tax-exempt bondholders tend to be wealthier, they will be compensated for the tax in the form of increased interest rates. They will suffer no economic detriment because their after-tax return on taxable state and local bonds will equal the return available on tax-exempt bonds. State and local governments will, however, need to raise taxes or limit governmental services so that they can pay the higher interest rates demanded on taxable obligations. Less wealthy constituents will bear the brunt of this. The less wealthy tend to be the recipients of more governmental services than the wealthy. Moreover, the less wealthy devote a larger share of their income to the payment of sales tax (the form of taxation on which state and local governments increasingly rely) than is the case with wealthier constituents. Consumption taxes, such as sales taxes, are by their nature regressive, because the less wealthy spend a greater percentage of their income than do the wealthy, who can save a larger share of their income. These savings are not subjected to a consumption tax.
[10] U.S. Const. Art. III, Sec. 2.
California Bill Proposes Expanding False Claims Act to Include Tax-Related Claims
California lawmakers are considering Senate Bill 799 (SB 799), introduced by Sen. Ben Allen, which proposes amending the California False Claims Act (CFCA) to encompass tax-related claims under the Revenue and Taxation Code.
The CFCA currently encourages employees, contractors, or agents to report false or fraudulent claims made to the state or political subdivisions, offering protection against retaliation. Under the CFCA, civil actions may be initiated by the attorney general, local prosecuting authorities, or qui tam plaintiffs on behalf of the state or political subdivisions. The statute also permits treble damages and civil penalties.
At present, tax claims are excluded from the scope of the CFCA. SB 799 aims to amend the law by explicitly allowing tax-related false claims actions under the Revenue and Taxation Code, subject to the following conditions:
1. The damages pleaded in the action exceed $200,000. 2. The taxable income, gross receipts, or total sales of the individual or entity against whom the action is brought exceed $500,000 per taxable year.
Further, SB 799 would authorize the attorney general and prosecuting authorities to access confidential tax-related records necessary to investigate or prosecute suspected violations. This information would remain confidential, and unauthorized disclosure would be subject to existing legal penalties. The bill also seeks to broaden the definition of “prosecuting authority” to include counsel retained by a political subdivision to act on its behalf.
Historically, the federal government and most states have excluded tax claims from their False Claims Act statutes due to the complexity and ambiguity of tax laws, which can result in increased litigation and strain judicial resources. Experiences in states like New York and Illinois illustrate challenges associated with expanding false claims statutes to include tax claims. For instance, a telecommunications company settled a New York False Claims Act case involving alleged under collection of sales tax for over $300 million, with the whistleblower receiving more than $60 million. Such substantial incentives have led to the rise of specialized law firms targeting ambiguous sales tax collection obligations, contributing to heightened litigation.
If enacted, SB 799 would require California taxpayers to evaluate their exposure under the CFCA for any positions or claim taken on tax returns. Importantly, the CFCA has a statute of limitations of up to 10 years from the date of violation, significantly longer than the typical three- or four-year limitations period applicable to California tax matters. Taxpayers may also need to reassess past tax positions to address potential risks stemming from this extended limitations period.