Regulation Round Up: February 2025
Welcome to the Regulation Round Up, a regular bulletin highlighting the latest developments in UK and EU financial services regulation.
Key developments in February 2025:
28 February
FCA Handbook Changes: The Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) published Handbook Notice 127, which sets out changes to the FCA Handbook made by the FCA board on 30 January and 27 February 2025.
27 February
Economic Growth / Consumer Duty: The FCA published a speech on, among other things, how the FCA is working to support growth initiatives in the economy and its approach to the Consumer Duty.
FCA Regulation Round‑up: The FCA published its regulation round‑up for February 2025. Among other things, it covers the launch of a new companion tool to the Financial Services Register and future changes to the pre‑application support services the FCA offers.
26 February
Reserved Investor Funds: The Alternative Investment Funds (Reserved Investor Fund) Regulations 2025 (SI 2025/216) were published, together with an explanatory memorandum. The Reserved Investor Fund is a new UK‑based unauthorised contractual scheme with lower costs and more flexibility than the existing authorised contractual scheme.
ESG: The European Commission proposed an Omnibus package on sustainability (here and here) to amend the sustainability due diligence and reporting requirements under the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive ((EU) 2024/1760) and the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive ((EU) 2022/2464). Please refer to our dedicated article on this topic here.
ESG: The European Commission published a call for evidence on a draft Delegated Regulation amending the Disclosures Delegated Act ((EU) 2021/2178) (Ares (2025) 1532453), the Taxonomy Climate Delegated Act (Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/2139) and the Taxonomy Environmental Delegated Act (Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/2486).
FCA Asset Management / Alternatives Supervision: The FCA published a portfolio letter explaining its supervision priorities for asset management and alternatives firms.
Cryptoassets: ESMA published the official translations of its guidelines (ESMA35‑1872330276‑2030) on situations in which a third‑country firm is deemed to solicit clients established or situated in the EU and the supervision practices to detect and prevent circumvention of the reverse solicitation exemption under the Markets in Crypto Assets Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 (“MiCA”).
24 February
Artificial Intelligence: The FCA published a research note on AI’s role in credit decisions.
Suitability Reviews / Ongoing Services: The FCA published a webpage and press release containing the findings of its multi‑firm review of suitability reviews and whether financial advisers are delivering the ongoing services that consumers have paid for.
21 February
Cryptoassets: The Financial Stability Board published summary terms of reference for its thematic peer review on its global regulatory framework for cryptoasset activities.
20 February
PRA Policy: The Prudential Regulatory Authority (“PRA”) published a policy statement (PS3/25) on its approach to policy.
Digital Operational Resilience: Two Commission Regulations supplementing the Regulation on digital operational resilience for the financial sector ((EU) 2022/2554) (“DORA”) were published in the Official Journal of the European Union (here and here).
17 February
Cryptoassets: ESMA published a consultation paper (ESMA35‑1872330276‑2004) on guidelines for the criteria to assess knowledge and competence under MiCA.
14 February
ESG: The FCA updated its webpage on its consultation paper on extending the sustainability disclosure requirements (“SDR”) and investment labelling regime to portfolio managers. Please refer to our dedicated article on this topic here.
ESG: The City of London Law Society published its response to HM Treasury’s November 2024 consultation on the UK green taxonomy.
Authorised Funds: The FCA published a document setting out its expectations on authorised fund applications.
Financial Sanctions: The Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation published a threat assessment report covering financial services.
13 February
Financial Regulatory Forum: HM Treasury published a statement following the third meeting of the joint UK‑EU Financial Regulatory Forum on 12 February 2025.
12 February
EU Competitiveness: The European Commission adopted a Communication setting out its vision to simplify how the EU works by reducing unnecessary bureaucracy and improving how new EU rules are made and implemented to make the EU more competitive.
European Commission 2025 Work Programme: The European Commission published a communication outlining its work programme for 2025 (COM(2025) 45 final).
10 February
Artificial Intelligence: The European Commission published draft non‑binding guidelines to clarify the definition of an AI system under the EU AI Act.
5 February
ESG: The EU Platform on Sustainable Finance published a report setting out recommendations to simplify and improve the effectiveness of taxonomy reporting. Please refer to our dedicated article on this topic here.
3 February
Payments: The FCA published a portfolio letter sent to payments firms setting out its priorities for them and actions it expects them to take.
Artificial Intelligence: The House of Commons Treasury Committee launched an inquiry into AI in financial services and published a related call for evidence.
Sulaiman Malik and Michael Singh contributed to this article
Tax Transparency and Data Privacy — Which Wins?
As tax authorities embrace new digital technologies, the issue of safeguarding citizens’ data privacy rights steps to the fore. Since the implementation of the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 2018, there has been a greater focus on data privacy from both the public and organisations. At the same time, the cooperative international effort to combat offshore tax evasion has been steadily increasing. Several information-sharing regimes have been conceived to allow tax authorities to share information globally relating to financial accounts and investments under Automatic Exchange of Information Agreements.
In J Webster v HMRC [2024] EWHC 530 (KB), Ms. Webster, a US citizen, brought a case against His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) regarding information sharing under the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act. At the centre of this case stands the question of which wins — tax transparency or data privacy?
Automatic Exchange of Information (AEOI)
The United Kingdom shares information with foreign tax authorities under two specific regimes:
1. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA): The FATCA regime is US-specific. Financial institutions outside of the United States are required to provide the US tax authorities with information relating to the foreign financial accounts of US individuals. Information includes, for example, the individual’s name and address, account balance and amount of interest accrued.
2. Common Reporting Standard (CRS): Nicknamed “global FATCA” by commentators at its inception, the CRS requires the automatic exchange of financial account information between tax authorities globally. The information shared is largely the same as that under FATCA, with the addition of the date and individuals’ places of birth (in some cases).
In practice, financial institutions in the United Kingdom supply the required data to HMRC, which then provides it to the relevant tax authorities on an annual and automatic basis.
The GDPR
Data privacy in the United Kingdom is regulated by the UK GDPR (the retained version of the EU GDPR) and the Data Protection Act 2018. Under Article 4(1) of the UK GDPR, personal data means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person. There are seven key principles for processing personal data (found in Article 5, UK GDPR). Broadly, these require that personal data is: (i) processed lawfully, fairly and transparently, (ii) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes only, (iii) limited to what is necessary for the purposes (minimisation), (iv) accurate, (v) not stored longer than necessary, and (vi) processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the data. Finally, the data controller must be responsible for and able to demonstrate compliance with the preceding six principles.
Importantly, personal data must only be transferred outside of the United Kingdom if the receiving countries have adequate levels of protection for data subjects in place or appropriate safeguards for the transfer of personal data (Article 46, UK GDPR).
So, Which Wins?
Ms. Webster argued that information sharing between tax authorities under the FATCA regime breached her data privacy and human rights. In summary, she claimed that there were no appropriate safeguards in place for the transfers by HMRC and that US law failed to provide adequate levels of protection. Additionally, the data transfers allegedly fell foul of the principle of proportionality, as bulk processing did not account for Ms. Webster’s personal circumstances — specifically, that Ms. Webster had no US tax obligations (having modest income in the United Kingdom and owning no assets or income in the United States).
Unfortunately, the central question of “which wins?” remains unanswered. The judgment focused more on questions of procedure than substance — for example, as argued by HMRC, whether the claim should have been brought via judicial review and was, therefore, an abuse of process.
However, it is not difficult to see some merit in Ms. Webster’s claim. The aims of FATCA and the CRS are clearly worthy, and tax transparency is important. However, since personal data is processed automatically and whether an individual poses any real risk of tax evasion is immaterial to that processing, it is unconvincing that the principles of proportionality and data minimisation are comfortably being met.
Information-sharing regimes have been challenged in other countries as well. For example, the Belgian Data Protection Authority has argued (in a decision that has since been annulled) that data exchanges under FATCA violate the EU GDPR since more information than necessary is shared and the purposes for the data transfers are insufficiently defined. The Slovakian Data Protection Authority also challenged FATCA on the grounds that the AEOI Agreement under which data transfers took place did not contain the necessary safeguards to transfer personal data to third countries.
It is widely agreed that the GDPR is far more comprehensive than US privacy laws — some might remember the highly publicised “Schrems II” case from 20201 where the Court of Justice of the European Union declared that the US privacy laws fail to ensure an adequate level of protection. Recent news about the US Treasury being hacked also inevitably raises concerns about the security of the personal data transferred, and with President Donald Trump’s firing of Democratic members of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board since the beginning of his second term, more widespread privacy concerns now linger.
We will have to wait and see how the tension between tax transparency and data privacy culminates. A judgment that focuses on the merits of Ms. Webster’s concerns would bring us some much-needed answers. However, what is clear is that there is pressure on tax authorities to address concerns relating to the data privacy of individuals, which are not subsiding.
1 Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Ltd, Maximilian Schrems and intervening parties, Case C-311/18.
Georgia Griesbaum contributed to this article
Trade Update: Navigating Trump Administration Tariffs
On March 4, 2025, the Trump Administration commenced new broad and sweeping tariffs on products of Canada and Mexico, while doubling tariffs on China previously imposed in early February of this year. On March 6, 2025, the Administration announced that tariffs on products of Canada and Mexico that are covered by the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (“USMCA”) will be postponed through April 2, 2025. The updated country-based duty regimes follow President Trump’s mid-February announcement of new and revised steel and aluminum tariffs targeting imports from all countries. As global trade tensions continue to rise and many countries have already begun to introduce retaliatory tariffs on the U.S., it will be critical to monitor how increased duty rates will impact your company’s cross-border transaction activity, as well as to develop practical supply chain strategies to mitigate the impact of these fluid and dynamic trade disputes.
I. Targeted IEEPA Tariffs
On February 1, 2025, pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), the Trump Administration originally announced new 25 percent tariffs on nearly all imports from Mexico and Canada (except for certain energy products from Canada, subject to a 10 percent duty), as well as additional 10 percent tariffs on nearly all imports from China. While the 10 percent tariffs on goods from China went into effect on February 4, 2025, the proposed tariffs on Mexico and Canada were initially suspended for 30 days. President Trump subsequently announced on March 3, 2025 that he is proceeding with the 25 percent IEEPA tariffs on Canada and Mexico, in response to outstanding national security concerns associated with both illegal immigration and drug trafficking at the northern and southern borders. In addition, President Trump issued an Executive Order to double the original 10 percent IEEPA tariffs on China to 20 percent.
The Administration then announced a temporary pause on automobile tariffs on Mexico and Canada for one month on March 5, 2025 and subsequently on March 6, 2025 announced an additional temporary pause on USMCA-compliant products through April 2, 2025 – when additional announcements on the Trump Administration’s “reciprocal tariff” regime is anticipated. In the interim, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) is continuing to update its Cargo Systems Messaging Service with related guidance implementing the Administration’s tariff-related Executive Orders.
As of the date of this article, a brief summary of current tariff impacts is included below.
Canada
IEEPA 25% Tariff: CBP announced on March 3, 2025 that all goods that are the product of Canada (except those identified below) that are entered for consumption, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time on March 4, 2025, will be subject to an additional ad valorem duty of 25 percent. (Classified in U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule (“HTSUS”) 9903.01.10).
IEEPA 10% Tariff: In the same guidance, CBP announced the following products of Canada will be subject to a 10 percent ad valorem duty effective March 4, 2025: Crude oil, natural gas, lease condensates, natural gas liquids, refined petroleum products, uranium, coal, biofuels, geothermal heat, the kinetic movement of flowing water, and critical minerals, as defined by 30 U.S.C. 1606(a)(3). (Classified in HTSUS 9903.01.13).
USMCA Compliant Goods – Temporary Pause: On March 6, 2025, the Administration announced that tariffs on all products of Canada that comply with the USMCA free trade agreement will be paused until April 2, 2025.
Mexico
IEEPA 25% Tariff: CBP announced on March 3, 2025 that all goods that are the product of Mexico (except those identified below) that are entered for consumption, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time on March 4, 2025, will be subject to an additional ad valorem duty of 25 percent. (Classified in HTSUS 9903.01.01).
USMCA Compliant Goods – Temporary Pause: On March 6, 2025, the Administration announced that tariffs on all products of Mexico that comply with the USMCA free trade agreement will be paused until April 2, 2025.
Canada and Mexico Tariff Exclusions
Products for personal use included in accompanied baggage of persons arriving in the United States;
Donations of food, clothing and medicine intended to relieve human suffering;
Certain informational materials; and
Certain goods entered under HTSUS Chapter 98 (e.g., HTSUS 9802.00.40, 9802.00.50, and 9802.00.60, where additional duties apply to the value of repairs, alterations, or processing performed in Mexico or Canada).
Foreign Trade Zones, Drawback, and De Minimis
Products of Canada or Mexico admitted to a foreign trade zone (“FTZ”) after 12:01 a.m. ET on March 4, 2025 subject to IEEPA tariffs must be admitted as privileged foreign status. Upon entry for consumption into the U.S., they will be subject to the rate of duty in effect at the time of admission into the zone.
Goods eligible for admission to an FTZ under domestic status (as defined in 19 CFR 146.43) are exempt from the tariffs.
Duty drawback is not available for impacted goods from Canada or Mexico.
The duty-free de minimis exemption under 19 U.S.C. 1321 continues to be available until the Department of Commerce establishes a system to collect such tariffs.
China
IEEPA 20% Tariff: President Trump originally imposed a 10 percent additional IEEPA tariff effective February 4, 2025 applicable to all imported articles that are the products of China and Hong Kong. This Order was amended March 3, 2025 and CBP announced that an additional 20 percent IEEPA tariff will apply to all imported articles that are the products of China and Hong Kong effective March 4, 2025.
Section 301 Tariffs: The 20 percent IEEPA tariffs apply in addition to any general rate of duty, Section 301 duty, or Section 232 duty that may be applicable to articles of Chinese origin. A full list of Section 301 China tariff classifications can be found on the HTSUS website administered by the U.S. International Trade Commission.
II. Section 232 National Security Tariffs
In February 2025, the Trump Administration announced updated 25 percent tariffs on steel and aluminum products pursuant to Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (“Section 232”), targeting all countries. The updated Section 232 tariffs will be effective March 12, 2025 – and the formal Federal Register notices describing impacted articles by HTSUS classifications for steel and aluminum were published on March 5, 2025. A summary of key information from these Proclamations is included below:
Blanket 25% tariffs on imports of steel, aluminum, and certain steel and aluminum derivative articles effective March 12, 2025.
For newly covered derivative articles that are outside of HTS Chapter 73 (steel) and Chapter 76 (aluminum), the additional duty will apply only to the value of the steel or aluminum content of the derivative product. Further, tariffs on the new derivatives outside of Chapters 73 and 76 will only take effect “upon public notification of the Secretary of Commerce,” upon determining that systems are in place to process and collect tariff revenue for such articles.
Importers will be required to report to CBP the primary country of smelt, secondary country of smelt, and country of cast on imports of all aluminum articles subject to the aluminum and aluminum derivatives Section 232 measures.
Rescission of previous country-specific Section 232 exclusions and tariff rate quotas implemented since 2018.
Recission of Section 232 product-specific exclusion process administered by the Department of Commerce. Previously granted product-specific exclusions remain in effect until they expire or the approved quantity has been exhausted.
CBP is directed to prioritize monitoring of steel and aluminum imports to discover misclassifications of merchandise that result in non-payment of the Section 232 duties, and to assess maximum monetary penalties against importers determined to have misclassified such articles.
In addition, on February 25, 2025 and March 1, 2025, the White House subsequently announced two new Section 232 investigations into (i) copper, and (ii) timber and lumber imports – which may result in additional tariff actions.
III. Supply Chain Strategies and Key Takeaways
Tariffs have been and will continue to be a focal point of the Trump Administration’s global trade policy, whether in pursuit of economic security, national security, or as a broader negotiation tactic. Further, the Administration has made it clear that a broad reciprocal tariff regime will be announced on April 2, 2025 – the scope of which is currently unclear, but which is anticipated to be both sector-based (e.g., automobiles, agriculture, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, and advanced computing equipment) as well as country-based. That being said, the tariff landscape is evolving rapidly and subject to constant evolution and change – and accordingly, companies and importers should take the following steps as soon as possible:
Evaluate your supply chain and diversify suppliers to mitigate tariff costs;
Reevaluate product designs and manufacturing operations to establish favorable country(ies) of origin;
Negotiate tariff cost-sharing provisions in supply and distribution contracts to mitigate effect of increased tariffs;
For outbound products, identify potential new costs to customers and distributors associated with retaliatory tariffs implemented by third-countries;
Closely monitor evolving negotiations and regulatory changes for new exclusions, exemptions, or carve-outs that may impact your cross-border transaction activity;
Utilize free trade agreements or free trade zones where practicable; and
Consistently audit and document HTS classifications and country of origin determinations for imported goods to ensure customs compliance, timely duty payments, and efficient responses to requests for information issued by CBP.
Tariffs: Force Majeure and Surcharges — FAQs
As we navigate a turbulent tariff landscape for manufacturers, we want to help you with some of the most frequently asked questions we are encountering right now as they relate to force majeure and price increases:
1. What are the key doctrines to excuse performance under a contract?
There are three primary defenses to performance under a contract. Importantly, these defenses do not provide a direct mechanism for obtaining price increases. Rather, these defenses (if successful) excuse the invoking party from the obligation to perform under a contract. Nevertheless, these defenses can be used as leverage during negotiations.
Force Majeure
Force majeure is a defense to performance that is created by contract. As a result, each scenario must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis depending on the language of the applicable force majeure provision. Nevertheless, the basic structure generally remains the same: (a) a listed event occurs; (b) the event was not within the reasonable control of the party invoking force majeure; and (c) the event prevented performance.
Commercial impracticability (Goods)
For goods, commercial impracticability is codified under UCC § 2-615 (which governs the sale of goods and has been adopted in some form by almost every state). UCC § 2-615 excuses performance when: (a) delay in delivery or non-delivery was the result of the occurrence of a contingency, of which non-occurrence was a basic assumption of the contract; and (b) the party invoking commercial impracticability provided seasonable notice. Common law (applied to non-goods, e.g., services) has a similar concept known as the doctrine of impossibility or impracticability that has a higher bar to clear. Under the UCC and common law, the burden is quite high. Unprofitability or even serious economic loss is typically insufficient to prove impracticability, absent other factors.
Frustration of Purpose
Under common law, performance under a contract may be excused when there is a material change in circumstances that is so fundamental and essential to the contract that the parties would never have entered into the transaction if they had known such change would occur. To establish frustration of purpose, a party must prove: (a) the event or combination of events was unforeseeable at the time the contract was entered into; (b) the circumstances have created a fundamental and essential change, and (c) the parties would not have entered into the agreement under the current terms had they known the circumstance(s) would occur.
2. Can we rely on force majeure (including if the provision includes change in laws), commercial impracticability, or frustration of purpose to get out of performing under a contract?
In court, most likely not. These doctrines are meant to apply to circumstances that prevent performance. Also, courts typically view cost increases as foreseeable risks. Official comment of Section 2-615 on commercial impracticability under UCC Article 2, which governs the sale of goods in most states, says:
“Increased cost alone does not excuse performance unless the rise in cost is due to some unforeseen contingency which alters the essential nature of the performance. Neither is a rise or a collapse in the market in itself a justification, for that is exactly the type of business risk which business contracts made at fixed prices are intended to cover. But a severe shortage of raw materials or of supplies due to a contingency such as war, embargo, local crop failure, unforeseen shutdown of major sources of supply or the like, which either causes a marked increase in cost or altogether prevents the seller from securing supplies necessary to his performance, is within the contemplation of this section. (See Ford & Sons, Ltd., v. Henry Leetham & Sons, Ltd., 21 Com.Cas. 55 (1915, K.B.D.).)” (emphasis added).
That said, during COVID and Trump Tariffs 1.0, we did see companies use force majeure/commercial impracticability doctrines as a way to bring the other party to the negotiating table, to share costs.
3. May we increase price as a result of force majeure?
No, force majeure typically does not allow for price increases. Force majeure only applies in circumstances where performance is prevented by specified events. Force majeure is an excuse for performance, not a justification to pass along the burden of cost increases. Nevertheless, the assertion of force majeure can be used as leverage in negotiations.
4. Is a tariff a tax?
Yes, a tariff is a tax.
5. Is a surcharge a price increase?
Yes, a surcharge is a price increase. If you have a fixed-price contract, applying a surcharge is a breach of the agreement.
That said, during COVID and Trump Tariffs 1.0, we saw many companies do it anyway. Customers typically paid the surcharges under protest. We expected a big wave of litigation by those customers afterward, but we never saw it, suggesting either the disputes were resolved commercially or the customers just ate the surcharges and moved on.
6. Can I pass along the cost of the tariffs to the customer?
To determine if you can pass on the cost, the analysis needs to be conducted on a contract-by-contract basis.
7. If you increase the price without a contractual justification, what are customers’ options?
The customer has five primary options:
1. Accept the price increase:
An unequivocal acceptance of the price increase is rare but the best outcome from the seller’s perspective.
2. Accept the price increase under protest (reservation of rights):
The customer will agree to make payments under protest and with a reservation of rights. This allows the customer to seek to recover the excess amount paid at a later date. Ideally, the parties continue to conduct business and the customer never seeks recovery prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations (typically six years, depending on the governing law).
3. Reject the price increase:
The customer will reject the price increase. Note that customers may initially reject the price increase but agree to pay after further discussion. In the event a customer stands firm on rejecting the price increase, the supplier can then decide whether it wants to take more aggressive action (e.g., threaten to stop shipping) after carefully weighing the potential damages against the benefits.
4. Seek a declaratory judgment and/or injunction:
The customer can seek a declaratory judgment and/or injunction requiring the seller to ship/perform at the current price.
5. Terminate the contract:
The customer may terminate part or all of the contract, depending on contractual terms
For additional information, here is a comprehensive white paper we have written on the tariffs.
Federal Circuit Broadens ITC Economic Prong
In the recent decision of Lashify, Inc. v. International Trade Commission, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rejected the long-standing approach concerning the interpretation of the domestic-industry requirement under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. The complainant, an American company importing eyelash extensions from international manufacturers, which alleged that certain other importers were infringing on its patents.
The central legal issue in this case revolved around the interpretation of the “economic prong” of the domestic-industry requirement under 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3)(B). Specifically, the panel examined whether significant employment of labor or capital related to sales, marketing, warehousing, quality control, and distribution could satisfy the economic prong, even in the absence of domestic manufacturing.
The Federal Circuit vacated the Commission’s split decision regarding the economic prong, finding that the Commission’s interpretation was contrary to the statutory text. Notably, the Court cited the Loper Bright Supreme Court decision that allows the Court to “exercise [] ‘independent judgment’ about the correctness of [the Commission’s] interpretation.”
The Court ultimately held that significant employment of labor or capital should be considered sufficient to satisfy the economic prong, regardless of whether the labor or capital is used for sales, marketing, warehousing, quality control, or distribution. The Court emphasized that the statutory language does not impose a domestic-manufacturing requirement or limit the economic prong to technical development. Rather the panel held that so long as the human activity is related to “aspects of providing [patented] goods or services,” the cost of that investment in human capital should be accounted for. This decision has significant implications for future cases involving the domestic-industry requirement under Section 337. The Federal Circuit’s interpretation broadens the scope of what can be considered significant employment of labor or capital, potentially allowing more companies to satisfy the economic prong without engaging in domestic manufacturing. This could lead to increased access to Section 337 relief for companies that focus on sales, marketing, and distribution activities within the United States.
Foley Automotive Update 06 March 2025
Foley is here to help you through all aspects of rethinking your long-term business strategies, investments, partnerships, and technology. Contact the authors, your Foley relationship partner, or our Automotive Team to discuss and learn more.
Special Update — Trump Administration and Tariff Policies
Foley & Lardner provided an update on the potential ramifications of steel and aluminum tariffs on multinational companies.
Foley & Lardner partner Gregory Husisian described sentiment among Chief Financial Officers on the Trump administration’s approach to trade policy in The Wall Street Journal article, “The Latest Dilemma Facing Finance Chiefs: What to Tell Investors About Tariffs.”
Key tariff announcements include:
USMCA-compliant automakers have a one-month exemption from the 25% tariffs on U.S. imports from Canada and Mexico that were announced on March 4. The Trump administration announced the decision on March 5, following discussions with Ford, GM, and Stellantis.
In a March 5 MEMA update regarding the temporary pause of auto tariffs on Canada and Mexico, President and CEO Bill Long stated “Conversations held today indicate positive results that USMCA-compliant parts are included, but we are awaiting official confirmation from the Administration.” In breaking news on March 6, Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick stated to CNBC: “It’s likely that it will cover all USMCA compliant goods and services, so that which is part of President Trump’s deal with Canada and Mexico are likely to get an exemption from these tariffs. The reprieve is for one month.”
On March 4, U.S. duties on Chinese imports were doubled to 20%. China intends to implement new tariffs on U.S. imports on March 10, and the nation added over two dozen U.S. companies to export control and corporate blacklists.
The Canadian government does not plan to repeal the 25% retaliatory tariffs on approximately C$30 billion worth of goods from U.S. exporters, announced on March 4. Canada could also implement a second round of 25% tariffs in three weeks on C$125 billion of products that include cars, trucks, steel, and aluminum. Mexico plans to announce tariffs on U.S. imports on March 9.
25% levies on U.S. imports of steel and aluminum could be implemented March 12.
Announcements could follow on April 2 regarding 25% sector-specific tariffs that would include automobile and semiconductor imports, along with broader “reciprocal tariffs” on countries that tax U.S. imports. Details have not been provided regarding the recent threat for 25% duties on European imports.
A February 25 executive order directed the government to consider possible tariffs on copper.
Automotive Key Developments
U.S. new light-vehicle sales are estimated to have reached a SAAR between 16.1 and 16.3 million units in February 2025, according to preliminary analysis from J.D. Power and Haver Analytics.
Annual U.S. auto sales could decline by 500,000 units, and up to 2 million units, if the Trump administration were to implement 25% tariffs on automotive imports from Mexico and Canada, according to automotive analysts featured in the Detroit Free Press and Bloomberg. In addition, a recession could begin “within a year” if certain tariffs “persist for any length of time.”
The Alliance for Automotive Innovation and Anderson Economic Group estimate tariffs on Mexican and Canadian imports could raise the cost of a new vehicle by up to 25%, or by a range of $4,000 to $12,000, depending on the model.
Crain’s Detroit reports product launch delays are impacting suppliers as automakers postpone investment decisions until there is more stability in areas that include “federal tariffs, regulatory policy and electric vehicle incentives.”
A number of large auto suppliers are taking steps to reduce expenses in order to support profitability amid market uncertainty, according to a report in Automotive News.
The Wall Street Journal provided overviews of the potential impact of tariffs on automakers and vehicle components, stating that “no sector is as exposed to possible Trump tariffs as the auto industry.”
The benchmark price for domestic steel has increased 25% this year to $900 a ton, ahead of a possible 25% import tariff on the metal.
The Wall Street Journal reports the potential for tariffs on aluminum have already raised costs for buyers, as there are few U.S. suppliers capable of meeting supply needs after years of declining domestic production.
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration laid off 4% of its staff as part of a government-wide reduction of federal employees. NHTSA had expanded its workforce by roughly 30% under the Biden administration, and it was estimated to have a staff of approximately 800 prior to the job cuts.
At the annual MEMA Original Equipment Suppliers event on February 27, the North American purchasing chief of Stellantis indicated the automaker will consider supplier requests for pricing relief. This represents a reversal of a “no more claims” policy announced in 2024.
OEMs/Suppliers
Stellantis reported a full-year 2024 net profit of $5.8 billion on net revenue of $156.9 billion, representing year-over-year declines of roughly 70% and 17%, respectively.
GM will temporarily halt production for a number of weeks at its Corvette plant in Bowling Green, Kentucky, for undisclosed reasons.
Mercedes plans to reduce capacity in Germany as part of an initiative to reduce expenses by 10% through 2027 amid heightened competition, uneven demand, and high material costs. The automaker may also reduce its sales and finance workforce in China, according to unidentified sources in Reuters.
China’s top-selling automaker, BYD, could decide on a third plant location in Europe within the next two years. The automaker has plants underway in Szeged, Hungary, and Izmir, Türkiye.
Detroit Manufacturing Systems, LLC will acquire Android Industries, LLC and Avancez, LLC. The combined entity, Voltava LLC, will be headquartered in Auburn Hills, Michigan, and it is expected to reach over $1.5 billion in annual revenue.
Market Trends and Regulatory
J.D. Power estimates the average monthly payment for a new vehicle reached $738 in February, up 2.4% year-over-year. The analysis noted “vehicle affordability remains a challenge for the industry and is the primary reason why the sales pace, while strengthening, has not returned to pre-pandemic levels.”
The new vehicle average transaction price reached $48,118 in January 2025, according to analysis from Edmunds.
The International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) ratified a six-year labor contract with the United States Maritime Alliance (USMX), ending months of uncertainty over the potential for a follow-up strike at U.S. East and Gulf Coast ports.
National “right to repair” legislation was introduced in Congress last month by a bipartisan group of lawmakers. The Right to Equitable and Professional Auto Industry Repair Act (H.R. 906) follows multiple recent attempts by Congress to pass similar legislation.
The 2026 Detroit Auto Show will take place January 14–25, 2026, at Huntington Place.
In response to concerns over the compliance costs associated with 2025 carbon dioxide emissions standards in the European Union, the European Commission announced automakers will now have a three-year window to meet emissions targets in the bloc.
Autonomous Technologies and Vehicle Software
Automotive News provided an update on the outlook for artificial intelligence (AI) adoption in certain automotive applications.
A number of automakers are pursuing software and AI-based technology to differentiate their vehicles’ self-driving features, according to a report in The Wall Street Journal.
Stellantis debuted a Level 3 automated driving system, STLA AutoDrive 1.0, that is expected to facilitate hands-free and eyes-off functionality at speeds of up to 37 mph. The automaker did not provide a launch date for the technology. The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) defines Level 3 as autonomous technology that can drive the vehicle under limited conditions without human supervision.
Mercedes is currently the only automaker with a Level 3 system approved for use in the U.S., and the automaker’s Drive Pilot is only available in Nevada and California. Honda plans to launch Level 3 automated driving system in 2026, in the 0 Series in North America.
Uber began offering its customers driverless Waymo rides in Austin, Texas.
Electric Vehicles and Low Emissions Technology
China’s Xiaomi has a goal to deliver over 300,000 EVs in 2025, and this would more than double its deliveries last year. The consumer electronics giant sells nearly all its EVs within China.
China announced new export restrictions on tungsten and other specialty metals used in applications that include EV batteries.
TechCrunch analysis indicates there are currently 34 battery factories either planned, under construction, or operational in the U.S., up from two in 2019.
Stellantis’ Brampton Assembly plant in Ontario has been temporarily shut down as the automaker reevaluates plans for the next-generation electric Jeep Compass SUV that was scheduled to begin production in early 2026. This follows a decision by Ford to delay the launch of its next-generation gas and hybrid F-150 pickup trucks.
Canada’s zero-emission vehicle sales declined by nearly 30% in January 2025 from December 2024. This follows a halt in the federal rebate program, when funding was exhausted ahead of the original termination date of March 31, 2025.
The Trump administration directed federal buildings across the U.S. to shut off EV chargers, according to communications from the General Services Administration described by unidentified sources in Bloomberg.
Upstream’s 2025 Automotive and Smart Mobility Global Cybersecurity Report found that attacks involving EV chargers increased to 6% in 2024, from 4% in 2023. According to the report, 59% of the EV charging attacks in 2024 had the potential to impact millions of devices, including chargers, mobile apps, and vehicles.
Among the top 10 battery electric vehicle (BEV) models with the fewest reported problems in the J.D. Power 2025 U.S. Electric Vehicle Experience (EVX) Ownership Study, seven were in the mass market segment. BMW iX was rated highest overall and highest in the premium BEV segment, and the Hyundai IONIQ 6 ranked highest in the mass market BEV segment.
Consumer Reports’ Best Cars of the Year for 2025 includes six models with hybrid options and one fully electric model.
BEV sales in Europe increased 34% year-over-year in January 2025, while overall new-vehicle registrations fell by 2.5%, according to data from the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA). BEVs achieved a 15% market share in Europe, compared to 10.9% in January 2024.
Analysis by Julie Dautermann, Competitive Intelligence Analyst
Important Update on U.S. Tariffs Impacting Ontario Businesses
The United States has announced the imposition of new tariffs on Canadian goods, effective immediately as of March 4, 2025. These tariffs include a 25% surcharge on a wide range of products imported from Canada. The products include but are not limited to: steel and aluminum products; automotive parts and vehicles; agricultural products such as dairy, beef, and pork; consumer goods like appliances, electronics, and apparel; raw materials and chemicals.
In response to the announcement, Ontario Premier Doug Ford stated on March 4, 2025, that Ontario would implement a reciprocal 25% surcharge on all energy exported by Ontario to the United States. He stated further that it was expected by the Ontario government that the tariffs would have a significant impact on multiple industries including, in particular, manufacturing.
The Purpose and Potential Impact of the Tariffs
The U.S. government has stated that tariffs are intended to protect American industries and jobs over the long term. However, the immediate impact on businesses and customers will be significant. For Canadians, the tariffs are likely to increase the cost of exporting goods to the U.S., potentially leading to reduced demand for Canadian products, and increasing the overall price of goods for citizens. This could result in financial strain on businesses and may necessitate adjustments to the workforce.
Legal Considerations for Workforce Reduction
The imposition of tariffs will pose challenges for many businesses and the workforce. But as we saw with COVID-19, the fact that there are significant and sometimes societal level impacts on the economy, or a particular industry, will not automatically remove or lessen an employer’s obligations to their employees in Ontario. In this regard, some of the major legal considerations to keep in mind as you contemplate how to weather this storm and manage your workforce are as follows:
Compliance with Employment Standards: Ensure that any workforce reductions comply with Ontario’s Employment Standards Act, 2000 (ESA), including proper notice periods and severance pay requirements. There are options short of termination for temporary reductions in work, including layoffs, which may be available.
Human Rights Legislation: Be mindful of the Ontario Human Rights Code, ensuring that layoffs or terminations are not targeted towards any particular group of employees.
Collective Agreements: If your workforce is unionized, review your collective bargaining agreements to understand the rules and procedures for layoffs or terminations. Many collective agreements contain provisions which deal with temporary interruptions of work, voluntary leaves/layoffs, and notice and severance obligations.
Constructive Dismissal: Although there may be an avenue to lay off employees under the ESA, the common law in Ontario does not automatically allow an employer to layoff an employee. It is important to consider, and avoid, how your actions could be construed as a constructive dismissal which could lead to legal claims from employees.
Record Keeping: It is important that you maintain thorough documentation of the reasons for workforce reductions and the steps taken to comply with your legal obligations. This can be crucial in defending against potential legal claims.
It is recommended that you review your employment agreements, collective agreements, and policies, and formulate a plan now that will allow you to respond quickly to changing economic conditions over the coming weeks. As always, and prior to implementing major changes in your workplace, it is important that you obtain advice and comply with your legal obligations.
Cross-Border Catch-Up: Employer Considerations for International Secondments [Podcast]
In this episode of our Cross-Border Catch-Up podcast series, Shirin Aboujawde (New York) and Maya Barba (San Francisco) discuss an important global mobility topic: international secondments. Maya and Shirin focus on key issues for employers to consider, including immigration compliance, employment law considerations in both the home and host countries, as well as obligations related to income tax, social security, and corporate taxation.
President’s Remarks Keep the Pressure on Congress to Deliver on Taxes
President Trump used his 4 March 2025 address to the joint session of Congress to remind the American public and Congressional leaders that he is serious about adding his imprimatur to the tax code—and in the process adding to the pressure that Republican leadership and tax committee chairs already face as they attempt to extend the 2017 tax cuts using budget reconciliation.
The President highlighted several tax policies he has championed during his campaign and in the weeks following his inauguration. On the business side, he touted a reduced tax rate on US manufacturers and 100% full expensing retroactive to 20 January 2025, (Inauguration Day). In addition to making the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act tax cuts permanent, he listed no taxes on tips, overtime, social security, and deductibility of car loan interest if the vehicle is produced in the United States, for individuals. Notably, he did not mention his proposal to lift the cap on state and local taxes (SALT), an issue that continues to divide the Republican caucus.
Each of these proposals has a cost, increasing the amount of revenue offsets that the tax writers must find to pay for them, or increasing the deficit if they do not, assuming a current law baseline. Indeed, some of the President’s other proposals would be offsets, which he also did not mention during his remarks. These include scaling back on the ability of sports team owners to amortize the cost of player contracts and taxing carried interest as ordinary income.
Congressional Republicans are in the midst of the arcane budgetary practice called budget reconciliation to enact tax reform without having to negotiate with or rely on Democrats. Because it is, in fact, a budgetary maneuver, the cost of tax reforms will be restricted by budget reconciliation instructions included in a budget resolution. The House resolution limits a decrease in revenue to US$4.5 trillion—barely enough to extend the 2017 tax cuts let alone accommodate the President’s own priorities, which House members view as something that they must address, especially after the President highlighted them in his joint session remarks. They do have some flexibility since Mr. Trump has not been particularly specific about most details, but when they have no room to spare to begin with that may be a distinction without a difference. These challenges are exacerbated by extremely tight margins in the House, intraparty tensions about cuts in benefits, adding to the deficit, and other assumptions that are part of the budget reconciliation process.
Although he did not specifically mention taxes of foreign jurisdictions during his remarks about imposing reciprocal tariffs—as some of his executive orders do—the President may have indirectly implicated certain foreign taxes and information-reporting regimes when he referred to “non-monetary” tariffs. He gave Speaker Johnson permission to use tariff revenues to reduce the deficit or for “anything you want to;” perhaps to help pay for tax cuts in budget reconciliation.
The President’s remarks reinforced his commitment to his campaign and post-inaugural tax proposals. It will be up to his House and Senate counterparts to sharpen their pencils and their elbows to successfully figure out how to accommodate President Trump’s priorities as part of the budget reconciliation process.
A Summary of China’s Retaliation Actions Since The Trump Administration
This summary helps to navigate the various retaliation actions China has taken in the past 50 days after President Trump took office on January 20, 2025, to counter the US trade restrictions, including (i) imposing additional tariff on certain US origin products, (ii) adding 12 US companies to the Unreliable Entity List, (iii) control of export of certain precious minerals, (iv) adding 15 US companies to the export control related Controlled Party List and (v) launching anti-circumvention investigation against US fiber optic products.
1. Tarriffs
The following additional tariffs has been imposed on US origin products:
Effective Date
Tariffs on Goods Originated from the US
February 10, 2025
15% on coal and liquefied natural gas10% tariff on crude oil, agricultural machinery, large-displacement cars, and pickup trucks No reduction or exemption.
March 10, 2025
15% on chicken, wheat, corn and cotton10% on sorghum, soybeans, pork, beef, aquatic products, fruits, vegetables and dairy products No reduction or exemption. *Goods that were departed before March 10, 2025, and imported between March 10, 2025 and April 12, 2025 are not subject to the additional tariffs.
2. Unreliable Entity List
The Unreliable Entity List (UEL) is a blacklist administrated by the China Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) pursuant to the Regulation on Unreliable Entity List. Companies placed on the UEL may be subject to the following measures:
Restricted or prohibited from import or export from China
Restricted or prohibited from investing in China
Restricted or prohibited from entering into China
Its personnel may be denied of work permits or residency permits
Be imposed with a fine
Since January 20, 2025, China has added 12 companies to the UEL with the list and the applicable restriction as follows.
Effective Date
Unreliable Entity List
Restrictive Measures
February 4, 2025
PVH group* lllumina, Inc. Reasons of Addition – Discriminatory actions against Chinese companies. Termination of normal business with Chinese companies. *As previously reported, MOFCOM launched an investigation against PVH likely in connection with UFLPA. See our previous post. PVH Facing the Risk of Being Placed on China’s Unreliable Entities List | The Trade Practitioner
PVH – Specific restrictive measures to be announced. Illumina – Prohibited its exporting of gene sequencers to China.
March 4, 2025
TCOM, Limited PartnershipStick Rudder Enterprises LLCTeledyne Brown Engineering, Inc.Huntington Ingalls Industries Inc.S3 AeroDefenseCubic CorporationTextOreACT1 FederalExoveraPlanate Management Group. Reasons of addition were not announced.
Prohibited from import and export with China Prohibited from making new investment in China
3. Export Control of Certain Minerals
On March 4, 2025, MOFCOM released an announcement (10th Announcement) to control certain products relating to tungsten, tellurium, bismuth, molybdenum and indium. The 10th Announcement also updates and supplements the Dual-Use Items Control List that was published December 2024.
To facilitate businesses in making classification and assessment of products, the 10th Announcement includes the HS code of each item under control.
For more information about China’s dual-use control and control list, please refer to our previous article: China Releases Consolidated Dual – Use Items Control List | Publications | Insights & Events | Squire Patton Boggs.
4. Controlled Party List (管控名单)
The Controlled Party List (CPL) was first created under the Export Control Law and supplemented under the new Regulations on the Export Control of Dual Use Items that took effect on December 1, 2024. Companies on ECPL are not allowed to purchase any controlled items without a special approval from MOFCOM.
For more information about Controlled Party List, please refer to our previous article: China Released the First Comprehensive Dual-use Items Export Control Regulations | Publications | Insights & Events | Squire Patton Boggs
On March 4, 2025, MOFCOM, for the first time, used the tool of ECPL and added 15 companies to ECPL.
Effective Date
Controlled Party List
Restrictive Measures
March 4, 2025
LeidosGibbs&Cox, Inc.IP Video Market Info, Inc.Sourcemap, Inc.Skydio, Inc.Rapid Flight LLCRed Six SolutionsShield AI, Inc.HavocAINeros TechnologiesGroup WAerkomm Inc.General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc.General Dynamics Land SystemsAero Vironment Reasons of Addition – Protect national security and interest, perform non-proliferation and other international obligations.
Export of dual-use items to the listed companies are prohibited All ongoing export must be stopped immediately If export is necessary under special circumstances, the exporter shall make an application to MOFCOM
5. Anti-circumvention Investigation
On March 4, 2024, MOFCOM announced an anti-circumvention investigation into certain cut-off shifted single-mode optical fiber, marking the first time that China has initiated such an investigation.
The investigation was initiated after receiving an application from Changfei Fiber Optic Cable Co. alleging suspected circumventing of China’s anti-dumping measures. China currently imposes a 33.3%-78.2% anti-dumping duty on US-originated fiber optic products.
The investigation may affect Corning Incorporated, OFS Fitel LLC, and Draka Communications Americas, Inc., and other related US exporters.
Comments Solicited on Michigan Research Credit Draft Notice
The Michigan Department of Treasury released a draft of a notice regarding the new research and development credit. The notice provides preliminary guidance to taxpayers on eligibility for the credit, how to calculate the unadjusted credit and make a tentative claim, how Treasury will notify taxpayers if total claims exceed the $100 million cap and must be prorated downward, and how taxpayers will claim the adjusted credit. The Department will accept comments on the draft through March 7, 2025. Please click here for Miller Canfield’s prior discussion of the credit.
Pass-Through Entities: The draft explains that the credit is available for a pass-through entity if the entity is subject to Michigan income tax withholding. This means that an employer located in Michigan or an out-of-state employer having employees in Michigan should evaluate its entitlement to the credit.
Related Federal Tax Disputes: Expenses that qualify for the credit are defined by federal tax law. The definition has been disputed and litigated in federal tax courts for almost the last four decades. It is unclear how such federal changes would impact the Michigan credit.
Departing Members of a Unitary Business Group: The draft does not explain the effect on the credit if a member departs a unitary business group that claimed the research credit. For federal purposes, the research credit history of the departing member is its attribute that would follow it. The departure would affect calculation of the base amount.
Refundability: The draft reminds taxpayers that the credit is refundable but not assignable.
Comment Period: Comments on the draft are due by March 7.
How Alcohol Exporters Can Use FDII and IC-DISC to Maximize Tax Savings
For US alcohol exporters – whether crafting bourbon, brewing craft beer, or bottling fine wines – selling to international markets is a significant opportunity for growth. Two US federal income tax regimes, the foreign-derived intangible income (FDII) deduction and the interest charge-domestic international sales corporation (IC-DISC), offer valuable ways to reduce tax liability and boost profits. Each has unique benefits and trade-offs, making them suited to different business needs. This blog post compares FDII and IC-DISC, helping alcohol exporters decide which tool – or combination – best fits their global ambitions.
Note that all discussions of tax rates are limited to US federal income tax. Additional state and local taxes and excise taxes may also apply.
FDII for Export Income
Introduced under the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), FDII incentivizes US C corporations to earn income from foreign sales while keeping operations stateside by providing a reduced effective tax rate on eligible export income derived from US-based corporations. It targets “intangible” income – profits exceeding a routine return on tangible assets – and applies a deduction directly on the exporter’s tax return.
How FDII Works
Eligible income comes from selling alcohol (e.g., whiskey or wine) to foreign buyers for use outside the United States.
The FDII deduction is 37.5% of qualifying income (dropping to 21.875% after 2025), reducing the effective corporate tax rate from 21% to 13.125% on that portion of income.
No separate entity is required. Claims are made on the existing C corporation’s Form 1120.
Example: A winery exporting $2 million in Pinot noir with $400,000 in net profit might qualify $300,000 as FDII. A 37.5% deduction ($112,500) lowers the tax from $63,000 to $39,375, saving $23,625.
IC-DISC: A Classic Deferral and Rate Reduction Tool
The IC-DISC, a legacy export incentive from the 1970s, operates as a separate “paper corporation” that earns commissions on export sales. It is available to any US business structure (e.g., C corporations, S corporations, and LLCs) and shifts income to shareholders at a lower tax rate or defers it entirely.
How IC-DISC Works
The exporter forms an IC-DISC and pays the entity a commission (up to 4% of export gross receipts or 50% of net export income).
The commission is deductible for the operating company, reducing its taxable income.
The IC-DISC pays no federal tax; instead, its income is distributed to shareholders as qualified dividends (taxed at 20% capital gains rate) or retained for deferral.
Example: A distillery owned by a closely held pass-through entity with $2 million in export sales and $400,000 in net profit pays a $200,000 commission to its IC-DISC. The operating company saves $74,000 in income tax (37%), while shareholders pay $47,600 in capital gains tax (20% plus 3.8% net investment income tax) on the dividend, netting a $27,600 savings.
Comparing Tax Benefits: FDII vs. IC-DISC
Combining FDII and IC-DISC?
For alcohol manufacturers and distributors, using both FDII and IC-DISC is possible. FDII reduces the corporate tax rate on export income, while an IC-DISC could shift additional income to shareholders at the capital gains rate or defer it.
Conclusion
FDII and IC-DISC are potent tools for alcohol exporters, each with distinct strengths. FDII delivers a lower tax rate with minimal effort, ideal for C corporations riding the wave of global demand for American products. IC-DISC offers flexibility, deferral, and broader eligibility, suiting a wider range of businesses with an eye on cash flow. As the craft beer, spirits, and wine industries expand abroad, choosing the right regime – or blending them – can uncork significant savings. Consult a tax professional to tailor the choice to your operation.