Competition Currents | May 2025
United States
A. Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
1. FTC requests public comment on EnCap, Verdun, XCL petition to modify order.
On April 2, 2025, the FTC announced it was seeking public comments through May 2, 2025, on a petition to reopen and modify its 2022 consent order relating to Verdun Oil Company II LLC’s acquisition of EP Energy LLC. Specifically, the parties asked to remove a prior approval requirement in the consent order (requiring the parties to seek prior approval from the FTC before engaging in certain related transactions in the future) that covered Verdun, which was under common management with XCL Resources Holdings, LLC at the time of the transaction, and their parent entities, EnCap Energy Capital Fund XI, L.P. and EnCap Investments L.P. (together, EnCap). See GT’s April 2022 Competition Currents for more information regarding the original consent order. In their request, the parties noted market changes since the consent decree was entered (including EnCap’s and XCL’s exit from crude oil exploration and production in the Uinta Basin area in Utah after a 2024 sale), which they argue obviates the need for a prior approval requirement.
2. FTC approves modification of Enbridge Inc. final order.
On April 8, 2025, the FTC approved a petition by Enbridge Inc. to set aside the 2017 final consent order in Enbridge’s merger with Spectra Energy Corp. At the time of the Spectra acquisition, Enbridge received an indirect ownership interest in the Discovery Pipeline, a competitor to the Walker Ridge Pipeline that Enbridge owns. The FTC was concerned that the acquisition would give Enbridge access to competitively sensitive information about the Discovery Pipeline and required Enbridge to establish firewalls to limit its access to information relating to the Discovery Pipeline as well as requiring Discovery Pipeline board members affiliated with Spectra to recuse themselves from votes involving the pipeline. In December 2024, Enbridge asked the FTC to reopen and set aside the 2017 order after it sold its interest in the Discovery Pipeline, making the consent decree terms obsolete.
3. Mark Meador confirmed as FTC commissioner.
President Trump nominated Mark Meador as FTC Commissioner, the Senate confirmed him on April 10, 2025, and he was sworn in as commissioner on April 16, 2025. Most recently, Meador worked in private practice and served as a visiting fellow at the Heritage Foundation Tech Policy Center. Previously, he was the deputy chief counsel for antitrust and competition policy for Sen. Mike Lee (R-Utah), as well as a trial attorney in the DOJ Antitrust Division. His term as FTC commissioner will expire on Sept. 25, 2031.
4. FTC seeks public comment on petition to modify Chevron-Hess final order.
The FTC announced on April 11, 2025, that it is seeking public comment through May 12, 2025, on a petition to set aside its final consent order (issued in January 2025) relating to Chevron Corporation’s acquisition of Hess Corporation. The consent order prohibited Chevron from appointing Hess CEO John B. Hess to its board of directors, as called for in the transaction’s merger agreement.
5. FTC seeks public comment on petition to modify Exxon-Pioneer final order.
Similarly, the same day, the FTC also announced that it is also seeking public comment through May 12, 2025, on a petition to set aside its final consent order (also issued in January 2025) relating to Exxon Mobil Corporation’s acquisition of Pioneer Natural Resources. The consent order prohibited Exxon Mobil from appointing Scott Sheffield (founder and former CEO of Pioneer) to its board of directors or from having him serve in any advisory capacity.
6. FTC launches public inquiry into anticompetitive regulations.
On April 14, 2025, the FTC announced that in response to President Trump’s executive order “Reducing Anticompetitive Regulatory Barriers,” it was launching a request for information on the impact of federal regulations on competition (to determine whether any regulations unnecessarily exclude new entrants or protect incumbents, for example). Comments can be submitted through May 27, 2025.
7. Illinois and Minnesota join FTC lawsuit challenging medical device coatings deal.
In March 2025, the FTC sued to block GTCR BC Holdings, LLC’s proposed acquisition of Surmodics, Inc., both of whom engage in manufacturing medical device coatings. GTCR is a private equity firm that also owns a majority of Biocoat, Inc., which per the FTC is the second-largest provider of outsourced hydrophilic coatings, with Surmodics being the largest. The FTC’s complaint alleges that the proposed acquisition is anticompetitive because it would give the combined company more than 50% of the market share for outsourced hydrophilic coatings, which medical device manufacturers use in devices including catheters and guidewires. On April 17, 2025, the FTC amended its complaint to add Illinois and Minnesota as co-plaintiffs.
8. FTC and DOJ issue letter seeking identification of anticompetitive regulations across the federal government.
Also as part of the antitrust agencies’ response to the executive order “Reducing Anticompetitive Regulatory Barriers,” on May 5, 2025, the FTC and DOJ issued a joint letter to all federal government agency heads requesting a list of anticompetitive federal regulations within the respective agency’s rulemaking authority that could reduce competition and innovation – including the agency’s recommendation for whether the regulation should be kept, amended, or rescinded. After receiving public and agency comments, the FTC and DOJ will provide the Office of Management and Budget with its consolidated recommendations.
B. Department of Justice (DOJ) Civil Antitrust Division
1. Justice Department hosts roundtables to address competition issues in the entertainment industry and unfair practices in the labor market.
On April 4, 2025, the DOJ hosted discussions centered on competition issues in the entertainment industry. First, DOJ Assistant Attorney General (AAG) Gail Slater met with union members and legal experts to discuss how non-compete agreements and no-poach agreements impact employees, with experts weighing in on strategies to protect workers. Second, AAG Slater discussed unfair practices in the live entertainment market in order to identify labor-market conduct that harms workers.
2. AAG Gail Slater welcomes Antitrust Division leadership team.
On May 1, AAG Slater appointed Dina Kallay to serve as DOJ deputy assistant attorney general for international, policy and appellate, joining the DOJ leadership team of Roger Alford (principal deputy assistant attorney general), Omeed Assefi (acting deputy assistant attorney general), Mark Hamer (deputy assistant attorney general), William “Bill” Rinner (deputy assistant attorney general), Dr. Chetan Sangvhi (deputy assistant attorney general), and Sara Matar (chief of staff).
3. Justice Department and FTC seek information on unfair and anticompetitive practices in live ticketing.
On May 7, 2025, the DOJ announced that in response to President Trump’s executive order “Combating Unfair Practices in the Live Entertainment Market,” it was launching, jointly with the FTC, a public inquiry aimed at identifying unfair and anticompetitive practices in the live entertainment market. AAG Slater stated of the inquiry, “Competitive live entertainment markets should deliver value to artists and fans alike,” while FTC Chair Ferguson also added, “Many Americans feel like they are being priced out of live entertainment by scalpers, bots, and other unfair and deceptive practices.” Comments can be submitted through July 7, 2025.
C. U.S. Litigation
1. Chalmers v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, Case No. 1:24-cv-05008 (S.D.N.Y. April 29, 2025).
On April 29, U.S. District Judge Paul A. Engelmayer dismissed a proposed class action by 16 former men’s basketball players against the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). The antitrust suit was filed last July, a month after the announcement of the $2.78 billion settlement that would compensate past athletes for their name, image, and likeness (NIL) and put a future revenue sharing plan in place. The players’ college careers spanned from 1994 to 2016, and Engelmayer agreed with the NCAA’s argument that the statute of limitations on their claims expired, noting in his opinion that “the NCAA’s use today of a NIL acquired decades ago as the fruit of an antitrust violation does not constitute a new overt act restarting the limitations clock.”
2. Compass Inc. v. Northwest Multiple Listing Services, Case No. 2:25-cv-00766 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 28, 2025).
On April 28, Compass Inc. sued the broker-led Northwest Multiple Listing Service (MLS), claiming that the MLS’s rules in Washington that prohibit “premarketing” real estate before they are officially listed for sale is an anticompetitive boycott. Compass—a broker service operating in Washington—engages in “office exclusive” listing that tests the asking price, pictures, and home specifications to a small set of potential buyers before the home is actually put up for sale. Compass alleges that the practice is used in other states, but that Washington prohibits this premarketing because it is “fundamentally unfair and perpetuates inequities that have long plagued the housing system.”
3. Mack’s Junk Removal LLC v Rouse Services LLC, Case No. 2:25-cv-03565 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 2025).
A nationwide class action was filed alleging several large construction equipment rental companies utilized RB Global Inc.’s product, Rouse, to set rates for construction equipment rental. According to the allegations, rental companies defer all rental-pricing decisions to Rouse, which uses an AI algorithm to set rates at anticompetitive levels. The complaint also alleges that Rouse allows participants to get detailed sales data of local competitors, allowing for a greater chance of price fixing.
4. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Amgen Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-00697 (D. Del. Apr. 11, 2025).
On April 11, 2025, U.S. District Judge Jennifer L. Hall denied defendant Amgen Inc.’s motion to dismiss an antitrust lawsuit. In the lawsuit, competitor Regeneron Pharmaceuticals alleges that Amgen improperly bundled discounts of its other medications—in which it has market dominance—to pharmacy benefit managers if they would agree to exclusively cover Amgen’s Repatha, a cholesterol-reducing medication. Regeneron, which offers a competing cholesterol medication, claims that such bundling schemes effectively drive other competitors out of the market. In her ruling, Judge Hall held that Regeneron has presented evidence of both improper bundling and “de facto exclusive dealing arrangements” to proceed to further discovery.
The Netherlands
ACM
1. The ACM approves sustainability collaboration in textile sector under competition rules.
The Dutch competition authority (ACM) has issued an informal assessment of the Textile Alliance — an initiative involving companies, trade associations, and civil society organizations in the garments, shoes, leather, and textile sectors — concluding that the initiative complies with Dutch and EU competition law.
The Textile Alliance aims to promote international corporate social responsibility by improving compliance with human rights, environmental, and animal-welfare standards in production and supply chains. According to ACM’s assessment, the arrangements focus on individual company commitments and voluntary tools, such as a collective risk assessment, without mandating uniform actions or exchanging competition-sensitive information. The assessment affirms that competition law does not necessarily pose a barrier to sector-wide sustainability agreements.
2. The ACM approves FincoEnergies’ acquisition of Klaas de Boer with conditions.
The ACM has approved FincoEnergies’ acquisition of Oliehandel Klaas de Boer with conditions to maintain competition in the marine fuel supply market. Both companies are major suppliers of marine fuels in several Dutch ports. The ACM had competition concerns due to limited alternative suppliers and high costs for buyers to switch ports. To address this, FincoEnergies and Klaas de Boer must sell various assets, including tankers and a storage terminal, to GMB Groep and Slurink Transport Services, ensuring continued competition in the affected ports and eliminating competition concerns.
3. The ACM emphasizes the importance of competition for European competitiveness in joint statement.
Certain European competition authorities, including the ACM, have issued a joint statement highlighting the crucial role of competition in enhancing European competitiveness. The statement aligns with the European Commission’s recently presented “Competitiveness Compass” and emphasizes that competition fosters productivity, innovation, and investment. The authorities assert that competition and economies of scale go hand in hand and that competition rules are essential for well-functioning markets. The statement specifically addresses competition in the telecom sector, where the authorities warn that reduced merger scrutiny, particularly in telecommunications, may result in fewer incentives to improve networks, services, and innovation. As such, careful oversight of mergers is deemed necessary. Mergers that harm competition should either be blocked or approved only under strict conditions. The national competition authorities of Belgium, Portugal, Austria, Czech Republic, Ireland, and the Netherlands signed the joint statement.
4. The ACM informs healthcare institutions of competition rules for new cancer and vascular surgery standards.
The ACM has issued guidance to healthcare providers on how to comply with competition law when making regional agreements on the redistribution of care, following new national volume norms for cancer and vascular treatments. These norms limit certain complex procedures to hospitals that perform them frequently, starting in 2026. The ACM emphasized that while cooperation is allowed, such agreements must not amount to unlawful market sharing. The ACM will not intervene in regional care arrangements if all relevant stakeholders are involved and the cooperation pursues clear, measurable goals aimed at improving care accessibility, affordability, and quality.
Poland
A. UOKiK issues conditional clearance for Medicover’s acquisition of CityFit Gyms.
On March 31, 2025, the President of the Polish Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK) conditionally approved ABC Medicover Holdings B.V.’s acquisition of 16 fitness clubs. ABC Medicover is a member of the Medicover group, a major private healthcare provider. The transaction consists of the acquisition of sole control over 16 companies operating under the CityFit and CityFit Blue brands. Medicover already has a strong presence in the Polish fitness sector through such brands as Just Gym, Well Fitness, McFit, Stellar, Platinum Fitness, Smart Gym, and Premium Fitness & Gym, operating over 150 clubs nationwide.
Based on its competition assessment, the UOKiK President concluded that while the concentration would not significantly restrict competition on most relevant markets, serious concerns arose in two cities (Bielsko-Biała and Gliwice) where the post-transaction market shares would be particularly high. To address these concerns, the clearance was made conditional on structural remedies. Medicover must divest one club in each of the two concerned cities — either an existing Medicover location or a CityFit club included in the acquisition. The buyer must be an independent third party the UOKiK President approves, with a credible commitment to operating a fitness facility at the divested location for a minimum of two years.
B. UOKiK launches investigation and conducts dawn raids in home appliances sector.
On March 31, 2025, the UOKiK President announced it was launching a preliminary investigation into a suspected price-fixing agreement between Electrolux Poland and major electronics retailers. The proceedings focus on suspicions that Electrolux Poland may have coordinated the retail prices of household appliances—including refrigerators, washing machines, dishwashers, coffee machines, ovens, vacuum cleaners, irons, and kettles—sold under the Electrolux and AEG brands. According to the authority, these practices may have prevented consumers from benefiting from lower prices, both online and in brick-and-mortar stores.
Based on signals received from the market indicating potential antitrust violations, the UOKiK President, after securing court approval, conducted unannounced inspections at the headquarters of Electrolux Poland and several entities operating retail chains, including companies running major home appliances chain stores. The case is still at its preliminary stage and is conducted in rem, meaning that it is not yet directed at any specific undertakings. Should evidence confirm the suspicions, the UOKiK President may open formal antitrust proceedings and bring charges against identified entities.
The investigation follows recent enforcement actions in the sector. Notably, in 2024, the UOKiK imposed over PLN 66 million in fines on companies involved in a decade-long price-fixing scheme concerning Jura-brand coffee machines. That decision also included a close to PLN 250,000 fine on an individual responsible for the agreement.
Italy
Italian Competition Authority (ICA)
1. ICA launches investigation against CNF for alleged concerted practice.
On March 25, 2025, ICA opened an investigation into the National Bar Council (CNF) for an alleged concerted practice in violation of Article 101 of TFEU. The investigation concerns the application of the “fair compensation rule” for lawyers, introduced by Law No. 49/2023. The “fair compensation rule” aims to provide specific protections for legal professionals when dealing with large clients, based on the presumption lawyers are often compelled to accept reduced fees from such clients.
According to ICA, CNF’s interpretation and enforcement of these rules—particularly through the new Article 25-bis of the Lawyers Code of Ethics—exceeds the scope of the law and may restrict competition among lawyers. ICA specifically challenged CNF’s use of ambiguous language prohibiting lawyers from agreeing upon or estimating fees, without specifying the context or limits. In ICA’s view, this lack of clarity failed to specify that the fair compensation obligations (and related disciplinary consequences) apply only to relationships with large corporate clients. By doing so, CNF is allegedly attempting to directly influence the economic behavior of lawyers under its supervision, potentially deterring them from negotiating fees below the indicated benchmarks.
ICA has given CNF a 60-day deadline, starting from the date of notification of this decision, to exercise its right to be heard by the legal representatives of the party. ICA has established that the procedure must conclude by the end of December 2026.
2. Unfair commercial practice: fine of almost EUR 20 million has been imposed on CoopCulture and other tourist operators.
On March 25, 2025, ICA fined Società Cooperativa Culture (CoopCulture) and the following tourist operators: Tiqets International BV, GetYourGuide Deutschland GmbH, Walks LLC, Italy With Family S.r.l., City Wonders Limited, and Musement S.p.A. almost EUR 20 million for making it difficult to purchase tickets online to access the Colosseum Archaeological Park. Specifically, the ICA found that CoopCulture failed to take adequate measures to counter ticket hoarding using automated methods while also reserving significant quantities of tickets for sales offered during its own educational tours, from which it gained considerable economic benefits. This forced consumers to turn to tour operators and platforms that resold tickets bundled with additional services (such as tour guides and pick-up) at significantly higher prices.
At the same time, the six tourist operators purchased tickets using bots or other automated tools, thus contributing to the rapid depletion of base-price tickets on the CoopCulture website. By doing so, these operators took advantage of the systematic unavailability of tickets, which forced consumers who wished to visit the Colosseum to obtain tickets bundled with additional services. ICA found that CoopCulture’s conduct constitutes an unfair commercial practice in violation of Article 20, paragraph 2, of the Italian Consumer Code. Also, the conduct of Tiqets International BV, GetYourGuide Deutschland GmbH, Walks LLC, Italy With Family S.r.l., City Wonders Limited, and Musement S.p.A. was found to be unfair under Articles 24 and 25 of the Italian Consumer Code.
3. Key takeaways from ICA’s annual report.
On March 31, 2025, ICA published its annual report on its 2024 activities. During 2024, ICA’s activity recorded a notable increase, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, confirming a trend established in recent years. Notably, between January 2024 and March 2025, ICA received 1,452 competition-related reports, examined 121 merger transactions, and concluded two proceedings on restrictive agreements and nine on abuse of dominant position.
In particular, the number of merger filings ICA reviewed increased by approximately 50% compared to the average of the past 10 years. Moreover, in seven cases, ICA exercised its call-in power, pursuant to Article 16, paragraph 1-bis, of Law No. 287/1990, to require notification of a merger not reaching the turnover thresholds for mandatory notification. According to the ICA, recent legislative amendments strengthened its investigative and intervention tools, also contributing to reinforcing enforcement activities against cartels. ICA initiated four proceedings, with over eight investigations covering as many sectors and over 30 companies. ICA reported that the intensified efforts to counter the most serious antitrust violations is also attributable to the establishment of the whistleblowing platform, which received over 200 reports, and to the leniency program, which was recently enhanced.
As for consumer protection, between January 2024 and March 2025, ICA examined 36,900 reports and concluded 71 proceedings; 46 with confirmation of the infringement, 17 with acceptance of commitments, and eight with no violations. According to the ICA’s estimates, the consumer protection activities carried out between 2023 and 2024 enabled savings of over EUR 28 million, as well as the restitution of more than EUR 150 million to 900,000 consumers.
European Union
A. European Commission
1. The European Commission opens investigation into UMG’s acquisition of Downtown after referral from the Netherlands and Austria.
The European Commission has accepted a referral request from the ACM to investigate Universal Music Group’s proposed acquisition of Downtown, a service provider to independent labels and artists. The ACM expressed concerns that the acquisition may negatively affect competition in the Netherlands and potentially other EU countries. Universal Music Group, the world’s largest record company, has a history of acquiring smaller industry players, often without regulatory oversight due to low turnover thresholds.
In this case, the ACM was notified about the acquisition in February 2025, and the deal prompted complaints from industry stakeholders. The Austrian competition authority supported the ACM’s request for a European-level review. The ACM reiterated its call for a “call-in power” to enable review of smaller, potentially harmful mergers even when they fall below standard notification thresholds. The European Commission has now launched a formal investigation into the deal’s cross-border competitive effects.
2. European Commission fines car manufacturers and ACEA EUR 458 million for cartel on end-of-life vehicle recycling.
The European Commission has fined 15 major car manufacturers and the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA) approximately EUR 458 million for their involvement in a long-running cartel concerning the recycling of end-of-life vehicles (ELVs). The cartel, which lasted over 15 years, involved coordination on avoiding payments to car dismantlers and restricting transparency around recycling rates in new vehicles.
Mercedes-Benz was granted immunity under the leniency program for informing the European Commission of the anticompetitive behavior. Other companies admitted their involvement and agreed to settle the case. Some companies received a reduction of their fine for cooperation under the leniency program. This decision is part of the European Commission’s broader efforts to enforce EU competition rules and address anticompetitive practices in the automotive sector.
3. The European Commission approves Safran’s acquisition of Collins Aerospace, with conditions.
The European Commission has approved Safran USA Inc.’s acquisition of parts of Collins Aerospace’s actuation business, subject to commitments to address competition concerns. Safran’s and the target’s businesses are largely complementary, but the initial transaction raised competition concerns, particularly in the market for trimmable horizontal stabilizer actuator (THSA) systems. These systems, used in civil aircraft, were found to have insufficient alternative suppliers post-merger.
To resolve these concerns, Safran committed to divesting its North American THSA business. A market test confirmed the remedy’s effectiveness, and the European Commission approved the deal subject to full compliance, which will be monitored by an independent trustee.
B. European General Court
General Court upholds Symrise raids in cross-border fragrance cartel investigation.
The EU’s General Court has rejected Symrise’s challenge to annul European Commission’s raids of its premises during a 2023 cross-border cartel investigation into the fragrance industry. The court found that the European Commission had sufficient grounds for inspections, based on credible evidence, including open-source intelligence, suspiciously similar tender bids, and confidential information exchanges. Symrise argued that the raids infringed its privacy and defense rights due to an alleged lack of reasonable suspicion. However, the court ruled that the broader context of international cartel suspicion, including indications from Symrise’s own activities and third-party findings, justified the European Commission’s actions. Symrise stressed that the ruling does not equate to the finding of guilt and reaffirmed its denial of any anticompetitive behavior, stating it continues to cooperate with authorities.
1 Due to the terms of GT’s retention by certain of its clients, these summaries may not include developments relating to matters involving those clients.
Additional Authors: Holly Smith Letourneau, Sarah-Michelle Stearns, Yongho “Andrew” Lee, Alexa S. Minesinger, Alexander L. Nowinski, Miguel Flores Bernés, Valery Dayne García Zavala, Hans Urlus, Dr. Robert Hardy, Chazz Sutherland, Manish Das, Johnny Shearman, Robert Gago, Filip Drgas, Anna Celejewska-Rajchert, Ewa Głowacka, Edoardo Gambaro, Pietro Missanelli, Martino Basilisco, Yuji Ogiwara, Mari Arakawa, Philip Ruan, and Dawn (Dan) Zhang.
Brussels Regulatory Brief: April 2025
Antitrust and Competition
European and UK Antitrust Enforcers Impose Fines Over End-of-Life Vehicles Recycling Cartel
On 1 April 2024, both the European Commission (the Commission) and the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) fined major car manufacturers and trade associations for participating in a 15-year long cartel concerning end-of-life vehicle recycling. The Commission’s and CMA’s decisions highlight the authorities’ interest in pursuing novel theories of harm that may have an adverse impact on the green transition.
Financial Affairs
EU Institutions Finalize Omnibus I; EFRAG adopts Work Plan to Simplify ESRS
The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union finalized the legislative procedure for Omnibus I, while the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) adopted the work plan detailing next steps for European Sustainability Reporting Standards (ESRS) simplification.
Commission Presents Savings and Investments Union
The Commission presented its Savings and Investment Union, outlining future legislative and nonlegislative initiatives to strengthen EU capital markets.
Sanctions
European Court of Justice Confirmed that the Ban on the Export of EU Banknotes to Russia Also Applies when the Money Is Intended to Finance Medical Treatments
The European Court of Justice ruled that only amounts strictly necessary for travel and basic living expenses may be brought into Russia.
Antitrust and Competition
European and UK Antitrust Enforcers Impose Fines Over End-of-Life Vehicles Recycling Cartel
On 15 March 2022, the European Commission (Commission) and the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) conducted parallel unannounced inspections (dawn raids) at the premises of companies and trade associations active in the automotive sector in several EU member states and in the United Kingdom. On 1 April 2025, the Commission fined 15 major car manufacturers and a trade association a total of approximately €458 million for participating in a 15-year-long cartel concerning the recycling of end-of-life vehicles (ELVs), i.e., cars that are no longer fit for use, either due to age, wear and tear, or damage. On the same day, the CMA imposed fines against 10 car manufacturers and two trade associations of approximately £77.7 million for breaching UK competition law for a similar conduct affecting the UK market.
Both the Commission and the CMA found that the parties infringed EU and UK competition law by colluding on two aspects:
Car manufacturers agreed not to pay car dismantlers for processing ELVs and shared commercially sensitive information on their individual agreements with car dismantlers. The car dismantlers were therefore unable to negotiate a price with the car manufacturers.
The parties also agreed not to advertise how ELVs could be recycled, recovered, and reused, and how much recycled materials are used in new cars. The Commission stated that the car companies’ objective was to prevent consumers from considering recycling information when choosing a car, which could lower the pressure on companies to improve their environmental efforts and go beyond legal requirements on recyclability.
The Commission’s and CMA’s investigations involved trade associations that were found to act as a facilitator of the cartel by arranging meetings and contacts between car manufacturers.
Both investigations were triggered by a leniency application submitted by one of the cartel participants. As this participant has revealed the cartel, it was not fined and received full immunity from penalties. In addition, all companies admitted their involvement in the cartel and agreed to settle the case, which reduced the fine by 10% in the Commission’s investigation and 20% in the CMA’s investigation.
Teresa Ribera, executive vice president for Clean, Just and Competitive Transition, commented:
We will not tolerate cartels of any kind, and that includes those that suppress customer awareness and demand for more environmental-friendly products. High quality recycling in key sectors such as automotive will be central to meeting our circular economy objectives, not only to cut waste and emissions, but also to reduce dependencies, lower production costs and create a more sustainable and competitive industrial model in Europe.
The Commission also stated that this investigation was the largest settlement case it has concluded so far. This shows that the Commission can use the settlement procedure in exceptionally large settlement cases. Also, this parallel investigation illustrates the Commission’s and the CMA’s close coordination in investigating novel theories of harm that may have an adverse impact on the green transition.
Financial Affairs
EU Institutions Finalize Omnibus I; EFRAG Adopts Work Plan to Simplify ESRS
On 3 April, the European Parliament approved the text of the first part of the Omnibus package (Omnibus I). Omnibus I postpones the application date of the reporting requirements under the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) by two years for certain groups of companies, and it also postpones the transposition deadline as the first wave of application of the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive by one year. Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) largely supported the proposal: 531 voted in favor, 69 against, and 17 abstained. The pro-European political groups (the European People’s Party, the Socialists and Democrats, and Renew Europe) were able to reach an agreement to approve the content of the proposal a few hours before the votes. Further, the final text of Omnibus I was published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 17 April and is now in force at the EU level. The directive mandates member states to transpose it into national law by 31 December 2025.
In a related development, the European Financial Advisory Reporting Group (EFRAG) adopted its work plan on the simplification of European Sustainability Reporting Standards (ESRS) under CSRD. This review is part of EFRAG’s broader mandate to assess the entire ESRS framework, as set out in a mandate letter from Commissioner Maria Luís Albuquerque. EFRAG is expected to submit its technical advice to the Commission by 31 October 2025.
Now that the first part of the package is completed, MEPs and member states at the Council of the European Union are discussing internally their approach to the second part (Omnibus II), which introduces substantial simplification amendments to the obligations and requirements notably comprised in these two frameworks. Check this article for a summary of the proposed amendments by Omnibus II.
Commission Presents Savings and Investments Union
On 19 March, the Commission issued a Communication on the Savings and Investments Union, seeking to offer EU citizens broader access to capital markets and better financing opportunities for businesses. The strategy focuses on four key pillars: (i) citizens and savings, (ii) investments and financing, (iii) integration and scale, and (iv) efficient supervision in the single market. For each pillar, the Commission underlined both legislative and nonlegislative actions to be adopted throughout 2025 and 2026.
For citizens and savings, the Commission underlined that it would facilitate negotiations between the European Parliament and member states on the Retail Investment Strategy, but it will not hesitate to withdraw the proposal if the negotiations do not meet the objectives of the strategy. Key initiatives include a review of pension frameworks to bolster retail investor participation, a financial literacy strategy by Q3 2025, and a EU-wide framework for savings and investment accounts. For the investment and financing pillar, the Commission aims to facilitate equity investments by institutional investors, revise Solvency II criteria for long-term equity investments, and streamline securitization requirements by mid-2025, with additional reforms targeting private market liquidity due in 2026.
On integration and supervision, the Commission plans to reduce capital market fragmentation and enhance cross-border activity through emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, simplifying rules for asset managers and potentially reviewing the Shareholders Rights Directive. In the context of capital markets integration, the Commission launched a public consultation to gather views on obstacles to financial markets integration across the European Union. On oversight, reforms to the European Supervisory Authorities could delegate supervisory powers to EU-level bodies, particularly for crypto services and large cross-border managers.
The Commission will conduct a midterm review of the strategy by mid-2027 to assess progress and refine initiatives.
Sanctions
European Court of Justice Confirmed that the Ban on the Export of EU Banknotes to Russia Also Applies when the Money Is Intended to Finance Medical Treatments
Under EU sanctions imposed on Russia, it is prohibited to sell, supply, transfer, or export banknotes denominated in any official currency of an EU member state to Russia or to any natural or legal person, entity, or body in Russia, including the Russian government and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, or for use in Russia. Only three limited exemptions to this general ban exist: (i) export of banknotes for the personal use of natural persons traveling to Russia or members of their immediate families traveling with them, (ii) export of banknotes for the official purposes of diplomatic missions, or (iii) export necessary for civil society and media activities that directly promote democracy, human rights, or the rule of law in Russia.
In case C-246/24, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Frankfurt am Main, delivered on 20 April 2025, the European Court of Justice addressed the situation where German customs officers discovered a passenger heading to Russia carrying nearly €15,000 in banknotes. The passenger stated the money was intended not only for travel costs but also for medical procedures in Russia, including dental work, hormone therapy for fertility, and follow-up care after breast surgery. Authorities confiscated most of the money, permitting the passenger to retain around €1,000 for travel-related needs.
The court ruled that carrying banknotes to Russia for medical treatment does not qualify as personal use under the exemption. The court reiterated that exceptions are to be interpreted strictly so that general rules are not negated. A broad interpretation of the exemption would result in a situation where it would be possible to transfer to Russia, without restriction, large sums of banknotes to make personal purchases of any kind there, and, moreover, it would be difficult to verify that such purchases are carried out.
The exemption in question is limited to covering costs directly related to the journey and stay—medical treatments do not fall within that scope, as the EU sanctions are ultimately intended to prevent the Russian economic system from gaining access to cash denominated in any currency of a EU member state to support Russia’s activities in the war in Ukraine.
Additional Authors: Petr Bartoš, Vittoriana Todisco, Kathleen Keating, Sara Rayon Gonzalez, Covadonga Corell Perez de Rada, Simas Gerdvila, Edoardo Crosetto, and Martina Pesci.
The BR International Trade Report: May 2025
Recent Developments
Various trade deals in the air.
U.S.-China trade deal: Washington and Beijing take steps to ease trade war. On May 12, the United States and China announced a deal to deescalate the trade tensions between the two countries. The centerpiece of the deal is a 90-day pause to the 100+ percent tariffs each country had imposed on the other. As of May 14, the United States lowered its general tariff on Chinese goods to 30 percent, while China lowered its tariffs on American goods to 10 percent. During the 90-day pause, the countries will endeavor to negotiate a more lasting resolution to ongoing trade tensions.
Trump administration announces UK trade deal. On May 8, President Trump announced his administration’s first major trade deal since his “Liberation Day” unveiling of broad reciprocal tariffs on April 2. Leaders in Washington and London agreed to terms that would (i) establish a “new trading union” for aluminum and steel products, (ii) lower the tariff on UK-origin automobiles to 10 percent for the first 100,000 vehicles imported into the United States each year, and (iii) streamline customs procedures for products exported from the United States. Notably, under the terms of the deal, the United States’ 10 percent base reciprocal tariff on UK-origin goods remains in effect. Shortly after the agreement was announced, International Consolidated Airlines, the owner of British Airways, purchased $13 billion of Boeing planes.
White House announces trade deals with Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Over May 13-14, during President Trump’s visit to the Middle East, the White House announced a $600 billion investment commitment from Saudi Arabia and a $142 billion U.S.-Saudi arms deal, as well as “an economic exchange worth at least $1.2 trillion” with Qatar.
United States and Ukraine sign long-awaited critical minerals deal. On April 30, the United States and Ukraine signed a natural resources deal which establishes the U.S.-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund (the “Investment Fund”). The Investment Fund grants the United States certain priority access to Ukrainian critical minerals, oil, and natural gas in exchange for military assistance. Unlike previous iterations of the deal, the April 30 agreement did not require Ukraine to reimburse the United States for past military aid. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent emphasized that the deal embodies America’s efforts to encourage peace between Russia and Ukraine, stating “[t]his agreement signals clearly to Russia that the Trump Administration is committed to a peace process centered on a free, sovereign, and prosperous Ukraine over the long term.”
United Kingdom and India agree to trade deal. On May 6, after more than three years of negotiations, the United Kingdom and India announced a free trade deal, described by the UK government as “the biggest and most economically significant bilateral trade deal the UK has done since leaving the EU.” Meanwhile, the United States is seeking to enter into a significant trade agreement with India. In late April, Vice President JD Vance and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met in India to “finalize[ ] the terms of reference for . . . trade negotiation[s].”
Semiconductor export controls. On May 13, Commerce announced a range of long-awaited actions regarding export controls (see our alert) applicable to advanced integrated circuits and computing items, including:
rescission of the Biden Administration’s “AI Diffusion Rule,” which was scheduled to significantly broaden preexisting controls over such items effective May 15;
informing the public that export licensing requirements may apply (a) to the export, re-export, and transfer of such items (such as to cloud providers) for use in training large AI models for persons in China and certain other restricted countries, where there is knowledge that such models are for use in WMD or military-intelligence applications, or (b) U.S. person “support” for such activity;
issuance of guidance regarding red flags that may present a risk of diversion of controlled items to prohibited end-users or end-uses; and
imposition of export licensing requirements applicable to most transactions worldwide involving certain Huawei “Ascend” chips, on the ground that such chips were produced in violation of U.S. export controls.
Section 232 investigations update.
Critical Minerals: On April 15, President Trump ordered the initiation of a Section 232 investigation into imports of processed critical minerals, which the U.S. Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) launched on April 22. Subsequently, he issued an April 24 executive order to spur the exploration and extraction of critical mineral deposits located on the seabed.
Trucks: On April 22, Commerce launched a Section 232 investigation into imports of certain medium- and heavy- duty trucks, their parts, and their derivatives. The probe aims to assess whether such imports compromise the country’s ability to meet domestic demand and pose risks to national security.
Aircraft, jet engines, and related parts: On May 1, Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick initiated a national security investigation into imports of aircraft, jet engines, and related parts, which could lead to additional tariffs, among other measures. Among other factors, Commerce will investigate the concentration of U.S. imports of such items from a small number of suppliers, along with what Commerce described as “foreign government subsidies and predatory trade practices.”
President Trump orders rescission of Syria sanctions. During a speech in Saudi Arabia, the president announced his intent to remove all U.S. sanctions on Syria—in place for decades—explaining that his decision followed discussions with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and aims to give Syria “a chance at greatness.” The next day, the president met with Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa, formerly associated with al-Qaeda, who led the rebel group that toppled the Assad regime in December 2024. This marked the first meeting between an American president and a Syrian leader since 2000.
U.S. Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”) announces intent to launch a “fast track” process for CFIUS review of foreign investments. Treasury’s May 8 announcement, issued under the auspices of President Trump’s February “America First Investment Policy” memorandum (see our prior alert), sets the stage for eventual implementation of streamlined review for preferred investors by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”). Treasury noted that it will design a pilot program featuring a “Known Investor Portal” through which CFIUS can collect information from foreign investors in advance of a CFIUS filing.
U.S. Trade Representative issues final rule on Chinese ships. On April 17, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (“USTR”) issued a final rule concerning the imposition of port fees on Chinese vessel operators, owners, and Chinese-built vessels. The rule seeks to implement steep tonnage-based port fees for both Chinese-built ships and Chinese-owned ships, with the intent of resurrecting the U.S. commercial shipbuilding industry. Following a 180-day implementation period, annually increasing tonnage-based fees will be levied at U.S. ports on Chinese-owned and operated ships, while Chinese-built ships face increasing fees based on net tonnage or containers. In addition, fees of $150 per car will be levied on all foreign-built car carriers, not just those with ties to China. After three years, incrementally increasing restrictions will be placed on the transportation of liquified natural gas (“LNG”) via foreign-built vessels. Check out our coverage of the final rule here.
Amidst U.S. trade tensions, incumbent governments retain power in Canadian and Australian elections.
Down in the polls by double digits only a few months ago, Canada’s Liberals surged in response to trade tensions with the United States and the resignation of longtime Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, who was replaced as party leader by Mark Carney. Conservative leader Pierre Poilievre, once considered the strongest contender to become prime minister, lost his parliamentary seat in the elections. The new government will look to reshape relations with the United States, which Prime Minister Carney initiated with a White House visit on May 6.
A similar story played out in Australia, where incumbent Labour Party Prime Minister Anthony Albanese fended off a challenge by Peter Dutton’s Liberal-National coalition. Similar to Canada, U.S. trade tensions loomed large in the election.
European Union announces retaliatory tariff plan against the United States. The retaliatory measures would target a list of almost 5,000 goods which total approximately $107 billion in European imports. Reports suggest that U.S.-origin aircraft and automobiles would be hit hardest by the tariff package.
UK Government takes control of last remaining “virgin steel” plant in country from Chinese company. Following the announcement by British Steel’s Chinese parent company, Jingye, that it would stop purchasing materials to keep the blast furnace running at the Scunthorpe plant, the UK government took action to prevent the closure of the plant. Although neither the plant nor British Steel have been nationalized for the time being, emergency legislation passed by the UK Parliament allows Business Secretary Jonathan Reynolds the ability to direct the British Steel board and staff, allowing for the purchase of necessary materials.
Foley Automotive Update- 15 May 2025
Trump Administration and Tariff Policies
The U.S. lowered the base level of duties on most Chinese goods to 30% from 145%, and China cut its levies on many U.S. products to 10% from 125% as part of a 90-day tariff pause scheduled between the nations that is to take effect this week.
A U.S.-UK trade deal announced May 8 would allow imports of 100,000 vehicles annually by UK car manufacturers under a 10% “reciprocal tariff,” with additional vehicles subject to 25% levies. The American Automotive Policy Council expressed disappointment that in certain instances, “it will now be cheaper to import a UK vehicle with very little U.S. content than a USMCA compliant vehicle from Mexico or Canada that is half American parts.”
A U.S. Customs and Border Protection guidance document for the auto parts tariffs that took effect May 3 indicated that US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA)-compliant parts have a “0 percent additional ad valorem rate of duty.” The duration of this exemption is unknown.
A pair of executive orders announced on April 29 will ease some of the impact of certain automotive import tariffs. One order will establish a complex system of temporary and partial reimbursements for certain tariffed auto parts, and another order indicates tariffed vehicles and auto parts will not “stack” on other levies, such as the 25% duty on steel and aluminum. One large supplier quoted in Automotive News indicated the orders were a positive step, while an unnamed major supplier stated the tariff revisions were “not cause for celebration” as the industry will still encounter significantly higher operational costs. An analyst from Wedbush described the revised tariffs as a “gut punch” for the auto industry.
May 16, 2025 is the deadline for submitting public comments regarding the Trump administration’s Section 232 investigation into imports of processed critical minerals and their derivative products.
Automotive Key Developments
Automotive News provided updates on suppliers’ concerns regarding the potential for lower production volumes this year as a result of automotive import tariffs, as well as the challenges of assessing USMCA-compliant content in vehicles.
GM estimated the Trump administration’s tariffs could increase its costs by up to $5 billion this year, and potentially reduce 2025 net profit by up to 25% year-over-year. The automaker expects to offset its projected tariff exposure by roughly 30% through spending reductions and shifting more supplies and manufacturing to the U.S. In 2024, GM imported more vehicles into the U.S. than any other automaker.
Japanese automakers could collectively experience a $19 billion impact from U.S. import tariffs, according to analysis from Bloomberg.
Toyota and Honda projected annual net profit declines of 35% and 70%, respectively, for fiscal year ending March 2026, if U.S. automotive import tariffs are maintained. Toyota estimated its tariff impact reached $1.3 billion within just two months, while Honda expects an annual tariff impact of up to $3 billion.
Ford projected a $2.5 billion impact from tariffs in 2025, but noted it plans to offset up to $1 billion of the costs.
Revised analysis from the Anderson Economic Group estimates the Trump administration’s current automotive tariff policies will raise vehicle costs from $2,000 to $15,000.
U.S. new light-vehicle inventory is down by an estimated 24% year-over-year, representing a 61 days’ supply, following robust sales in April.
Kelley Blue Book estimated the U.S. new light-vehicle average transaction price (ATP) rose 2.5% in April 2025 from March. New-vehicle sales incentives fell to 6.7% of ATP last month, down from 7% in March and compared to a pre-pandemic norm of roughly 10%.
The U.S. House Ways and Means Committee included a measure to eliminate consumer tax credits of up to $7,500 for a new EV and $4,000 for a used EV at the end of 2025 in the “Big, Beautiful” tax package introduced on May 12. The initial proposal would extend new EV tax credits until the end of 2026 for automakers that sold less than 200,000 EVs in the U.S. between 2010 and 2025.
California and 16 other states filed a lawsuit over the Trump administration’s suspension of the $5 billion National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) program created by the 2021 Bipartisan Infrastructure Law.
The U.S. House on May 1 passed the third of three Congressional Review Act resolutions to repeal Clean Air Act waivers issued by the Environmental Protection Agency for California’s vehicle emissions programs. A Senate vote related to the proposals has not yet been scheduled.
Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell cautioned the U.S. “may be entering a period of more frequent, and potentially more persistent, supply shocks” due to economic and trade policy uncertainty.
OEMs/Suppliers
First-quarter 2025 profitability dropped by 2.3% for Hyundai, 6.6% for GM, nearly 40% for Volkswagen, and over 60% for Ford.
Automakers that include Ford, Volvo, Stellantis and Mercedes recently suspended 2025 financial guidance due to tariff-related uncertainty.
Magna estimated its annual direct tariff costs will reach $250 million for 2025.
Nissan reported a net loss equivalent to $4.55 billion for its fiscal year ended March 31, 2025 due in part to restructuring charges. The automaker intends to cut 15% of its global workforce, and consolidate its global production base to 10 assembly plants from 17.
Ford plans to raise prices by as much as $2,000 on certain Mexico-produced models in response to U.S. import tariffs.
GM plans to eliminate a shift at its Oshawa Assembly plant in Ontario in response to “forecasted demand and the evolving trade environment.”
Aptiv plans to establish two new plants in China in the second half of this year that will produce high-voltage connectors and active safety products.
Stellantis plans to launch a lower-priced version of its U.S.-made Ram pickup truck later this year to boost sales and mitigate tariff exposure. The automaker previously shifted pickup truck production for certain models from Michigan to Mexico.
Market Trends and Regulatory
AlixPartners predicts Chinese brands will account for 30% of the global auto market by 2030, compared with 21% in 2024.
BYD has a goal to achieve 50% of its sales outside of China by 2030.
Congress voted to repeal an Environmental Protection Agency rule on National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants related to rubber tire manufacturing.
According to a Gartner survey of 126 supply chain executives, 47% of respondents were renegotiating contracts with suppliers to mitigate the impact of tariffs.
Autonomous Technologies and Vehicle Software
Automotive News provided an overview of recent developments in autonomous driving.
Ford plans to cut 350 connected-vehicle software jobs in the U.S. and Canada, and the reductions account for roughly 5% of the total team, according to a report in The Detroit News.
Waymo will partner with Toyota to develop robotaxi technology for personally-owned vehicles. Waymo’s self-driving partnerships include Hyundai and China’s Geely.
Electric Vehicles and Low-Emissions Technology
U.S. EV sales declined by roughly 5% in April, amid a 10% YOY increase in overall new-vehicle sales. Global EV sales in April were up by an estimated 29% YOY, led by a 35% increase in China.
Honda will postpone a planned $11 billion investment in new EV factories in Ontario, Canada due to slowing demand in North America.
GM’s Orion Assembly Plant in Michigan may not operate as a fully electric vehicle factory as originally planned, according to unnamed sources in Crain’s Detroit.
The American and Chinese car markets are likely to diverge further due to differences in supply chain costs and consumer preferences, as well as the nations’ ongoing trade conflicts.
GM suspended a project with Piston Automotive to establish a $55 million hydrogen fuel cell plant in Detroit.
Stellantis delayed production of its first battery-electric Ram pickup truck until 2027.
Hyundai plans to launch a hydrogen production and dispensing facility for heavy-duty trucks in Georgia.
Toronto-based battery recycler Li-cycle is pursuing a sale of its business or assets.
Canadian electric truck and bus maker Lion Electric faces a “very high” likelihood of liquidation after the Quebec government decided not to support a public bailout.
The Renaissance of HVDC for a Low Carbon Future: Part 2
As we discussed in Part 1 of this series of Articles, there is likely to be significant future increased demand for low loss, long-distance interconnectors. While the concept of transmitting large amounts of energy with relatively low losses over long distances (e.g., from solar farms in North Africa to Europe) might be attractive in principle, significant political, economic and legal challenges face potential investors and lenders, particularly in developing jurisdictions.
We will explore below the key models for structuring and financing transmission infrastructure, including the integrated grid model, merchant investment and independent power transmission (IPT) projects.
Integrated grid model
Power transmission has traditionally been considered a natural monopoly. Globally, transmission assets are most commonly owned and/or operated by a transmission utility as part of an integrated grid. The transmission utility may be state-owned, privately owned or operating under a concession granted by the government. Under this model, investment in transmission lines is typically financed using the utility’s balance sheet and recovered through a regulated tariff. This tariff is charged to consumers as part of the overall retail electricity price. However, in countries where the transmission infrastructure is publicly owned, this model can strain public finances, particularly when governments and state-owned utilities face fiscal constraints. This often results in underinvestment in transmission infrastructure and delays to necessary upgrades.
Merchant investment
The merchant investment model is a privately funded approach to developing transmission lines where revenue is primarily derived from price differentials between two markets or zones creating arbitrage opportunities. This makes it particularly suited for cross-border interconnections or countries with an unbundled power market and multiple wholesale price zones. Many interconnection projects[1] to date have used the merchant investment model in which the investor builds and operates a transmission line. This model is typically for standalone assets—either a single line or a bundle of lines. A technical requirement for the merchant model is the ability to control and measure electricity flows, as the operator profits from directing power where it is most valuable. As such, this model is more suited for DC lines.
However, the revenue uncertainty of this model makes it more difficult to finance using project finance techniques, which require predictable revenue streams. To mitigate this risk, governments have sometimes intervened to support merchant lines. One example is the NeuConnect interconnector between the UK and Germany, which operates under a cap and floor mechanism. This reduces revenue uncertainty, improving bankability while still allowing private investors to benefit from price differentials. See below for further discussion on the NeuConnect project.
The merchant investment model is not generally viable in countries without liberalised wholesale electricity markets. This is the case for many emerging markets with a vertically integrated, state-owned power sector. The lack of a competitive wholesale market and transparent, market-based price signals limits the potential for price differentials and reduces opportunities for price arbitrage between different markets or zones that are essential for a merchant line’s revenue model.
IPT Projects
Another model which can facilitate private investment in transmission assets is independent power transmission (IPT). In essence, it involves the government (or the state-owned utility) tendering a long-term contract whereby the IPT (the winning bidder) will be responsible for building and operating a transmission line in exchange for contractually defined payments dependent upon the availability of the line.
A recent example of an IPT project, although not HVDC, is the 400 kV Lessos–Loosuk and 220 kV Kisumu–Musaga transmission lines in Kenya. This project involves the development, financing and construction of the transmission lines under a public-private partnership framework by Africa50 and the Power Grid Corporation of India Limited. The project is set to become Kenya’s first IPT and a pioneering example in Africa.
IPT projects have been adopted in many countries, albeit mostly for in-country transmission. Adopting the same model for international interconnectors is likely to be more complex, not least due to the need to coordinate between the governments of the relevant countries.
Also in the African context, the Côte d’Ivoire-Liberia-Sierra Leone-Guinea (CLSG) interconnection project, financed by the AfDB, EIB, KfW, World Bank and its member countries and completed and commissioned in 2021, illustrates one way forward. It involved the construction of a 1,300 km long 225 kV AC transmission line and associated substations connecting four participating countries’ energy systems into the WAPP. The project was implemented through a regional special purpose company (Transco), jointly owned by the national utilities of those countries, and responsible for the financing, construction, ownership and operation of the project assets.
To encourage the use of the CLSG transmission line, an open access policy was adopted. Power purchase agreements (PPAs) were signed between Côte d’Ivoire’s national utility and those of the other three countries, with each also entering into a transmission service agreement with Transco. The transmission tariff was set using the “postage-stamp” methodology rather than an availability-based tariff, so that transmission costs are effectively charged to the power purchasers based on their relative shares of trade through the transmission line. To mitigate the risk of a funding shortfall owing to low trading volumes, Transco’s shareholders agreed to cover any shortfall from trading revenue. This pricing methodology ensures cost recovery whilst facilitating trade through the transmission line.
While the CLSG project structure does not involve any private investment, in principle a similar structure could be adopted to implement the IPT model; for example, by replacing government-owned shareholders of Transco with private sector sponsors.
To a limited extent this was the structure adopted by the Central American Electricity Interconnection System (SIEPAC) which was taken into account in structuring the CLSG project. The SIEPAC transmission company (EPR),owns the 1,793 km interconnector (230 kV) linking the power grids of six Central American countries. EPR is owned by eight national utilities or transmission companies together with a private company (ENDESA of Spain) which is responsible for managing EPR. During the project design stage, the option of relying entirely on private investment was considered, but it was ultimately decided that there might not be sufficient interest from the private sector due to perceived project risks and the natural monopoly nature of transmission. Nevertheless, there seems to be no reason why, through proper risk management and with adequate financial incentives, such a structure could not be adopted with entirely private ownership.
Regulatory and legal challenges
In many developing countries, the electricity sector remains vertically integrated with monopoly networks. Although full “unbundling” is not a necessary pre-condition for IPT projects, existing legislation and regulation will need to be reviewed and may need to be revised to enable an IPT project to operate alongside the national utility. In particular, the grid code will likely need to be modified to include operating procedures and principles. In the context of an interconnection project, this will need to be done for each country to which it connects and could be cumbersome and result in a long development period.
This challenge was highlighted by the North Core Interconnector Project (a 330 kV AC transmission line connecting Nigeria, Niger, Benin and Burkina Faso). According to the ECOWAS Master Plan, the SPV structure adopted in the CLSG project was originally considered for the North Core project but was ultimately not adopted owing to concerns over the delay that could be caused by the need to make adjustments to national legal frameworks.
In civil law jurisdictions, specific enabling legislation may also be required to implement interconnector projects. Conflicts of law and policy questions may also arise where cross-border agreements are entered into; for example, some provisions of law may have mandatory application in certain jurisdictions; and where state-owned entities are involved, legal or policy requirements may dictate a choice of a particular governing law or dispute resolution arrangement.
“Project-on-Project” risk
For a cross-border interconnector, separate SPVs (or “sub-projects”) may be established in each relevant jurisdiction. This approach offers several benefits, including ring-fencing national risks, aligning with local licensing requirements and facilitating construction delivery management. However, it also introduces a high degree of interdependency, as each project segment must be successfully completed for the overall project to function. This creates challenges in managing interface risks, project delivery alignment and providing certainty for stakeholders in each sub-project that the other sub-project(s) will be delivered as planned.
To address these risks, risk allocation between project sponsors and other contract parties must be carefully calibrated to ensure that risk levels are acceptable to all stakeholders while achieving the bankability of the project.
Financial viability
The CLSG project provided an example of how transmission tariffs can be set to meet minimum revenue requirements. Investors, however, need confidence that contractual payments will be received from the transmission line users, which are likely to be national utilities, who may be in poor financial health. Many developing countries have experience in addressing this question in the context of independent power projects (IPPs), which may provide valuable lessons for developing IPT projects. For example, credit support may be provided through the use of escrow accounts to prioritise payments to private sector market participants. Where this is insufficient, governments may provide sovereign guarantees (or other government support) for payment obligations to IPTs. Additional security may also be provided by development finance institutions (DFIs).
EPC contract questions
The structuring of an interconnector project may present challenges in negotiating an EPC contract. For example, where multiple procuring parties decide to use a single entity (e.g., a special purpose vehicle company) to act as the employer under an EPC contract, with assets transferred to them as third party owners, particular concerns may arise for both the procuring parties and the contractor under the EPC contract, including in respect of risk allocation, indemnities, insurance and ensuring that the asset owners obtain the full benefit of rights under the EPC contract whilst the EPC contractor maintains adequate recourse against parties of sufficient financial substance; and bespoke amendments are likely to be required to standard construction contracts, e.g., those based on FIDIC forms.
The European interconnector experience and project revenue support regimes
The European market offers examples of successful privately financed submarine HVDC interconnector projects, underpinned by revenue support arrangements to make investment sufficiently attractive to sponsors and risks more palatable to prospective lenders.
The NeuConnect interconnector will create the first direct power link between Germany and the UK, two of Europe’s largest energy markets, and allowing trading of electricity between them. Construction of the pair of 725 km long terrestrial and subsea 525 kV HVDC cables is in progress and will create 1.4 GW of transmission bi-directional transmission capacity, sufficient to power 1.5 million homes.
The project has a capital cost of around £2.4 billion and achieved financial close in 2022, involving Meridiam, Allianz Capital Partners, Kansai Electric Power Grid and TEPCO Power Grid as sponsors and a consortium of more than 20 major banks and financial institutions as lenders (including EIB and JBIC). NeuConnect Britain Ltd. (NBL), incorporated in England, is responsible for all aspects of the project in the UK (as well as construction works in Dutch waters) while NeuConnect Deutschland GmbH & Co. KG, incorporated in Germany, is responsible for all aspects of the project in Germany.
NeuConnect states that it will facilitate non-discriminatory, fair and transparent access to capacity through a range of standardised auctioned products, detailed in Access Rules which are compliant with relevant regulations. The project however takes limited merchant risk as its revenues are underpinned by a 25 year cap and floor regime in the UK, which broadly covers 50% of project costs and 50% of the total revenues earned by the interconnector. Under this scheme, the project is entitled to a minimum revenue (the “notional floor”) but in return agrees to a defined cap above which all revenues will in effect be paid back to the electricity consumers. This mechanism is intended to ensure that end-consumers obtain value for money by capping investment returns if the project outperforms revenue expectations in exchange for the protection granted through the floor, with an element of commercial risk for the project in between, thereby providing an incentive for private investors to develop interconnector projects, as compared with other regimes where revenues are purely regulated and return on equity is generally insufficiently attractive.
Ofgem approved regulatory changes to the pre-existing UK cap and floor regime to allow the project to go ahead. Meanwhile, in Germany, legislative change was needed to accommodate the project. Pre-existing German legislation (the EnWG law) did not cover interconnector assets that were not owned by a German TSO, requiring an amendment to extend the German StromNEV regime to NeuConnect. Under this regime, the project receives statutory revenues based on its assessed cost base, including depreciation of the RAB and return on such RAB (differentiated between equity and debt). NeuConnect receives its regulatory revenues from TenneT TSO GmbH, the local transmission system operator in northern Germany.
In both jurisdictions, it is understood that the revenue support arrangements are adjusted based on the level of availability of the interconnector in order to incentivise the project to maximise availability.
Threats
Recent geopolitical events have highlighted the vulnerability of subsea data cables, gas pipelines and submarine electricity cables to deliberate sabotage or damage from ships’ anchors. It seems unlikely that insurance will be available for such risks and unless governments are willing to underwrite remediation costs and lost revenues, future private investment in submarine HVDC cables may be thrown into doubt in vulnerable areas of the world.
Conclusions
While AC power transmission and distribution systems are likely to remain for many years to come and may never be entirely replaced, HVDC is certain to play a vital role in providing backbone infrastructure to support a low carbon future. Investors, lenders, utilities, regulators and policymakers alike will be taking a keen interest in this exciting technology.
Endnote
[1] Outside Europe, where interconnectors are subject to regulation unless they are formally exempted. Even in the latter case, conditions may be placed on the exemption, such as an overall IRR cap.
European Commission Previews New Round of Countermeasures Against the United States
In April 2025, the European Union (“EU”) set tariffs on a series of US imports but immediately suspended their application until 14 July 2025. This was due to the US almost simultaneously announcing that it would be softening its across-the-board tariffs. In the case of EU exports, this meant going from a 20% to a 10% general “reciprocal” tariff for three months to negotiate better US/EU trade arrangements.
Possible further EU countermeasures on imports of US goods
Regardless, the European Commission (“EC”) hopes to have new countermeasures ready in case the ongoing trade negotiations between the EU and the US “do not produce a satisfactory result.” The EC has published a list of EU Combined Nomenclature (“CN”) codes, which represent categories of US goods which could be subjected to even further retaliation by the EU if the US does not adequately resolve its tariff dispute with the EC (vid. here). Examples of industries with goods that could be affected by the proposed countermeasures are:
Agrifood
Agricultural equipment
Chemical hydrocarbons
Alcohol/Spirits
Metals
Appliances and other household items
Sports equipment
Automobile
Turbines / related
Seagoing vessels
Aircraft
Paper
On 8 May 2025, in light of the slow pace of the negotiations, the EC announced that it would be hosting a stakeholder consultation, running until 10 June 2025. All interested parties may participate in consultations, including EU stakeholders, as well as US and third-nation companies (vid. here). Any new countermeasures would presumably apply concurrently with those which were suspended in April 2025.
The EC has not indicated what form these new countermeasures might take. The most likely scenario is that they would mostly take the form of retaliatory tariffs. The suspended April countermeasures constitute ad valorem tariffs ranging from 10% to 25%, depending on the type of good(s) in question.
The EC aims to make their newly proposed countermeasure operable before the US’ three-month tariff respite ends. Therefore, it would likely seek to have its proposals adopted by the time the temporary suspension of the April 2025 countermeasures runs out (i.e. on 15 July 2025).
It is important to note that, as of now, these new countermeasures are merely a possibility. Indeed, they have been proposed, and their implementation is being envisaged. Nevertheless, they are not yet definitive, as that would require their formal adoption by the EC and subsequent publication in the EU’s Official Journal.
Possible EU export controls on US-bound goods
In tandem with the tariff countermeasures, the EC has also published a list of EU goods that could be subject to export controls when bound for the US (available here). This list is much shorter than the proposed US goods list discussed above, but it does contain certain key goods such as:
Ferrous waste and scrap;
Remelting scrap ingots of iron or steel;
Aluminum waste and scrap;
Toluidines and their derivatives, and salts thereof;
Mixtures of odoriferous substances and mixtures of a kind used as raw materials in the food or drink industries, as well as other preparations based on odoriferous substances; and
Certain enzymes.
According to the EC, exports restrictions would affect US-bound goods worth EUR 4.4 billion. The exact form that the possible export controls would take remains unknown.
During the aforementioned consultation period running until 10 June 2025, interested parties may likewise submit comments on the scope of these proposed export controls.
How we can help
The publication of the proposed lists of US and EU goods by the EC constitutes a significant moment in transatlantic trade relations. While the two parties are formally engaged in trade negotiations, the EU is now threatening to impose considerably more severe countermeasures on the US. This escalation could impact both importing and exporting companies, as well as businesses throughout the broader supply chains. Nevertheless, the EC’s stakeholder consultations provide a valuable opportunity to engage with EU authorities on this situation to advocate for targeted, meaningful adjustments. Time is of the essence for companies who wish to participate in the consultation. An effective, evidence-based submission must be made before the 10 June 2025 deadline.
Motorcycle Safety Awareness Month: Key Tips for Drivers to Share the Road
Every May, we observe Motorcycle Safety Awareness Month to educate and remind all road users that motorcyclists have the same rights and responsibilities as any other driver. It’s a time to emphasize the importance of recognizing motorcyclists as equal participants on the road. In 2023, the fatality rate for motorcyclists was 28 times higher than that of passenger car occupants, highlighting the urgent need for increased driver awareness. With warmer weather bringing more bikes onto the roads, drivers must stay alert, drive responsibly, and understand how to share the road.
Here are some reminders that every driver should be aware of to safely share the road with motorcyclists:
1. Always Check Your Blind Spots
Motorcycles are small and can easily disappear in your blind spots, especially during lane changes or merges. Always double-check your mirrors and look over your shoulder before moving over. A quick glance can save a life.
2. Give Motorcycles Enough Room
Never crowd a motorcycle or follow too closely. Motorcycles may need to stop more quickly than cars, and rear-ending a rider can be fatal. Give them at least a full lane width and a 3- to 4-second following distance.
3. Use Your Turn Signals Early
Clear communication is key. Use your turn signals well in advance so motorcyclists and other drivers can anticipate your moves. This gives riders time to adjust their speed or position safely.
4. Respect Their Lane Position
Motorcyclists often adjust their lane position to see better, be seen, or avoid hazards. Don’t assume they’re giving up space, they are likely staying safe. Never try to share a lane with a motorcycle.
5. Be Extra Cautious in Intersections
Most motorcycle crashes occur at intersections. Always look more than once before turning or pulling out, especially when making a left turn. A motorcycle may seem farther away than it actually is due to its smaller size.
6. Watch for Weather Changes
Rain, wind, and road debris can be much more dangerous for riders than for drivers. Give them space to maneuver and never assume they’re overreacting.
Why It Matters
Motorcyclists are more vulnerable than drivers because they do not have airbags or steel frames to protect them. Being more cautious can mean the difference between life and death.
Final Thoughts
This May, let’s commit to driving with greater awareness. Protecting motorcyclists starts with simple practices, such as checking your blind spots, leaving space, and staying alert.
European Union Adopts 16th Package of Sanctions Against Russia
In a bid to further increase the pressure on Russia, the Council of the European Union has adopted additional measures which have been introduced in its 16th sanctions package. The new measures amending the framework Council Regulation (EU) 833/2014 are found and included in Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 (EU’s 16th Package). They target systemically important sectors of the Russian economy, including energy, trade, transport, infrastructure and financial services.
Additional Listings
An additional 48 individuals and 35 entities have been targeted by asset freezes and travel bans. The EU’s 16th Package adds new criteria for listing individuals and entities that are part of support or benefit from Russia’s military-industrial complex. This is in addition to any entities or individuals who are active in sanctions circumvention, maritime or Russian crypto assets exchanges.
Anti-Circumvention Measures
An additional 74 vessels, bringing the total number of listed vessels to 153, have been added. These vessels are part of the shadow fleet or contribute to Russia’s energy revenues.
Trade Measures
Ban on Primary Aluminium Imports
The EU’s 16th Package also adopts further restrictions on the trade of goods and services. An aluminium import ban on EU imports of primary aluminium from Russia has been included. The exception to this is that it includes a “phase-in period” permitting the import of 275,000 tons over a 12-month period.
Export Bans
Export restrictions have been added which target 53 new companies, which include 34 companies outside of Russia and which support Russia’s military-industrial complex.
Dual-use export restrictions have been extended to additional items in order to cut Russia’s access to key technologies, including the following:
Dual-use chemical precursors to produce chloropicrin and other riot control agents used as chemical weapons by Russia in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Software related to computer numerical control machine tools used to manufacture weapons and video game controllers used by the Russian army to pilot drones on the battlefield.
Chromium ores and compounds due to their military applications.
Additional export restrictions on industrial goods, such as steel products, fireworks and certain minerals and chemicals, have been included.
Energy Measures
The EU’s 16th Package prohibits temporary storage or the placement under free zone procedures of Russian crude oil or petroleum products in EU ports, which was, until now, allowed if the oil complied with the price cap and went to a third country. This prohibition will inflict additional costs on the transport of Russian oil.
The package extends the prohibition to provide goods, technology and services for the completion of Russian liquefied natural gas projects to also crude oil projects in Russia, such as the Vostok oil project.
The package extends the existing software ban to restrict the export, supply or provision of oil and gas exploration software, which includes drilling processes, geological inspections and reservoir calculations, to Russia.
Infrastructure Measures
With immediate effect, a full transaction ban on specific Russian infrastructures—ports and airports which are believed to have been used to transport combat-related goods and technology or to circumvent the oil price cap by transporting Russian crude oil via ships in the shadow fleet—have been included in this latest package as they contribute to Russia’s military efforts.
The restrictions are broadly drafted and will apply to any transactions with relevant ports and airports (as listed in Annex XLVII of the EU’s 16th Package), even if there is no direct transaction with the port authorities themselves.
Transport Measures
One of the most notable changes under Article 5ae of the EU’s 16th Package is the imposition of a full flight ban which provides for the possibility to list any third-country airline operating domestic flights within Russia or supplying, selling, transferring or exporting, directly or indirectly, aircraft or other aviation goods and technology to a Russia air carrier or for flights within Russia.
If listed in Annex XLVI of the EU’s 16th Package, these air carriers, as well as any entity owned or controlled by them, will not be allowed to land in, take off from or fly over EU territory.
The flight ban will not apply to the following:
• In the case of an emergency landing or an emerging overflight.• If such landing, take-off or overflight is required for humanitarian purposes.
Financial Measures
An additional 13 Russian banks and three non-Russian banks, namely Bank BelVEB, Belgazprombank and VTB Bank (PJSC) Shanghai Branch (due to their use of the system for Transfer of Financial Messages of the Central Bank of Russia), have been either disconnected from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication international payment system or subjected to a transaction ban, intensifying financial isolation of Russia.
The European Union has also extended a transaction ban to allow it to target financial institutions and crypto asset providers circumventing the oil price cap so as to further isolate Russia’s financial network.
Measures Against Disinformation
To combat media manipulation and distortion of events, further restrictive measures have been placed on broadcasting activities. Eight additional media outlets, namely EADaily, Fondsk, Lenta, NewsFront, RuBaltic, SouthFront, Strategic Culture Foundation and Krasnaya Zvezda, have had broadcasting suspended because they are under the permanent control of Russian leadership and participate in spreading misinformation and propaganda.
Concluding Remarks
These increased enforcement efforts and highlighted sanctions are not just symbolic but impactful. As the European Union strengthens its sanctions framework and expands enforcement efforts, businesses must proactively assess their compliance strategies to mitigate legal and operational risks.
The Renaissance of HVDC for a Low Carbon Future
In this, the first of a series of two articles, we explore the resurgence of high voltage DC transmission technology and its relevance in a world that is transitioning to renewable power and adopting electric vehicles and heating and reducing its reliance on fossil fuels.
In this article we consider the benefits of the technology and some of the challenges it creates for investors, regulators and policy makers. In the second article we will look at how investments in HVDC transmission projects might be structured, including by examining examples of projects that have been successfully implemented.
Introduction
Anyone who has read a little history or seen the 2017 film The Current War knows that George Westinghouse’s alternating current (AC) won the late nineteenth century battle against Thomas Edison’s purportedly safer direct current (DC) alternative—the evidence is plain to see in our own homes. Ultimately, in 1892 the Edison Electric Light Company merged with its main AC competitor, Thomson-Houston, to form General Electric.[1]
A principal reason for AC’s early success was that transmission of electricity over significant distances is inefficient at low voltages: the energy wasted as heat in a conductor is proportional to the square of the current; and, for any given quantity of power transmission, the current is inversely proportional to voltage. Therefore, the higher the voltage the lower the energy losses become.
High transmission voltages are therefore desirable, with lower voltages at the point of use for safety reasons. A hundred odd years ago there was no efficient solution to convert DC from low to high voltage. AC on the other hand could be easily stepped up in voltage using a simple and cheap transformer, which has no moving parts. The invention of the induction motor also allowed AC to be used to power heavy industrial machinery, although DC still had many advantages over AC, such as being easier to use for railways and to control variable speed, asynchronous motors.
DC’s renaissance
More recently, over the past few decades, DC systems and in particular high voltage DC (HVDC) have enjoyed a renaissance, owing to their offering a number of benefits. HVDC transmission involves purely reactive power with no reactive power component and associated losses, which ultimately limits the length of high voltage AC power lines. HVDC transmission lines are technically the only viable solution for submarine or terrestrial buried electrical cables longer than a few tens of kilometers because of the capacitance of the insulated cables (which have to be charged and discharged each cycle, causing significant energy losses).
DC transmission also allows two asynchronous AC transmission grids (e.g., operating at different frequencies in different territories) to be interconnected. For the same reason, HVDC is typically also used to connect offshore wind farms, with the additional advantage that wind turbine generators can operate asynchronously with the onshore grid and, as such, at an optimum level of efficiency for any given wind condition.
Photovoltaic panels are only capable of directly producing DC output, and an inverter therefore has to be used to generate a three-phase high voltage AC output which is synchronised with the transmission grid. The same is true of storage batteries and other non-traditional power generation sources that do not use spinning generators.
Inverters use high-power, solid-state devices (typically, insulated gate bipolar transistors (IGBTs)) which switch on and off in a modulated configuration, controlled by sophisticated electronics, to produce a sinusoidal output which can be stepped up via a transformer to high voltage AC (HVAC) for transmission. Similar conversion devices can be configured to step-up the lower voltage DC output of a solar panel array or battery energy storage system directly to HVDC suitable for transmission or indeed to convert HVAC to HVDC.
The drive towards increased offshore wind power generation in many countries, including the UK, where generation sources are located far from where energy is required by consumers, provides a good illustration of the advantages and benefits of HVDC solutions. It would be impractical to build new transmission lines linking Scotland with England, such as the Eastern Green Links, without using subsea cables;[2] and, as noted above, HVDC is the only viable way to transmit electricity over long distances via such cables, which will necessarily have to be several hundred kilometers long.[3]
Several planned projects also involve long distance terrestrial buried HVDC cables, as the impact on the landscape is minimal once the work is completed and the land corridor restored—and there may be significant local resistance to new terrestrial overhead cables.
As the proportion of electricity generated by renewables increases, and as battery storage systems become more widespread, the arguments for using HVDC transmission more generally, as opposed to high voltage AC, become more compelling. If we take into account the future expansion of electric vehicle (EV) use and the need for fast battery charging stations, there are additional arguments in favour of HVDC systems. EV batteries require relatively low voltage but high current DC to charge rapidly. As such, a battery charging station array could in principle be supplied locally by DC or AC. There is no inherent technical requirement for AC as opposed to DC (or vice versa) and in principle either could be used with the appropriate conversion equipment; but what HVDC offers is potentially greater efficiencies and economies on a wider scale, which are discussed below.
Why use HVDC systems?
HVDC transmission systems offer a number of advantages over HVAC:
HVDC requires only two conductors, whereas HVAC needs three to support three phases, reducing costs and potentially requiring narrower land corridors.
HVDC power transmission losses may be lower than 0.3% per 100 km, which is 30% to 40% lower than losses for HVAC at an equivalent voltage, for a number of reasons:
AC suffers from a skin effect whereby only the outer part of the cable conducts current, which is avoided in DC transmission—the result is that for a given conductor size and energy losses, HVDC systems can transmit higher current over longer distances;
HVDC lines operate continuously at peak voltage (which is determined by the design of the transmission line insulators and towers, among other things), whereas HVAC is sinusoidal—and while the crests of the sine wave are naturally at peak voltage, the effective average voltage (and corresponding current) is the root mean square value (RMS), which is only 0.7 times the peak voltage; the net effect is to increase the power transmission capacity of an HVDC system relative to HVAC; and
DC carries only active power, whereas AC transfers both active and reactive power.
HVDC transmission lines/interconnectors are asynchronous, enabling connections between unsynchronised power sources, such as two grids operating at different frequencies, phases or voltages.
As noted above, HVDC is the only practical option for undersea cables longer than around 50 km.
Drawbacks of HVDC
HVDC does have certain drawbacks:
HVDC systems may be less reliable, have lower availability and be more expensive to maintain than HVAC, owing to their greater complexity;
additional complexity also increases the relative cost for shorter-distance transmission as compared with HVAC;
converter stations are required at each end of HVDC cables to convert from AC to DC and back again (assuming the source and load are AC)—these are expensive and may introduce relatively higher energy losses for shorter distance lines—but as noted above in the case of DC generation sources (such as solar) and DC loads (such as battery chargers), conversion equipment is also required if an HVAC transmission line is used; and
HVDC switching and breaker systems are more difficult to design and implement because, unlike AC which has zero current twice every cycle (at which point the circuit can be broken safely), HVDC current is continuous and a simple mechanical breaker cannot therefore be used because it would suffer potentially destructive arcing.
Weighing up the pros and cons, it is generally considered that for overhead transmission lines, HVDC transmission becomes cost effective above a minimum critical distance.
Bringing increased future reliance on renewable power generation, electrical vehicles, battery storage and heat pumps into the equation suggests that there are potential benefits in developing wide area HVDC super grids. These might help to mitigate the intermittency of renewable power sources by averaging and smoothing the outputs of geographically dispersed generation facilities.
It also seems likely that substantial investment in upgrading of transmission systems will be required to support any move towards the widespread use of electric vehicles and the adoption of heat pumps for heating in place of natural gas. Existing transmission systems are entirely inadequate and would create severe bottlenecks. The United Kingdom is already seeing the impact of planning for such changes in its “Great Grid Upgrade” through the procurement of the Eastern Green Links (EGL 1 to EGL 4) between Scotland and England, in the case of EGL3 and EGL4 reaching as far as East Anglia.
Implications for investors, regulators and policymakers[4]
Given the potential attractiveness of HVDC solutions, those responsible for investing in grid infrastructure (such as integrated utilities or unbundled network companies) may need to keep their investment programmes under review. Changes in the nature of the grid and the technologies connected to it may mean that HVDC becomes a contender to traditional AC network investments where the conditions are right, such as where power generated by non-synchronous generators (e.g., wind and solar farms) is being moved over long distances and in particular where it is impractical to build new conventional terrestrial transmission lines.
As noted above, this is already happening today in the UK. While many early links to offshore windfarms relied on AC technology, ENTSO-E’s Offshore Network Development Plan (ONDP) has adopted HVDC as a standard transmission technology, with 525 kV VSC converter technology. Following the precedent of the Eastern Green Link projects, it looks likely that 525 kV HVDC may become the standard for the significant GB offshore network investment planned in the North Sea, as well as interconnectors (for example, Neuconnect).
The EGL projects were signed off after formal reviews of their costs and benefits, conducted separately from the normal regulatory regime for the GB transmission network. This underlines that considering the full range of technologies and making optimum choices with the right long-term strategic benefits may require extraordinary action by policymakers and regulators.
Traditionally, network regulation typically aims to incentivise grid companies to do what is cheapest, but regulatory incentives are typically less effective than those from competitive markets. For example, if new technologies carry more of an operational risk than the traditional options, and grid operators believe that regulators may penalise them for investments which fail to perform, they may act in an unduly risk-averse manner and just carry on doing what they have always done, particularly if new technologies are not as well understood as traditional ones; and, at least in the short term, choice of technologies may be affected by limitations in the supply chain for HVDC equipment, and in particular cables, while traditional HVAC infrastructure is more readily available.
Everyone would agree that regulators should protect customers’ interests. However, they also need to realise that, in a world of technical change, this sometimes means innovation and taking greater risks. While penalising failure (e.g., lower asset availability) or failing to allow companies to pay to reserve supply chain capacity may feel like the right strategy in the short term, this could act to stall innovation, which in turn might be against customers’ long-term interests. Striking the right balance is therefore critical.
The NeuConnect project (which we discuss in part 2 of this article) provides a good illustration of how regulators such as Ofgem have taken a flexible approach in adapting regulatory regimes to unlock private investment in HVDC infrastructure through revenue support arrangements.
Endnotes
[1] Today, General Electric’s successor GE Vernova is once again championing DC in the form of high voltage conversion systems to support HVDC cables that can transfer electricity point-to-point or from offshore wind farms to shore—more about this below.
[2] The environmental impact of using terrestrial overhead transmission lines for the entire length of one of the Eastern Green Links would likely be prohibitive. Terrestrial underground cables are estimated by Scottish Power to cost between five and ten times as much as overhead transmission lines; however, submarine cables are also significantly more expensive than overhead transmission lines.
[3] For example, Eastern Green Link 1 (EGL1) is almost 200 km long (including 176 km of subsea cable) and when completed will link East Lothian with County Durham, allowing the transfer of 2GW of electrical power. The UK is planning a series of such links, including four Eastern Green Links, and the Western HVDC Link between Scotland and North Wales (with a capacity of 2.25 GW) was completed in 2019.
[4] Comments on regulatory aspects were kindly provided by Dan Roberts of Frontier Economics.
Mandating English Proficiency for Truck Drivers: Trump EO Shifts Policy for Transportation Industry
Takeaways
A new EO reinstates enforcement of the English proficiency rule for drivers of commercial motor vehicles.
The EO directs the Department of Transportation to issue new guidance and revise inspection procedures.
Transportation industry employers should also be mindful of states requiring or considering English proficiency for drivers of commercial motor vehicles.
Related links
Enforcing Commonsense Rules of the Road for America’s Truck Drivers (EO)
49 CFR 391.11 — General qualifications of drivers
Arkansas HB1745
Article
Although the English proficiency rule (49 C.F.R. 391.11(b)(2)) is part of the minimum qualifications for drivers of commercial motor vehicles operating in interstate commerce, with certain limited exceptions, it has previously been interpreted as not requiring drivers who are found only in violation of the rule to be taken out of service. It seems that this will soon change.
President Donald Trump signed the “Enforcing Commonsense Rules of the Road for America’s Truck Drivers” executive order (EO) on April 28, 2025, directing the Department of Transportation to reinstate enforcement of the existing federal rule.
The EO explains, “[T]ruck drivers are essential to the strength of our economy, the security of our Nation, and the livelihoods of the American people. Every day, truckers perform the demanding and dangerous work of transporting the Nation’s goods to businesses, customers, and communities safely, reliably, and efficiently.” For this reason, proficiency in English should be a “non-negotiable safety requirement for professional drivers.”
The EO goes on to explain the following:
Truck drivers should be able to “read and understand traffic signs, communicate with traffic safety, border patrol, agricultural checkpoints, and cargo weight-limit station officers. Drivers need to provide feedback to their employers and customers and receive related directions in English. This is common sense.”
This is not a new requirement. “Federal law requires that, to operate a commercial vehicle, a driver must ‘read and speak the English language sufficiently to converse with the general public, to understand highway traffic signs and signals in the English language, to respond to official inquiries, and to make entries on reports and records.’ Yet this requirement has not been enforced in years, and America’s roadways have become less safe.”
Highlights
The EO directs the following actions:
Within 60 days, the “Secretary of Transportation, acting through the Administrator of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), shall … rescind the guidance document titled, ‘English Language Proficiency Testing and Enforcement Policy MC-ECE-2016-006,’ issued on June 15, 2016, and issue new guidance to FMCSA and enforcement personnel outlining revised inspection procedures necessary to ensure compliance with the requirements of 49 C.F.R. 391.11(b)(2).” This regulation requires drivers of a commercial motor vehicle to be able “to converse with the general public, to understand highway traffic signs and signals in the English language, to respond to official inquiries, and to make entries on reports and records.”
The “Secretary of Transportation [and] the Administrator of the FMCSA … shall take all … actions, consistent with applicable law,” to revise the current rules to ensure that a violation of the English proficiency requirement results in a truck driver being taken out-of-service.
The “Secretary of Transportation … shall review all non-domiciled commercial driver’s licenses (CDLs) issued by relevant State agencies to identify … unusual patterns or … irregularities,” and evaluate and take “actions to improve the … current protocols” being followed to verify “the authenticity and validity of both domestic and international commercial driving credentials.”
Within 60 days, the “Secretary of Transportation shall identify and begin carrying out additional administrative, regulatory, or enforcement actions to improve the working conditions of America’s truck drivers.”
State Law Considerations
Transportation industry employers should also keep in mind that Arkansas has passed a state law requiring English proficiency for drivers of commercial motor vehicles, and the state is issuing stiff penalties for drivers who are not in compliance. Other states have similar bills pending. In Tennessee and New Hampshire, lawmakers seek to implement English-only written driver’s license exams, prohibiting the use of any translation devices or an interpreter.
Foley Automotive Update and the Latest Tariff Developments
Trump Administration and Tariff Policies
The U.S. Commerce Department initiated a Section 232 investigation into imports of medium- and heavy-duty trucks and parts, in a development that could serve as a basis for future tariffs. Public comments must be received by May 16, 2025.
Bloomberg Law provided an explanation of the legal arguments in certain lawsuits that have been filed to challenge the Trump administration’s authority to impose tariffs. Most recently, a dozen states filed a lawsuit on April 23 over tariffs that were allegedly imposed without congressional authority. This follows suits over the legality of the tariffs filed by the New Civil Liberties Alliance, as well as California Governor Gavin Newsom and Attorney General Rob Bonta.
U.S. House Representative Mike Lawler (R-NY) on April 25 stated Congress “will likely exert more authority” if the White House does not make “significant progress” in ongoing tariff negotiations in the coming weeks.
President Trump warned he would veto a bipartisan Senate resolution led by Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) that seeks to terminate the emergency declaration used as a basis for the president’s tariffs. A vote on the resolution could occur in the coming days.
A proposal by the U.S. Trade Representative’s office could impose fees on ships built, owned or operated by Chinese entities that dock at U.S. ports. If the proposal is implemented, the fees would begin in six months based on the volume of goods carried, on a per-voyage basis. The proposal intends to restore the U.S. maritime industry and it follows an investigation ordered under the Biden administration into whether Chinese shipbuilding threatens national security.
Automotive Key Developments
In an April 21 letter to the Trump administration, trade groups including MEMA, the Alliance for Automotive Innovation and the National Automobile Dealers Association outlined their concerns over the impact of import tariffs on automotive parts.
The Wall Street Journal and Bloomberg reported the Trump administration could ease the impact of certain automotive tariffs in ways that include temporary partial reimbursements and preventing certain auto levies from stacking on other duties.
Automotive News provided an overview of the opportunities and barriers involved in major production shifts to underutilized U.S. auto plants.
Many auto suppliers are encountering challenges regarding the complexities of calculating U.S. import tariffs on steel and aluminum, according to a report in Automotive News.
U.S. new light vehicles are projected to reach a SAAR of 17.9 million units in April 2025, representing a 10.5% year-over-year increase, according to a joint forecast from J.D. Power and GlobalData. The anticipated volume increase was attributed to consumers that have been accelerating purchase decisions due to expectation tariffs will lead to higher prices.
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) new Automated Vehicle (AV) Framework will expand the Automated Vehicle Exemption Program (AVEP) to include domestically produced vehicles, and streamline rules in regard to the reporting of safety incidents. The framework also intends to facilitate efforts to modernize the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards.
The U.S. House could vote in the coming days on a measure to revoke a Biden-era Environmental Protection Agency waiver that allowed California to require increasing thresholds of zero-emissions vehicle sales between 2026 and 2035 in the state. U.S. House lawmakers previously introduced several Congressional Review Act resolutions that intend to repeal certain clean-vehicle waivers issued for California under the Biden administration. Senate Republicans are pursuing similar measures.
OEMs/Suppliers
Following a two-week shutdown to assess the impact of U.S. automotive import tariffs, Stellantis resumed production at its Windsor Assembly plant in Ontario, Sterling Stamping in Michigan and two transmission plants in Kokomo, Indiana. The automaker’s Jeep plant in Toluca, Mexico, is expected to remain idle through the end of April.
Volvo Group is preparing to lay off up to 1,000 workers at its North American truck operations in the coming months, amid uncertainty over how President Trump’s tariff policies will affect demand.
Ford halted exports to China of models that include the F-150 Raptor pickups and Bronco SUVs in response to the nation’s retaliatory import tariffs, according to a report in The Detroit News.
Volkwagen and Nissan expect to avoid tariff-related increases on U.S. vehicle prices through the end of May, and Ford indicated its vehicles will have higher prices by July or sooner as a result of the levies.
Hyundai intends to shift an unspecified volume of production of Tucson crossovers from Mexico to the U.S., and the automaker established a tariff task force to mitigate the effects of import duties on its finances.
GM plans to remove certain equipment for EV drive system production at its Toledo Propulsion Systems plant to increase capacity for gas-powered truck transmissions.
Toyota is reported to be considering a buyout of its parts supplier Toyota Industries, at an estimated valuation of $42 billion.
Nissan expects to incur a net loss of up to $5.3 billion for the fiscal year ended March, due to impairments and restructuring expenses, as well as declining sales.
Volkswagen’s Audi brand is reported to be close to a decision on whether to establish its first U.S. production site.
GM’s executive vice president of global manufacturing resigned after just over a year in the role.
Market Trends and Regulatory
The Federal Communications Commission on April 21 dismissed “as unnecessary the remaining cellular vehicle to everything (C-V2X) early transition waivers and confirm[ed] that each of the applicants may now seek a C-V2X authorization under the new rules.”
The U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) and Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) repealed a Biden-era rule that would have required state transportation departments to measure and establish declining targets for carbon dioxide emissions on federally supported highways.
The California New Car Dealers Association filed a lawsuit against Volkswagen Group and its affiliate Scout Motors over the brand’s plans to sell directly to consumers in violation of the state’s franchise laws.
Autonomous Technologies and Vehicle Software
Alphabet reported its autonomous vehicle unit Waymo is booking over 250,000 paid robotaxi rides weekly in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Phoenix, and Austin.
California’s Department of Motor Vehicles announced proposed regulations for the testing and deployment of self-driving heavy-duty vehicles on the state’s public roads.
Volkswagen will partner with Uber Technologies to launch autonomous rides with the electric ID. Buzz van beginning in Los Angeles next year.
Huawei Technologies Co. is a leading provider of intelligent driving software in China’s EV market, according to a report in Automotive News.
Electric Vehicles and Low-Emissions Technology
Automotive News assessed the ramifications of the Trump administration’s tariffs and trade policies on the U.S. EV industry.
BYD reported its first quarter 2025 revenue rose 36% YOY, supported by strong growth within China and overseas.
China’s Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. (CATL) debuted a next-generation battery that can reach up to 520 kilometers (323 miles) of range from five minutes of charging time. Competitor BYD recently developed batteries for certain models in China that would enable up to 400 kilometers (249 miles) of range with five minutes of charge time.
First quarter 2025 registrations of new battery-electric vehicles (BEVs) in the European Union increased 24% YOY for a 15% share of the total EU market. New EU registrations of hybrid-electric vehicles rose 21% YOY for a 35% share of the EU market. New car registrations across all powertrains declined 1.9% YOY in the region.
Missouri Enacts Significant Utility/Regulatory Omnibus Bill
On April 9, 2025, Missouri Governor Mike Kehoe signed into law a comprehensive Utility Omnibus Bill – Senate Bill 4 (SB 4 or the Bill). Among other things, the Bill significantly changes the regulated electric utility landscape. SB 4 establishes a statutory integrated resource planning framework, requires electrical corporations to add schedules governing large load customers to their tariffs, authorizes recovery of construction work in progress for the development of new natural gas generation facilities and establishes new standards for decommissioning large thermal generation assets.
Integrated Resource Planning
The last section of SB 4 modifies the integrated resource planning (IRP) process under what will become Section 393.1900 RSMo. The Bill makes filing an IRP a statutory requirement, rather than the current IRP process, which is codified by regulations administered by the Missouri Public Service Commission (MPSC). Under the current regulations, utilities file a new IRP every three years with an informational-only “Preferred Plan.” Every year between the triennial filings, utilities provide annual updates. The MPSC does not “approve” the Preferred Plan, and the utility can deviate from the Preferred Plan as long as it provides notice within 60 days of the utility’s determination of the need to deviate. Under the current regulations, adherence to the Preferred Plan does not meaningfully streamline the utility’s need to file for a certificate of convenience and necessity (CCN) prior to beginning construction on a new generation facility.
By contrast, under SB 4, utilities will file its IRP every four years, and CCN approvals will be streamlined if the utility can show consistency with their Preferred Plan. After holding a public hearing, the MPSC is specifically required to determine if the Preferred Plan “represents a reasonable and prudent means of meeting the electrical corporation’s load serving obligations at just and reasonable rates.” If such a finding is made, it “shall constitute the commission’s permission for the electrical corporation to construct or acquire the specified supply-side resources.” Before issuing a CCN, the MPSC will still assess the utility’s qualifications to construct and operate the resources, their ability to finance construction or acquisition of the resources, and siting consideration. The CCN process will be vastly expedited, requiring Commission action in 120-180 days. The IRP requirements of SB 4 begin in August 2027. The MPSC is directed to promulgate rules to implement the new IRP requirements, and such rules will need to be in place prior to August 2027.
Large Load Tariff Schedules
SB 4 requires electric utilities to submit schedules that govern large load customers to the MPSC for inclusion in the utility’s service tariffs. This provision will be codified at Section 393.130(7) RSMo. Utilities with over 250,000 customers must submit schedules for customers who are reasonably projected to exceed 100 megawatts (MW) of annual peak demand. Utilities with fewer than 250,000 customers must submit schedules for customers reasonably projected to exceed 50 MW of annual peak demand. The schedules should be designed to reflect these customers’ representative share of the costs incurred to serve them, to prevent other customer classes’ rates from reflecting any unjust or unreasonable costs arising from service to such customers.
Recovery of Construction Work in Progress for New Natural Gas Generation Facilities
While Missouri law has prohibited electric utilities from charging customers for the costs of construction of new facilities prior to their becoming operational, SB 4 allows electric utilities to recover construction work in progress (CWIP) in its rate base for new natural gas generation units. This provision is codified in new Section393.135(2) RSMo. The amount of CWIP that a utility may recover is limited by the estimated cost of the project and project expenditures made during the estimated construction period for the project. Any recovery of CWIP is subject to refund with interest if the MPSC determines that construction costs were imprudently incurred or if the project is not placed in service within a reasonable amount of time.
Furthermore, the CWIP recovery provision replaces other allowances for recovery of funds used during construction that may have otherwise been recoverable in the rate base for an electric utility. The rate base used to determine a deferred return under Section 393.1400.3(2) RSMo. will now include an offset for the amount of CWIP included in the rate base under Section 393.135.2.
The CWIP recovery provision will sunset in 2035 unless, in a hearing conducted in 2035, the MPSC chooses to extend the provision through 2045 based upon a submission from an electric utility demonstrating good cause for such an extension.
Decommissioning & Replacement of Generation Facilities
SB 4 prescribes a new practice for decommissioning and replacing thermal generation assets. This will be codified in Section 393.401 RSMo. Before closing an existing electric generating power plant on or after January 1, 2025, the electric utility must certify to the MPSC that it has secured and placed an equal or greater amount of reliable electric generation on the grid as accredited power resources based on the relevant regional transmission organization’s resource accreditation for the technology at issue and any loss of load expected by the utility. An “existing electric generating power plant” is defined as a thermal power plant (or generating unit/combination of generating units within a thermal power plant) with over 100 MW of nameplate capacity. Concurrent with the closure of the existing generation asset, the electric utility must have adequate electric transmission lines in place and the replacement reliable electric generation shall be fully operational, unless the new facility uses some or all of the interconnection facilities of the existing asset or the existing asset is closed due to an “unexpected or unplanned event.”
Under SB 4, “dispatchable power resources” shall comprise at least 80 percent of the average of the summer and winter accredited capacity of the replacement reliable electric generation. Section 393.401.2 RSMo. Furthermore, if “existing electric generating power plant” capacity is replaced pursuant to Section 393.401, its capacity shall not be replaced by “replacement resources” as defined in Section 393.1705 RSMo., which includes wind and solar energy. It is unclear from the statute to what extent, if any, renewable energy resources may comprise up to 20 percent of the replacement reliable electric generation.
Renewable Portfolio Standards
SB 4 amended Missouri’s Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) statute: Section 393.1030 RSMo. Renewable energy generated by an electric utility with between 250,000 and 1,000,000 retail customers in Missouri and contracted for by an “accelerated renewable buyer” cannot have its renewable energy certificates (RECs) used to meet the utility’s RPS requirements, and the RECs shall be retired by the accelerated renewable buyer. Evergy is the only electric utility that will be affected by this provision. An “accelerated renewable buyer” is an electric utility customer with an aggregate load over 80 MW that contracts to obtain RECs — as defined in Section 393.1025 RSMo. — or energy and RECs from solar or wind generation located within the Southwest Power Pool and placed into service after January 1, 2020. SB 4 exempts “accelerated renewable buyers” from any RPS compliance costs established by utilities regulated by this section and approved by the MPSC associated with the amount of credits retired pursuant to new Section 393.1030.2.