This is the first in a series of discussions about insurance issues unique to the Lone Star State.
For nearly a century, the Stowers doctrine has been a critical cornerstone of Texas insurance law protecting insureds facing the threat of a nuclear verdict. This doctrine, named after the seminal 1929 case G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indemnity Co., is both a powerful sword for plaintiffs – allowing them to recover damages exceeding the available insurance limits – and a shield for insureds – shifting the risk of an excess judgment to the insurer. But obtaining Stowers protection can be a challenge for defendants with multiple layers of coverage.
Under the Stowers doctrine, an insurer faced with a settlement offer within policy limits must accept the offer if “an ordinarily prudent insurer would do so” (G.A. Stowers Furniture Co., 15 S.W.2d 544, 547 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1929)). If the insurer rejects that offer, the insurer is liable to its insured for the resulting judgment – even if that judgment exceeds the insurance policy limits. Stowers liability is based on the premise that it is usually the insurer, not the insured, who has the power of the purse and therefore control over both settlement and defense of the case, as provided in a standard form commercial general liability policy.
In the common circumstance of a single insurer with a single policy, the risk of Stowers liability is clear. The insurer controls settlement discussions and bears the corresponding Stowers risk. For example, standard form ISO commercial auto policies (CA 00 01 11 20), CGL polices (CG 00 01 04 13), and cyber liability policies (CY 00 02 11 21) all cede control of both defense and settlement to the insurer. Any proper Stowers demands made within the policy limits of these policies raise the specter of excess exposure for the insurer. But what if there are multiple insurers, such as an umbrella or excess insurer? Under standard form ISO commercial umbrella (CU 00 01 04 13) and excess policies (CX 00 01 04 13), the insurer can only take control of defense and settlement once the underlying limits have been exhausted. The interplay between the duties of the primary and umbrella/excess insurers can put insureds at risk.
Let’s use a basic $3 million, three-layer insurance program as an example. Insurer A provides coverage for the insured’s first $1 million in liability, Insurer B covers the second $1 million under an umbrella policy, and Insurer C covers the final $1 million under an excess policy – for a total of $3 million in liability coverage. A wrongful death claimant sues the insured, alleging liability within the limits of all three policies, and makes a settlement demand against the insurers for $3 million. Are the three insurers in this hypothetical subject to Stowers liability?
The insurers may contend that Stowers does not apply if they do not agree on settlement strategy. The Stowers doctrine rests on the premise that an insurer confronted with a properly made Stowers demand controls the decision to settle, and accordingly should be held to account for an unreasonable refusal to do so. In the hypothetical above, the insurers may disagree on strategy and, as a result, contend that none of them controls the settlement. Insurers A and B may wish to accept the settlement offer, but both are powerless to accept the full $3 million demand unless Insurer C also agrees. Furthermore, Insurer C may argue that its policy is not implicated until Insurer A’s and Insurer B’s policy limits are exhausted by payment of judgment or settlement. Insurers will cite case law suggesting that Stowers liability does not attach in this scenario. See, e.g., AFTCO Enterprises, Inc. v. Acceptance Indem. Ins. Co. 321 S.W.3d 65 (Tex. App. 2010). But relieving all three insurers of their Stowers obligations would effectively eliminate the critical protection Stowers provides — leaving the insured exposed to a potentially nuclear verdict arising from the insurers’ collective refusal to settle. This outcome would be particularly perverse given that only relatively high-value claims implicate multiple layers of insurance.
Insureds can turn to a federal district court case, Pride Transp. v. Cont. Cas. Co., 804 F.Supp.2d 520 (N.D. Tex. 2011), as a solution. Pride provides a guidepost for how umbrella and excess insurers can still be held to their Stowers obligation if the lower insurers tender their policy limits to the excess insurers. Interestingly, Pride is the reverse of the prototypical Stowers case, as it involved the insurer arguing that its Stowers duties were triggered and the insured arguing that no Stowers duty existed. Pride involved an auto accident where the owner of the at-fault vehicle, Pride Transportation, was insured by a $1 million primary policy and a $4 million excess policy. The underlying plaintiff made a Stowers demand against Pride’s driver for $5 million – the combined limits of the primary and excess policies. Pride demanded that its primary insurer (Continental) tender its limits to its excess insurer (Lexington) – which Continental did. Lexington then settled the claims against Pride’s driver for the full $5 million limits of both insurance policies. After settling the claims against the driver, Lexington withdrew its defense of Pride, and Pride’s exposure was left uninsured. Pride sued Continental and Lexington for breach of contract, arguing in part that the insurers had no duty to accept the $5 million demand against Pride’s driver because the demand did not impose Stowers liability. Relying on AFTCO, Pride argued that there could be no Stowers liability where the demand exceeded each individual policy’s limits. The court rejected this argument, reasoning that, because Continental had tendered its limits to Lexington, Lexington could unilaterally accept the $5 million demand, triggering Lexington’s Stowers duty (804 F. Supp. 2d at 529-530).
So, what are the practical implications for a Texas insured covered by a multi-layer insurance tower? Once a claim has been made, an insured faced with a Stowers demand that implicates multiple layers of its insurance tower should demand that the lower-tier insurers tender their limits to the highest insurer. The highest insurer, now in complete control of the settlement – and therefore now subject to Stowers liability – may find itself open to a settlement it previously rejected.
While the excess insurer may not be contractually bound to accept the tender of the lower-level policy limits, Stowers liability may attach even if the excess rejects the tender. As the Texas Supreme Court has noted, Stowers liability can arise from “the insurer’s control over settlement” – not just from the insurer’s formal duty to defend (Rocor Intern., Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 77 S.W.3d 253, 263 (Tex. 2002)). Once the primary insurer tenders its limits to the excess insurer and cedes control of settlement negotiations to the excess insurer, the excess insurer would have the sole and unilateral ability to settle the case within its policy limits – which is the hallmark of Stowers liability – regardless of whether the excess insurer exercises that control. Furthermore, an excess insurer who refuses to exercise the settlement authority provided by the lower-level insurers could also be pursued by those same lower-level insurers (in addition to the insured) should an excess verdict result.
In sum, Texas policyholders faced with a Stowers demand should demand that their insurers tender the limits to the highest excess insurer in play and then demand that the excess insurer settle the case or face Stowers liability. Doing so will increase the possibility that the insurer – not the insured – bears the risk of an excess verdict.