The District of Massachusetts continues to refine the contours of conduct occurring “primarily and substantially” within the Commonwealth that could give rise to a Chapter 93A Section 11 claim, as illustrated by Pro Sports Servs. FI OY v. Grossman. Courts continue to look at the “center of gravity” of the specific circumstances giving rise to the claim to determine if the conduct occurred “primarily and substantially” in the Commonwealth. In this case, the conduct giving rise to the claim did not occur in Massachusetts, and the claim was dismissed.
Plaintiff brought an action alleging, among other things, a violation of Chapter 93A arising from defendant’s refusal to satisfy an arbitration award. Plaintiff originally contracted with an agency in New York owned by defendant to represent Finnish ice hockey players. After two arbitrations related to the agency’s failure to make certain payments under the contract, plaintiff learned defendant incorporated a new entity in Massachusetts and transferred funds to that entity allegedly to obfuscate and avoid the judgment against it.
Defendant moved to dismiss on the basis that the facts giving rise to the claim occurred outside the Commonwealth. The allegations in the amended complaint connecting the claim to the Commonwealth included (1) a business entity incorporated under the laws of the Commonwealth; (2) the defendant residing in the Commonwealth; (3) the New York entity having the same address as the Commonwealth entity; and (4) the defendant’s allegedly fraudulent transfer of assets from New York to Massachusetts. The court found these facts insufficient. While they provided a connection to Massachusetts, the judgment against the New York entity was obtained in New York. Thus, the substantial conduct giving rise to the Chapter 93A claim occurred outside the Commonwealth and the claim was dismissed.